

Federal Artillery structure within the organization of the Army of the Cumberland

December 26-31, 1862, January 1-5, 1863

Colonel James Barnett, chief of artillery and ordnance
Captain Jeremiah Howard Gilman, inspector of artillery

RIGHT WING

Major Charles S. Cotter, chief of artillery

11 6-pdr. James rifled guns, 17 6-pdr. Model 1844 smoothbore guns,
8 10-pdr. Parrott rifled guns, 4 12-pdr. Model 1857 smoothbore Napoleons
Total 40 guns in 9 batteries

FIRST DIVISION

Captain Oscar F. Pinney, chief of artillery

1st Brigade- 5th Wisconsin
2nd Brigade- 2nd Minnesota
3rd Brigade- 8th Wisconsin

SECOND DIVISION

Captain Warren Parker Edgerton, chief of artillery

1st Brigade- Battery A, 1st Ohio
2nd Brigade- Battery E, 1st Ohio
3rd Brigade- 5th Indiana

THIRD DIVISION

Captain Asahel Kidder Bush, chief of artillery

1st Brigade- 4th Indiana
2nd Brigade- Battery G, 1st Missouri
3rd Brigade- Battery C, 1st Illinois

CENTER CORPS

Captain Oscar Addison Mack, chief of artillery

4 6-pdr. James rifled guns, 3 6-pdr. Model 1844 smoothbore guns,
4 12-pdr. Model 1841 smoothbore howitzers, 12 10-pdr. Parrott rifled guns,
2 6-pdr. Wiard rifled guns, 2 12-pdr. Wiard rifled guns
Total 27 guns in 6 batteries

FIRST DIVISION

Colonel Cyrus Orlando Loomis, chief of artillery

1st Brigade- none

2nd Brigade- 1st Michigan
3rd Brigade- 1st Kentucky
4th Brigade- Battery H, 5th U.S.

SECOND DIVISION

Captain Frederick Schultz, chief of artillery

1st Brigade- not present
2nd Brigade- Battery G, 1st Ohio
2nd Brigade- Battery M, 1st Kentucky (attached)
3rd Brigade- Battery M, 1st Ohio

LEFT WING

Captain John Mendenhall, chief of artillery

6 6-pdr. James rifled guns, 12 6-pdr. Model 1844 smoothbore guns,
10 12-pdr. Model 1841 smoothbore howitzers, 16 10-pdr. Parrott rifled guns,
4 3 inch Rodman guns
Total 48 guns in 10 batteries

FIRST DIVISION

Major Seymour Race, chief of artillery

Artillery not attached to brigades
10th Indiana
8th Indiana
6th Ohio

SECOND DIVISION

Captain William E. Standart, chief of artillery

Battery B, 1st Ohio
Battery F, 1st Ohio
Battery H, 4th U.S.
Battery M, 4th U.S.

THIRD DIVISION

Captain George R. Swallow, chief of artillery

7th Indiana
3rd Wisconsin
26th Pennsylvania

PIONEER BRIGADE

Captain James H. Stokes, chief of artillery
2 6-pdr. James rifled guns, 4 6-pdr. Model 1844 smoothbore guns
Chicago Board of Trade Battery

CAVALRY DIVISION

Battery D, 1st Ohio
2 3-inch Rodman rifled guns

Organization of Artillery of the Army of the Potomac, commanded by Major General Joseph Hooker, May 1-6, 1863.

COMMAND OF THE PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL

Maryland Light Artillery, Battery B, Captain Alonzo Snow.
Ohio Light Artillery, 12th Battery, Captain Aaron C. Johnson.

ARTILLERY.

Brigadier General HENRY J. HUNT,
Chief of Artillery.

ARTILLERY RESERVE.

Brigadier General ROBERT O. TYLER

1st Connecticut Heavy, Battery B, Lieutenant Albert F. Brooker.
1st Connecticut Heavy, Battery M. Captain Franklin A. Pratt.
New York Light, 5th Battery, Captain Elijah D. Taft.
New York Light, 15th Battery, Captain Patrick Hart.
New York Light, 29th Battery, Lieutenant Gustav von Blucher.
New York Light, 30th Battery, Captain Adolph Voegelée.
New York Light, 32th Battery, Lieutenant George Gaston.
1st United States, Battery K, Lieutenant Lorenzo Thomas, jr.
3rd United States, Battery C, Lieutenant Henry Meinell.
4th United States, Battery G, Lieutenant Marcus P. Miller.
5th United States, Battery K, Lieutenant David H. Kinzie.
32nd Massachusetts Infantry, Company C, Captain Josiah C. Fuller.

FIRST ARMY CORPS

Artillery.

New Hampshire Light, 1st Battery, Captain Frederick M. Edgell.
1st New York Light, Battery L, Captain John A. Reynolds.
4th United States, Battery B, Lieutenant James Stewart.
Maine Light, 2nd Battery (B), Captain James A. Hall.
Maine Light, 5th Battery (E): Captain George F. Leppien.
Lieutenant Edmund Kirby. Lieutenant Greenleaf T. Stevens.
Pennsylvania Light, Battery C, Captain James Thompson.
5th United States, Battery C, Captain Dunbar R. Ransom.

1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery B, Captain James H. Cooper.
1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery F, Lieutenant R. Bruce Ricketts.
1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery G, Captain Frank P. Amsden.

SECOND ARMY CORPS

Artillery.

1st New York Light, Battery B, Captain Rufus D. Pettit.
4th United States, Battery C, Lieutenant Evan Thomas.
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery A, Captain William A. Arnold.
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery B, Lieutenant T. Fred. Brown.
1st New York Light, Battery G, Lieutenant Nelson Ames.
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery G, Captain George W. Adams.

RESERVE ARTILLERY.

1st United States, Battery I, Lieutenant Edmund Kirby.
4th United States, Battery A, Lieutenant Alonzo H. Cushing.

THIRD ARMY CORPS

Artillery.

New Jersey Light, Battery B, Lieutenant Robert Sims.
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery E, Lieutenant Pardon S. Jastram.
3rd United States, Batteries F and K, Lieutenant John G. Turnbull.
1st New York Light, Battery D, Lieutenant George B. Winslow.
New York Light, 4th Battery: Lieut George F. Barstow. Lieut William T. McLean.
1st United States, Battery H: Lieut Justin E. Dimick. Lieut James A. Sanderson.
4th United States, Battery K, Lieutenant Francis W. Seeley.
New York Light, 10th Battery, Lieutenant Samuel Lewis.
New York Light, 11th Battery, Lieutenant John E. Burton.
1st Ohio Light, Battery H, Captain James F. Huntington.

FIFTH ARMY CORPS

Artillery.

Massachusetts Light, 3rd Battery (C), Captain Augustus P. Martin.
Massachusetts Light, 5th Battery (E), Captain Charles A. Phillips.
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery C. Captain Richard Waterman.
5th United States, Battery D, Lieutenant Charles E. Hazlett.
1st Ohio Light, Battery L, Captain Frank C. Gibbs.
5th United States, Battery I, Lieutenant Malbone F. Watson.
1st New York Light, Battery C, Captain Almont Barnes.
1st United States, Batteries E and G, Captain Alanson M. Randol.

SIXTH ARMY CORPS

Artillery.

Massachusetts Light, 1st Battery (A), Captain William H. McCartney.

New Jersey Light, Battery A, Lieutenant Augustin N. Parsons.

Maryland Light, Battery A, Captain James H. Rigby.

2nd United States, Battery D, Lieutenant Edward B. Williston.

New York Light, 1st Battery, Captain Andrew Cowan.

5th United States, Battery F. Lieutenant Leonard Martin.

1st Pennsylvania Light, Batteries C and D, Captain Jeremiah McCarthy.

2nd United States, Battery G. Lieutenant John H. Butler.

New York Light Artillery, 3rd Battery, Lieutenant William A. Harn.

ELEVENTH ARMY CORPS.

Artillery.

New York Light, 13th Battery, Captain Julius Dieckmann.

1st New York Light, Battery 1, Captain Michael Wiedrich.

1st Ohio Light, Battery I, Captain Hubert Dilger.

RESERVE ARTILLERY.

New York Light, 2nd Battery, Captain Hermann Jahn.

1st Ohio Light, Battery K, Captain William L. DeBeck.

1st West Virginia Light, Battery C, Captain Wallace Hill.

TWELFTH ARMY CORPS.

Artillery.

1st New York Light, Battery K, Lieut. Edward L. Bailey.

1st New York Light, Battery M: Lieut Charles E. Winegar. Lieut John D. Woodbury.

4th United States, Battery F: Lieut Franklin B. Crosby. Lieut Edward D. Muhlenberg.

Pennsylvania Light, Battery E: Lieut Charles A. Atwell. Lieut James D. McGill.

Pennsylvania Light, Battery F: Captain Robert B. Hampton. Lieut James P. Fleming.

CAVALRY CORPS

New York Light, 6th Battery, Lieutenant Joseph W. Martin.

2nd United States, Battery A, Captain John C. Tidball.

REGULAR RESERVE CAVALRY BRIGADE.

2nd United States, Batteries B and L, Lieutenant Albert O. Vincent.

2nd United States, Battery M, Lieutenant Robert Clarke.

4th United States, Battery E, Lieutenant Samuel S. Elder.

**SPECIAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. DEFENSES OF WASHINGTON,
Numbers 12. } January 14 1863.**

4. Brigadier General R. O. Tyler, commanding artillery brigade, will immediately assume command of Fort Lyon and its dependencies in addition to his present command.

By command of Major-General Heintzelman:
CARROLL H. POTTER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

**GENERAL ORDERS, } WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJT.General 'S OFFICE,
No.20.} Washington,D.C., January 25,1863.**

I. The President of the United States has directed:

1st. That Major General A.E.Burnside, at his own request, be relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac.

2d. That Major General E.V.Sumner, at his own request, be relieved from duty in the Army of the Potomac.

3d. That Major General W.B.Franklin be relieved from duty in the Army of the Potomac.

4th That Major General J.Hooker be assigned to the command of the Army of the Potomac.

II. The officers relieved as above will report in person to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

By order of the Secretary of War:
E.D.TOWNSEND,

**GENERAL ORDERS,} WAR DEPT., ADJT., GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Numbers 45.} Washington, February 16, 1863.**

Regulations for the care of the Field-Works, and the Government of their Garrisons.

1. It will be the duty of the commanding officer of each work to provide for the care of the armament, and the safety and serviceable condition of the magazines, ammunition, implements, and equipments, and by frequent personal inspections, to secure the observance of the rules prescribed for this purpose.

2. The fixed armament, consisting of the heavy guns, and those whose positions are prescribed, will be numbered in a regular series, commencing with the first gun on the right, as you enter, of the main gate. The ammunition will be kept in the magazines, with the exception of a few stand of grape, canister, and the solid shot, which will be piled near guns.

3. The gun carriages will be kept clean; they will be traversed daily, and never be allowed to rest for two successive days on the same part of the traverse circle. If the gun carriage does not move easily on the chassis, the tongue will be occasionally greased. The gun carriage should not rest habitually on one part of the chassis.

4. The elevating screw and its box will be kept clean and well greased. When the guns are not in use the screw will be run down as far as it will go, the breech of the piece being raised until the muzzle is sufficiently depressed to prevent water running into it, and kept in that position by a wooden quoin or block. The tomion to be kept in the muzzle, and the apron over the vent.

5. The piece is not to be kept loaded. It will be time to load when the enemy appears, or when special orders to load are given.

6. The commanding officer will see that a shed is constructed for the implements and equipments. For each drill these will be issued to the gunners by the ordnance-sergeant or other non-commissioned officer acting as such, who will receive and put them away after the drill is over, and be at all time responsible to the commanding officer for their safety, and that the supply is adequate. Until sheds are provided, the implements will be kept near the pieces. The equipments (haversacks, tube pouch, &c.) may be kept at the entrance of the magazine, where they will be sheltered. Platforms for projectiles will be laid near the guns; for canisters a couple of pieces of scantling for skids will answer. A watershed, made by joining two boards together at the edges, should be placed over them. When the wooden sabots get wet they burst the canisters, so that they cannot be put into the gun. When this happens, dry the canister until the block shrinks sufficiently, and tack the canister edges together.

7. When not furnished by the Engineer Department, materials for constructing the sheds and for skidding will be furnished on requisitions made to the chief of artillery.

8. The magazines must in dry weather be frequently aired. For this purpose the ventilators and doors will be opened after 9 a. m., and must be closed, at latest, two hours before sunset. The ammunition for different classes of guns will be carefully assorted, and the shelves, boxes, or barrels containing each kind plainly marked. When there is more than one magazine the ammunition will be so distributed as to be nearest to the particular guns from which it is to be used. Cartridges must be moved and, if necessary, rolled once a week, to prevent caking of the powder. Friction-primers will be carefully dried in the sun once a week, and always after a day's or night's rain. At least two lanyards for each gun will be kept in store. As soon as received, their hooks will be tested, to see if they are sufficiently small to enter the eye of the primer and yet strong enough for use.

9. No person will be allowed to enter the magazines except on duty, and then every precaution against accidents will be taken. Lights must always be in glass lanterns, and carried only by the person in charge of the magazine. Swords, pistols, canes, &c., will not be admitted, no matter what may be the rank of the person carrying them. Socks or moccasins will be worn, if they can be procured. No fire nor smoking will be allowed in the vicinity when the doors or ventilators are open. Too much pains cannot possibly be taken to avoid the chances of an explosion.

10. Companies will be assigned to guns in such proportions as will furnish at least two, preferably three, reliefs in working from the magazines. From fifteen to twenty men should therefore be assigned to each gun, and instructed in its use. Companies should habitually serve the same guns, each man being assigned a special number at the gun, and thoroughly instructed in all its duties, and, as occasion offers, in the duties of all the numbers. Every night, at retreats or tattoo, the men who are to man the guns in case of a night attack should be paraded at their pieces and inspected, to see that all their equipments, implements, and ammunition are good order, and the gun in serviceable condition and easy working order. The men so stationed should "call off" their numbers before being dismissed, and in case of alarm repair at once to their posts, equip themselves, and await orders.

11. Each gun should be under charge of a non-commissioned officer, and every two or three guns under a lieutenant, who will be responsible to the captain for their serviceable condition at all times. The captain will be responsible

to the commanding officer for the condition of the pieces and the instruction of the men of his company. Artillery drills will be frequent until all the men are well instructed, and there will never be less one artillery drill a day when the weather will permit. For action, all the cannoneers not actually serving the guns will be provided with muskets, and will be stationed next the guns to which they belong.

12. Each company should be supplied with three copies of the Tactics for Heavy Artillery, and rigidly adhere to its directions. Tables of ranges will be found in the work. One copy of Instructions for Field Artillery should be supplied each company. They can be obtained on written application to the chief of artillery, who will obtain them from the Adjutant-General of the Army. The books so drawn are the property of the United States for the use of the company; they will be borne on the muster-rolls.

13. The commanding officer will make himself acquainted with the approaches to his work, the distance to each prominent point commanded by his guns, the nature of the ground between them and his post, and the most probable points of attack upon it.

Tables of ranges or distances for each point, and the corresponding elevations in each case, according to the nature of the projectile, with the proper length or time of the fuse when shell or case-shot are used, will be made out for each gun, and furnished to the officer and noncommissioned officers serving it. As these differ for different kinds of gun, the same men should be permanently assigned to the same piece.

14. The projectiles should be used in their proper order. At a distance, solid shot; then shells or case-shot, especially if firing at troops in line. Canister or grape is only for use at short ranges. When columns are approaching, so that they can be taken in direction of their length, or very obliquely, solid shot is generally the best projectile, because of its greater accuracy and penetrating power. If the column consists of cavalry, some shells or case-shot will be useful from the disorder their bursting among the horses. As to the absolute distance at which the projectiles must be used, they vary with the description and caliber of the gun, and can only be ascertained by consulting the tables of ranges. The prominent parts on the approaches to the works should be designated, their distances noted, and directions drawn up for the different kinds of ammunition to be used at each gun when the enemy reaches them. During the drills the attention of the chiefs of pieces and gunners should frequently be drawn to this subject.

15. Commanding officers will pay special attention to the police and preservation of the works. All filth will be promptly removed and the drainage be particularly attended to. No one should be allowed to walk on the parapets, nor move or sit upon the gabions, barrels, or sand-bags that may be placed upon them. When injuries occur to the earth-works, they should be repaired as quickly as possible by the garrison of the work. If of a serious nature, they should at once be reported to the engineer officer in charge of the work. All injuries to the magazines or platforms of the guns will be promptly reported as soon as observed.

16. Special written instructions as to the supply of ammunition at the different posts, and the proportion for the different classes of guns, will be furnished by the chief of artillery to the commanders of posts at the earliest period practicable. Instructions will also be furnished as to the special objects of each work.

17. No person not connected with the garrisons of the field-works will be allowed signed them except such as visit them on duty, or who have passes signed by competent authority; nor will any person, except commissioned officer, or those whose duty requires them to do so, be allowed to enter the magazine or touch the guns, their implements, or equipments.

18. The garrison can greatly improve the work by sodding the superior (upper) slope of the parapet, and also the exterior or outer slope, or by sowing grass seed on the superior slope, first covering it with surface soil. The grass-covered or sodded portions of the parapets, traverses, magazines, &c., should be occasionally watered in dry weather and the grass kept closely cut.

19. As a great deal of powder is wasted in unnecessary salutes, attention is called to paragraph 268 of the Army Regulations, edition of 1861.

Paragraph 268. A general officer will be saluted but once in a year at each post, and only when notice of his intention to visit the post has been given.

20. The practice of building fires on the open parades for cooking and other purposes is prohibited, as it endangers the magazines.

21. The armament of a fort having been once established will not be changed except by authority of the commander of the district, geographical department, or army corps.

22. The machinery of the Whitworth guns will not be used except by special orders from the commanding officer of the post. There shall be at each fort, and redoubt at least one drill a day as artillery and one as infantry.

23. Particular care must be taken to keep the bores of the rifled guns free from rust and always well oiled.

24. The forts will be inspected at such times as the chief of artillery may direct, and a full report of their condition will be made. Particular attention will be paid to the drill and police of the work in each case, as also to the condition of the armament, ammunition, and magazines.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FIRING.

1. The firing in action should be deliberate, never more than will admit of accurate pointing. A few shots effectively thrown will produce more effect than a larger number badly directed, although the larger number may have killed the most men.

It is not so important to kill as to inspire terror. The object of killing a portion is to so frighten the rest as to cause them to run; and to inspire this terror, precision of fire and consequent certainty of execution is of infinitely greater importance than a great noise, rapid firing, and less proportional execution.

2. To secure accuracy of firing, the ground in the neighborhood must be well examined and the distanced the different prominent points within the field covered by each gun noted. The gunners and cannoneers should be informed of these distances, and in the drills the guns should be accurately pointed at one or the other of them in succession, the gunner designating the spot, calling the distance in yards, and the corresponding elevation in minutes and degrees, until all the distances and corresponding elevations are familiar to the men.

When shell or case-shot are use, the time of flight corresponding to the distance must be given to the man who goes for the projectile. He tells the ordnance-sergeant, or person who furnishes the ammunition, and the latter cuts the fuse to burn the required time.

3. The gunner is responsible for the aiming. He must, therefore, know the distance to each prominent point the field covered by his gun, the elevation required to reach that point, and the time of flight of the shell or case-shot

corresponding to each distance or elevation. He must have a table of these ranges taken from the Heavy Artillery Arctics, pages 265 to 269. a

For example: The cartridges for the 24-pounder guns all weigh six pounds as issued to these works

The last table on page 269 should read: " Eight-inch sea-coast howitzer, on barbette carriage, instead of 8-inch sea coast mortar."

Twenty-four pounder gun on siege or barbette carriage.

Pounds..... deg" Yards.

...6..... 0..0 412

That is, the bore being level, a range of 400 yards.

...6.....1..0842

1 degree elevation, range about 850 yards.

...6.....1..30 953

1 1/2 degrees elevation, range about 950 yards.

...6.....2..01,147

2 degrees elevation, range about 1,150 yards.

...6.....3..01,417

3 degrees elevation, range about 1,400 yards.

...6.....4..01,666

4 degrees elevation, range about 1,660 yards.

...6.....5..01,901

5 degrees elevation, range about 1,900 yards,
the extreme range of 24-pounder round-shot.

Thus, if the enemy appears at a point 1,000 yards distant, look at the table - 950 yards requires 1 deg. 30" elevation; 1,150 yards requires 2 deg.; therefore, elevate a very little, say 5" to 10" over 1 deg. 30", or simply give 1 deg. 30" full.

In the same way, for each 8-inch sea-coast howitzer, make out a table from page 269, noting, however, that only 6 and 8 pounder cartridges being now issued for

them, and of late only 8-pound cartridges, it must first be ascertained what the cartridges in your magazine weigh, and then make out the table accordingly.

4. These tables will be promptly prepared under the direction of the commanding officer, and copies furnished for each gun and used habitually in the drills. They will be examined and verified by the chief of artillery.

5. The attention of all officers in charge of artillery in the works is directed to the articles in the Tactics on "Pointing guns and howitzers," pages 85 to 88.

6. Commanding officers of the works will keep themselves accurately informed of the amount and kinds of ammunition in the magazines. The supply should be kept up to 100 rounds per gun. When it is less than that amount a special report will be made of the fact to the chief of artillery, with requisitions for the amount necessary to complete the supplies. They will also see that the necessary equipments are always on hand for the service of all the guns, as follows:

For 24 or 32 pounder guns, the articles named on pages 47 and 48, article 97.

For 8-inch sea-coast howitzers, the articles named on page 58, article 117; and for other guns, according to the tables as prescribed in the Tactics.

NOTE.- Two lanyards and at least 150 friction-primers for each gun to be kept on hand; one lanyard and a very few primers to be kept in the tube pouch, the other in the magazine.

One globe or dark lantern for every three guns. Two globe lanterns for watch magazine.

**By command of Major-General Halleck:
E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.**

**SPECIAL ORDERS,} HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH,
Numbers 133.} Hilton Head, Port Royal, S. C., March 7, 1863.**

Brigadier General James H. Ledlie, chief of artillery to Major-General Foster, is included in the operations of Special Orders, Numbers 97, current

series, from these headquarters, and is relieved from duty in this department. He will proceed to North Carolina by the first opportunity.

By command of Major General D. Hunter:
CHAS. G. HALPINE,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Tenth Army Corps.

**SPECIAL ORDERS, } HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Numbers 79.} March 21, 1863.**

VIII. The batteries of horse artillery will reduce the number of ammunition chests on the caisson body to one, which will be arranged so as to sit over the axle, as in the Sixth New York Battery (Martin's). The remaining chests will be kept full. But one spare wheel to the section will be taken by each field battery of the army; the remainder will be turned into the ordnance department.

To reduce the weight, only six fellows, twelve spokes, one jack-screw, and one splinter-bar will be carried in the battery wagon. The excess of these articles will be turned into the ordnance department; no other stores than those authorized in the table of contents will be carried in the battery wagons and forges, except spare fuses and primers, well boxed and secured.

Repairs of gun-carriages, of wheels, &c., will, so far as possible, be made from the stores carried with the battery. When, from the extent of injuries received, in action or otherwise, it is necessary to employ more labor than the battery can supply, the commandant of artillery of the corps may collect such wheelwrights and other mechanics as are disposable from the batteries of his corps to effect it; when carriages and wheels are so broken as to be useless, the sound part will be secured, and as soon as possible the repairs effected.

When in camp, the coal-boxes will be filled with hard coal, if possible, and remain so, as they are intended to carry coal for the march. For ordinary use, other sources of supply must, when practicable, be depended on.

When the batteries go into camp with a prospect of remaining sufficiently long, the commandants of artillery will cause coal-pits to be made for current uses.

In the batteries of light 12-pounders, it is very important that the fuse be screwed down tightly, so that the horseshoe on the bottom may be supported by the shoulder of the fuse-hole. If this is not done, a premature explosion may

result. The fuse-wrench, furnished with the battery stores, is used for this purpose, and, when practicable, the fuse should always be screwed down just before firing.

**By command of Major-General Hooker:
S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant-General.**

**Troops in the Department of Washington, Washington Defences,
Maj.Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman Commanding, March 31, 1863.**

ARTILLERY DEFENSES OF ALEXANDRIA

Brig. Gen. ROBERT O. TYLER.

1st Connecticut Heavy Artillery, Col. H. L. Abbot.

19th Connecticut, Col. L. W. Wessells.

1st Massachusetts Heavy Artillery, Col. Thomas R. Tannatt.

34th Massachusetts, Col. George D. Wells.

2d New York Heavy Artillery, Lieut. Col. Jeremiah Palmer.

3d New York Artillery Battalion, Lieut. Col. A. Senges.

Wisconsin Heavy Artillery (one company), Capt. C. C. Meservey.

ABERCROMBIE'S DIVISION

9th Massachusetts Battery, Capt. J. Bigelow.

4th New York Heavy Artillery, Lieut. Col. H. H. Hall.

17th New York Battery, Capt. G. T. Anthony.

CASEY'S DIVISION

2d Connecticut Battery, Capt. J. W. Sterling.

11th Massachusetts Battery, Capt. E. J. Jones.

Keystone (Pennsylvania) Battery, Capt. M. Hastings.

1st Rhode Island Artillery, Battery H, Capt. Jeffrey Hazard.

CAVALRY DIVISION

9th Michigan Battery, Capt. J. J. Daniels

ARTILLERY CAMP OF INSTRUCTION.

Brig. Gen. WILLIAM F. BARRY.

1st Delaware Battery, Capt. B. Nields.

10th Michigan Battery, Capt. J.C. Shuetz.

1st New York Artillery (Battery A), Capt. Thomas H. Bates.

12 New York Battery, Capt. George F. McKnight.

16th New York Battery, Capt. F.L. Hiller.

19th New York Battery, Capt. William H. Stahl.
27th New York Battery, Capt. J.B. Eaton.
Independent Pennsylvania Battery, Lieut. E. H. Nevin, jr.
1st West Virginia Artillery (Battery A), Lieut. Max. Sivers.

DEFENSES NORTH OF THE POTOMAC.

Lieut. Col. JOSEPH A. HASKIN.

First Brigade.

Col. AUGUSTUS A. GIBSON.

3d Maine Battery, Capt. James G. Swett.
2d Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery, Col. A. A. Gibson.
1st Vermont Heavy Artillery, Col. J. M. Warner.

Second Brigade.

Col. LEWIS O. MORRIS.

1st Maine Heavy Artillery, Col. D. Chaplin.
7th New York Heavy Artillery, Col. Lewis O. Morris.
9th New York Heavy Artillery, Col. J. Welling.
9th New York Battery, Capt. Emil Schubert.
117th New York (Battalion), Lieut. Col. A. White.

Third Brigade.

Col. WILLIAM R. PEASE.

5th New York Heavy Artillery (Battalion), Maj. G. F. Merriam.
10th New York Heavy Artillery, Col. Alex. Piper.
117th New York (Battalion), Col. William R. Pease.

CORPS OF OBSERVATION

10th Massachusetts Battery, Capt. J. Henry Sleeper

FORT WASHINGTON

16th Indiana Battery, Lieut. Charles R. Deming.
4th U.S. Artillery (headquarters).

GENERAL ORDERS No. 29.

**HDQRS. ART. DEFENSES OF ALEXANDRIA,
Near Fort Ward, Va., April 17, 1863.**

I. The Second New York Heavy Artillery, Fourth New York Heavy Artillery, and Sixteenth Virginia Volunteers, are hereby temporarily attached to the command of Colonel Tannatt.

II. This command will hereafter be designated as the "Defenses of Washington South of the Potomac."

By order of Brig. Gen. Robert O. Tyler:
E. L. KINNEY,
Second Lieutenant and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS LEFT WING,
May 1, 1863-3 a. m.

Brigadier-General HUNT, Chief of Artillery:

General Reynolds wants a 20-pounder battery in place of the 3-inch battery sent him last night. Can you spare him one? He is opposed by 20-pounder guns. He reports the ammunition used in his 3-inch guns not good.

JOHN SEDGWICK,
Major-General, Commanding Left Wing, Army of the Potomac.

UNITED STATES FORD,
May 1, 1863-2.25 p. m.

General BUTTERFIELD:

General Hooker directs that you send Graham's Horse Artillery, all of it, twenty-two guns, to report to me at Banks' Ford; also two batteries Napoleons, or, if there are none, two other field batteries, 3-inch, if General Sedgwick can spare them. The latter can be replaced by Hart's and Kusserow's batteries, now with Colonel Warner on Sedgwick's extreme left. They can be replaced by Blucher's 20-pounders, now at the camp of the Artillery Reserve.

Please acknowledge to me here, with substance of this, that I may be sure all is right.

HENRY J. HUNT,
[Brigadier-General.]

UNITED STATES FORD,
May 1, 1863-3.02 p. m.

General BUTTERFIELD:

Have not yet received your answer; line down. I go to Banks' Ford. Will await Graham there. General Hooker requires me to hold that ford against the enemy's attempt to cross. I shall expect the batteries there. I will be at the white house. Will you direct the quartermaster to send a mule load of forage, at least, for the horses of myself, staff, servant, and orderlies? Answer me at Banks' Ford.

HENRY J. HUNT.

BANKS' FORD, VA., May 2,1863-6.45 p.m.

General HOOKER:

All quiet. About a regiment reoccupy the rifle-pits of the enemy. Apparently the movement of Reynolds up the river has caused their reoccupation. General Gibbon reports (at 5.30 o'clock) enemy falling back from Sedgwick's front.

HENRY J.HUNT,
Brigadier-General.

SPECIAL ORDERS, } HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
No.120.} May 2,1863.

Brigadier General R.O.Tyler, U.S.Volunteers, having reported at these headquarters for duty, is assigned to the command of the Artillery Reserve, and will enter upon his duties at once.

By command of Major-General Hooker:

S.WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

**BANKS' FORD, VA.,
MAY 3, 1863-3 p.m.**

General HOOKER:

Parties across from this command. Colonel Doull sent over with directions to ascertain and report the distance of Sedgwick's and Gibbon's advance on the Plank road. The bridge is being thrown. The wires are across; taken by swimmers. Portion of the Reserve Artillery ammunition train sent for to come here.

**HENRY J. HUNT,
Brigadier-General.**

Report of Captain James M. Robertson, Second U.S. Artillery, commanding Horse Artillery, including operations April 13-May 10.

CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., May 11, 1863.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of that portion of the brigade of Horse Artillery with me in the late raid in the rear of the enemy's army in the direction of Richmond:

I left camp near Aquia Creek, Va., at 7 a.m., April 13, with Battery E, Fourth Artillery, Lieutenant S.S. Elder commanding [four guns]: and Batteries B and L, Second Artillery, Lieutenant A.O. Vincent commanding [six guns], and marched to Hartwood Church. At this place Lieutenant Elder was detached with his battery, and assigned to duty under the orders of General Buford. At 9 p.m. I marched with the two remaining batteries, and reported to General Gregg, at Grove Church. The night being dark and the roads very difficult and muddy, and also obstructed with wagon trains, I did not reach that point till daylight on the 14th.

After resting two hours, I moved forward to Bealeton Station, arriving at 1 p.m. Lieutenant Clarke was here ordered forward to Rappahannock Bridge, where he was for a short time engaged with the enemy, Lieutenant Elder at the same time being engaged with him at Kelly's Ford. The reports of these officers I herewith inclose.*

On the 15th, the command moved forward to the ford above Rappahannock Bridge, but, owing to the severe rain-storm, it was found impracticable to cross. The batteries were recalled and went into bivouac, where we remained until the 18th, when we moved back to Bealeton Station.

On the 19th, by direction of General Stoneman, one section from each of the three batteries was selected to accompany the expedition, and the remainder under the command of Lieutenant Clarke, returned to Falmouth, with orders to report to the chief of artillery.

On the 20th, we moved forward to near White Sulphur Springs. The roads were in a most horrible condition.

On the 22nd, we marched to Warrenton Junction. The railroad having been repaired, we got full supplies of rations and forage, and remained till 5 p.m. of the 28th, when we again moved forward to Bealeton Station. The roads were very heavy, and the night so dark we did not reach Bealeton till 1 a.m.

On the 29th, at 7 a.m., we marched to and crossed the Rappahannock River on a pontoon bridge half a mile below Kelly's Ford. At 7 p.m.

we moved toward the Rapidan; marched 3 miles, and bivouacked without fires. At daylight we again moved forward, and put Lieutenant Elder's section across the Rapidan at Hamilton's Ford. The entrance to and egress from the river was very difficult, and the water so deep as to completely submerge the guns. The current was very strong, but we succeeded in crossing without accident, taking over the ammunition chests in a country wagon, having constructed a platform to raise the chests above the water. With the remaining four guns I moved to Raccoon Ford, and crossed without difficulty at sunset, and bivouacked on the south side of the river.

May 1.-Marched from bivouac on the Rapidan at daylight, and arrived at Orange Springs at 1 p.m. Left Orange Springs at 5 p.m., and arrived at Louisa Court-House at daylight on the 2nd; roads in a very bad condition. Left Louisa Court-House at 2 p.m., and arrived at Thompson's Cross-Roads at 9 p.m.

At 3 a.m. of the 3rd, Lieutenant Woodruff, Second Artillery, was detached, with a section of Battery M, and accompanied General Gregg to destroy the bridges on the South Anna River.

At 8 a.m. of the 4th, marched from Thompson's to Flemmings' Cross-Roads.

May 5.-Left Flemmings' Cross-Roads at 8 a.m., and arrived at Yanceyville at 1 p.m. Having been ordered to lighten my carriages, I destroyed all the paulins. The night was extremely dark and the rain was pouring in torrents, and so cold that warmest clad were suffering extremely.

We arrived at Orange Springs at 9 a.m. on the 6th, over roads so heavy that I would consider them impracticable for ordinary mounted artillery in daylight. Marched from Orange Springs at noon. After advancing 2 miles, the command halted until 5 p.m., when we again moved forward. Just at dark the battery entered a dense wood on a narrow and winding cart-road, which they passed through for a distance of 2 miles, the rain pouring in torrents, and so dark that at times I could not see my horse's ears, and with the mud so deep that at times it was with difficulty my saddle horse could extract his feet. We passed through without accident, and at once moved on and crossed the Rapidan River at sunrise on the 7th.

At this point we rested till noon, when we again moved forward, arriving at Kelly's Ford, on the Rappahannock, at 10 p.m. The night was very dark, with some rain; the road horrible. Finding it impracticable to cross the ford during the night, we went into bivouac.

At daylight on the 8th, I commenced to cross the guns, first removing the ammunition chests. The water at the ford was so deep that the carriages were completely submerged, and the horses swimming in harness, dragging the guns after them for fully 20 yards. In this manner the entire battery was crossed without the slightest accident, and without the least delay to the cavalry, which was crossing at the same time and point. To cross the ammunition chests the only means at our disposal was a small punt-boat worked on a telegraph wire stretched from bank to bank. The first chest loaded in the boat was found to be too much, swamping the boat and losing the chest with its entire contents. I then had half the ammunition removed from the second chest and passed it safely. Finding the process a slow and unsafe one, General Stoneman attempted to establish a flying bridge, but, owing to there being two currents, it did not work successfully. After several attempts, by direction of General Stoneman the ammunition was destroyed.

The men of the battery being very much exhausted, Captain Farnsworth, of the Eighth Illinois Cavalry, kindly volunteered to float over the ammunition chests, which he successfully accomplished, and for which I herewith tender him my sincere thanks.

I marched from Kelly's Ford at 8 p.m. on the 8th, and arrived at Deep Run at daylight on the 9th, where I rested two hours. I then moved forward to Stafford Court-House; marched from Stafford Court-House at 11 a.m. on the 10th, and joined the remainder of the brigade at this place at sunset.

The officers accompanying the expedition were: Lieutenants Elder and Egan, Battery E, Fourth Artillery; Lieutenants Woodruff and Hamilton, Battery M, Second Artillery, and Lieutenant Vincent, Batteries B and L, Second Artillery. Lieutenant Browne, Sixth Independent New York Battery, accompanied Lieutenant Vincent as far as Kelly's Ford, where he was ordered to rejoin his own battery. While serving with the expedition, he performed his duties in a most able and efficient manner, and for which he has my sincere thanks.

Too much credit cannot be awarded to the officers and enlisted men of the command for the cheerful and willing manner in which they performed their duties without any means of subsistence other than they could procure from the country; marching night after night over paths that could hardly be called roads, and all without a murmur.

Respectfully,
J.M.ROBERTSON,
Captain, Commanding First Brigade, Horse Artillery.

*Reports of Captain Stephen H. Weed,
Fifth U. S. Artillery, Chief of Artillery.*

**OFFICE OF CHIEF OF ARTILLERY, FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
May 7, 1863.**

COLONEL:

I have the honor to submit the following report of the service of the artillery which I commanded from the 3rd to the 5th instant:

On the morning of the 3rd, between 10 and 11 o'clock, our center fell back to the open space on which stood the white house, at the intersection of what became our right and left lines. I received authority from the major-general commanding the corps, and subsequently from the general commanding the army, to place in a defensive position all the artillery I could find not otherwise posted. Nearly if not quite every corps in this army was represented in the line then formed. Fifty-six guns were placed, twenty-eight on the right,

twenty-four on the left, and four in the angle. The line of our troops was a triangular one, the artillery occupying about 500 yards on each side the salient angle.

The enemy made attacks upon our right and left fronts on Sunday, the 3rd, and on the left front and salient on the 4th and 5th, with artillery and infantry. The latter was repulsed and the former silenced by our artillery fire.

The position was maintained until we were ordered to retire, on the evening of the 5th. A partial list of casualties was submitted on the 5th. As my command was but temporary, and given for the express purpose of obtaining a concentrated force of artillery upon our center, it ceased with the abandonment of our lines. The lists of casualties suffered by the different batteries have doubtless been submitted to the corps commanders. With two or three shameful exceptions, the officers and men behaved well.

I was much assisted in the performance of my duties by Captain Randolph, chief of artillery, Third Corps, and Second Lieutenant S. B. McIntire, Second U. S. Artillery, who acted as my adjutant and aide.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
STEPHEN H. WEED,
Captain, and Chief of Artillery, Fifth Army Corps.

*Report of Captain Augustus P. Martin,
Battery C, Massachusetts Light Artillery.*

**CAMP NEAR POTOMAC CREEK, VA.,
May 7, 1863.**

CAPTAIN:

I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the battery under my command during the recent movement:

I left camp, in compliance with instructions from headquarters Army of the Potomac, on the 30th ultimo, and marched to Hartwood Church. On the 1st instant, marched to Chancellorsville and reported to Captain Weed, chief of artillery of the corps. Encamped for the night near Chancellorsville.

On the morning of the 2nd instant, took a position on the extreme left of the line, near Child's house, where I remained until the evening the 5th instant, when I received orders from Captain Randol to recross the river and return to the old camp, near Potomac Creek. The battery was not engaged. No men or horses were lost.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. P. MARTIN,
Captain Battery C, Massachusetts Artillery.
Captain S. H. WEED,
Chief of Corps Artillery.

*Report of Captain Charles A. Phillips,
Battery E, Massachusetts Light Artillery.*

**CAMP NEAR POTOMAC CREEK, VA.,
May 7, 1863.**

CAPTAIN:

The battery under my command left camp at Potomac Creek on April 30, in obedience to orders from Captain Martin, and marched to Hartwood Church.

On the 1st, we marched to near Chancellorsville, and remained in park all night. The next day I marched about 2 miles to our left, and placed the battery in position, supported by Humphreys' division. I remained there until the evening of the 5th, when, by order of Captain Randol, I marched to the United States Ford. Crossed and returned to our old camp. I have not been in action; have lost no men or horses, and the few implements I have lost can be easily replaced.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CHAS. A. PHILLIPS,
Captain Battery E, Massachusetts Artillery.
Captain S. H. WEED,
Chief of Corps Artillery.

*Report of Captain Richard Waterman,
Battery C, First Rhode Island Light Artillery.*

**CAMP NEAR POTOMAC CREEK,
VA., May 7, 1863.**

CAPTAIN:

I have the honor to report the operations of my command since April 27 last.

April 27.-Broke camp at 11 a.m.; marched 10 miles, and encamped near Stafford Court-House.

April 28.-Marched at 10 a.m. 8 miles, and encamped near Mount Holly Church.

April 29.-Marched at 7.30 a.m. to the Rappahannock River, and crossed on the pontoon bridge just below Kelly's Ford at 10 a.m.; marched 16 miles, and encamped at 5 p.m. on the banks of the Rapidan River, at Ely's Ford.

April 30.-Marched at 5 a.m.; crossed the Rapidan at Ely's Ford; marched to Chancellorsville, and halted at about 12 m. In the afternoon marched up the road toward Banks' Ford with the First Brigade; returned at dusk, and encamped in an open field to the left of Chancellor's. Marched 12 miles.

May 1.-Broke camp at 10 a.m., and, with the First and Second Brigades, marched on the road to the left of Chancellorsville and leading into the main road to Fredericksburg. Marched until 3 p.m., then countermarched and returned to Chancellorsville, and went into position in a lot to the left of Chancellor's house. Two pieces were detached and sent down the road to the left, and went into position. The remaining four guns fired 7 rounds into the woods in front and to the left. Remained in position during the night.

May 2.-Fell back at 4 a.m., and went into a lot to the left of the road leading to Chancellorsville. Went into position again, and remained all day. At night, four pieces went down the road to the left center about 1 miles and took position.

May 3.-Still in position. The two pieces, under command of Lieutenant Sackett, took up position in a lot on the right of the road leading to Chancellorsville. Sergt. August S. Hanna and Private Frederick S. Moyes killed in action, and Privates Charles Jenkins and Patrick J. May, severely, and Corp. Charles McCarty, slightly, wounded; all belonging to the section under command of Lieutenant Sackett. Private Moyes was killed, and Privates May and Jenkins wounded, by a volley of canister from a battery stationed to the left and rear of Lieutenant Sackett's section. Only 1 man was killed and none were wounded by the enemy. Expended 20 rounds of ammunition.

May 4.-Lieutenant Sackett's section fired 5 rounds at the enemy, who were advancing from the woods in a solid column. Lieutenant Sackett was wounded severely in the wrist by a Minie ball.

May 5.-Remained in position all day. At night ordered to cross the Rappahannock; moved at 8 p.m. Crossed pontoon at 2 a.m. next morning; halted 1 miles from the river.

May 6.-Returned to our old camp at Potomac Creek at 1 p.m.

The losses sustained by this command are as follows: Killed, 2 men; wounded, 1 officer and 3 men; and missing, 2 men. Two horses killed in action and 3 died; 2 caisson bodies abandoned, by order of General Hunt; 1 McClellan saddle lost, and 13 artillery traces expended by breaking. About 75 rounds of ammunition expended.

RICH'D WATERMAN,
Captain First Rhode Island Artillery, Commanding Battery.
Captain S. H. WEED,
Chief of Artillery, Fifth Army Corps.

*Report of Lieutenant Malbone F. Watson,
Battery I, Fifth U. S. Artillery.*

**CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA.,
May 7, 1863.**

SIR:

I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by Battery I, Fifth Artillery, losses, &c., in the late actions with the enemy between April 27 and May 6:

The battery left camp near Falmouth on the 27th; marched to Hartwood, and encamped for the night. Next day reached Kelly's Mills.

Marched on the 29th to the Rapidan, at Ely's Ford; crossed on the 30th, and marched to Chancellorsville, and encamped for the night.

Moved out on May 1, with the division, on the old Richmond pike, and took position. After firing one or two shots, I was ordered farther to the front,

and was there engaged with the enemy for about an hour. In this action, 1 limber was destroyed by a shot from the enemy, 2 men slightly wounded, 1 horse killed and 4 wounded. After the action, the battery retired, with the division, and took up a position near the Chancellor house, remaining until the morning of the 2nd, when it was ordered to fall back on the road to the ford, and bivouacked in a field about 1 1/2 miles in the rear.

Sunday morning, went into position again, and was engaged in repulsing the enemy's attack on that day. Was again engaged on Monday.

Tuesday night, received orders to return to camp near Falmouth, and reached here about noon on Wednesday.

On Sunday, the 3rd, 2 men of the battery were slightly wounded. One bugler, serving as orderly to Captain Weed, Fifth Artillery, was wounded slightly in the hand.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. F. WATSON,

First Lieutenant Fifth Artillery, Commanding Battery I.

Captain S. H. WEED,

Commanding Artillery, Fifth Army Corps.

*Report of Captain Almont Barnes,
Battery C, First New York Light Artillery.*

CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA.,

May 7, 1863.

CAPTAIN:

I have the honor to report that on April 30, ultimo, at 1 p. m., the battery under my command (C, First New York Artillery), in accordance with orders from headquarters of the army, left camp, near Stoneman's Swith, to join the army near Chancellorsville, Va., which place it reached at 5 p. m. the next day, May 1.

On the morning of May 2, in accordance with orders from Captain Weed, chief of corps artillery, I reported to Brigadier-General Tyler with my command on the left front of the army, and by him was placed in position on his right, and

there remained until 8 p. m. of the 5th instant, when, by your order, I commenced the march for this camp, arriving here at 1 p. m. on the 6th instant.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
ALMONT BARNES,
Captain First New York Artillery, Commanding Battery C.
Captain A. M. RANDOL,
Commanding Artillery, Third Division, Fifth Army Corps.

*Report of Captain Andrew Cowan,
First Battery, New York Light Artillery.*

CAMP IN THE FIELD,
May 7, 1863.

SIR:

I have the honor to report that at 5 a. m. on the 3rd instant I took a position assigned me near to and on the left of Fredericksburg, and shelled the enemy's batteries on the heights. Much of the ammunition failed to work satisfactorily, but the fire of my battery was very fair. During the charge, I kept up a rapid fire on all the works, and succeeded in driving the enemy from the work on the left, compelling him to abandon his pieces, after several ineffectual attempts to run the gauntlet of our fire. This work was then occupied by the Seventy-seventh New York Regiment. A shell from my third piece exploded a limber in the right work carried by our division.

At 3.15 p. m. received orders to follow the Third Brigade; marched over the heights back of Fredericksburg, and then followed in rear of the leading regiment of the Second Brigade, marching on the plank road leading to Culpeper Court-House. Came into battery on the left of the road at 6.20 p. m.

At 9.15 p. m. received orders to proceed to the front without delay; came into battery on the right of the road near the toll-gate; the enemy's skirmish line was in the edge of the woods 700 yards to my front. At daylight, discovered the enemy building an earthwork in front, using the plank from the road to strengthen it. A few well-directed shells put a stop to their operations. During the day they threatened our position several times, but did not attempt to advance in strong force.

At 5 p. m. the fighting became general along the whole line, and about 6.45 p. m. General Sedgwick informed me that he was about to withdraw the infantry, and ordered me to hold my position as long as possible, holding on until General Brooks passed, if I could. Harn's battery, on my left, and a regiment 300 yards in our front were the only forces remaining at this point at 7 p. m. I continued to fire into the enemy's lines until 7.30 p. m.; when Brooks' division having withdrawn, as also Harn's battery, and the enemy's skirmishers advancing on my left and rear, I considered it time to withdraw. I then fired by piece, commencing on the right, and, as each piece was fired, limbered it up and moved from the field. Before the shell from the left piece had reached the point aimed at, the entire battery was on the road to Banks' Ford. On arriving at the ford, the roll was called and every man reported present. We crossed the bridge at 1 a. m. I had not a man hurt and but 1 horse killed.

During the fight on the morning of the 3rd instant, the axle of one of my pieces was broken, and I sent a lieutenant back to camp with it to be repaired, with orders to return as soon as possible, and bring forward the battery wagon, forge, and baggage wagons. He recrossed at Fredericksburg about 6 p. m., and, learning that our division had crossed the hills at the point carried by it in the morning, he took the same route, and, after marching 1 1/2 miles beyond the enemy's works, suddenly came upon 2 of the enemy's pickets, who fled, but a battery immediately opened fire from a distance of less than 600 yards. Lieutenant Atkins changed the direction of the carriages at once, and had nearly succeeded in making good his escape when a shell, exploding in the road, frightened the mules, and one wagon was upset directly across the road, preventing the passage of the forge and remaining wagons. The drivers unhitched their horses and mules with the exception of one (a contraband) who ran away, leaving his team hitched. Before the lieutenant discovered this, the enemy was too near, and it was impossible to return. I lost, therefore, my forge, 2 wagons, and 6 mules. Lieutenant Atkins had to march over a mile exposed to the fire of the battery, and did all that was possible to bring the wagons, &c., out in safety. I fired but 545 rounds during both days.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
ANDREW COWAN,
Captain First (Independent) Battery, New York State Vol.

*Reports of Captain Robert H. Fitzhugh, First New York Artillery,
Commanding Battery, and Chief of Artillery.*

**STAFFORD COURT-HOUSE, VA.,
May 7, 1863.**

COLONEL:

I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by Battery K, First New York Artillery, in the late operations on the Rappahannock:

The battery crossed the river at United States Ford on Thursday, April 30, 1863, and early the next morning joined its division (First, of the Twelfth Corps) near Chancellorsville, Va. During the reconnaissance made by the Twelfth Corps on Friday, May 1, the battery was held in reserve, and remained unengaged until about 5 p. m. of Saturday, May 2, when the enemy, having driven in the Eleventh Corps, Captain Best, chief of artillery, Twelfth Corps, directed me to come into position south of the Plank road, and about 500 yards in rear of the line held by Generals Williams and Berry. Soon after, Lieutenant F. B. Crosby, with four pieces of battery F, Fourth U. S. Artillery, took position on my right, and Lieutenant C. E. Winegar, commanding Battery M, First New York Artillery, on my left, joined, at about 6 p. m., by Battery D, First New York Artillery, and forming, with other batteries of the Third and Twelfth Corps, a line of thirty-four pieces. From this position I fired, during the fighting of Saturday night, 56 rounds, chiefly of Hotchkiss shell, at $1\frac{3}{4}$ degrees elevation, with $2\frac{1}{2}$ second fuse, directing the fire against a body of the enemy occupying the Plank road and the woods in front of General Berry's line. They were thrown into great confusion by the fire of the batteries, and their advance was checked for the night.

At about 4.30 a. m., Sunday, May 3, I was ordered by Captain Best to send one section to strengthen General Geary's line, and the other to General Meade's-Lieutenant Bailey joining General Meade, and Lieutenant Davis General Geary.

At about 9 a. m. Lieutenant Winegar, commanding Battery M, First New York Artillery, still engaged in his position of the previous evening, reporting to me that he was nearly out of ammunition, I brought up Lieutenant Davis' section from General Geary's line to relieve him; but before the section, though coming up at a trot, could reach the graveyard in rear of the Twelfth Corps artillery, the batteries of that line had all fallen back, M, of the First New York Artillery, the last of them to retire, going by Lieutenant Davis just as he went into battery, which he did under my direction a little northeast of the graveyard. From this position we opened a fire of Hotchkiss fuse and Schenkl percussion shell against a rebel battery which was enfilading our line from

the field about a mile south of the Plank road, every one of the 12 shells that we fired (elevation 6 degrees) bursting among the enemy's pieces, although the smoke that hung over that part of the field prevented us from seeing any other effect than the explosion of an ammunition chest and a temporary slackening of their fire. After firing 12 rounds, we were obliged to direct our pieces against a body of rebel infantry who had driven our troops back over the road, and were pouring into us a sharp fire of musketry from our right and front. We now fired shell and case shot at an average elevation of 1 degree until the enemy advanced over the line that had been occupied by Captain Best's artillery, D, of the First New York Artillery, and other batteries, earlier in the morning, when we fired percussion shell at point-blank.

A regiment of our infantry that had been lying on the ground on our right and rear now rose and fell back. At about 10.30 a. m. I withdrew the section, under cover of a fire from some of our artillery posted near the Chancellorsville house, to the second line, formed near the white house, which we had barely reached when we came into battery, west of the United States Ford road, against a body of the enemy who were driving our infantry out of the woods on the west and south of the white house. We here fired percussion shell at point-blank against the enemy in the edge of the woods with great effect. Their advance at that point was effectually checked by the artillery fire. Between 2 and 3 p. m. I directed Lieutenant Davis to join Lieutenant Bailey's section, which had been in position, unengaged, near General Griffin's division of the Fifth Corps, on our right.

Early Monday morning, Captain Weed, commanding the artillery of that line, ordered the battery to the left, near General Birney's division of the Third Corps. Here, toward evening, we were hotly engaged with the rebel infantry and artillery, first shelling a battery on the left which we silenced, and then turning our fire, in common with that of the whole line, against a battery on the right, which was also silenced in a few minutes.

From Monday evening, May 4, until Tuesday, 8 p. m., we remained in the last-named position, unengaged. We were then (Tuesday, May 5, 8 p. m.) ordered to United States Ford by Captain Weed.

On Wednesday a. m., May 6, I put the battery in position near the group of buildings a short distance south of the ford, by order of Major-General Reynolds, commanding First Corps, and about 10 a. m., by order of the same officer, crossed the river, the battery joining its corps at Stafford Court-House at about 7 p. m.

First Lieutenant Edward L. Bailey and Second Lieutenant Henry W. Davis deserve a great deal of credit, not only for their gallant bearing under a severe fire, but for the excellent judgment displayed by them both in the management of their respective sections. The non-commissioned officers and men, without a single exception, behaved nobly. The pieces were worked very carefully, and not a shot was thrown away. The total expenditure of ammunition was 195 rounds.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
ROBERT H. FITZHUGH,
Captain First New York Artillery, Commanding Battery K.
Colonel C. S. WAINWRIGHT,
Commanding First New York Artillery.

Casualties in Battery K, First New York Artillery, during battles near Chancellorsville, Va., May 1-5, 1863.

R. H. FITZGUGH,
Captain First New York Artillery, Commanding Battery K.

STAFFORD COURT-HOUSE, VA.,
May 13, 1863.

LIEUTENANT:

I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the artillery of the division in the late operations on the Rappahannock:

A list of casualties and losses immaterial have already been forwarded.

Battery M, First New York Artillery, First Lieutenant C. E. Winegar commanding, having crossed the Rappahannock with the division at Kelly's Ford, reached Fairview Thursday p. m., April 30, where, on Friday, May 1, at 6 a. m., it was joined by Batteries F, Fourth U. S. Artillery, Lieutenant F. B. Crosby commanding, and K, First New York Artillery, First Lieutenant E. L. Bailey temporarily commanding.

During the reconaissance of Friday a. m., none of the batteries were engaged.

About noon of that day, First Lieutenant E. D. Muhlenberg, with a section of Battery F, Fourth U. S. Artillery, was ordered to general Geary's line by

Captain C. L. Best, chief of artillery, Twelfth Corps, and remained there during the actions of the next two days.

About 4 p. m. of Friday, May 1, a rebel battery, opening from a point about 300 yards southwest of Colonel Ross' position, was silenced in about half an hour by the converging fire of Battery M, posted near the log house, First Division headquarters, with one section of Battery F, Fourth U. S. Artillery, and from another section of Battery F, under Lieutenant Crosby, posted, by order of Brigadier-General Williams, commanding division, at the point of woods on the west side of the ravine.

During Friday night, the division artillery remained in battery near General Williams' headquarters.

On Saturday, May 2, Lieutenant Muhlenberg, on General Geary's left, was engaged at intervals during the whole day repelling three cavalry charges and one of infantry, using canister with great effect. The rest of the division artillery remained unengaged until between 5 and 6 p. m. The Eleventh Corps giving way, by order of Captain Best I posted the batteries in front of General Williams' headquarters, forming, with the rest of the Twelfth Corps artillery and two batteries of the Third Corps, a line of thirty-four pieces, stretching from the Plank road south to a short distance beyond the log house, the line being completed just as Generals Williams' (Twelfth Corps) and Berry's

(Third Corps) divisions had fallen back to the edge of the woods in our front. From this position a sharp fire was kept up by the artillery at intervals until nearly midnight, directed principally against a body of the enemy who seemed to be near the farm house occupied during the day by Brigadier-General Knipe, commanding First Brigade, and creating among them great disorder and confusion.

During the night, by direction of Captain Best, a breastwork was thrown up along the artillery line.

Sunday, May 3, at daybreak, by order of Captain best, I sent one section of Battery K, First New York, under Second Lieutenant H. W. Davis, to report to General Geary, and the other section, under First Lieutenant E. L. Bailey, to General Meade's line.

Soon after daybreak, the enemy (whose advance on the previous evening had been effectually checked) renewed the attack, which was replied to by the artillery with about the same effect as on the night before until between 7 and 8 a. m. Gaining ground on our right flank, they poured in from that quarter a hot fire

of musketry, at the same time that a battery firing from the field on General Ruger's left enfiladed our line. At this time the division artillery suffered its heaviest loss in men and horses.

At about 9 a. m. Lieutenant Winegar, commanding Battery M, First New York Artillery, reported to me that he was nearly out of ammunition. A battery brought up Lieutenant Davis' section, of Battery K, First New York Artillery, from General Geary's line, where he had been engaged up to that time, to relieve him; but before the section, although coming up at a trot, could reach the graveyard in rear of First Division headquarters, our artillery had fallen back from its intrenched position, and the last battery of the line, Lieutenant Winegar's, and a battery of the Third Corps, retired under cover of the fire from Lieutenant Davis' section, posted a short distance northeast of the graveyard. That section maintained an effective fire against, first, the enfilading battery before spoken of, and then against the enemy's infantry, checking it as it advanced on our intrenchments, near division headquarters, until the enemy, gaining on our right, and our infantry supports on our right and rear falling back, it was withdrawn to General Meade's line, retiring between 10 and 10.30 a. m., under cover of fire from Lieutenant Muhleberg, who, posted near the brick house (Major-General Hooker's headquarters) with seven pieces, besides his own section, gallantly kept his ground until about 11 a. m., when he was ordered to the United States Ford, there joining the other four pieces of his battery and Lieutenant Winegar's battery (M, First New York Artillery). Battery K, First New York Artillery, after joining General Meade's line, taking position near the white house between 10.30 and 11 a. m., was sharply engaged at intervals until Tuesday night, May 5, repelling the attacks of the enemy's infantry; also engaged at this point with two rebel batteries posted on the Chancellorsville and United States Ford road.

At about 8 p. m. of Tuesday, May 5, all the batteries of the division were ordered to recross the Rappahannock and return to their old camps, which they did, reaching Stafford Court-House Wednesday evening, May 6.

I regret to have to report the loss of two battery commanders. At about 9 a. m., Sunday, May 3, First Lieutenant F. B. Crosby, commanding Battery F, Fourth U. S. Artillery, while directing the fire of his battery, which he had handled most skillfully during the whole engagement, was shot through the heart. Lieutenant C. E. Winegar, who had worked his battery with great effect during the hottest of the enemy's fire, retiring the last of the line of artillery, after bringing all of his pieces safely off the field, returned in search of two disabled caissons, and has not been heard of since.

The conduct of the whole command was all that could be desired. First Lieutenant T. B. Kirby, Twentieth Connecticut Volunteers, adjutant, First Division artillery, deserves great credit for his coolness under fire, and for remaining on the field in the discharge of his duties after receiving a wound in the arm which made it necessary to lift him on his horse.

First Lieutenant Muhlenberg, of Battery F, Fourth U. S. Artillery, for his conduct while on General Geary's left; Second Lieutenant Floyd, left in command of four pieces of Battery F, Fourth U. S. Artillery, after Lieutenant Crosby's death; First Lieutenant E. L. Bailey and Second Lieutenant H. W. Davis, of Battery K, First New York Artillery, for their conduct while in Captain Best's line and in other position; First Lieutenant J. D. Woodbury and Second Lieutenant Smith, of Battery M, First New York Artillery, for their conduct on the 1st, 2nd and 3rd instant, deserve favorable mention.

The following-named enlisted men have been reported for bravery and oldierlike conduct:

Battery F, Fourth U. S. Artillery-Sergts. David Joel and [Michael] Fitzgerald, and Corps. John Phillips and Tazewell B. Amiss.

Battery K, First New York Artillery-First Sergt. Charles Keller, Sergts. John Duane and Marion Mosher, and Corps. John Pitts, Clark Fairbanks, Thomas Evans, and Datus Miller.

Battery M, First New York Artillery-First Sergt. John W. Weld, Sergts. Royal A. Ide and Samuel Hood, Corpl. Charles H. Rems, and Privates Henry M. Johnson and John Walker.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ROBERT H. FITZHUGH,

Captain 1st N. Y. Art., Chief of Art., 1st Div., 12th A. C.

*Report of Lieutenant John D. Woodbury,
Battery M, First New York Light Artillery.*

STAFFORD COURT-HOUSE, VA.,

May 7, 1863.

CAPTAIN:

I have the honor to report that Battery M, First New York Artillery, broke camp April 27, 1863, and marched with the troops of the Twelfth Corps; crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford, and arrived at Chancellorsville April 30, 1863.

May 1, a. m., made a reconnaissance with the troops of the Twelfth Corps toward Spotsylvania Court-House; returned to camp about 2 p. m., near General Slocum's headquarters. At 5 p. m. were ordered to take a position on a tongue of land to the right of General Slocum's headquarters, to repulse the enemy, who were making a demonstration at that point. While taking our position, the enemy opened upon us with 18-pounder shot and shell. We replied as soon as possible, and silenced their battery in three-fourths of an hour, using 100 rounds of ammunition. Camped for the night with pieces in battery.

May 2, 3 p. m., the enemy having gained our rear, received orders from you, changed front fire to the right, throwing right wing to the rear, causing us to occupy the ridge in rear of General Slocum's headquarters. Commenced firing about 6 p. m. on the enemy's infantry and artillery. Their artillery was soon silenced and infantry repulsed; they, however, soon rallied and again were repulsed with great slaughter. At this time we used from one to three second fuse. They were driven back the third time in the same manner. We then, by your order, threw up earthworks by digging down 1 1/2 feet, and placing the earth in front of the pieces. For want of proper tools, consumed nearly the whole night.

The next morning at break of day the men were at their posts, and the enemy soon made his appearance in our front with great force, and were again driven back by the fire of our artillery. The enemy came down in this manner for the fifth time, and were driven back as before with great loss. Our support having fallen back, the enemy's sharpshooters gaining our flank, our ammunition expended, we by your order retired.

May 5, were ordered to cross the river at United States Ford and cover the crossing of the retiring column early next morning, the enemy having two batteries in position to annoy our troops. I immediately opened upon them with my battery, in connection with Captain Pettit's (First New York) artillery and Captain Knap's (Pennsylvania) batteries. We silenced them in about one hour, causing one limberchest to explode and destroying two caissons. Received orders May 6, at 6 p. m., to return to our old camp at Stafford Court-House, where we arrived May 7, 1863.

During the recent engagement mentioned, in regard to officers and men, all behaved with the utmost bravery and performed their duties well. The following is the list of casualties in men and material:

I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOHN D. WOODBURY,
First Lieutenant Battery M, First New York Artillery.
Captain C. L. BEST,
Chief of Artillery, Twelfth Army Corps.

*Report of Lieutenant Edward D. Muhlenberg,
Battery F, Fourth U.S. Artillery.*

**NEAR STAFFORD COURT-HOUSE, VA.,
May 7, 1863.**

GENERAL:

I have the honor to report the operations of that portion of the artillery of the Second Division, Twelfth Corps, under my charge in the actions of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd instant, at Chancellorsville, Va.

I was placed in charge of the artillery of the Second Division on the night of the 1st.

On the 2nd, I found one section (two Napoleons) of Captain Bruen's (New York) independent battery in the field, and not subject to any orders. I took possession of it, and placed it in position, covering that occupied by the artillery of the First Division, under Captain Best.

On the 3rd, three Napoleons of Company C, Fourth U. S. Artillery, and two rifled pieces (commander unknown) reported, and were placed in position with the other two already mentioned. I also in the latter part of the day placed my section in the same position, Lieutenant O'Donohue in command, and to my knowledge 7 privates of these three guns were killed.

The conduct of Lieutenant Field, an officer present, deserves a favorable notice for gallantry.

The casualties, further than this, of these guns and others under my charge, I have no report of.

The operations of the artillery under my command were immediately under your own eye, and a lengthy report is unnecessary.

I have the honor to be, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,
EDW'D D. MUHLENBERG.
First Lieutenant Fourth U. S. Artillery, Commanding Battery F.

*Report of Captain Joseph M. Knap, Battery E,
Pennsylvania Light Artillery, Chief of Artillery.*

**CAMP NEAR AQUIA CREEK, VA.,
May 7, 1863.**

GENERAL:

In compliance with the several orders from headquarters Army of the Potomac and corps and division headquarters, I furnish the following report of action and casualties and loss of material and near Chancellorsville, Va., commencing on the 1st instant, my command comprising Knap's and Hampton's Independent Pennsylvania batteries, six guns each:

On the 1st instant Knap's battery, under command of Lieutenant Atwell, advanced with the corps, firing about 60 rounds with accuracy; the result not known.

During the evening of the same day the same battery, with two guns of Hampton's, assisted in repelling the attack on the front and left of the position occupied by the Second Division of the Twelfth Corps without loss or accident to either. Number of rounds fired, about 300.

On the morning of the 2nd, while endeavoring to stop the advance of the enemy on the left, a battery was brought to bear on our flank, and four guns of Knap's were placed in position, which in about forty-five minutes succeeded in silencing the enemy, exploding two of his caissons and dismounting one of his pieces. Two hundred rounds were fired, and 3 men and 3 horses of Knap's wounded, and 1 horse of Hampton's killed.

During the afternoon of the same day, two guns of Knap's (Dunlevy's section) advanced with a portion of the division under the command of Brigadier-General Kane, Lieutenant Atwell accompanying, having his other four guns in the rear, in readiness for action. After firing 12 rounds of case shot, the section was

ordered back; Lieutenant Atwell wounded in the left arm severely, and one enlisted man mortally (since died).

During the evening our position, as originally, covered the division and left until the Eleventh Corps gave way. I then changed four guns to cover the right, should occasion demand, thus bringing into action my entire command - twelve pieces.

At 3 a. m. Sunday, the 3rd, I was ordered to place Hampton's six guns near the headquarters of General Williams, on the right of the Twelfth Corps, and at 4.15 a. m. was ordered to report with my other six guns (Knap's) to General Reynolds, commanding First Corps, where they remained in position during the day, covered by earthworks we had erected as a protection against musketry.

During the engagement of Sunday morning, Hampton's battery was hotly engaged for about three hours, and Captain Robert B. Hampton fell, mortally wounded (died a few hours after), while gallantly performing his duty.

In this action, one caisson of Hampton's was exploded; a second was disabled; 1 enlisted man was killed, 7 wounded (3 seriously), and over 20 horses killed and disabled, which, with the harness, were lost, compelling him to abandon the third caisson. No guns were lost. About 600 rounds were expended, and during the afternoon the battery was taken to the rear.

On the 4th, my battery was not engaged, and Hampton's, under Lieutenant Fleming, remained in the rear.

On the morning of the 5th, by order of General Hunt, I reported to Captain C. L. Best, chief of artillery, Twelfth Corps, at the United States Ford, and found Hampton's had before reported and crossed the river.

During the afternoon, Knap's was placed in position, assisted by four guns of Thompson's Pennsylvania, on the peninsula below the crossing, where it remained during the night. Being senior officer, I assumed command.

At early daylight, I found the enemy erecting a breastwork directly in our front, and ordered Captain Thompson to fire an occasional shot to hinder his operations.

About 9 a. m. the enemy opened on us with two batteries, four guns on our right, angling about 40 degrees, at 1,200 yards range. After a brisk fire for

nearly an hour, we succeeded in silencing the battery in front, exploding two of his limbers, while Thompson silenced the guns on the right.

My loss was 3 men wounded and 4 horses.

It gives me pleasure to testify to the good conduct and bravery of the officers and men in the two batteries under my command; all did their duty nobly.

To Captain Elliott, ordnance officer of the division, credit is due for his gallant conduct in supplying the batteries with ammunition under the hottest fire.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOS. M. KNAP,

Captain , and Chief of Artillery, 2nd Div., 12th Army Corps.

Report of Lieutenant Greenleaf T. Stevens, Fifth Maine Battery.

CAMP NEAR WHITE OAK CHURCH, VA.,

May 8, 1863.

CAPTAIN:

On Sunday, May 3, at 8 o'clock, orders were received from Colonel Wainwright, chief of artillery, First Army Corps, to move our battery to the front and report to General Reynolds, commanding First Army Corps. Subsequently, while on our way to the front, orders were received from General Hooker that the batteries in reserves should move along to Chancellorsville, which was near the center of our lines, and report to the chief of artillery there. On arriving and reporting, we were ordered into position on the northerly side of a circular field, some 500 or 600 yards across. The enemy's line of infantry extended across the field and into the woods, at a distance of not more than 450 or 500 yards. As soon as our battery emerged from the woods and made its appearance upon the field, the enemy's line of infantry divided in center, and marched by the right and left flank at a double quick to the woods. This movement disclosed their artillery, which was posted in the rear of their infantry, and partially covered by a slight elevation. Having our exact range, they immediately opened a most galling fire from their artillery, which appeared to consist of two light batteries. Our men and horses began to fall before we got into position. Their artillery was

served with great vigor and remarkable precision, opening with canister, spherical case, and shell.

The ground being hard, and affording no cover, their projectiles ricocheted, causing the loss of a large number of horses, and inflicting many severe wounds upon the cannoneers and drivers. Our guns were served deliberately, so that the ammunition in the limber might not become exhausted, and the effect of our fire might be noticed; the right half of the battery engaged the enemy's artillery, the left half holding in check a large body of infantry massing on our left. The ammunition in the limbers of the right section was expended; that in the center section, with the exception of 4 or 5 rounds, which were ignited by an exploding shell and the limber destroyed; that in the left section was expended, and a few rounds served from a caisson near by, when, by the direction of General Hancock, there being but one limber which could be moved, and the remaining cannoneers completely exhausted, the prolongs were attached, and the guns moved by the infantry support to the rear. The caissons were previously moved from the field.

Notwithstanding the disadvantages under which we labored, our men behaved in the most gallant manner, continuing to work their pieces until their ammunition was exhausted and the enemy's skirmishers had approached within the distance of 150 yards.

Our loss in killed and wounded is as follows: Killed, 6; wounded, 22. It is with the deepest regret that I mention the names of Sergt. William F. Locke and Corpl. Benjamin F. Grover among the killed, as they were the best of soldiers, and showed themselves at the battles of Bull Run, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville as the bravest of men.

I remain, captain, your obedient servant,

G. T. STEVENS,

Lieutenant, Commanding Battery.

Captain D. R. RANSOM,

Chief of Artillery, Second Division, First Army Corps.

Report of Captain James Thompson, Battery C, Pennsylvania Light Artillery.

CAMP NEAR WHITE OAK CHURCH, VA.,

May 8, 1863.

CAPTAIN:

At 12 m. on the 28th ultimo, with division, marched from old encampment to the Fitzhugh farm. At 2 a. m. on the 29th, moved forward, and by daylight took a position on second bank from the river Rappahannock, near Purdy's [Pollock's?] dam, for the purpose of protecting our pontoniers and to cover the crossing of our troops. The fog was dense, but at 7 a. m. I fired some 12 rounds at parties of the enemy at a range of from 1,300 to 1,400 yards; we sustained no loss whatever.

The 30th was ushered in with a steady rain, but otherwise perfectly quiet until 5.20 p. m., when we replied to a rebel battery of 20-pounder Parrott guns, which opened on our infantry from the heights on our left front. We were soon subjected to a cross-fire also, but continued firing until dark, with no loss; threw 60 rounds, at a range of about 3,700 yards.

Still in same position on the 1st of May. Fog heavy until 9.25 a. m.; had no firing. The morning of the 2nd opened up clear; engaged with the enemy's batteries from 8 to 9.30 a. m., at a range of 3,700 yards; no loss. At 11 a. m., with division, marched for United States Ford, and arrived at the front at 2 a. m. on the 3rd instant.

Ordered into position on the right with the First Corps at 6 a. m., and was relieved by Captain Stewart's battery of light 12-pounders at 11 a. m., and ordered to join reserve batteries.

Was, on the morning of the 4th instant, ordered to report to General Slocum, commanding Twelfth Corps, at sunrise; when proceeding to the position assigned, was ordered to recross the river and take a position lower down, so as to prevent the enemy firing upon our bridges.

At daylight, 6th, observed the enemy throwing up earthworks for guns upon the heights opposite to and across the river from us, at a range of from 1,300 to 1,400 yards, when my battery opened on them, so as to prevent their further progress, while I was at the same time hotly engaged with a battery of two 24-pounder howitzers and a 12-pounder on our right and from rifled guns on our front, when, with the assistance of Captain Knap's Pennsylvania Battery, blew up the enemy's caissons, silenced their guns, and obliged them to run for the woods and leave their guns upon the field. Continued to fire occasionally, so as to prevent their occupying the works, until about 3 p. m., at which time the bridges having all been taken up, we were ordered to retire, having sustained the following loss, viz, Private David Chase, killed; Sergt. R. Parcell,

wounded in face, slightly; Private Lyman Ellithorp, wounded in legs and groin, dangerously; Private M. Lynch, wounded in arm, slightly; also 3 horses killed.

Very respectfully submitted, captain, by your obedient servant,
JAMES THOMPSON,
Captain , Commanding 4th Pa. Batty, 2nd Div., First Army Corps.
Captain D. R. RANSOM,
Commanding Artillery, Second Division, First Army Corps.

*Report of Captain Rufus D. Pettit,
Battery B, First New York Light Artillery.*

FALMOUTH VA., May 8, 1863.

COLONEL:

I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the battery under my command in the late battle near Chancellorsville:

By direction of Major-General Couch, I reported to Major-General French, at 12 a. m. May 1, and followed the brigade of General Hays to a point on the Plank road, about 1 1/2 miles south of Chancellorsville, when the command returned to its previous position near the headquarters of General Couch.

On the morning of May 2, first section was detached by Colonel Morgan and sent in charge of First Lieutenant Sheldon to Scott's Mills, to report to the commander of the Irish Brigade; the remaining section wee placed in position near the headquarters of General French.

About 2 p. m. I was directed to relieve Knap's Pennsylvania battery, near General Hooker's headquarters, when I engaged a section of the enemy's artillery at about 2,700 yards, and obliged it to withdraw, expending 40 rounds of shell and case. Remained in this position until 9 a. m. May 3, when I was directed by Colonel Morgan to occupy a position in an open field near General Couch's headquarters, when Lieutenant Sheldon reported with his section from Scott's Mills.

At 10 a. m. I was placed in position by Colonel Morgan, at Chancellorsville, to engage a battery of the enemy, which at the time was enfilading our line of infantry. Within a very few moments the enemy opened with three batteries in my front, one on my left flank, and one section in my rear.

This position was held until 1 lieutenant Slauson, 3 chiefs of pieces Harvey Cox, Thomas Coyne, and Charles H. Gates, 1 gunner, and 7 men were disabled 1 caisson destroyed, and 8 horses killed, when, having expended nearly 600 rounds of case and shell, I withdrew my battery, and was ordered by Colonel Morgan to the heights near the ford, where I remained waiting orders until 7 a. m. May 5, when I was ordered by Captain Best to cross the brigade, and from the heights cover the recrossing of the troops and the taking up the bridges, which was accomplished at 3 p. m. May 6.

Was then ordered to return to camp, near Falmouth, by Colonel Alexander Doull, to which place I arrived with my battery at midnight.

The conduct of the officers, the non-commissioned officers, and men during these operations was worthy of your highest regard. not a man absented himself, and it gives me great pleasure to be able to say that my orders were executed by all with promptness.

Hoping this may meet your approval, I have the honor to remain, as ever, yours, truly,
R. D. PETTIT,

Captain Company B, First New York Artillery.

Colonel C. S. WAINWRIGHT,

Commanding First New York Artillery.

*Report of Captain Thomas W. Osborn,
First New York Light Artillery, Chief of Artillery.*

**OFFICE OF CHIEF OF ARTILLERY,
May 8, 1863.**

MAJOR:

I have the honor to report the movements of the light batteries of the division - Company K, Fourth U. S. Artillery, light 12-pounder guns, commanded by First Lieutenant F. W. Seeley; Company H, First U. S. Artillery, light 12-pounder guns, commanded by First Lieutenant J. E. Dimick; Company D, First New York Artillery, light 12-pounder guns, commanded by First Lieutenant George B. Winslow, and Company B, First New Jersey Artillery, 10-pounder Parrott guns, commanded by Captain A. Judson Clark - between April 29 and May 5.

On the 29th ultimo, at 2 p. m., I received orders from Major-General Berry to move the batteries, with the infantry, to near the bank of the Rappahannock, and about midway between the crossing of Sedgwick's and Reynolds' corps.

We rested for the night at 11 o'clock, and at sunrise of the 30th reported, by orders, to General Newton on the bank of the river. I posted the batteries to sweep the plain on the south bank, but at 3 p. m. I was ordered to move with the corps to the United States Ford. At midnight, we halted a mile south of Hartwood Church, and in the morning crossed the river.

At 12 m. of the 29th, Captain Clark's battery was transferred to the First Division of this corps, and the Fourth New York Independent Battery to this. I regret this change very much; it was a rifled battery, and splendid in its officers, men, and all its equipments. It has been my especial delight to assist in and to make in perfect for the field, and the effort has not been in vain.

At 3 p. m. the division was ordered to the front about 3 miles, with the exception of General Mott's brigade and Seeley's battery, which were left at the ford. Brisk skirmishing was going on at the front; at night we rested near the white house.

The morning of May 2 brought a day filled with the variable incidents nearly always attendant on the immediate proximity of contending armies on the eve of battle - the small but vigorous attacks of each on the other's lines, to learn the points of strength and weakness. At 4 p. m. we realized a heavy attack was being made on the left, and the varying direction of the sound showed us too plainly our forces were giving way. The division was soon ordered to the front, the batteries following in the order of Domick, Winslow, and the Fourth New York Independent Battery. As we passed General Hooker's headquarters, a scene burst upon us which, God, grant, may never again be seen in the Federal Army of the United States. The Eleventh Corps had been routed, and were fleeing to the river like scared sheep. The men and artillery filled the roads, its sides, and the skirts of the field, and it appeared that no two of one company could be found together. Aghast and terror-stricken, heads bare and panting for breath, they pleaded like infantry at the mothers, breast that we would let them pass to the rear unhindered. The troops in the old division, unwavering, and the artillery, reckless of life or limb, passed through this disorganized mass of men. Reaching the crest of the hill, I left the batteries of Dimick and Winslow on the brow, taking position perpendicular to the road, Dimick taking the right, excepting one section of Dimick's battery, which I took about 400 yards to the front, on a line with the front of the woods, and only a few yards in the rear of our line of battle.

At this time (a little after sunset), a rebel battery opened fire on the batteries on the brow of the hill, and less than 1,000 yards from them. Winslow

and mason, in command of two sections of Dimick's battery, accepted the challenge, and almost immediately silenced them.

All was now quiet, excepting that we could constantly hear the enemy, from 300 to 1,000 yards in our front, massing their troops and moving their artillery. It was now evident that their force was large, as the swearing of officers and giving orders sounded like the chattering of multitude. This continued until 9.30 o'clock, during which time severely commissioned officers rode within our lines of pickets and were captured. At this time, I distinctly saw the head of a column moving down the road, it being a beautiful moonlight night. The column seemed to cover the entire breadth of the road, and moved very cautiously until within 150 yards of us, when it began to deploy in line of battle. At this moment, I directed Lieutenant Dimick to open with canister, clearing the road almost instantly. The batteries on the crest opened, at the signal, upon the road beyond, and, taking the reports of prisoners as reliable, the havoc on their ranks was fearful.

This same movement of the enemy occurred again at 10.30 and at 12 midnight, excepting he did not move his forces upon the open road, but in the woods, and the challenge to open fire was given by the enemy's infantry against our own, but the results were each time the same, the enemy being at each assault repulsed. He used his artillery considerably, but to no great effect, only wounding a few artillerymen and killing a few horses. The practice of the artillery this evening was the most splendid I ever saw. The lines of battle at several times became closely engaged, but the batteries on the crest varied their elevation most admirably, keeping precisely the time of fuse required and the exact elevation necessary to strike the rebel line of battle, and I have yet to learn that one Federal soldier was struck by one of our shots or a premature explosion of a shell; yet we repeatedly tore the rebel lines to fragments, and assisted our gallant infantry to drive them, shattered to the rear. The artillery fire of the evening, although perhaps not quite so heavy as at the world-renowned battle of Malvern Hill, I consider far more perfect in time and accuracy. During the firing of this evening, the rifled guns of the Fourth New York Independent Battery, although stationed at some little distance to the rear of the 12-pounder batteries, did excellent service, and assisted in driving the enemy back. Two batteries of the Twelfth Corps were on the left of Winslow's battery, commanded by Captain Best, as chief, but their position was inferior to our own, yet doubtless they did good service. These batteries remained in this position during the next day's engagement.

At 2 a. m. Seeley's battery reached the field, with General Mott's bridge, from the ford.

At 3 a. m. the Fourth New York was ordered to the rear by an aide-de-camp of General Hooker, and I regret to say that , though we needed it much thought the day, the order carried it beyond my reach and beyond the battle-field.

During the night, Captain [Charles W.] Squier, chief engineer of General Berry's staff, threw up small works in front of the guns, which were of great benefit during the engagement of the following day.

At 5 o'clock in the morning, the enemy attacked us in force, and, after a very severe fight by our men, the Federal line began to fall back. From the first moment I learned the position of the enemy, I played upon him with the artillery, the section in the road using very short fuse him with the artillery, the section in the road using very short fuse and canister as the enemy moved to and from. In the movement of this section, securing and defending the front of our line from the persistent attacks of the enemy, notwithstanding its own exposed condition, and under a most galling fire from the rebel sharpshooters and line of battle, Lieutenant Dimick showed the skill and judgment of an accomplished artillery officer and the intrepid bravery of the truest soldier. After holding this position for upward of an hour, his men fighting bravely, but falling rapidly around him (his horse being shot under him), and our infantry crowding back until his flanks were exposed, I gave him the order to limber and fall back. In doing this his horses became entangled in the harness, and in freeing them he received a shot in the foot. This wound he his form his men, but in a movement received one in the spine, and from the effects of it died in two days after. I would, if possible, here pay a slight tribute to his memory, but I cannot. He was na educated and accomplished officer, just budding into the full vigor of manhood. As a line officer he has shown fine abilities, and on the battle-field was unsurpassed for gallantry. Lieutenant Sanderson, before and after the fall of Lieutenant Dimick, conducted himself with great courage, judgment, and decision.

The division artillery was now confined entirely to the brow of the hill, but Seeley was to the left and in front of the Twelfth corps batteries. Seeley took this position by order of General Hooker, and it being so far removed from the other batteries (about 600 yards), I could pay no personal attention to it; besides, I had unbounded confidence in his judgment and in his battery. The best report I can give will be the body of his report, which will be found below. The battle was now beginning with almost unparalleled fury, the enemy

throwing his troops upon us in double and triple lines, and then in solid masses. The infantry of the division fought with stubborn desperation, and the contending forces surged backward and forward like two huge waves, mingling and unmingling as the one or the other gained a momentary advantage.

It was at this time that the artillery carried the most fearful havoc among the enemy's forces. The batteries of Winslow and Dimick here bore the same part, and I can do no better in giving you a clear understanding of the part each bore in the engagements than to quote from Winslow's report. He says:

To the part Lieutenant Seeley bore, I quote from his report. He says:

During the heat of the battle, I perceived the firing of my guns began to slacken, and learning the ammunition was giving out, I applied immediately for another battery of Captain Randolph, chief of corps artillery, and though he gave me orders for Captain von Puttkammer's Eleventh New York Independent Battery, I could not get him to the front, and I was compelled to withdraw my guns, and thus caused the gallant old division to fall back before the rebel masses. I withdrew the batteries to the ammunition train, and in three hours they were ready for service again.

On the 4th, nothing of special interest transpired to the batteries.

On the 5th, we were ordered by General Hunt to recross the river, and to proceed to our present camp.

In refitting the batteries for whatever service they might be called to perform, I was compelled to resort to the unpleasant alternative of temporally unhorsing the Fourth New York Independent Battery, Lieutenant William T. McLean commanding, and putting it in position the bluffs on the north side of the United States Ford. It has since been again placed on its original footing.

I am frank to say that I felt the utmost gratification at the management of the artillery by its immediate commanders, and the favorable results it produced on the battle. I can scarcely conceive it possible that more destruction could have been carried into our enemy's force by three light batteries than was apparently by our own; how the firing could have been more accurate; the coolness and judgment which directed each battery; how the men could have been more heroic, noble, and true than all were; how commanders and subalterns could surpass these noble men.

The ammunition used by the division artillery was about 2,450 rounds. The loss of material was 94 horses, 2 empty caissons (by horses being killed), and 1 gun-carriage broken, but gun secured.

In officers and men we lost First Lieutenant J. E. Dimick, Battery H, First U. S. Artillery, killed; Second Lieutenant Isaac Arnold, Battery K, Fourth U. S. Artillery, wounded. Battery K, Fourth U. S. Artillery, 7 men killed and 37 wounded; Battery H, First U. S. Artillery, 2 men killed and 18 wounded, and Battery D, First New York Artillery, 2 men killed and 12 wounded.

Before closing, I wish to call the attention of the general commanding to the following officers as especially worthy of promotion, by brevet or otherwise, for their very gallant and meritorious conduct at the battle of Chancellorsville on the 2nd and 3rd instant: First Lieutenant F. W. Seeley, Battery K, Fourth U. S. Artillery; First Lieutenant George B. Winslow, Battery D, First New York Artillery, and Second Lieutenant J. A. Sanderson, Battery H, First U. S. Artillery.

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
THOS. WARD OSBORN,
Captain and Chief of Artillery, 2nd Div., 3rd Army Corps.

*Report of Lieutenant George B. Winslow,
Battery D, First New York Light Artillery.*

**HDQRS. BATTERY D, FIRST NEW YORK ARTILLERY,
May 8, 1863.**

CAPTAIN:

I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by the battery under my command in the recent active operations of the army:

The battery moved from its camp near Falmouth just before dark on Tuesday, April 28, and marched with the division (Berry's) down the Rappahannock to a point about midway between where Sedgwick's and Reynolds' corps crossed, and went into camp a little before midnight. Early on the following morning, the battery went into position near the Pollock house, on the bank of the river, but was soon after ordered back under cover and out of sight of the enemy, where it remained until 2 p. m. of the 30th, when we were ordered to move with the division up the river.

At 2 o'clock on the morning of May 1, we bivouacked within 3 or 4 miles of the United States Ford. About 2 p. m. of the same day, we crossed the river at the above-named ford, and halted three-fourths of a mile beyond to rest and feed our horses.

At 5.30 p. m. orders were received to move to the front - where a heavy engagement was evidently taking place - in the shortest possible time.

Notwithstanding the horses were unharnessed, the paulins, overcoats, and blankets spread out to dry (having been wet by the rain of the day before), everything was packed, the battery harnessed and moved to the rear of the First Brigade (Carr's), a half mile distant, in not more than twenty minutes from the time the order was received. Just before dark we reached General Hooker's headquarters, the vicinity of which was being shelled by the enemy on our left. Some three hours later the battery moved, by your orders, to a clearing about 1,000 yards in the rear, with instructions to remain in readiness to move at any moment.

About the middle of the afternoon of the 2nd instant, there was heavy firing in front of General Hooker's headquarters, and we moved by orders rapidly forward. Soon after arriving at the front, the firing ceased, and we again returned to our position in the rear. The horses were then unharnessed, and were being watered, when very heavy firing of artillery and infantry opened upon our right and front. The battery was immediately harnessed, and again moved with the utmost rapidity to the front. As we neared General Hooker's headquarters at Chancellorsville, the shot and shell from the enemy's guns fell thick and fast around us, causing no little haste and confusion among the supply teams then moving to the rear. The road was soon cleared, however, by General Patrick, and the battery moved on, turning at Chancellorsville to the right down the Fredericksburg and Gordonsville Plank road. Here an indescribable scene of confusion and disorder presented itself. Our way was literally blocked with the artillery and infantry of the Eleventh Army Corps, who were flying to the rear apparently in the utmost terror, begging in many instances by word and gesture that nothing might impede their cowardly and disgraceful flight. To turn them out of the way, much less back, was impossible, and some time elapsed before we could advance, and then only by turning into the field to the left of the road. A section of Battery H, First U. S. Artillery, then in front of me, advanced to the foot of the hill near our line of battle. I passed the remaining four guns, and placed my battery in the first eligible position I could find, which was upon the brow of the hill some 500 or 600 yards in rear of our advance line, my right resting upon the Plank road. The position, as the battle developed, proved an admirable one.

The enemy opened upon us from a battery in the road on the hill less than 1,000 yards in front. I immediately brought my guns to bear upon the enemy's, using solid shot, and after a few rounds succeeded in silencing them for a time. One man was killed and 1 severely wounded at my right gun just as they were in the act of firing the first round. Soon after, four guns of the First U. S. Artillery (Battery H) came into position in the road on my right, and Best's and other batteries on my left. By this time, night had come upon us, but a cloudless sky and a bright moon enabled us to sight our guns with a considerable degree of accuracy.

While our infantry and the enemy's were hotly engaged, we directed our fire upon the latter with terrible effect, using shell and spherical case, which exploded at the proper time and place. The fighting continued almost without cessation until after midnight, but our infantry nobly stood their ground, and the enemy's guns were repeatedly silenced.

During the night, I threw my battery into echelon, at about two-thirds the usual intervals and distances, the better to command the slope of the hill and both flanks, and, when, not engaged in firing, and my men throw up earthworks in front of the guns, which proved of great service in the next morning's engagement. Toward morning, Captain Squier, of Major-General Berry's staff, who had a pioneer company under his command, relieved my men of this duty.

At the first glimmer of day on Sunday, the 3rd instant, the battle opened furiously upon our left and front, the enemy driving our lines back upon their supports after a brief but brisk engagement. Our artillery fired upon the enemy's infantry until the two lines were so near each other that our fire was alike dangerous to friend and foe. Berry's division, in our front at this time, repulsed the enemy handsomely, as it did repeatedly during the morning, aided by the artillery.

Our left having fallen back, our troops in front were exposed to a heavy fire both in front and flank, and finally fell back a short distance, but in good order, the batteries keeping the enemy in check while our infantry rallied and advanced, regaining their former position.

Four or five times our infantry retired a short distance, and again obstinately advanced, driving the enemy, who seemed to outnumber them two to one. At each successive attack, the enemy's numbers increased. As they came down the hill in almost solid masses, our artillery greeted them with shot and shell, causing a fearful destruction in their ranks.

Just before the last charge of the New Jersey Brigade, in front of my battery, the enemy came down in solid masses, covering, as it were, the whole ground in front of our lines, with at least a dozen stand of colors flying in their midst. I immediately ordered my guns loaded with solid shot, and, as our infantry fell back and wheeled to the left, unmasking the battery, fired at about 1 1/2 degrees' elevation. The effect was most terrible. A few rounds sufficed to drive the enemy in great confusion up the hill, whereupon our infantry again charged and took several stand of colors. The enemy then crossed the road and came down in the woods upon our right. Just before this, the section of Dimick's battery in front had been compelled to retire, and, soon after, his guns upon my right also withdrew. Meanwhile the enemy continued to advance, our own troops slowly return before him. In a few moments, the former came out of the woods not more than 100 yards from the muzzle of my guns, planted their colors by the side of the road, and commenced picking off my men and horses. When a sufficient number had rallied around their colors, my guns having been previously loaded with canister, I gave the order to fire. In this way they were repeatedly driven back. they were, however, rapidly closing around us in the woods upon our right, not more than 25 or 30 yards from my right gun, when I received your orders to limber up and retire; besides, my ammunition was exhausted. I limbered from the left successively, continuing to fire until my last piece was limbered.

The battery retired to the ammunition train, and was put in readiness for another engagement before night.

On the morning of the 5th, I was ordered by General Hunt, through you, to take my battery across the river and to the vicinity of Hartwood Church, and then return with my horses for the Fourth New York Battery. Mistaking the road, I went to Berea Church, where I arrived at 4 p. m. After resting and feeding my horses, I returned with my drivers to the United States Ford. At midnight, I had moved the Fourth New York Battery about 2 miles. the rain had fallen in torrents, and the roads were almost impassable. I was compelled to leave three caissons and the battery wagon and forge at this place, and double my teams on the remainder of the carriages. I left the Fourth New York Battery near Berea Church at daylight on the 6th, and sent my own to its camp near Falmouth.

I cannot close this hastily written report without speaking of the gallant behavior of the officers and men under my command. The duties throughout the whole movement were most arduous, and the battle, from its commencement on Saturday evening to its close, between 9 and 10 a. m. Sunday, the most fearful and hardest fought of the many in which this battery has been engaged.

Although exposed most of the time to a heavy fire of artillery and infantry, my officers and men maintained throughout a coolness and bravery worthy of all praise.

Lieutenants Mathewson, Ames, and Richardson commanded their respective sections to my entire satisfaction and are entitled to all the honors that can be bestowed upon officers for gallant conduct. Not a man but performed his duty nobly and cheerfully. Not a murmur or complaint was heard, either upon the tiresome march or upon the battle-field. The only order obeyed with reluctance was that to retire. Under no circumstance would they have forsaken their guns. Below are the names of the killed and wounded in this battery.* I also lost 20 horses killed and disabled.

I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. B. WINSLOW,

First Lieutenant First New York Artillery, Commanding Battery D.

Captain THOMAS W. OSBORN,

Chief of Artillery, Second Div., Third Army Corps.

*Report of Captain James F. Huntington,
First Ohio Light Artillery, Chief of Artillery.*

**HDQRS. ARTILLERY, THIRD DIV., THIRD ARMY CORPS,
May 8, 1863.**

CAPTAIN:

I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the batteries of this division in the late action near Chancellorsville on May 2 and 3:

The batteries crossed the river at the United States Ford about noon on Friday, the 1st instant, and moved up and parked near the headquarters of General Couch.

Remained at that place until the afternoon of the following day, when, in obedience to orders, we followed the division up the Plank road, and halted in the open field to the left of the woods bordering that road. While the infantry went on to the front, a considerable body of cavalry drew up near us on our left as we faced while in park. While resting there, the attack was made on the Eleventh Corps. The firing grew nearer, and though we could see nothing, it was evident that our troops were giving way. Captain Puttkammer being absent at the time, I ordered the three batteries to wheel into battery. They had hardly

done so when a torrent of our retreating infantry tore through our line, frightening the horses and producing a temporary confusion. The enemy opened a heavy fire from our front, and, advancing through the woods between us and the Plank road, enfiladed our lines. This rendered it necessary to retire a little and make a partial change of front. The execution of this maneuver was much impeded by the cavalry before alluded to, which rode round and round on the ground we wished to occupy. The Tenth New York Battery, which was close to the edge of the woods, exposed to a severe fire, being unable to make the change of front, limbered up and retired, taking a new position farther to the rear and right.

Battery H, First Ohio, was then swung round so as to rake the woods on our right, and continued to fire in that direction, while the Eleventh New York Battery maintained the front until the enemy fell back and our infantry returned. The men lay by the guns all night, and early on Sunday morning all the artillery was withdrawn, except the pieces of Battery H, which were to remain and hold that position. Two regiments of infantry also remained, one on each flank. The enemy soon advanced in strong force from the woods in front, where they also had a battery, which played on us, while another body moved round our left flank. The battery was served as rapidly as possible and kept the front clear, but though the infantry on our left fought gallantly, it was forced back. Seeing our flank turned and the enemy already in our rear, I ordered the battery to limber to the rear, and moved off. Our only line of retreat was down over the hill, on the brink of which we were, through a piece of marshy ground and over a bad ditch, and through a narrow space to the left of the line of breastworks thrown across the ravine. Two of the pieces got out, but the horses of the others being shot and unable to get them over the ditch, and being exposed to the fire of our own men as well as that of the advancing enemy, they were necessarily abandoned. I was with the last piece, and speak from personal knowledge. One gun was afterward recovered. The remains of this battery were then sent to the rear.

After the Tenth and Eleventh New York Batteries left the position occupied on Saturday evening, they went back near General Hooker's headquarters and formed in line. The Eleventh New York Battery was soon after placed in position on the right of the Plank road. It was here exposed to a heavy artillery fire, losing so many horses that the bodies of the caissons and one complete caisson were abandoned, when the battery retired, for the want of teams to draw them off. This battery was then bade back, and put in position near the frame house known as General Couch's headquarters, and remained there until evening, when it was ordered back to the ford. The first position taken

by the Tenth New York Battery was in front of General Hooker's headquarters diagonally across the corner. This battery suffered severely at this point. It remained there until all the artillery was ordered back to the new position, where it was held until our whole force retired.

In my opinion the batteries of this division are entitled to credit for maintaining their position on Saturday evening, left as they were without support worth naming, exposed to the demoralizing effects of the flight through their ranks of a crowd of panic-stricken fugitives. Permit me to add that the practice of placing infantry supports in the rear of batteries cannot be too strongly deprecated; they generally in such cases do nothing or worse than nothing.

On Saturday evening, one company of the One hundred and tenth Pennsylvania, lying in the rear of Battery H, First Ohio, rose and fired a volley directly into it, not, of course, designedly, but owing to their being in our rear. I have the honor to refer you for particulars of casualties to report already sent in. The total loss of the three batteries was 40 killed, wounded, and missing.

I am, captain, yours, most respectfully,

J. F. HUNTINGTON,

Captain , and Chief of Artillery, Third Div., Third Army Corps.

*Report of Lieutenant Charles E. Hazlett,
Battery D, Fifth U. S. Artillery.*

**CAMP BATTERY D, FIFTH U. S. ARTILLERY,
May 8, 1863.**

SIR:

I have the honor to state that this battery left camp on the 30th ultimo, and reached Chancellorsville, Va., on the afternoon of the 1st instant.

On the morning the 2nd instant it took position on the left, where it remained until ordered to recross the river. The battery was not engaged, and suffered no loss either in men, horses, or material.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHAS. E. HAZLETT,

First Lieutenant Fifth Artillery, Commanding Battery.

**Captain S. H. WEED,
Chief of Artillery, Fifth Army Corps, Army of the Potomac.**

*Report of Captain Frank C. Gibbs,
Battery L, First Ohio Light Artillery.*

**CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA.,
May 8, 1863.**

SIR:

I have the honor to report the following as the operations of Battery L,
First Ohio Light Artillery, in the late engagement with the enemy:

Left Stoneman's Station April 30 at 3 p.m. encamped near Hurtwood Church for
the night at 8 p.m.

May 1.-Broke camp at 6 a.m.; crossed the United States Ford at 3 p.m., and went
into park at Chancellorsville at 9 p.m.

May 2.-Broke camp at 6 a.m. and went into park 1 mile from Chancellorsville, on
the road leading to the ford.

May 3.-Ordered to the front at 7 a.m., and took position with the left and
center sections, on the right, and with the right section, on the front of the
white house line of operations. Remained in position until May 5, at 7.30 p.m.,
when we marched to the United States Ford, crossing at 5 a.m. May 6, arriving
at our old camp at 1.30 p.m.

Lost 1 lieutenant and 1 corporal, killed; 2 corporals and 6 privates wounded.

I remain, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

**F. C. GIBBS,
Captain, Commanding Battery L, First Ohio Light Artillery.
Captain S. H. WEED,
Chief of Artillery, Fifth Army Corps.**

Report of Captain John. A. Reynolds, First New York Light Artillery.

**HDQRS. BATTERY L, FIRST NEW YORK ARTILLERY,
Near White Oak Church, Va., May 9, 1863.**

CAPTAIN:

I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my battery in the late engagement:

On the morning of April 29, at daylight, I took position with my battery, in accordance with orders received from Colonel Wainwright, chief of artillery, First Corps, on the line of hills commanding the river and near Pollock's Mill. As soon as the mist rose from the river, our infantry was discovered engaged with the enemy, who was in rifle-pits, and endeavoring to prevent the laying of the bridge. Soon after, when the crossing was effected by boats, and the charge made upon the rifle-pits by the Sixth Wisconsin and the Twenty-fourth Michigan, I directed a few shots, by order of Colonel Wainwright, at the retreating rebels. I expended 12 rounds at this time.

About noon of the 30th ultimo, several shots from a battery of 20-pounder Parrotts were thrown near our position, but the efforts of the enemy failed, nearly all of the projectiles falling short. No injury was sustained and no reply made.

At 3 a. m. on the 1st instant, I was directed to move my battery across the river and report to Brigadier-General Wadsworth, which I obeyed, taking position on the plain just above the bridge and behind earthworks, which had been thrown up during the night.

At about 9 a. m. on the 2nd instant, when the First Division was about to retire across the river, a severe fire was opened upon us by a battery of the enemy in our front and near the foot of the heights. They had a perfect range of my battery. Eight of my men were severely wounded, 1 of whom died; 2 others received slight wounds. Ten horses were killed or disabled and 2 slightly wounded. Three limbers were injured by the fire; on one an axle broken, on another, part of the lid to chest blown off, and, on the third, one wheel knocked to pieces. The harness was also considerably cut up. The precise effect of our fire could not be observed on account of the trees along the Bowling Green road obstructing the view from thence to the enemy's position. We saw one limber or caisson explode, and the pickets, who could better observe, state that we disabled one of their pieces. The firing was kept up for about an hour and a half before we succeeded in silencing the enemy, and was continued slowly for another half hour, during which time the other troops were safely withdrawn across the bridge. I next withdrew my battery, piece by piece, keeping up the firing until the last gun was removed. We expended 303 rounds in this action. The distance between the batteries was computed at about 2,000 yards. Our shell, as far as I could judge, worked very well, though many of the paper

fuses are imperfect. The combination case-shot worked admirably with this exception-in ramming them many caught on the end of the reamer, which had to be worked or turned to disengage them, thus deranging the setting. I have since had the reamers reamed out more, thus obviating this difficulty.

The officers and men were cool and collected. Lieutenants Reynolds and Breck were especially so, watching carefully the effect of the fire from their sections, and giving directions accordingly, inspiring their men with coolness by their example. Sergt. Amos Gibbs is also deserving of especial mention. Though wounded in the shoulder by a shell, thereby rendering him unable for duty, he persisted in remaining at his piece, and when by me ordered to go to the rear went to the bank, and in about a quarter of an hour I again found him at his post. This time I positively ordered him to the rear and to remain there. Sergt. William Henry Shelton is also deserving of special mention. He was as cool as on ordinary drill, and by his example inspired his detachment with courage and coolness. The earthworks thrown up in front of the pieces afforded great protection to the men, who would undoubtedly have suffered much more had they been entirely exposed, as several shots struck directly in front of the works and many pieces lodged in them.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. A. REYNOLDS,
Captain Battery L, First New York Artillery.

Report of Captain James A. Hall, Second Maine Battery.

WHITE OAK CHURCH, VA.,
May 9, 1863.

COLONEL:

I have the honor to report that we marched from our encampment near Fletcher Chapel, Va., by order of General Robinson, at 12, Monday, the 28th of April, and arrived at the bank of the Rappahannock, 3 miles below Fredericksburg, at 2 a. m. on the 29th. We took up our position, covering the bridge, and fired 11 rounds at the enemy's infantry, all of the shots doing well. We remained in this position until May 2, when we moved, at 11.30 a. m., up the river, and crossed it at United States Ford, and bivouacked for the night in the woods, 1 1/2 miles from Chancellorsville, Va. May 3, at 7 a. m., marched to the heights, taking position on the right of the line of battle of the Army of the Potomac.

We occupied this position until the 6th, when we marched, by order of Brigadier-General Hunt, chief of artillery, Army of the Potomac, to the United States Ford. May 6, crossed the Rappahannock, and went into camp at Berea Church, 5 miles from Falmouth, Va.

May 7, marched from Berea Church, and arrived at White Oak Church at 4 p. m. same date, and went into camp.

JAMES A. HALL,
Captain, Commanding Second Mounted Battery, Maine Volunteers.
Colonel C. S. WAINWRIGHT,
Chief of Artillery, First Army Corps.

*Report of Captain Dunbar R. Ransom, Third U. S. Artillery,
Commanding Battery C, Fifth U. S. Artillery.*

WHITE OAK CHURCH, VA.,
May 9, 1863.

COLONEL:

I have the honor to report that this battery marched from camp near Fletcher Chapel, Va., by order of General Robinson, at 12 m. on the 28th day of April, and arrived at the Rappahannock River, 3 miles below Fredericksburg, at daylight on the 29th instant, having 3 horses shot while going into position to cover the crossing; fired three case shots at the enemy's skirmishers. On the 30th instant, by order of General Reynolds, we moved across the river and took a position on the right of Battery B, Fourth U. S. Artillery, Lieutenant Stewart, and near the bridge, where we remained until the following day, May 1, a portion of the time under fire; did not reply, as the enemy was out of range of our guns. We were then relieved by Battery L, First New York Artillery, Captain Reynolds, recrossed the river, and parked on the flat in front of the Fitzhugh house. We remained here until the morning of the 2nd, when, by order of General Reynolds, we took a position near the river to cover the recrossing of the troops, where we remained until the bridge was removed. By order of General Reynolds, we marched to United States Ford, and crossed the river at sunset with the division.

On the morning of the 3rd, we marched to the front, and took a position with Battery B, Fourth U. S. Artillery and Second Maine Volunteers, on the front and right of the Army of the Potomac, and covering a road leading to the Rapidan River, where we remained until the night of the 5th instant, when, by order of General Reynolds, we moved back nearly to the river, when we were halted and ordered to return to our former position by General Hunt, where we remained

until 3 a. m. of the 6th instant, when we moved back to the river and took a position to cover the recrossing of the troops; after which we moved to the left bank of the river and took a position by order of General Meade, where we remained until the bridge was removed. Then marched to Berea Church and camped for the night. On the 7th instant, marched to White Oak Church.

D. R. RANSOM,
Captain Third Artillery, Commanding Battery.
Colonel C. S. WAINWRIGHT,
Chief of Artillery, First Army Corps.

*Report of Captain R. Bruce Ricketts,
Battery F, First Pennsylvania Light Artillery.*

HDQRS. BATTERY F, FIRST PENNSYLVANIA ARTILLERY,
May 9, 1863.

MAJOR:

I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by my command in the late operations in the vicinity of Fredericksburg:

At daylight on the morning of April 29, I was placed in position in the corn-field in front of the Fitzhugh house, by Colonel Wainwright, chief of artillery, First Army Corps.

At 5 p. m. on the 30th, the enemy opened from a battery of 20-pounder Parrott guns, at a distance of about 3,600 yards, and continued firing until 7 p. m. During that time I fired 20 Hotchkiss shell, 25 Schenkl percussion, and 3 case-shot (Schenkl), at an elevation of from 10 to 14 degrees, and fuse from eleven to fifteen seconds. The distance being so great, and several batteries firing at the same time, it was impossible to determine with any degree of certainty what execution was done. I was able to ascertain, however, the proper elevation to be 14 degrees, and length of fuse fifteen seconds.

On Saturday morning, May 2, the enemy opened again from the same battery. During the forenoon I fired 30 shell (Hotchkiss), 27 percussion (Schenkl), and 18 case-shot (Schenkl), all at an elevation of 14 degrees. On Saturday afternoon, I marched with my command up the river, and crossed at the United States Ford. On Sunday evening, I was ordered to the front, to relieve Captain Seeley's battery, and was placed in position on the extreme left of the Fifth Army Corps. The enemy made several attacks on this position, but every time

were repulsed. The woods in front were but 250 yards distant, and were occupied by the enemy's sharpshooters, who kept up a continued firing, compelling me to remove the horses to the rear and to throw up earthworks for the protection of the men. Not a man or horse was hit during all the operations. While in this position, I fired 4 rounds of canister and 2 case-shot (Schenkl), with one and a half second's fuse.

On Tuesday evening, May 5, I received orders to retire across the river, and reached our present camp, near white Oak Church, on Thursday, May 7.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. BRUCE RICKETTS,

Captain, Commanding Battery F, First Pennsylvania Artillery.

Major E. W. MATTHEWS,

Chief of Artillery, Third Division, First Army Corps.

*Report of Captain Frank P. Amsden,
Battery G, First Pennsylvania Light Artillery.*

**CAMP BATTERY G, FIRST PENNSYLVANIA ART.,
May 9, 1863.**

MAJOR:

I have the honor to make the following report of the participation of Battery G, First Pennsylvania Artillery, in the late engagement:

Left camp April 28, about 10 a. m.; took up line of march for the heights in the rear of Pollock's Mill; reached the heights and went into position about daylight on the morning of the 29th. Fired 8 rounds of shrapnel during the morning.

Left this position at 4 p. m. May 1; took position near Traveler's Rest, on Widow Gray's farm, about 10 a. m.

On the 2nd instant, took up line of march to the United States Ford; crossed the United States Ford about midnight, and encamped in the woods about 2 miles beyond the ford.

About 10 a. m. on the 3rd instant, I received orders from Captain Candler, aide to General Hooker, to report at General hooker's headquarters with the battery; found General Meade at headquarters, who ordered me to report to General Couch, on the road toward Chancellorsville; reported to General Couch, who ordered me

to report to Captain Weed, commanding the artillery. Was assigned a position in the line of artillery, upon the ground recently occupied as General Hooker's headquarters; maintained this position until 8 a. m. of the 5th instant.

On the 3rd instant, fired 90 shrapnel, 23 shell, and 46 canister.

On the 4th instant, fired 32 shrapnel, 44 shell, and 20 canister.

On the 3rd instant, First Lieutenant Beldin Spence slightly wounded, 2 men severely and 4 slightly wounded, and 3 horses killed.

On the 4th instant, 2 men severely wounded.

On the 5th instant, at 8 p. m., I took up line of march and recrossed the river at the United States Ford, and encamped on the heights for the night.

On the 6th instant, took up line of march for old camp, and encamped on the night of the 6th at the white house, near headquarters Army of the Potomac.

On the morning of the 7th instant, I received orders from Colonel Wainwright to report to General Doubleday, commanding Third Division, First Army Corps; marched with the division to the heights, near Pollock's Mill.

On the 8th instant, I received orders from Colonel Wainwright to join artillery park of the First Corps, in camp near White Oak Church; joined the same at 4 p. m.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. P. AMSDEN,

Captain, Commanding Battery G, First Pennsylvania Artillery.

Major E. W. MATTHEWS,

Chief of Artillery, Third Division, First Army Corps.

*Report of Lieutenant Nelson Ames,
Battery G, First New York Light Artillery.*

CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA.,

May 9, 1863.

SIR:

I have the honor to report that, during the late engagement of the Army of the Potomac, on the 2nd and 3rd instant, my battery occupied a number of

different positions, but without being actively engaged until the afternoon of the 3rd.

On the evening of the 2nd, when our lines were driven in, I immediately formed my battery to the right of the hospital, in the road leading from Chancellorsville to the United States Ford. After vainly endeavoring to learn by inquiry what troops, if any, were in my front, I dispatched First Lieutenant McClellan to the front on a hazardous expedition, to try and find out whether we had any troops on a hazardous expedition, to try and find out whether we had any troops in front or not. He proceeded for about a quarter of a mile without finding any pickets in my immediate front, but found General Sykes' division in line of battle about 1,000 yards to my left and front. Apprehending that the enemy might try and surprise the battery under cover of the darkness, I mounted a heavy guard, under command of a commissioned officer, to prevent a surprise during the night.

At 3 o'clock on the morning of the 3rd, I was ordered by Lieutenant-Colonel Morgan, chief of artillery, Second Army Corps, to fall back to the United States Ford. Shortly after arriving at the ford, I was again ordered to the front; but, upon again appearing at the front, I received orders to return again to the ford, as there was no position for the battery. Shortly after getting to the rear, I received orders from Colonel Wainwright, who commanded the artillery in the absence of General Hunt, to move to the front as soon as possible, to relieve Battery K, of the First Ohio Artillery. Shortly after getting into position, the enemy advanced in line of battle, when I opened fire with my whole battery with spherical case, which caused the enemy to fall back. About this time I received an order from Captain Weed to detach one section of the battery to take position in front of the hospital. I accordingly ordered Lieutenant McClellan to report to Captain Weed, with the left section, retaining with me the right and center sections, under command of Lieutenants [James B.] Hazelton and Goff. The left section remained in front of the hospital until the evening of the 5th instant, when the whole battery withdrew from the works, recrossed the river, and arrived in the old camp at 10 a.m. of the 6th instant, without the loss of one man or animal. The loss in material is very trifling.

In conclusion, I cannot say too much for the conduct of both officers and men during the whole time, both on the march and while under fire.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
**N. AMES, Lieutenant, First New York Light Artillery,
Commanding Company G.**

*Report of Captain Alanson M. Randol,
Battery E, First U. S. Artillery.*

**CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA.,
May 9, 1863.**

CAPTAIN:

I have the honor to report that my battery left camp on the 27th ultimo. Marched with the division to Chancellorsville, where, of Friday, I was ordered to report with my battery to General Sykes. About 4 p. m. I was ordered to return to the division, and by direction of General Humphreys placed the battery in position on the extreme left. I remained in position until the night of May 5, when I was ordered by General Slocum to recross the Rappahannock, via the United States Ford. The battery arrived at its old camp near Falmouth on the 6th instant. During the march to Chancellorsville, the rear axle of one of my caissons broke, owing to the great weight of forage I was ordered by the chief of artillery to carry on my carriages, but it was promptly repaired during the night.

During the absence of Captain Weed, I was in command of the corps artillery, and directed its march, from the position in the rear of Chancellorsville, across the river. This movement, in itself a very difficult one, the night being very dark and stormy and the roads almost impassable, was greatly retarded, my command being twice ordered to return to its former position and twice countermanded. Finally, General Hunt being absent, I was directed by General Patrick to move the artillery across the river. Being the ranking officer present, I ordered Captain Amsden to move on with his battery, and from that time, as far as I know, the passage of the artillery was almost without interruption.

I also forward herewith the report of Captain Bernes, commanding Battery C, First New York Artillery.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. M. RANDOL,

Captain First U. S. Artillery.

Captain S. H. WEED,

Chief of Artillery, Fifth Army Corps.

*Report of Captain William H. McCartney, Battery A.
Massachusetts Light Artillery, Artillery Battalion, First Division.*

CAMP, BATTERY A, May 9, 1863.

SIR:

I have the honor to report as follows concerning the operations of this battery on the 3rd and 4th days of May current:

On the morning of the 3rd, the battery was ordered into position on the left of the Bowling Green road, and directly in front of the Bernard house. Soon after reaching that position, the two left guns were engaged in driving back small bodies of the enemy's infantry, who were evidently trying to form for attack on the left of this battery, while the four right guns were engaged with four brass guns saturated in an earthwork about 1,300 yards in front of the battery. Toward this earthwork was directed the fire of Captain Rigby's Maryland battery, two guns of Battery A, New Jersey Artillery, and the four right guns of this battery. Between them all the enemy's four guns were silenced, one of them at least having been dismounted by a solid shot thrown from the right gun of this battery. The enemy replaced his brass guns with two 20-pounders and one 10 pounder Parrott into the earthwork from the rear. Subsequently he undertook to get four other rifled guns into the same work by the front, but through the combined efforts of the batteries above named he was unable to get in more than one. After we had been in this position about two hours, the enemy, having strengthened his picket on the left of this battery, caused them to advance on it, supported by a regiment of infantry. The nature of the ground was such that they were not seen until within 100 yards. The battery then opened on them with canister, with marked effect, the two left guns using it at not more than 75 yards. They fell back into the Bowling Green road, badly used up, and the battery, having expended all its ammunition but the canister in the center and rear boxes of the caissons, which were then absent for other ammunition, fell back to its position in front of the rifle-pits, near the pontoon bridge. This battery fired in this position 299 rounds of solid shot and 253 rounds of case shot, 85 shell used as solid shot, and 48 rounds of canister. The battery lost in this position 1 man killed, 1 wounded, and 4 horses killed.

In the afternoon, this battery moved through Fredericksburg, over the heights, and up the Plank road, near Salem Church, and was not engaged again during the day. Early in the morning of the 4th, this battery was put into position about 200 yards on the left of the Plank road and toll gate, near a large white house. Soon after reaching this position, the enemy opened on the left section, which was removed somewhat from the rest of the battery, with 20 pounder Parrots, at more than 2,000 yards distance. He succeeded in throwing 15 shells, which lodged inside of the left section, but as the limber had been

removed to the right, and as none of this shells burst, they did no harm. At about 1,000 yards in front of this battery , and directly toward it. The battery opened on them whit solid shot, forming by battery, which caused them to recoil in great confusion. They were rallied twice, but were again broken. The enemy then brought up two brass pieces to the front and left of the battery, but were utterly unable to get them into position. The men were driven from the guns by case shot thrown from this battery, and they did not fire a shot. Subsequently the enemy came from the woods in small squads, for the purpose of forming and charging on the battery, as I am informed, but the battery threw case shot at them, and ,instead of charging, they dispersed.

I beg leave to say in this connection that the case shot worked admirably, but 1 round exploding prematurely out of 142 rounds thrown. I was then ordered to withdraw the battery by section, which was executed, the last section moving off at about dusk.

This battery fired in this position 24 rounds of solid shot and 142 rounds of case shot. The battery lost in this position 2 houses killed.

I beg leave to add that the officers and men of this command conducted themselves at all times as became soldiers, and that from the time the battery broke camp near the present camp until it returned, not one man of the battery was at any time absent from this post.

I am, sir, with much respect,
W. H. McCARTNEY,
Captain, Commanding.
Major J. A. TOMPKINS,
Commanding Artillery Brigade.

*Report of Lieutenant Augustus N. Parsons,
Battery A, New Jersey Light Artillery.*

CAMP NEAR WHITE OAK CHURCH, VA.,
May 9, 1863.

SIR:

I have the honor to make the following report:

On the morning of the 3rd instant, received an order from you to place the battery in position and within range of the enemy's batteries which were posted upon the side of the hill below the town of Fredericksburg, which

order I immediately executed, and opened fire upon the enemy, using percussion and time shell at 5 and 6 degrees' elevation and seven to eight seconds fuse, with what effect it is impossible for me to say, but I believe the shots from the battery injured the enemy considerably. The battery fired about 300 rounds, when, near 11 a. m., I received orders to limber up and follow Captain McCartney, halting about 1 mile back from the town of Fredericksburg, where I again received orders to move forward, following Captain Rigby. After moving along the road for about one-third of a mile, the head of the column was fired upon by the enemy from a battery placed in the road, near the toll gate. I immediately turned into the field to the right of the road, for the purpose of placing the battery in position, but in the meantime Captain Rigby was placing his battery in position in the same field, so that I could only get three guns in position to bear upon the enemy's battery. I fired about 50 rounds, 20 of which were percussion shell, the other time shell and case shot, with three to four seconds fuse.

I then received orders from General Brooks to move forward along the road, with the advance of the infantry, when, after moving forward about half of a mile, the enemy again opened fire from a battery placed in and near the road, to the left of a large barn. I immediately opened fire upon the enemy with my right section, and had the other four guns brought up as quickly as possible. I fired about 50 rounds of shell, the enemy firing about 20 rounds, when they limbered up and left. Later in the day, when our infantry were repulsed and falling back, I opened fire over heads of our own men with percussion shell, but as soon as the enemy were out of the woods and I could fire without endangering our own men, I used shell and case shot at short range. The firing was very rapid, and during that part of the action I fired about 600 rounds, from point-blank to 5 degrees' elevation and one and a half to six seconds fuse. I remained in position until 10 p. m., when I was relieved by another battery.

On the 4th instant, about 4 p. m., I was ordered by General Brooks to report to General Bartlett, which I did, and was ordered to go into battery near a ravine which was occupied by the enemy's infantry, which were then firing upon our pickets. I immediately opened fire upon them with shell and case shot at very short range, and with good effect, which checked the enemy, and caused them to fall back. At that point, I fired about 400 rounds from four guns, the other two having been ordered to go to the assistance of General Russell's brigade, when I received orders from General Bartlett to retire to the river. During the action of the 3rd and 4th, this battery fired between 1,400 and 1,500 rounds. It is impossible for me to give the exact number of rounds, for the number and kinds of projectiles, part of the ammunition having been drawn

during the action and packed by the divers of the caissons, the different kinds not being properly assorted through the ammunition chests.

The battery lost none killed; 1 man was wounded, shot through the leg; lost 2 horses. With one or two exceptions, the men behaved well.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

A. N. PARSONS,

First Lieutenant, Commanding Battery.

Major J. A. TOMPKINS,

Commanding Artillery Brigade.

*Report of Captain James H. Rigby,
Battery A, Maryland Light Artillery.*

**CAMP, BATTERY A, MARYLAND ARTILLERY,
May 9, 1863.**

SIR:

I have the honor to report that, on the morning of the 28th of April, I received an order to report with my battery to Colonel Charles Tompkins, at the Sands house. I found the colonel about 5 o'clock in the evening, and was ordered by him to take a position on the heights opposite Fredericksburg. I left camp about 2.30 a. m., 29th, for the place designated; arrived there, and placed my battery in position at about 4 a. m. I remained there without having occasion to fire on the enemy until the evening of May 2, when I was ordered to cross the river and report to you.

About 6 o'clock on Sunday morning, May 3, I was ordered by you to take a position in front of two small earthworks, in which the enemy were working four brass 12-pounders. After a lively engagement of about two hours' duration, they were compelled to retire, and the forts were immediately occupied by two 20-pounder Parrots. At the same time an attempt was made to re-enforce them with four 12-pounders, but the solid shot from Captain McCartney's 12-pounders and the shell from a section of Captain Hexamer's and my own battery fell among them so thick that I do not think they succeeded in placing more than one of the guns in position. We remained in this position until the heights in the rear of Fredericksburg were in possession of our troops, when I was ordered by General Brooks to proceed to Fredericksburg. In this position I fired 200 Schenkl percussion shell and 250 Schenkl combination shrapnel, at a distance of 1,200 yards; had 1 man and 1 horse wounded. I arrived in the city about 1 p. m., and rested about three-fourths of an hour, after which started, in company

with the brigade, for the heights. After resting there about half an hour, was ordered to follow the Third Brigade, First Division. Had not proceeded more than 1 1/2 miles, when we fell on the enemy's pickets. Just as we reached the top of a hill in the road, they opened upon us with a rifled gun, at a distance of about 800 yards. The second shell exploded directly in front of my right piece, severely wounding Sergt. John Wormsley and killing his horse. My right piece was immediately thrown forward, and took a position on the left of the road; the rest of my guns were placed in position on the right of the road, from which point we delivered a very effective fire, judging from the haste in which the enemy withdrew his guns. We followed him about a mile, when he made a stand upon a high ridge in rear of a dense wood. Here a severe engagement took place between the infantry, the artillery not being very actively engaged, until near sundown, when the rebels pressed our infantry so hard they were compelled to retire. At this time I poured shrapnel into them as fast as I could, and as soon as they came within the range my right section gave them canister. I was unable to fire canister from my other guns on account of the large numbers of our troops directly in front of them. Night ended this engagement. In the two positions I fired 150 Schenkl percussion shell, 200 Schenkl combination shrapnel, and 10 rounds of canister. I had 1 sergeant severely wounded, 1 horse killed, and 1 crippled.

The next morning (Monday, May 4). I was ordered to report to General Howe for duty. I found him about 7 a. m. He placed me in a position on the Banks' Ford road, about 250 yards to the left of the Plank road.

We remained in this position, inactive, until about 4 p. m., at which time the rebels attacked us with an overwhelming force, and compelled our troops to retire. I poured shell into them until they came close enough for shrapnel, when I poured that into them. They advanced firmly and steadily, and when they had arrived about 200 yards from the battery, the Twentieth New York regiment (which was directly in front of me) broke and ran into the battery. They frightened my horses, and created so much confusion that I could do nothing. The rebels were still advancing, and when they were about 80 yards from me, I gave the order to limber to the rear. This was done with considerable difficulty, owing to the confusion created by the broken regiment, which was still hovering around the battery. The horses attached to one of my limbers became unmanageable and ran away, leaving the piece on the field. As soon as I perceived this, I drew my saber, and, by hard blows, forced the infantry to assist in drawing the piece from the field, which was done by attaching a prolonged. They drew it about 200 yards, where I found the limber. The rebels were driven back by the Third Vermont Regiment. I immediately joined the rest of my battery, and moved to the left of the line, where I met

Colonel Thompkins, who placed me in position, where I remained until dark, when I was ordered by General Howe to proceed to the river and report to General Brooks. I found General Brooks; he placed me in position, where I remained until about midnight, when I was ordered to cross the river.

In the last engagement I fired 82 Schenkl percussion shell, 93 Schenkl combination shrapnel, and had 1 man wounded and 2 horses crippled. You will perceive that I have fired 985 projectiles, had 1 sergeant and 2 privates wounded, 1 horse killed and 4 wounded.

I am happy to say that my gunners have proved themselves excellent marksmen, my men have behaved exceedingly well, my officers performed their duties with gallantry, and I am proud to say are an honor to the State which calls them her sons.

I am, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,
JAS. H. RIGBY,
Captain Battery A, Maryland Artillery.
Major J. A. TOMPKINS,
Chief of Artillery, First Division, Sixth Army Corps.

*Report of Lieutenant Leonard Martin,
Battery F, Fifth U. S. Artillery.*

**CAMP NEAR WHITE OAK CHURCH, VA.,
May 9, 1863.**

MAJOR:

I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken in the recent engagement by Battery F, Fifth Artillery:

On the night of May 2, it crossed the Rappahannock. Previous to that, while on the river, it had been in position at different points along the flats opposite the position of General Brooks' division, for the purpose of protecting the flanks of that command. On the morning of May 3, having moved to a point a little below and near Fredericksburg, after an attack on the height immediately in rear of that place had been made and repulsed, a position was taken so as to fire both upon those heights and those still farther below, along which artillery could be discerned. Until the attack by which the heights were taken (about 10 a. m.) was made, a desultory firing was kept up, in which, as shown by subsequent investigation, the enemy suffered severely. Occupying such commanding points, and protected by earthworks, the enemy had an

immense advantage over us, as only extremely accurate shot could harm him in the least. In the successful attack, I regard the artillery as taking no mean part. The rapidity and accuracy of its fire kept the enemy from working his guns with the effect their position warranted.

The battery followed closely on the infantry in its attack, and came into position on the crest only a few seconds after its capture. A battery of eight guns of the enemy opened upon us immediately on our arrival, at the close range of 600 yards. The fire upon us for a short time was terrific. It only, however, required fifteen minutes to dislodge them. What injury was sustained by them could not be ascertained.

The enemy attacked us in position on the left of the line early Monday morning. One section, the light 12-pounder guns, had been placed to command the approach of the heights. The section then had no support between it and the enemy. There was but a thin line of skirmishers; about 60, I believe. He charged the heights with four regiments, and was repulsed by the fire of the 12-pounders and the few skirmishers. The practice of the artillery was magnificent.

in the afternoon, about 5 p. m., the enemy threw his whole force upon us. One section of the Parrot guns had been brought over and placed near the light 12-pounder section, to protect the left. The remaining section (Parrots) was some half mile on the right, near the right of the division. While the enemy was advancing, the four guns on the left, over which I had more particular control, kept up a sharp enfilading fire upon him. The different positions were taken by them as their advance rendered necessary. All the ammunition in the light 12-pounders was expended, and nearly all in the Parrot guns, which could do but little execution against the approach of infantry. I only left my position for the rear when the enemy was nearly upon us on three sides. On the front and on the left the enemy's infantry was not more than 15 yards distant.

I cannot too highly praise the conduct of both officers and men under fire. Lieutenant McDonald, in command of the light 12-pounders, did fine service through the day. Lieutenant Hickox, with me on the left, and Lieutenant Simon, on the right, displayed great coolness and gallantry. All of them deserve promotion.

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

LEONARD MARTIN,

First Lieutenant Fifth Artillery, Commanding.

Major J. WATTS DE PEYSTER,

Chief of Artillery, Second Division, Second Army Corps.

*Report of Major Ezra W. Matthews,
First Pennsylvania Light Artillery, Chief of Artillery.*

**HDQRS. ARTILLERY, THIRD DIV., FIRST ARMY CORPS,
May 10, 1863.**

GENERAL:

I have the honor to inclose the reports of the operations of Batteries B, F and G, First Pennsylvania Artillery, from April 29 to May 6.

While in position at the lower crossing of the Rappahannock, opposite the Fitzhugh house, they were engaged, on April 29 and 30, and May 1 and 2, in shelling the rifle-pits and in replying to the enemy's heavy guns (20-pounder Parrotts) at long range; no loss at this point.

On the 2nd instant, they marched with the First Corps to and across the United States Ford.

On the 3rd, Captain Amsden, commanding Battery G, took position in the front line of the Second Army Corps, near the white house, at one time occupied as headquarters by General Hooker. Here he was constantly annoyed by the enemy's sharpshooters, and during the several engagements lost 2 men severely wounded, 1 officer and 4 men slightly wounded, and 3 horses killed. On the afternoon of the 3rd, Captain Ricketts took position in front of General Meade's headquarters, on the left of the Fifth Corps and on the right of the Second. This position was attacked several times, and was exposed to the constant fire of the sharpshooters of the enemy, but, by removing his horses to the rear and throwing up earth works in front, Captain Ricketts suffered no loss whatever. General Whipple was standing near this position when shot by one of the enemy's sharpshooters.

Captain Cooper did not move to the front, but on the 5th recrossed the river and took position on the left bank below the ford, where he threw a few shells at the enemy's batteries at long range; he suffered no loss.

On the 6th instant, the batteries returned to camp near their present position at White Oak Church. Officers and men behaved well, with one exception, an attached infantryman, of Battery F, who feigned sickness and did not cross the river; he will be brought to trial. The batteries are ready for further operations.

I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant,
**E. W. MATTHEWS, Major, Commanding Artillery,
Third Division, First Army Corps.**

**Report of Captain James H. Cooper,
Battery B, First Pennsylvania Light Artillery.**

May 10th, 1863.

SIR:

I have the honor to make the following report of the action of Battery B, First Pennsylvania Artillery, from April 29 to May 7:

The battery was ordered into position on the morning of April 29 on the left bank of the Rappahannock, a short distance below the Bernard house, and to the right of the bridges. At about 8.30 a. m., by order of Colonel Wainwright, the rifle-pits of the enemy, on the opposite shore, were shelled slowly for about one hour. During the firing 79 projectiles were expended, of which 30 were Schenkl percussion, 30 Hotchkiss time shell, and 19 Hotchkiss case-shot. Most of the percussion, 30 Hotchkiss time-shell, and 19 Hotchkiss case-shot. Most of the percussion shell struck in and about the pits and exploded. A small proportion did not explode. The Hotchkiss shell and case-shot worked well, most of them exploding at or near the point fired upon. The battery remained at the place above designated without further action until the morning of May 2, at 10 a. m., when it took up the line of march for the United States Ford, where it crossed the river and parked three-eighths of a mile from the bank until May 5. At 10 a. m., by order of Captain Best, it recrossed the river and was posted on the bank of the river, 1 mile below the United Sated Ford, where it remained until about 10 a. m., May 6, when the enemy opened a battery to our right and front, about 1,500 yards distant.

This battery was beyond a crest of a hill, firing down a ravine at Thompson's and Knap's batteries. We could see nothing but the smoke of their guns rising above the crest of the hill, and the projectiles were fired at such an elevation as to go over the hill, and the effect could not be observed. This engagement lasted about one hour, in which 73 projectiles were fire, of which 120 were Hotchkiss time-shell, 12 Schenkl percussion, and 51 Hotchkiss case-shot. At 5.30 p. m. the battery withdrew from this position, and went into camp near the Warrenton pike.

On the morning of the 7th instant, it marched to its present camp near Whit Oak Church, where it arrived at 5 p. m.

No casualties occurred to the men or officers of the battery during these operations. The materials lost were 1 horse (left exhausted); 4 tar-buckets and 4 watering-buckets were lost on the march.

J. H. COOPER,
Captain, Pennsylvania Artillery, Commanding Battery B.
Colonel C. S. WAINWRIGHT,
Chief of Artillery, First Army Corps.

*Report of Lieutenant Edward B. Williston,
Battery D, Second U. S. Artillery.*

CAMP IN THE FIELD, May 10, 1863.

SIR:

I have the honor to submit the following report of the park taken by this battery in the action on the south side of the Rappahannock between the 29th day of April and the 6th day of May, 1863:

At 1 p. m. on the 28th of April, I was detached from the First Division, Sixth Corps, and ordered to report to Colonel Tompkins, First Rhode Island Artillery, chief of corps artillery, at Sands' house. I moved the battery to the place designated as soon as possible, and reported, as ordered, at 6 p. m. of same day. I was ordered to hold my battery in readiness to protect, with Seeley's battery of the Fourth U. S. Artillery, the bridge builders at pollock's house.

On the morning of the 29th, the rifle-pits on the opposite side of the river having been occupied by our infantry, I moved my guns over and put them in position within the principal work. By order of General Brooks, commanding First Division, Sixth Corps, I took every precaution against any right attack. The battery remained in this work until daylight on the morning of Sunday, May 3, when I was ordered to report to General Russell, at the Bernard house, by Major Tompkins, First Rhode Island Artillery, commanding division artillery. The battery was moved forward, and halted under the protection of a slight rise of ground. During the time it remained in this position, it was subjected to a severe artillery fire from a 20-pounder rifle battery, which result in the death of 1 of my men, who was almost instantaneously killed by one of the enemy's shot.

At 10 a. m. I was ordered to move toward Fredericksburg. Soon after arriving in the city, the battery moved forward on the Chancellorsville road. When near Salem Church, the enemy being in great force, Major Tompkins ordered forward a

section from my battery at a gallop, to take position at the toll-gate. On arriving on the ground designated, I found that the enemy in heavy force were slowly driving back our infantry in a large open field on the right of the road. By holding the fire from the section for a few moments, I was enabled to fire into the extreme right flank of the enemy, his front being in prolongation of our line of sight. The first shot fired was spherical case, with one and three fourths [seconds] of time, which burst splendidly, causing the enemy to waver. Finding the time and elevation to be right, I fired 16 rounds of case as rapidly as possible. The effect of this fire proved so disastrous to the rebels that they retreated in great confusion, and crossed the road to the left-hand side. During the time they were crossing, 13 round shot were fired down the road, which was perfectly straight for a long distance, and very hard, being peculiarly suited for ricochet firing. The enemy railhead on the left side of the road, but were dislodged by several round shot and shell. During this action, the enemy carried a large red battle-flag, crossed with white, which was knocked down twice by shots from by section. The firing ceased for some ten minutes, when the enemy, appearing suddenly in the road, in what appeared great force, and with the evident intention of charging the section, I fired canister at them with great rapidity for several minutes, the effect of which was of such a character as to cause them to fall back under cover. The enemy at this time could not have been more than 300 yards distant.

Soon after dark, I was relieved by Butler's battery (G, Second U. S. Artillery), and moved to the rear. During the time that this section was engaged at the toll-gate, the other four guns, commanded by Second Lieutenant C. N. Warner, of the battery, moved to the left, and materially aided in the repulse of the enemy by Bartlett's brigade, of the First Division. Lieutenant Warner had 2 horses killed.

From the night of the 3rd, nothing occurred, so far as the battery was concerned, until it crossed the river at Banks' Ford, about 1 o'clock on the morning of the 5th.

At 10 a. m. I was again detached from the corps and ordered to proceed to Richards' Ford, on the river, above Hartwood Church, to prevent the enemy from crossing at that point.

On the 7th, received orders to rejoin my division, and arrived in camp, near While Oak Church, Va., about noon on the 8th instant.

I cannot too highly commend Lieutenant Warner, Second U. S. Artillery, and Sergeants [William] Scott and [Thomas] Wright, commanding sections, for the

gallantry and coolness they manifested during the action. Sergeant [Samuel] Bollinger, acting chief of caissons, deserves credit for the manner in which he conducted himself.

The non-commissioned officers and men acted nobly, and I saw no indication of fear, although the battery was exposed to a severe infantry fire. Nothing was lost or abandoned worthy of mention.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
EDWARD B. WILLISTON,
First Lieutenant Second U. S. Artillery, Commanding Company D.
Major J. A. TOMPKINS,
Chief of Artillery, First Division, Sixth Army Corps.

Report of Cap. Clermont L. Best,
Fourth U. S. Artillery, Chief of Artillery.

STAFFORD COURT-HOUSE VA.,
May 10, 1863.

COLONEL:

I have the honor to submit the following movements and operations of the artillery arm of the Twelfth Corps in the interval of their departure and return to this point:

The corps broke camp on Monday morning, 27th ultimo, one battery, in accordance with orders, moving with each of the two divisions-M, of the First New York Artillery, with the first, and Knap's (pennsylvania) battery with the Second Division. the remaining three batteries-Hampton's, K, First New York, and F, Fourth U. S. Artillery-were directed to remain and move with the corps wagon train, and subsequently joined the command at Chancellorsville on Thursday, the 30th. Up to the time of this junction I need say nothing of movements or operations of the artillery, since they were quite unimportant compared with the trying times so near at hand.

On Friday, May 1, the corps commenced a cautious movement from Chancellorsville on the Plank road toward Fredericksburg, one battery (and the same as previously mentioned) accompanying each division.

After preceding about 2 miles, the enemy was felt, evidently in some force, and commenced disputing the advance with his artillery. By direction of the general commanding, I advanced Knap's battery to a suitable point, opening a slow but

effective fire; posted Lieutenant Winegar's six guns suitably, and sent back for Battery F, Fourth U. S. Artillery, which soon came up, and was posted near Knap's.

Soon after these dispositions the whole command was recalled to Chancellorsville. While retiring, the general commanding directed me to proceed to Chancellorsville, and post the corps batteries in such positions for defense against the probable following enemy as might be deemed judicious. Accordingly, I placed Knap's, Hampton's, and one section (under Lieutenant Muhlenberg) of Battery F at the intersecting point at Chancellorsville of the roads leading to Fredericksburg, and the other four pieces of Battery F with Fitzhugh and Winegar, on the rising and open ground on the Gordonsville front. Thus we had fourteen pieces on each front, on one or both of which the attack must occur, and did occur on both in the afternoon. The enemy was effectually checked or repulsed in each case Knap's battery being most engaged, and doing its work, as usual, well. A section of Knap's battery was pushed down (a hazardous experiment) the Plank road without my knowledge, by order of General Geary, among the enemy's skirmishers, but was soon recalled by the general commanding. Lieutenant Atwell was wounded in this movement. Lieutenant Muhlenberg's light 12-pounders were of great service on this front during this and subsequent days, sweeping the woods and road with their heavy fire, canister included. Lieutenant Muhlenberg behaved with great discretion and gallantry during all the engagements, having at the last nearly all his cannoneers wounded and horses nearly all killed. I think he will deserve the favorable consideration of the Government.

The batteries all maintained the positions specified until Saturday afternoon, when the Eleventh Corps was suddenly routed, and came fleeing in disordered and bewildered masses toward Chancellorsville. Having no doubt the enemy would follow in force, I gathered all our batteries, save Knap's and Lieutenant Muhlenberg's section, massing them on the ridge in rear of our First Division, and posting in position with them some of the fragments of the Eleventh Corps batteries, until I had 34 guns in what may be termed the key-point of the battle-field. The general commanding soon after came up, approved the disposition and kindly authorized me to open fire whenever I deemed it necessary. The necessity soon occurred, for there was no doubt that the enemy was in force in the woods between 600 yards and a mile in our front. I was obliged to fire over the heads of our infantry force, ranged in parallel lines about 500 yards in front. It was an operation of great delicacy, this cannonade of 34 guns over the heads of our men, but it was a matter of necessity, and was promptly and fully executed.

Up to near 10 o'clock at night the cannonading at intervals was terrific, and, in my opinion, contributed much to checking the bold and elated enemy. So far as I can learn, and I am happy to record it, not one of our men was killed by our fire, or, indeed, wounded. That night I intrenched all my guns, the digging subsequently proving much protection.

Early Sunday morning, the enemy commenced the attack, evidently determined to carry that point, and all my batteries again opening on their masses.

Here I beg leave to offer an opinion. Our position could not have been forced had the flanks of our line of guns been successfully maintained. An important point—an open field about a mile to our left and front, guarded by a brigade of our troops (not of the Twelfth Corps) and a battery—was seemingly taken by a small force of the enemy and the battery captured and turned on us with fearful effect, blowing up one of our caissons, killing Captain Hampton, and enfilading General Geary's line. It was most unfortunate. My line of guns, however, kept to its work manfully until about 9 a. m., when, finding our infantry in front withdrawn, our right and left turned, and the enemy's musketry already so advanced as to pick off our men and horses, I was compelled to withdraw my guns to save them. We were also nearly exhausted of ammunition.

While retiring, I was directed by the chief of artillery of the army to take the batteries to the brick hospital near the ford, to replenish them, and to remain in person to take charge of all the batteries of our own and other corps there massed, where I remained so engaged until Tuesday, the 5th, when General Hunt directed me to cross all the batteries, and select positions to protect the recrossing of the army, which I did with about fifty guns, eighteen of our own being among the number, including Captain Knap's, to whom I gave the most important point, and which he protected well.

Let the general commanding be assured I am well pleased with our artillery in these terrific conflicts from first to last, and I hope he is.

To Captains Knap and Fitzhugh I am much indebted for valuable assistance, the battery of the former being almost constantly engaged. They speak in high terms of their subordinate officers and conduct of their men, to which, as far as I can, I bear cordial witness, and to whom I tender my admiration and thanks.

Lieutenant Smith, Battery M, First New York Artillery, assisted me much in the transmission of orders during Saturday and Sunday. Lieutenant Winegar, in the desire to remove a lost caisson, rode into the enemy's line on Sunday afternoon and was captured. Captain Hampton was wounded on Sunday morning

about

8 o'clock, and died soon after. For the eighteen months in which I have been associated with him I have found him, particularly in battle, brave and devoted to his duty.

Lieutenant Crosby, commanding Battery F, Fourth U. S. Artillery, was killed about 9 a. m. by a musket-ball while fighting his guns. My pen almost refuses to record his untimely death. Young, ambitious, highly educated, efficient as an artillery officer, unexceptionable in his habits and character, a Christian, practicing as he believed, the service lost an officer of great value, and it seems yet a dream that his gallant heart is hushed forever.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. L. BEST,

Captain, and Chief of Artillery, Twelfth Army Corps.

**GENERAL ORDERS, } HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Numbers 53.} Camp near Falmouth, Va., May 12, 1863.**

The flag for the headquarters of the Artillery Reserve will be of the same size and shape as heretofore prescribed for headquarters infantry corps, red, with cross-cannon white.

By command of Major-General Hooker:

S. WILLIAMS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

**SPECIAL ORDERS,} HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Numbers 129.} Camp near Falmouth, Va., May 12, 1863.**

I. In consequence of the reduction of the strength of the infantry of the division, a consolidation and reduction of the artillery attached to army corps will be effected.

The artillery assigned to each corps will constitute a brigade, under the command of the chief of artillery of the corps for its command and administration.

The following-named batteries, now serving with divisions of this army, will report without delay to Brigadier General Robert O. Tyler, commanding Artillery Reserve:

Batteries E and G, First U.S. Artillery, Captain Randol commanding; Batteries F and K, Third U.S. Artillery, Lieutenant Turnbull commanding; Battery C, Fourth U.S. Artillery, Lieutenant Thomas commanding; Battery C, Fifth U.S. Artillery, Captain Ransom commanding; Battery D, Fifth U.S. Artillery, Lieutenant Hazlett commanding; Battery C, First Rhode Island Artillery, substituted for Battery D, Fifth U.S. Artillery, May 13, commanding; Battery F, Fifth U.S. Artillery, Lieutenant Martin commanding; Battery B, First New York Artillery, Captain Pettit commanding; Battery G, First New York Artillery, Lieutenant Ames commanding; Battery K, First New York Artillery, Captain Fitzhugh commanding; First New York Independent Battery, Captain Cowan commanding; Tenth New York Independent Battery, Captain Bruen commanding; Eleventh New York Independent Battery, Captain von Puttkammer commanding; Battery F, First Pennsylvania Artillery, Lieutenant Ricketts commanding; Battery G, First Pennsylvania Artillery, Captain Amsden commanding; Third Independent Pennsylvania Battery, Lieutenant Fleming commanding; Fourth Independent Pennsylvania Battery, Captain Thompson commanding; Battery A, First New Hampshire Artillery, Lieutenant Edgell commanding; Battery A, First Maryland Artillery, Captain Rigby commanding; Battery E, First Massachusetts Artillery, Captain Philips commanding; Battery H, First Ohio Artillery, Captain Huntington commanding; Battery C, First [West] Virginia Artillery, Captain Hill commanding; Sixth Independent Maine Battery, Lieutenant E.B. Dow commanding; Battery G, First Rhode Island Artillery, Captain Bloodgood commanding.

II. The under-mentioned field officers of artillery will report to Brigadier General R. O. Tyler, commanding Artillery Reserve:

Major Tompkins, First Rhode Island Artillery; Major De Peyester, First New York Artillery; Major McGilvery, Maine Artillery; Major Matthews, First Pennsylvania Artillery.

III. The batteries remaining with the corps will be completed to a thorough state of efficiency (with the number of guns they now have) by the transfer of sufficient of such men of the remaining [other] batteries of the corps as are attached from the infantry.

IV. The artillery ammunition train of the batteries attached to corps will be organized, and placed under the direction of the commander of artillery of the corps; the surplus will be transferred to the Artillery Reserve.

By command of Major-General Hooker:

S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

*Report of Captain A. Judson Clark,
First New Jersey Light Artillery, Chief of Artillery.*

CAMP NEAR POTOMAC CREEK, VA.,
May 12, 1863.

CAPTAIN:

In obedience to orders received from you, I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by the artillery of this division in the recent movement of the army:

Wednesday, April 29.-Battery B, First New Jersey Artillery, was transferred from the Second Division to the First Division, Third Army Corps, and, by order of General Birney, I assumed command of the artillery of the division. At that time the batteries were lying near the banks of the Rappahannock, below Fredericksburg, and near the pontoon bridges.

During the afternoon of the 30th, the batteries marched to near Berea Church, by General Birney's orders, where they bivouacked for the night.

At 6.30 next morning (May 1), they started again for the United States Ford, which place they reached, crossing the river during the forenoon of the same day, and, after a short rest, proceeded to near the white house, about a quarter of a mile from Chancellorsville. Batteries F, and K, Third U.S. Artillery, Lieutenant Turnbull, commanding, were immediately ordered to report to General Graham for picket duty, about 2 miles to the right of the Chancellor house, on the Plank road. Toward the latter part of the day Birney's division was placed near to the Chancellor house. One of the batteries, B, First New Jersey Artillery, Lieutenant Sims commanding, was placed on the right of the division. This battery was shortly after relieved by Turnbull's (F and K, Third U.S. Artillery), which came in at that time, the picket being relieved in consequence of the ground being held by General Howard, Eleventh Corps. During the evening of the same day, General Birney moved his division up the Plank road about three-quarters of a mile, and, by his direction, I

placed three guns of Battery B, Lieutenant Sims, on the edge of the woods, about a quarter of a mile to the left of the Plank road.

About 8 o'clock next morning, one section of this battery was placed on the brow of the hill in front of the position of the previous night, and near the ruins of an old house, when it opened fire, apparently with much effect, on a column of rebel troops which was passing the brow of the hill about 1 1/2 miles instant. Two more guns of the same battery were ordered there, and a section, under Lieutenant Clark, placed on the extreme right of the opening, for the same purpose. Some two or three hours after this, Batteries F and K, Third U.S. Artillery (Turnbull's), and, a short time after, Jastram's (E, First Rhode Island Artillery), were placed in position near General Birney's headquarters, in the open field near the woods. Toward the latter part of the afternoon, Birney's division having advanced meanwhile beyond the hill which lay in our front, I was ordered to send a battery to the front immediately, to silence a battery which, from a point about 1,400 yards distant, near a dwelling-house, was annoying our advance seriously. Lieutenant Turnbull was sent, with his guns alone, leaving the occasions in the rear, and went into battery under fire of the rebel guns near an old foundry. There seemed much unnecessary confusion when the battery came into action, although there was some reason for it on account of the small place in which they were obliged to go into position.

Captain Randolph, chief of artillery of the Third Corps, who was present, aided in getting the battery at work. The firing was very good and well sustained until the ammunition was expended from their limbers, when the battery retired. Jastram's battery was then sent to relieve it, but before it reached the spot the rebel battery had disappeared. Leaving a section near the foundry to shell the woods as General Whipple advanced on the left, Lieutenant Jastram, with the remaining four guns, advanced with the First Division to the front and right, and shelled the woods in the immediate front until nearly dark, when orders were received to go back to the ground occupied during the day.

While this was taking in the front with General Birney, the enemy, which had massed during the day on our right (held by General Howard, Eleventh Corps), attacked him vigorously, and soon the close proximity of the firing and torrent of fleeing officers and soldiers told the story that the corps had become panic-stricken and were being routed. The batteries` which had been left in the open field near the woods, by direction of General Pleasonton, changed front to fire to the rear, and, with Martin's (Sixth New York) horse battery, soon commenced firing. The supports were a few cavalry , placed in rear by General Pleasonton. Here the batteries were warmly engaged, but, although

hindered greatly by the stragglers from the Eleventh Corps flocking through, the battery sustained their part so well that the enemy were compelled to keep the woods. The firing ceased here about 8 o'clock, and shortly after Battery E, First Rhode Island (Jastram's), came in front the front and was placed in position by Captain Randolph, chief of artillery of the corps. The First Division had arrived on the ground meanwhile, and was rapidly forming. About midnight, an attack was made in our front, which opened fully our communication with general headquarters.

Just as day was breaking next morning, I was ordered by Captain Randolph to take the batteries to the open field near the Chancellor house, and four pieces of Battery E, First Rhode Island (Lieutenant Jastram), were placed in an unoccupied position of the small earthworks, about 800 yards to the right of the Chancellor house, and to the left of the Plank road . Battery B, First New Jersey (Lieutenant Sims), was put in position soon after to the left of this, in the same line of batteries, some three or four of Best's batteries (Twelfth Corps) lying between the two. Here the batteries were very hotly engaged, and fought gallantly, sustaining a heavy loss both in men and horses.

About 9 o'clock, Sims's battery was ordered to retire by General Sickles, as their ammunition was entirely expended and none now could be obtained. Shortly after this, the line of support commenced falling back, and, by order of General Birney, Jastram's battery was withdrawn from its position. A section of this battery, under Lieutenant Bucklyn, which had not previously been in action, was, by order of Captain Randolph, placed in position near the Chancellor house, with four guns of Seeley's battery (K, Fourth United States), to check the advance of the enemy as our line fell back to its new position. Here they gallantly maintained their position, under a terrible fire, until their ammunition was expended. Many cannoneers had been killed and wounded, and most of their horses killed. One gun could not be removed, but was disabled by an ax before it was left.

The batteries were subsequently withdrawn to near the United States Ford, where they remained until the morning of the 4th, when I was ordered by General Hunt to send two of them back to their camp near Falmouth. Those batteries were E, First Rhode Island and Turnbull's F and K, Third United States. The remaining battery (Sims') was placed in position near the ford by Colonel Doull, of General Hunt's staff, where it remained until late in the afternoon of the 5th. It was then relieved and sent back to camp.

I am, captain , your obedient servant,

A. JUDSON CLARK,

Captain 1st N.J. Arty., Chief of Arty., 1st Div., 3rd Army Corps.

*Report of Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Morgan,
Assistant Inspector-General and Chief of Artillery.*

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS,

May 14, 1863.

CAPTAIN:

I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the artillery of this corps in the late movement of the army:

On the morning of April 28, the following batteries moved to Banks' Ford: Kirby's, I, First United State; Cushing's, A, Fourth United States; Thomas;, C, Fourth United States; Arnold's, A, First Rhode Island, and Pettit's, B, First New York. The following batteries remained with General Gibbon's command near Falmouth: Adams', G, First Rhode Island, and Hazard's, B, First Rhode Island. Ames' battery (G, First New York) accompanied Carroll's brigade of infantry to the United States Ford.

On the 29th, the five batteries first mentioned moved to the United States Ford, and on the 30th, together with Ames' battery, crossed the river, parking for the night near the Chandler house.

On the morning of May 1, Arnold's battery was sent out on the Fredericksburg road, and, under the direction of Captain Weed, Fifth U. S. Artillery, chief of artillery, Fifth Corps, assisted in covering the withdrawal of Sykes' division from its advanced position. One section of Cushing's battery, under Lieutenant Canby, was also in position for the same purpose.

On May 2, one section of Pettit's battery was detached with the Irish Brigade near ---- Mills. About 5 p. m. the remainder of this battery relieved Knap's battery, near the Chancellor house, and soon after became engaged with a battery ont he Fredericksburg road, with no loss on our side. Kirby's battery was parked across the road near the Chancellor house until about 9 p. m., when it, with Cushing's battery, was placed in position to the right of the Plank road and beyond the Chancellor house, under direction of Captain Comstock, U. S. Engineers. Three pieces of Thomas' battery, under Lieutenant Thomas, were in position in the same vicinity, the other three pieces being placed along General Hancock's line, under Lieutenant O'Donohue (Hogan's battery).

At 3 a. m. on the morning of the 3rd, all the artillery of the corps, excepting Pettit's battery and three pieces of Thomas', were sent to the vicinity of the United States Ford, by direction of Major-General Couch. The enemy driving in our lines on the right, in the direction of the Plank road, these batteries changed front to rear. O'Donohue's pieces were occupied from time to time in shelling the woods to their left. Pettit's battery was not able to fire while our troops still held the ridge on his front, and he was moved by me to a point near the Chandler house, and placed in battery to shell the woods through which the enemy were endeavoring to force their way. He was almost immediately recalled, however, by Major-General Couch, our lines having given way and the enemy's artillery being advanced to the same ridge occupied by ours during the morning. I returned with this battery and placed it in position, and remained with it and O'Donohue's pieces long enough to satisfy myself that both officers and men were acquitting themselves handsomely. I noticed particularly the gallantry of Lieutenant O'Donohue, afterward wounded and left in the hands of the enemy.

Having previously received orders from General Hooker to bring up all the batteries of the corps which had not been engaged, I endeavored to get up Cushing's, Arnold's, and Kirby's, with the intention of putting in every gun that could be worked; but as the head of the column arrived at the Chandler house, I met our troops falling back, the ground in dispute having been yielded to the enemy. I do not think it could have been held by any number of guns I could have placed in the contracted ground near the Chancellor house. The enemy's position was greatly superior, and our batteries were subjected to a direct enfilading and reverse fire. The Fifth Maine Battery was in position near the Chancellor house. I am not familiar with its history during the morning, except that it was exposed to a most destructive fire, badly cut up, and the five pieces finally brought off by hand by the infantry of Hancock's division. Lieutenant Kirby was placed in command of it about 9 a. m. by General Couch, and was dangerously wounded, as was the permanent commander of the battery and two of the subalterns. It is due to the brave and gallant Kirby that a permanent record be made of his conduct. His thigh was fractured by a ball from a spherical case shot, yet when it was proposed to move him from the field he exclaimed, "No! take off that gun first."

I understand that some dissatisfaction has been expressed that the batteries near the Chancellor house did not disregard the fire against them and turn their attention to the rebel infantry in the woods near by, but from whose fire they were suffering little or nothing. My own judgment is that the only thing

that could have enabled us to hold the ground was to have silenced the enemy's batteries. Their fire was so accurate and so heavy that a battery exposed to it and not replying to it, especially if the battery was required to uncover entirely and expose itself to a flank fire, would have been disabled (as was Leppien's battery) in short order. The experiment would have cost us either guns or a great many men killed and wounded in running them off by hand.

I would mention the officers and men of Pettit's battery and Lieutenants O'Donohue and Field and the men of Thomas' battery for good conduct. The latter battery lost one caisson, the horses being disabled and no time to replace them, and the former had one caisson blown up.

Kirby's battery (Lieutenant Woodruff) and Ames' battery were in position near the Chandler house, under Captain Weed, Fifth U. S. Artillery, during the remainder of the day and until the troops were withdrawn. Ames was engaged, but suffered no loss.

On Tuesday morning the three rifle batteries were placed in position to cover the removal of the bridges.

The batteries reoccupied their old camps by Wednesday morning, May 7.

Adams' battery and Hazard's (under Lieutenant Brown) were both engaged at Fredericksburg on the 3rd. The first named was under a very heavy fire and suffered severely, as will be seen by the accompanying table. Great credit is due Captain Adams. Lieutenants Torslow, Allen, Kelly (dead), and Chase, for the manner in which they discharged their duties. Lieutenants Allen and Torslow were slightly wounded, but did not leave the field. Lieutenant Kelley lived but a few hours after being struck. Hazard's battery was not so warmly engaged, and its loss was inconsiderable. Officers and men acquitted themselves well.

Inclosed herewith are the reports of battery commanders and a tabulated statement of the losses of men* and material as far as ascertained.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. H. MORGAN,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Insp. General and Chief of Art., Second Corps.

*Report of Captain Michael Wiedrich,
Battery I, First New York Light Artillery.*

**CAMP NEAR STAFFORD COURT-HOUSE, VA.,
May 14, 1863.**

SIR:

I have the honor to forward the following report of the part taken by my battery in the action on the enemy of May 2:

Late in the evening on the 30th ultimo, we arrived near Dowdall's Tavern, when I was directed by Colonel Buschbeck, commanding First Brigade, to take a position south of the Plank road leading from Gordonsville to Fredericksburg, with his brigade.

On the evening of May 1, I received orders from Major-General Howard to place one section of my battery in rear of his headquarters, which I did. When, on the evening of May 2, the firing commenced on our right, we were for some time prevented from opening fire, first, on account of the thick woods some distance in front of the battery, which prevented us from getting sight of the enemy, and, secondly, when the enemy got in sight, our infantry, while retiring, rushed in such masses in front and past the battery that it prevented us for some time again to open fire. As soon as the infantry was out of our way, we opened with canister with good effect, and checked the advance of the enemy for a few minutes. Soon he advanced again in greater numbers, and, seeing that they were getting in our left flank, I gave the order to limber up and retire. In the act of limbering, all the cannoneers but 1 of one piece were wounded, and we were compelled to leave it on the field. On another one, after being limbered up and in the act of driving away, the 3 hand-horses and 1 saddle-horse were killed, and we had to leave this also. On another, 2 horses were killed, but, by the exertions and good behavior of the men, we succeeded in bringing it off with 2 horses.

In this action I had 1 man killed, 10 wounded, and 2 missing.

We retired to near the white house, where I refitted the remainder of my battery as well as I could for further action. I am happy to say that all officers and men behaved well during the engagement.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. WIEDRICH,

Commanding Battery I, First Regiment New York Light Artillery.

*Report of Captain William A. Arnold,
Battery A, First Rhode Island Light Artillery.*

**HDQRS. BATTERY A, FIRST RHODE ISLAND ARTILLERY,
May 15,1863.**

CAPTAIN:

Battery A, First Rhode Island Artillery, left camp near Falmouth, on the morning of April 28,1863, and marched to Banks' Ford; camped for the night within 1 mile of the ford.

April 29.- Marched for United States Ford, and halted for the night about 4 miles from the bank of the river.

April 30.- Moved at 10 o'clock toward the ford, and crossed the river in the afternoon with General French's division; marched about 4 miles in the directions of Chancellorsville, and camped for the night in an open field one-half mile from Chancellorsville.

May 1.- Moved from camp in rear of General Hays' brigade, and halted near Chancellor's house. At 2 o'clock was sent to the support of General Sykes, who was engaging the enemy about 2 miles from Chancellorsville, on the road to the left of the Plank road. Went into position to the left of the road, and expended 26 rounds of ammunition; 5 p.m., retired toward Chancellorsville, and occupied camp occupied in the morning. Horses remained in harness during the night.

May 2.- At daylight, moved one-half mile to rear, on road toward the United States Ford. Afternoon, heard fighting on the right; took position behind earthworks at night, and remained all night.

May 3.- At daylight, received orders to return to United States Ford and park near brick house; 10 a.m., ordered to the front; was not wanted, and returned to camp near the ford, by order of Colonel Morgan. Horses taken out of harness; remained in camp all night.

May 4.-Remained in camp.

May 5.-Retired over river at 7 a.m., by order of Captain Best, commanding Artillery Reserve, and took position on bank of the river to the left of the ford. Spent the remainder of the day in masking battery.

May 6.-Remained in position to cover the crossing of the troops; expended 28 rounds of ammunition on the enemy's skirmishers; 3,30 p.m., ordered to return to old camp. Halted for the night 3 miles from camp, on the Warrenton road.

May 7.-Arrived at old camp near Falmouth at 10 a.m. The battery sustained no loss of men or material; 1 horse died from exhaustion.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W.A. ARNOLD,

Captain First Rhode Island Artillery, Commanding Company A.

Report of Brigadier General Henry J. Hunt, U. S. Army, Chief of Artillery.

ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

August 1, 1863.

GENERAL: On April 27, in pursuance of your instructions, I made a reconnoissance of the enemy's position at Banks' Ford, and determined upon the number and position of the guns to be placed there to enfilade the enemy's rifle-pits; to crush the fire of his work on the hill overlooking the river; to cover the throwing of the bridges at that ford, and to protect the crossing of the troops. The necessary instructions to supervise this work; to place the batteries; to prepare cover for those that were exposed, and to take command there in case of my absence, were given to Major A. Doull, inspector of artillery on my staff, who executed them with his customary energy, taking with him two batteries of position (B, First Connecticut, Brooker, four 4 1/2-inch guns, and the Twenty-ninth New York, Blucher, four 20-pounders) from the Artillery Reserve. The 20-pounder battery, under Lieutenant Blucher, from the necessity of the case, was placed in a very exposed position, but with the labor of his men he constructed good cover for them. The remaining batteries required for this position were drawn from the Second, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps.

After performing this duty, I returned to select positions for the batteries, to cover the throwing of the bridges at Franklin's Crossing, and at a point just below the mouth of White Oak Run, near Pollock's Mill, the positions were selected, the batteries designated, and on the night of the 28th were placed in position as follows:

Franklin's Crossing - Ten guns of position of the Artillery Reserve (Pratt's, M, First Connecticut, four 4 1/2-inch guns, and Voegelee's Thirtieth New York, six 20-pounder Parrotts) and twenty-four light rifles of the Sixth Corps (Harn's Third New York, six 10-pounder Parrotts; McCarthy's, C and D, First Pennsylvania, six 10-pounders; Rigby's, A, First Maryland, six 3-inch guns; and Cowan's First New York, six 3-inch guns) on the bluffs back of the crossing; twelve light 12-pounders (Williston's, D, Second United States, six 12-pounders, and Seeley's, K, Fourth United States, six 12-pounders) on the

bank of the river, one battery above and one below the position selected to throw the bridges, so as to cross their fire over the enemy's rifle-pits opposite, and prevent his firing on the pontoons; the whole under the command of Colonel C. H. Tompkins, First Rhode Island Artillery.

Crossing near Pollock's Mill - Twenty light rifles (Reynolds', L, First New York, six 3-inch guns; Hall's Second Maine, six 3-inch guns; Amsden's, G, First Pennsylvania, four 3-inch guns, and Cooper's, B, First Pennsylvania, four 3-inch guns) were placed on the elevation just above the mill, and fourteen (Edgell's, A, First New Hampshire, six 3-inch guns; Thompson's Fourth Pennsylvania, four 3-inch guns, and Ricketts', F, First Pennsylvania, four 3-inch below, to which were added in the morning six light 12-pounders (Ransom's, C, Fifth United States); the whole under the command of Colonel C. S. Wainwright, First New York Artillery.

A mile below these positions, and near Traveler's Rest, sixteen guns, (Taft's Fifth New York, four 20-pounders; Kusserow's Thirty-second New York, six 3-inch guns, and Hart's Fifteenth New York, six 3-inch guns), under the command of Lieutenant Colonel E. R. Warner, inspector of artillery, were stationed to control the bridge across the Massaponax, and to cover the left of the army after the crossing should be effected. These three batteries moved along the banks, following the subsequent movements of the army until, at the close of the operation, they were stationed so as to sweep the streets of Fredericksburg and command the Falmouth Ford. In the course of these operations, Hart's battery was relieved by von Blucher's, which had returned from Banks' Ford. Miller's battery (G, Fourth United States, six 12-pounders) was already in position near the Lacy house, and twenty-two light 12-pounders in addition (Randolph's, E, First Rhode Island, six 12-pounders; Kinzie's, K, Fifth [U. S.] Artillery, four 12-pounders; Dimick's, H, First United States, six 12-pounders, and Bruen's Tenth New York, six 12-pounders) were placed in reserve near Falmouth Station, in readiness to move to any point above or below where their services might be required. The disposable horse artillery (Graham's, K, First United States, six 3-inch guns; Meinell's, C, Third United States, six 3-inch guns, and Pennington's detachments, ten 3-inch guns), under Captain Graham, First [U. S.] Artillery, was in like manner stationed between White Oak Church and the river, so as to be available at any point near or below the crossings.

At daybreak of the 29th, Russell's brigade of infantry crossed the river in boats at Franklin's Crossing, and occupied the enemy's rifle-pits with but little resistance. The bridges were constructed and Brooks' division crossed, taking with it Williston's battery (D, Second United States, six 12-pounders), which was posted behind the rifle-pits.

On the 3rd, Seeley's battery (K, Fourth United States, six 12-pounders) was relieved and joined its division. At the lower (or Reynolds') crossing, the attempts to throw the bridge early in the morning were defeated by the enemy's sharpshooters and the infantry in his rifle pits.

About 8.30 a. m. the fog lifted, and the batteries were brought into requisition. By slow, deliberate, and well sustained fire of great accuracy, the fire of the enemy was completely suppressed, the men taking refuge by lying down in the ditch, and a regiment moving down to re-enforce them driven back. Under the protection of the fire, a force was thrown across in the pontoons with little or no loss, and captured about 100 of the men in the pits, the remainder escaping by flight.

The practice of the rifle batteries, especially that of Cooper's (B, First Pennsylvania, four 3-inch guns), was excellent. The bridges were then established, and Wadsworth's division crossed. The three batteries near Traveler's Rest (Taft's Fifth New York, four 20-pounders; Kusserow's Thirty-second New York, six 3-inch guns, and Hart's Fifteenth New York, six 3-inch guns) repulsed all attempts of the enemy to pass the Massaponax from below, and, on the arrival of the enemy's columns from Port Royal, compelled them to make a wide detour and pass round by the hill roads.

For an account of the further operations of the batteries at the crossings, I respectfully refer you to the reports of Colonels Wainwright and Tompkins, chiefs of artillery of the First and Sixth Corps.

On the 30th, I received orders to accompany you to Chancellorsville, which place we reached that night. The troops having crossed at United States Ford, the artillery was withdrawn from Banks', and ordered to join their proper commands, with the exception of Brooker's 4 1/2-inch battery, which crossed at the United States Ford.

May 1. - Soon after General Sykes became engaged, he sent to me for two batteries, one of rifles and one of 12-pounders. Lieutenant-Colonel Morgan, chief of artillery Second Corps, kindly furnished me with a battery of rifles (Arnold's, A, First Rhode Island, six 3-inch guns), and I also ordered Crosby's (F, Fourth United States, six 12-pounders), which I found near the Chancellor house, placing both under command of Major Alexander Doull, inspector of artillery, to report to General Sykes. Crosby's battery was soon after recalled, and sent to report to its own corps commander, General Slocum, who needed it. I could find no other to replace it.

At 1.30 p. m. I received verbal instructions from you to return to headquarters camp, near Falmouth, collect the disposable artillery, move it to Banks' Ford, and to prevent any attempt of the enemy to cross at that point. In obedience to these instructions, I directed Captain Brooker to recross the river with his siege guns (B, First Connecticut, four 4 1/2-inch guns) and resume his position at Banks' [Ford]. From the telegraph station at the United States Ford I sent a message to Major-General Butterfield, chief of staff, requesting him to send to Banks' Ford the disposable batteries near headquarters camp, and proceeded myself to reconnoiter the ford and select positions for them. In conformity with my request for infantry, the remainder of General Owen's brigade, a portion of which was on duty at the ford, under the orders of General Benham, reported to me that night.

At 7.30 p. m. the batteries which had reported (Pennington's, M, Second United States, ten 3-inch guns, and two attached sections, and Graham's, K, First United States, six 3-inch guns) were placed in position, sixteen guns, and these arriving during the night (Meinell's, C, Third United States, six 3-inch guns; Hart's, Fifteenth New York, six 3-inch guns; Kinzie's, K, Fifth United States, four 12-pounders, and Brooker's, B, First Connecticut, four 4 1/2-inch guns) went into part, with the exception of Brooker's, which was placed in position commanding the enemy's work on the hill. No demonstrations were made by the enemy.

On the afternoon of the 3rd, he abandoned his rifle-pits opposite us. Major-General Sedgwick having carried the heights above Fredericksburg, and being then on the advance along the Chancellorsville road, I sent Major Doull across (swimming his horse) to communicate with General Sedgwick and report his progress. In the meantime General Benham laid the bridges, and I crossed to inspect the different works of the enemy. The firing between General Sedgwick and the enemy growing into the sounds of a battle, I immediately returned to the north side of the river, in order to send support to Sedgwick. On reaching the bridge, I found Brigadier-General Owen crossing, and directed him to connect with Sedgwick's right, so as to keep up communication with the bridges. I also sent word to General Sedgwick that two horse batteries were at his disposal and more artillery if the required it.

About this time I received a dispatch from General Butterfield, directing me to report immediately to you at Chancellorsville, and I turned the command of the artillery over to Brigadier-General Tyler, who had just joined the army to take command of the Artillery Reserve. In the meantime the battles of May 2 and 3 had been fought at Chancellorsville. For the particulars of the service of the artillery in these battles, I respectfully refer to the reports of the

commanders of the troops to which the batteries were attached. I will only note some of the main features so far as the artillery was concerned.

When the Eleventh Corps was broken up and routed, on the 2nd, its batteries are reported as having behaved well. General Pleasonton collected some batteries belonging to different corps (Martin's Horse Artillery, Sixth New York, six 3-inch guns; Clark's, B, First New Jersey, six 10-pounders; Lewis', Tenth New York, six light 12-pounders; Turnbull's, F, and K, Third United States, six 12-pounders), and with them formed a large battery of twenty-four guns. The retreating troops swept through and around this battery, carrying off horses and caissons and even overturning one of the guns; but, as a whole, it held firm, and when the enemy, flushed with success, appeared before it, met them with a storm of canister, first checking and then driving them back into the woods, from which they had emerged at 300 yards distance. It was a desperate combat between artillery and infantry at 300 yards distance, in which the artillery repulsed the infantry, flushed, as they were, with a great success, which they were following up when checked by this battery.

After being driven back, the troops of the enemy (Jackson's corps) tried by two flank movements to dislodge the battery and resume their advance. The first was repulsed by the artillery alone, the second by the artillery aided by the advance of Whipple's and Birney's divisions, which were enabled to reach the ground by the check previously given to the enemy. At the same time a battery of thirty-eight guns (Dimick's, H, First United States, six 12-pounders; Crosby's, F, Fourth [U.S.] Artillery, four 12-pounders; Winegar's, M, First New York, six 10-pounders; Fitzhugh's, K, First New York, four 3-inch guns; Thomas', C, Fourth [U. S.] Artillery, four 12-pounders; Winslow's, D, First New York, six 12-pounders; Hill's, C, First [West} Virginia, one section, two 3-inch guns; Dilger's, I, First Ohio, six 12-pounders -- Dilger relieved on Sunday morning, May 3, by Hampton's Third Pennsylvania, six 10-pounder Parrotts) was assembled near Fairview by Captain Best, Fourth U. S. Artillery, and stationed so as to reach the enemy by firing over the heads of our own troops, distant 500 yards, as no better position could be obtained, and the use of the guns was imperative. The firing was very effective, and, as far as known, without accident to our own troops. Down to 10 p. m. the cannonade was at times terrific, and contributed much to checking the enemy. The batteries were then in trenched.

Early next morning (Sunday, the 3rd), the enemy renewed the attack, and the battery replied. An open field, about three-fourths of a mile to the left and front of the battery, occupied by one of our brigades and some guns, was taken possession of by the enemy, who opened with artillery on Best's position with

fearful effect, killing, among others, Captain Hampton, of the Third Pennsylvania Battery, blowing up one of the caissons, and enfilading our line of infantry. Best, however, stood to his work manfully till about 9 a. m., when, the infantry having retired, both flanks of the battery being turned, the enemy's musketry picking off men and horses, and the ammunition nearly expended, the guns were withdrawn, to save them.

Toward the close of this affair, Lieutenant F. B. Crosby, commanding Battery F, Fourth [U. S.] Artillery, a young officer of high character and great promise, was killed by a musket ball.

In the meantime Sedgwick had crossed the river with his corps; occupied Fredericksburg on the 3rd, and assaulted and carried the enemy's works above the town; captured a number of guns, and advanced on the Chancellorsville road to the vicinity of Salem Heights, where the enemy were found in strong force. Here a furious struggle took place, in which the artillery played a conspicuous and important part. On this day and the succeeding one the batteries of the corps were engaged in the desperate struggle maintained by Sedgwick against a largely superior force. Colonel Tompkins, commanding the artillery of the corps, makes special mention of the services of each, and to his report for more extended information, and to that of General Sedgwick for his estimate of the value of the service rendered by the artillery on that occasion, I would respectfully refer you. In the meantime it is but just that the names of the batteries and their commanders be presented: Harn's, Third New York, six 10-pounders; McCartney's, A, First Massachusetts, six 12-pounders; Butler's, G, Second United States, six 12-pounders; Martin's, F, Fifth United States, six 10-pounders; Cowan's First New York, six 3-inch guns; McCarthy's, C and D, First Pennsylvania, six 3-inch guns; Williston's, D, Second United States, six 12-pounders; Rigby's, A, First Maryland, six 3-inch guns, and Parsons', A, First New Jersey, six 10-pounders.

At Banks' Ford. General Tyler, upon taking command, communicated with General Sedgwick, and placed such of his batteries of the Reserve Artillery as might be needed at General Sedgwick's disposal. The batteries, placed in position to command the crossing places and cover the bridges, engaged with such of those of the enemy as came within their range. In this service 1 man was wounded and a few horses killed, and Sedgwick's corps now crossed, under protection of their fire.

On my arrival at general headquarters, at 10 p. m. of May 3, I was directed by you to take charge of all the artillery, relieving Colonel Wainwright, who had been placed in command of it the day before. Colonel Wainwright informed me

that he had made the best practicable arrangement for the lines of defense, but that in the general confusion, from the want of a commander of the artillery, the batteries of the corps had become scattered and mixed with each other.

On examination, I found the line commencing on our left, which rested on the Rappahannock and extended to Hunting Creek, had three large batteries, viz: One of thirty guns, twenty rifles and ten light 12-pounders (Waterman's, C, First Rhode Island, two sections, four 3-inch guns; Barnes', C, First New York, four 3-inch guns; Phillips', E, First Massachusetts, six 3-inch guns; Hazlett's, D, Fifth Artillery, six 10-pounders; Randol's, E, First United States, four 12-pounders, and Martin's, C, First Massachusetts, six 12-pounders), under command of Captain Randol, First Artillery, on the left of the line; one of forty-eight guns, twenty-four light 12-pounders and twenty-four 3-inch guns (Kirby's, I, First [U. S.] Artillery, six 12-pounders; Ames', G, First New York, six 12-pounders; Gibbs', L, First Ohio, six 12-pounders; Bruen's Tenth New York, six 12-pounders; Fitzhugh's, K, First New York, four 3-inch guns; Ricketts', F, First Pennsylvania, four 3-inch guns; Martin's, F, Fifth United States, four 3-inch guns; Waterman's, C, First Rhode Island, one section, two 3-inch guns; Edgell's, A, First New Hampshire, six 3-inch guns, and Amsden's, G, First Pennsylvania, four 3-inch guns), under command of Captain Weed, Fifth U. S. Artillery, commanding the artillery of the Fifth Corps, at the angle in our line near

the white houses, and one of thirty-two guns, twenty light rifles and twelve light 12-pounders

(Hall's Second Maine, six 3-inch guns; Wiedrich's, I, First New York, four 3-inch guns;

Knap's First Pennsylvania, four 10-pounders; Reynolds', L, First New York, six 3-inch guns; Ransom's, C, Fifth [U. S.] Artillery, six 12-pounders, and Stewart's, B, Fourth [U. S.] Artillery, six 12-pounders) under command of Colonel Wainwright, First New York Artillery, commanding the artillery of the First Corps, on the right of our line, near Hunting Creek.

After examining these batteries, and giving such instructions as were required, I proceeded to ascertain the positions of the other batteries of the corps, which I found mostly in the open ground near the United States Fond or in the woods behind the line of the army. I had them replenished with ammunition and so placed as to become available should their services be needed.

On the afternoon of the 4th, during a reconnaissance made by Griffin's division, Fifth Corps, a cannonade took place between the large battery at the center of our line, under Captain Weed, and the enemy's artillery. This closed

the active operations of the main body of the army on the south side of the river.

At daybreak on the morning of Tuesday, the 5th, I received your instructions to cross all the batteries not in line of battle to the north side of the Rappahannock, under cover of the fog, and to send them by way of Hartwood Church to their old camps. This duty was performed under the immediate direction of Captain Best, Fourth Artillery, commander of the artillery of the Twelfth Corps. By my order he stationed several batteries in the open space on the hill below the ford, so as to sweep the front of the left of our line and to command all the open ground upon which the enemy could place guns to shell our bridge, which he had attempted the previous evening. At the same time, batteries were placed upon the bluffs, commanding the ford both above and below the bridges, to hold the enemy in check should he attempt to follow the army on its withdrawal.

The army passed to the north bank during that night and a portion of the next day. The enemy, as I had foreseen, sent a force to the position from which he had shelled our bridges, but, after a sharp cannonade, it was driven off, principally by the fire of Knap's and Thompson's batteries (Knap's First Pennsylvania, six 10-pounders, and Thompson's Fourth Pennsylvania, four 10-pounders), with some loss in killed and wounded on our part. The enemy suffered considerably and lost one caisson-blown up.

Our loss in all these operations, so far as I can learn from the imperfect reports furnished me, was 5 officers-Captain R. B. Hampton, Third Independent Pennsylvania Battery; First Lieuts. F. B. Crosby, Fourth [U. S.] Artillery; F. Dorries, Battery L, First Ohio; B. E. Kelley, Battery G, First Rhode Island Artillery; Lieutenant [William] O'Donohue, Second Independent New York Battery-and 50 enlisted men killed, and 13 officers-Captain G. F. Leppien (mortally), First Lieutenant G. T. Stevens, and Second Lieutenant A. B. Twitchell, Fifth Maine Battery; Second Lieutenant [Beldin] Spence, Battery G, First Pennsylvania; First Lieuts. E. Kirby, First U. S. Artillery (mortally), C. Allen, jr., and O. L. Torslow, Battery G, First Rhode Island; J. B. Sluson, Battery B, First New York; J. E. Dimick, First U. S. Artillery (mortally); F. M. Sackett, C, First Rhode Island; J. C. Carlisle, Thirteenth New York Battery; Jacob Blind and Theodore Tiebel, Second New York Battery; C. A. Atwell, First Pennsylvania Battery-and 268 enlisted men wounded, 53 captured or missing, and 388 horses killed and disabled, horse artillery not included.

I respectfully refer to the reports of commanders of artillery, corps, and of the generals with whom they served for the names of those who have distinguished themselves for gallantry and good conduct.

To the officers of my staff-Lieutenant Colonel E. R. Warner and Major Alexander Doull, inspectors of artillery, who were each charged with separate commands, at different points, as already stated; Captain J. N. Craig, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenant C. T. Bissell, aide-de-camp-my thanks are due for the gallantry and efficiency with which they discharged the duties devolved upon them. Those of Lieutenant Bissell, my only aide, were necessarily arduous and always performed with promptitude.

To Colonel Wainwright, First New York Artillery, who was placed by the commanding general in charge of all the artillery on the 3rd; Captain C. L. Best, Fourth [U. S.] Artillery, who took charge of the batteries not in the line of battle on the 4th, and of the posting and commanding of such batteries as were needed to cover the withdrawal of the army, and to Lieutenant-Colonel Morgan (captain Fourth [U. S.] Artillery) for assistance given me of the field, I beg to make my acknowledgments.

In justice to the artillery, and to myself, I think it necessary to state certain circumstances affecting its condition and losses in these operations. The command of the artillery, which I held under Generals McClellan and Burnside, and exercised at the battles of Antietam and Fredericksburg, was withdrawn from me when you assumed command of the army, and my duties made purely administrative, under circumstances very unfavorable to their efficient performance. I heard after the movement commenced that, when the corps were put in motion to cross the river, they left part of their artillery in their camps. No notice of this was given to me, and it was only by accident that I learned that the batteries so left behind were afterward ordered to rejoin their corps. As soon as the battle commenced on Friday morning, I began to receive demands from corps commanders for more artillery, which I was unable to comply with, except partially, and at the risk of deranging the plans of other corps commanders. That same morning I was ordered to Banks' Ford, to take command there, and was absent at that place until the night of the 3rd from general headquarters.

The promotion of many of the old artillery officers, and the invariable transfer which accompanied it to other duties, weakened the regular batteries exceedingly, and at the same time deprived the divisional artillery of experienced commanders. The limitation of officers of fourgun batteries crippled the volunteer service, and the want of field officers added to the

great difficulties under which the arm labored. It will, perhaps, hardly be believed that for the command and management in their operations of the artillery of the army, consisting of 412 guns, 980 artillery carriages, 9,543 men and officers, and 8,544 horses, besides their large ammunition trains, there were but five field officers of artillery in the army, and from the scarcity of officers of inferior grades these officers had miserably insufficient staffs. Add to this that there was no commander of all the artillery until a late period of the operations, and I doubt if the history of modern armies can exhibit a parallel instance of such palpable crippling of a great arm of the service in the very presence of a powerful enemy, to overcome whom would require every energy of all arms under the most favorable circumstances. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at that confusion and mismanagement ensued, and it is creditable to the batteries themselves, and to the officers who commanded them, that they did so well. Fourteen guns were lost, but the most of these losses (eight) occurred in the rout of the Eleventh Corps, and all of them before Colonel Wainwright or myself was placed in command of the whole artillery.

HENRY J. HUNT,
Brigadier-General, Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac.

*Report of Colonel Charles S. Wainwright, First New York
Light Artillery, Chief of Artillery.*

CAMP NEAR WHITE OAK CHURCH, VA.,
May 11, 1863.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the batteries of the First Corps in the late operations around Fredericksburg:

In accordance with orders, the corps broke camp about noon on the 28th ultimo, and proceeded down the White Oak Church road, where the batteries were parked together, about half-way to the river road, for the night.

By daylight on the 29th, the following batteries were posted on the heights above and below Pollock's Mill by Lieutenant-Colonel Warner and myself, to cover the crossing, in accordance with directions received from you the previous day: Reynolds', Hall's, Amsden's, and Cooper's (twenty 3-inch guns) above the mill; Edgell's, Thompson's, and Richetts' (fourteen 3-inch guns) below the mill. Soon after, Ransom's battery (six light 12-pounders) was

posted on the first rise between the road and the river. The enemy held the opposite bank with 400 or 500 men, one regiment, the Ninth Louisiana, in a large rifle-pit directly in front of where the head of the bridge was to rest, the others as skirmishers along the bank. Our engineers had not succeeded in throwing the bridge before daylight, as intended, and the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters was quite brisk, as well as that of the regiment in the rifle-pit.

The fog lifted about 8.30 o'clock, and the rifle-pit was slowly shelled by the batteries on the hill. A regiment coming down to relieve or re-enforce them was scattered and severely handled by our artillery fire.

At 10 o'clock, two regiments of infantry were thrown across, in boats, and the rifle-pit carried, with about 100 prisoners. During these operations, the 3-inch batteries expended 160 rounds of ammunition in nearly equal proportion of shrapnel, fuse, and percussion-shell, and Captain Ransom fired 3 rounds. The firing was good, that of Captain Cooper's battery (which held the best position for a cross-fire on the pit) particularly so. The bridges having been established and the First Division posted on the opposite bank, everything remained quiet for the rest of the day.

April 30.-At noon, Stewart's and Ransom's batteries were moved across the river and placed in position on the crest directly above the head of the bridges, so as to command the plain as far as the Bowling Green road.

About 5 p. m. the enemy opened from four 20-pounder Parrott guns, placed on the height on which they had their batteries in the engagement of this corps in December last. Their fire was first directed on the infantry of the Second and Third Divisions, massed on the flat on this side of the river. These being withdrawn, they turned their attention to the batteries on the hills, and just before dark fired a few shots at Stewart's and Ransom's batteries. Their practice was very good, injuring a number of the infantry and severely wounding one of Lieutenant Stewart's men. So soon as our infantry were withdrawn, we opened from three batteries on the heights below the mill, firing 138 rounds. The distance was about 3,400 yards, too great for certain practice with the 3-inch guns. The elevation required was found to be 14 degrees, and time fifteen and a half seconds for a Hotchkiss fuseshell. The Schenkl percussion was found to work best at this distance.

About an hour before dark, Lieutenant-Colonel Warner moved a section of Taft's battery of 20-pounder Parrotts out on the road above Traveler's Rest, and opened on the enemy's battery. A few Whitworth shot were fired from a gun of

the enemy posted below the Massaponax, doing no damage. The firing ceased at dark. After dark one section of Stewart's battery was moved up to the front of the brick house; Pratt's within our lines on the opposite bank, and before daylight Ransom's battery was withdrawn from that side and replaced by Reynolds' (six 3-inch guns). Our whole front was covered with a rifle-pit, and small earthworks thrown up in front of the guns.

May 1.-Everything continued quiet through the day, the batteries remaining in the same position, except that of Amsden's (four 3-inch guns) was moved down the river to Traveler's Rest, to replace one of the reserve batteries ordered up to Banks' Ford, and Lieutenant Blucher reported with six 20-pounder Parrott's (Twenty-ninth New York Battery), and was placed in position on the left of the other batteries on the crest in front of the Fitzhugh house. Large bodies of the enemy were seen moving up the river. Our lookouts reported nine batteries, of fifty guns.

May 2.-I received orders to withdraw across the river and proceed to the United States Ford. Soon after, the movement commenced, and about 8 a. m. the enemy opened with 20-pounder Parrotts, above mentioned, and also with two 10-pounder Parrotts stationed on the same crest. Their fire was directed on our bridge and at Reynolds' battery, stationed immediately in front of it. Captain Reynolds replied deliberately and with good effect, exploding one of their ammunition chests. The batteries on the hill also opened, and with much better effect than on the 30th ultimo, the range having been pretty accurately ascertained at that time. Lieutenant Blucher did good service with his 20-pounders after he had ascertained the range and got his men quieted down. The enemy's battery was silenced in about an hour. Captain Reynolds and Lieutenant Blucher, however, continued to throw occasional shots into their position for half an hour longer, until all our troops were withdrawn. The enemy's fire was rapid and accurate, destroying one of the pontoons and wounding 10 men (1 mortally) in Reynolds' battery; three of his limbers were also struck and more or less damaged, and 10 horses killed. The battery was exceedingly well handled, the firing being carried on coolly and deliberately.

The troops having been withdrawn, the batteries proceeded up the river, Ransom, Stewart, and Cooper with their divisions; the remainder by an inner road, under my own command. We arrived at the United States Ford about dark, and lay that night near the brick hospital, half a mile in front of the bridges.

Sunday, May 3.-One proceeding to the front, I found the First Corps occupying the right of the army, along the road leading from Chancellorsville to Ely's Ford. By direction of General Reynolds, Hall's (six 3-inch guns), Ransom's, and

Stewart's (twelve night 12-pounders) batteries were brought up and posted where our lines made a bend to the rear, about one-third of a mile from the point at which the road crosses Hunting Creek. Their guns were afterward protected with small earthworks, and remained in this position without being engaged until withdrawn on the night of the 5th. Captain Leppien's battery (Fifth Maine) had been ordered to this position instead of Captain Ransom's, but, on arriving at the Chancellorsville and Ely's Ford road, was turned off by order of General Hooker, and sent out to Chancellorsville.

In the engagement at that point on the 3rd, this battery suffered very severely, losing 3 officers and 25 men; also 43 horses killed and wounded. The battery seemed to have behaved excellently, and, with the aid of a body of General Hancock's troops, brought off all their guns. I was not present in this engagement, and would refer for particulars to the report of Lieutenant Stevens, a copy of which is appended.* During the day Amsden's battery (four 3-inch guns) was moved to the front and posted by Captain Weed on his left front. Toward evening, Edgell, with six 3-inch guns, relieved Puttkammer's battery, on the same front, and Ricketts, with four 3-inch guns, relieved Seeley's battery, on Captain Weed's right front. Amsden was engaged in the actions of that afternoon and also the next morning, having 1 officer and 8 men wounded; the other two batteries were also engaged to a small extent. These batteries at the time were not under my command, and do not report anything deserving your attention.

May 4.-Reynolds' battery was moved up to relieve Knap's battery on a small knoll, about 100 yards in the rear of the Chancellorsville and Ely's Ford road, and half a mile west of the road to the bridges. Wiedrich's battery, of the Eleventh Corps, also held the same position. They were not engaged at all, and were safely withdrawn on the night of the 5th.

May 5.-Everything remained quiet along our lines during the day. So soon as it was dark I commenced withdrawing the batteries stationed along the front of the First Corps. Wiedrich's and Reynold's passed off without trouble, but the road by which the three batteries on our left were to have withdrawn having being rendered impassable by the heavy rain, they were obliged to go around by the main road, and the bridges having been damaged, were ordered back to their old position after getting half-way to the crossing.

In another hour, however, they were again started, and after daylight on the morning of the 6th all the batteries of the corps were again on this side of the river. With the exception of Thompson's and Cooper's batteries, they at once proceeded on their march back to White Oak Church. These two batteries

were posted on the heights below the bridges, to cover their removal, and during the afternoon had a sharp engagement with some of their guns at about 1,400 yards, in which Thompson lost 1 killed and 3 wounded. The enemy were driven from their guns and several of their chests exploded.

It had been difficult to make the above report satisfactory, as the batteries, of the corps were much scattered, and, except during the operations below Fredericksburg, those that were engaged were not under my own command at the time. So far as I have been able to learn, the officers and men behaved well.

I would submit the following observations in regard to the 3-inch projectiles. The Schenkl common fuse worked well, but can only be used within 2,500 yards. The head of the fuse was found in some cases to stick in the hollow at the end of the reamer, and the shot displaced after being sent home, causing it to fail in taking the grooves. The Hotchkiss shell and shrapnel did well, but the paper fuses were far from certain. This was doubtless partly owing to the dampness of the atmosphere and the powder in the fuse-head having got more or less rubbed off by abrasion in the chests. Both these difficulties are removed by the new mode of putting up fuses, I notice, in some of these issued since our return. For certainly, both of flight and explosion, I give the preference to the Schenkl percussion-shell over any other projectile.

The march from our first position to the ford was a hard one on horses and harness, and much of the latter was broken. I would respectfully call the attention of the Ordnance Department, through you, to the fact that the harness issued at the commencement of this war is now nearly worn out, and that there will soon be a necessity for its replacement.

Of the officers and men deserving especial approbation, I would mention First Lieutenant A. B. Twitchell, Fifth Maine Battery, who, though twice wounded and his clothing badly burned at the commencement of the engagement at Chancellorsville, continued to command his section until struck the third time; also Sergt. Amos Gibbs, of Battery L, First New York, who, though badly wounded in the shoulder by a shell, persisted in remaining at his piece after being permitted to go to the rear by his captain.

I remain, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. S. WAINWRIGHT,
Colonel and Chief of Artillery, First Corps.
Brigadier General HENRY J. HUNT,
Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac.

*Report of Colonel Charles H. Tompkins,
First Rhode Island Artillery, Chief of Artillery.*

**OFFICE CHIEF OF ART., SIXTH ARMY CORPS,
May 15, 1863.**

GENERAL:

I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the artillery of this corps in the recent operations:

On Tuesday, the 28th ultimo, the Sixth Corps left its camp and moved to the vicinity of Franklin's crossing, near the month of Deep Run. Arriving near the bank of the river about sunset, the artillery was parked near Sands' house, behind the woods, and secure from the observation of the enemy.

During the night, in obedience to your orders, Harn's, McCarthy's, Rigby's, and Cown's batteries were placed upon the heights about 600 yards distant from the river, and were nearly in the same position as that occupied by these batteries on December 13 last. Willison's battery was parked upon the flat behind a slight crest, 300 yards in rear of where the bridges were to be thrown, with instructions to move forward into battery, and command and protect the bridges should the enemy attack in force. Seeley's battery, of the Third Corps, having reported to me, was also parked upon the flat, some 500 yards to the right of Williston's, and the same instructions were given him. All were in position an hour before daylight. The other batteries remained in park near Sands' house, ready to move forward into position should their services be required.

Just before daybreak, a brigade (Russell's) of Brooks' division crossed the river in the boats, and occupied the rifle-pits on the other side, but slight resistance being made by the enemy. The division was crossed and the bridges thrown over without further resistance. As soon as the bridges were completed, Williston's battery crossed the river and took position behind the rifle-pits lately occupied by the enemy. The other batteries of the corps, except those in position upon the heights, were moved down and parked on the plain near the bridge-heads.

On Thursday, the 30th, Seeley was relieved by Kinzie's battery, and ordered to report to his division commander. The same afternoon Kinzie was ordered to report to you at Banks' Ford.

On Saturday, the 2nd instant, the troops of the corps remaining upon this side of the river were ordered to cross, and the batteries crossed with their respective divisions. At 12 o'clock that night, the corps moved out upon the Bowling Green road, and took up its line of march for Fredericksburg, Newton's division (to which had been attached the Light Brigade) in advance; Butler's, Harn's, and McCarthy's batteries were with this division; Martin's and Cowan's batteries with Howe' division, and Willston's, McCartney's, Rigby's, and Hexamer's batteries with Brooks' division.

The column entered Fredericksburg and took possession of the town about daybreak of Sunday, 3rd instant, having skirmished with the enemy all the way from Deep Run. The enemy having opened fire from all the way from Deep Run. The enemy having opened fire from their works in rear of the town. Harn's battery was placed in position on the right of the railroad, near the gas-works; McCarthy and Butler on the left of the railroad-McCarthy on the right of Butler, and both, owing to the nature of the ground, about 100 yards in advance of Harn's position-and immediately opened fire upon the enemy's works, marking excellent practice and doing good execution, as subsequent investigation showed.

Howe's division had not crossed Hazel Run, and General Brooks, being threatened with an attack from the enemy in his front, had not left his position on the Bowling Green road in front of the bridges.

The general commanding having ordered an assault to be made upon the works of the enemy and directed General Howe to advance upon the left of Hazel Run, and General Newton upon the right, the batteries of Howe's division, Martin's and Cowan's, under command of Major De Peyster, were placed in position to cover the advance of the assaulting column. The batteries of Newton's division were directed to concentrate their fire upon a certain point in the stone wall at the foot of the crest, and behind which the enemy's infantry was concealed, until the assaulting column had nearly reached the wall, and then to direct their fire upon the batteries upon the crest.

These instructions were fully carried out. The practice was excellent, inflicting great damage upon the enemy and aiding very materially in the success of the assault. During their time Brooks' division, on the left, was hotly engaged with the enemy in their immediate front. For the part taken by the batteries of that division in the engagement I respectfully refer you to the report of Major Tompkins,* who commanded them.

The crest having been carried, and the enemy in full retreat, Harn's battery, followed by McCarthy's, was moved rapidly up the Telegraph road. Both were placed in battery some distance in rear of the works from which the enemy had been driven, Harn upon the right and McCarthy upon the left of the road, and immediately opened fire upon the retreating enemy. From this point to Salem Heights, the advance of the corps was annoyed by a section of horse artillery, the only guns not captured from the enemy in the assault, which took position upon every available point, and opened upon our troops, firing until driven off by the fire of the batteries (Harn's and McCarthy's), which were with the advance, and the near approach of the infantry, which continued steadily to advance.

At Salem Heights the enemy were found to be in force. Brooks' division, which had come up and taken the advance, moved forward to the assault on the left of the Plank road, and Newton's division upon the right. Williston's, Rigby's, and Hexamer's (Lieutenant Parsons commanding) batteries were placed in position near the toll-gate, where a slight rise in the ground afforded good cover for the limber and caissons. One section of Williston's was placed in the road, the other two sections on the left, and Rigby's and Hexamer's (Parsons') upon the right of the road. From the batteries to the wood, which begins at the foot of the heights, was about 500 yards of open ground. The infantry moved steadily across this ground, the wood, and, after a severe contest, reached the crest, held it for a few moments, and then, being greatly outnumbered, was forced to retire. It came out of the wood, many of the regiments in great confusion, closely followed by the enemy. Already had the batteries opened fire over the heads of the retiring troops, firing slowly at first, and, as the enemy attempted to follow our troops out of the wood, rapidly, Williston using canister. The enemy were checked and driven back by this fire. The infantry reformed behind the batteries, advanced, entering the wood, and held the position until darkness ended the conflict. Shortly after dark, I ordered Butler's, Cowan's, and Harn's batteries, which had been held in reserve, to relieve Williston, Rigby, and Parsons, who were sent to the rear to replace their ammunition.

On Monday, the 4th instant, the enemy retook possession of Fredericksburg Heights. Howe's division was at once formed to the rear (east), to meet any attack from that direction, Newton's division formed to the front (west), and Brooks' division formed to the south, his right joining Newton's left and his left Howe's right. On Howe's line, Martin's and Rigby's batteries were placed in position, Rigby's and one section of Martin's on the right, the remaining two sections of Martin's on the left. McCartney's and Hexamer's (Parsons')

batteries were placed in position on Brooks' line, McCarney's and one section of Hexamer's (Parsons') on the right, the remarrying two sections of Hexamer's (Persons') on the left. On Newton's line, Butler, Harn, and Cowan were in position on the left center, near the toll-gate, and Willson's and McCarthy's were placed in a commending position in the rear of the right counter. A brigade of the enemy which attacked Howe in the morning was repulsed by the fire of the line of skirmishers and the section of 12-pounder guns of Martin's battery.

In the evening a most determined attack was made upon Howe's front, the enemy advancing upon Brooks' front at the same time. Three times their column advanced upon Brooks, to be as often driven back by the fire of the skirmishers and McCartney's and Hexmer's (Parsons') batteries. McCartney's practice was very fine; he not only rendered valuable assistance in dispersing the infantry of the enemy, but when they subsequently brought up a section of a battery and attempted to put it in position, he prevented them from doing so, driving the gunners from their pieces and preventing their firing a shot.

In the attack upon Howe, Martin and Rigby both did excellent execution, fighting desperately, but with coolness and judgment, and only falling back to a second position when their supports had left them.

Butler's battery was sent from the right to General Howe late in the evening, arriving there just after his first line had been driven in. The battery was placed so as to command a ravine by which the enemy were approaching, and his well-directed fire soon checked their advance. Rigby's second position was some 200 yards to the right of Butler, and Martin's some 200 yards to the left and center, Butler being in the center, Rigby on the right center, and Martin the left center of Howe's second line. In his attack upon this line, the enemy was repulsed with great slaughter, the batteries rendering very efficient service.

During the night, the batteries fell back to Banks' Ford, and, crossing with the corps to the north bank of the river, went into camp about 6 a. m. on the 5th, about a mile back from the ford, on the Falmouth road.

At 10 a. m. Williston was, by order of General Sedgwick, sent to Richards' Ford. He reported back on the 7th.

On the 8th, the batteries returned to the vicinity of their former camps.

I cannot close this report without speaking in the highest terms of the coolness, bravery, and efficiency of the officers and men of the artillery of

this corps. I claim for them that to these qualities, which they possess in so eminent a degree, is due much of the success of the Sixth Corps.

On Sunday, and again on Monday, when our infantry was driven back by the greatly superior numbers of the enemy, our artillery checked his advance and turned the tide of battle.

To Major J. A. Tompkins, First Rhode Island Artillery, commanding Artillery Brigade, First Division, I am greatly indebted for most valuable assistance. He again, as he has so often before, proved himself to be an officer thoroughly acquainted with his profession, and possessed of great coolness and personal courage. Captains McCartney, Cowan, Rigby, and McCarthy, and Lieutenants Williston, Butler, Martin, Parsons, and Harn proved themselves, by the able manner in which they handled their batteries and the coolness and courage they displayed under the most trying circumstances, to be worthy of all praise, and entitled to promotion. I respectfully recommend all the above-named officers for brevet.

For the names of others who distinguished themselves, as well as for more full particulars, I respectfully call your attention to the accompanying reports of Majors Tompkins and De Peyster, Captain McCarthy, and Lieutenants Butler and Harn,* whose recommendations I cordially indorse.

I inclose a list of casualties, and of property loss and destroyed.

I remain, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. H. TOMPKINS,
Colonel, and Chief of Artillery, Sixth Army Corps.
Brigadier General HENRY J. HUNT,
Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac.

*Report of Lieutenant Francis W. Seeley,
Battery K, Fourth U. S. Artillery.*

HDQRS. BATTERY K, FOURTH U. S. ART.,
May 16, 1863.

CAPTAIN:

In compliance with instructions from headquarters Second Division, Third Corps, I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of Battery K, Fourth U. S. Artillery, under my command, during the late movements of this army:

On the evening of April 28, pursuant to instructions, I marched to a point near Franklin's bridge, and early next morning went into position, where I remained until 3 p. m. on the 30th, when I marched with the division to a point near the United States Ford, and crossed to Rappahannock on May 1; remained in position on the south side of the river, near the ford, until 7 p. m. on the 2nd, when I marched to Chancellorsville and parked for the night.

Early on the morning of the 3rd, the enemy having vigorously attacked our lines at that point, I was ordered by an aide of General Hooker to a position on a rising ground in the angle made by the formation of our infantry, which was on two sides of a square facing outward. Soon after bringing my pieces into position, one of the enemy's batteries, posted behind the crest of a hill some 500 yards in my front, opened a destructive fire on my battery, to which I replied from the left half of the battery, commanded by Lieutenant Arnold, vigorously for about fifteen minutes, when, finding that, although my shell and case shot exploded on the crest of the hill behind which the enemy's battery was posted, they failed to do any harm, owing to the fact that the opposing guns were perfectly screened by the crest, I desisted, and made no further attempt to dislodge them. I then turned my attention to the enemy's infantry, a brigade of which had gained a temporary advantage on our right, and forced a portion of our first and second lines to retire on their supports. A few well directed shots from my right section, commanded by Lieutenant [Robert] James, caused the enemy hastily to retire, after which I ceased firing, the battery in my front keeping up meantime and incessant and well-directed fire, killing and wounding several of my men and horses.

I held my position for about half an hour longer, when, finding that our batteries had been engaged on my right had left the field, and that our infantry was also retiring, and the enemy crowding in on both flanks of my battery, I limbered up my guns and moved off at a trot to the ground immediately a very destructive fire from the enemy's line, then advancing, and distant about 250 yards on my flank. The fire was galling in the extreme. Many of my bravest and best men fell, and, in order to save my guns, I was obliged to leave the brave fellows on the field.

When I arrived near the brick building before mentioned, Major-General Sickles, then on the ground, through his chief of corps artillery, Captain G. E. Randolph, assigned me to a position in order to check the advance of the enemy,

who was then pressing on in front and both flanks. I loaded the guns with canister, and reserved my fire until the enemy was within 350 yards of my position, and then opened with terrible effect, causing their troops to break and take to the cover of the woods on my left and front, where we followed them with solid shot until the ammunition in the limbers was exhausted. Then, with the aid of my few remaining men and horses, the debris of my battery was drawn from the field, my men cheering, under a heavy fire from three of the enemy's batteries, one on the Plank road in front of my right, one on the left and rear, and another on the left and front of my battery.

When leaving the field, I was obliged for want of horses - many of the pieces and caissons having but two and three, and they, in many instances, wounded - to abandon a caisson; also five wheels, which were shattered by solid shot and changed under fire.

My loss in men was as follows: Killed, 7 enlisted men; wounded, 1 officer (Lieutenant Arnold) and 38 enlisted men; also 59 horses killed and disabled. The loss in men was probably greater than that of any other battery during the war; that is, in proportion to my numbers, as I took into action about 120 men.

Of the conduct of officers and men I cannot speak in too high terms. Without a single exception it was heroic, and reflects credit on the battery and the service in general. It will be a pleasant duty for me, as soon as time will permit, to recommend to the attention of the general commanding such cases of particular merit as will be considered deserving of acknowledgment by promotion by brevets and by the bestowal of medals of honor. This is due to the brave men by whose untiring efforts I was enabled to save my guns and deal destruction to the enemy.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. W. SEELEY,

First Lieutenant Fourth Artillery, Commanding Battery K.

Captain GEORGE E. RANDOLPH,

Chief of Art., 3rd Army Corps.

*Report of Captain George E. Randolph,
First Rhode Island Light Artillery, Chief of Artillery.*

**HEADQUARTERS ARTILLERY, THIRD ARMY CORPS,
May 19, 1863.**

COLONEL:

I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the batteries of this corps during the recent movements of the army:

On the afternoon of Tuesday, April 28, five batteries, viz, Seeley's, (K, Fourth U.S. Artillery), Huntington's (H, First Ohio), Dimick's (H, First U.S. Artillery), Randolph's (E, First Rhode Island Artillery), and Bruen's (Tenth New York), were ordered to report to Brigadier-General Hunt, and during the night were placed as follows: Seeley's on the bank of the river at the bridge-head, covering Franklin's crossing; Huntington's on a prominent hill just in rear and a little to the right of Franklin's crossing; Dimick's, Randolph's, and Bruen's between the railroad and the Lacy house, in reserve.

The remaining batteries, viz, Livingston's (F and K, Third United States), Smith's (Fourth New York), of Birney's division, Osborn's (D, First New York), Clark's (B, First New Jersey), of Berry's division, and von Puttkammer's (Eleventh New York), of Whipple's division, marched, with their respective divisions, and encamped the night of the 28th in the woods on the road from General Sedgwick's headquarters to Franklin's crossing.

On the morning of the 30th, by command of General Sickles, I ordered these five batteries to a point near the river, and to report to General Newton, by whom they were placed in battery on the bank of the river, to prevent our bridge being threatened by artillery at Bernard's house or to repel any attack upon our troops already crossed.

At 3 p.m. all the batteries of the corps followed their respective divisions, and marched until late in the night of the 30th, encamping with the troops at Hamet's on the Warrenton turnpike.

Marched at 5 a.m., May 1, across the Rappahannock to Chancellorsville, Livingston's and Clark's arriving soonest. Seeley's and Randolph's were placed in battery, covering the bridge at the United States Ford from the south side. At the time of the alarm, caused by the withdrawal of our lines, about 2.30 p.m. of May 1, Turnbull's and Clark's were put into battery in a second line parallel to and in rear of the Plank road, and on the right of the Chancellor house. The other batteries of the corps had by this time reported to their divisions, near Chancellorsville. Later in the day, when Graham's brigade formed line of battle near Fairview, the batteries of Birney's and Whipple's divisions were parked in the field in rear of and near them, those of Berry's being still in reserve near the white house occupied by General Couch as headquarters. When Birney's division occupied the line assigned it on the left

of the Eleventh Corps, the batteries of that division (now Clark's, in the place of Smith's, by transfer), Livingston's and Randolph's, bivouacked near it. During the latter part of the morning and early in the afternoon, General Birney had remarked the train of the enemy moving on a road, distant about 1,600 yards from the line he was then holding, and about 11 a.m. placed Clark's battery in position, ordering it to annoy and check the passage of the troops and trains he had seen. This was done by Clark effectually and handsomely. The practice was, on the whole, excellent, and the enemy was compelled to stop the movement or continue it by some other road.

At 3 p.m. General Birney was ordered to advance through the woods and to gain possession of the road over which the trains had been seen to pass. He advanced through the woods until he came to the iron foundry, a mile in advance of the line he had occupied, where a 12-pounder battery of the enemy opened upon his advance. He ordered up Clark's battery to dislodge it, but as Clark's was already in position, Livingston, was sent, which, after a little confusion, got into position between the woods and foundry, and opened upon and silenced the battery of the enemy, losing 2 men severely wounded and several slightly.

Their ammunition was soon exhausted, caissons having been left in the rear, and they were relieved by Randolph's, one section of which took position at the foundry, co-operating with the infantry of Whipple's division, and guarding this important point, while four pieces advanced with Birney's troops to the house on the hill from which the enemy's battery had been dislodged.

Meanwhile the most unexpected events were taking place in the rear. Thinking the First and Third Divisions the only part of our corps likely to be engaged, I had parked the other batteries, and superintended in person the operations of Livingston's and Randolph's batteries, in the advance with General Birney. I must, therefore, depend for the particulars of the occurrences in my rear upon the reports of Captains Huntington and Osborn, accompany this.

The batteries of the Third Division and Livingston's battery were unfortunate in that they were directly in the way of the fugitives of the Eleventh Corps and of the enemy who followed them, and were thrown into temporary confusion. One piece and several caissons of Livingston's battery and several caisson bodies of Randolph's, the limbers of which had been sent to supply the battery in front with General Birney, were abandoned, but recovered when the ground was regained at midnight by General Birney's attack. These batteries, with Clark's and Martin's horse battery, formed a line diagonally across the open field, and, with the cavalry of General Pleasanton, held the enemy until the arrival of the First and Third Divisions of infantry.

The batteries of the Second Division, under Captain Osborn, had been put into position on rear the Plank road, not far from Fairview; a section of Dimick's (H, First United States) in the road, and rendered signal service here, forming a part of the iron wall that the Second Division opposed to the advance of the enemy in that direction.

I must refer to Captain Osborn's report for the particulars of this part of the battle, only calling the attention of the general commanding to the important place held by these batteries (Dimick's and Osborn's), and to the handsome manner they performed that ask assigned them.

Early on the morning of the 3rd, I was ordered to mass the artillery of the corps in the woods between the white house and the United States Ford.

This order was afterward countermanded, and I was ordered to withdraw those on the field occupied by the First and Third Divisions during the night, and place them in the line of earthworks near Fairview, covering the withdrawal of our troops. Huntington's battery (H, First Ohio Volunteers), whose position was an admirable one, was last to move, and had an opportunity to sweep the plain in front of it with a terribly destructive fire and with very little loss.

In retiring, however, it was more exposed, and through the loss of horses and the confusion consequent on being between the enemy's line and our own, three pieces were necessarily abandoned in the bad ditch running along the ravine at the bottom of the hill on which were the breastworks occupied by our batteries. On this line were, commencing on the right of the Plank road, Dimick's and Osborn's; Randolph's near and to the right of the house occupied by General Slocum on Friday; Clark near and to the left of the house, and Seeley on the extreme left of the crest; Lieutenant Lewis was in the rear, near the Chancellorsville house; Livingston and von Puttkammer at the rear, near the white house, and Huntington's three pieces at the ford.

Now began the hardest battle it has been my fate to witness. The five batteries were admirably posted and admirably served. Never had artillery a finer opportunity to do good service, and never was a better use made of favorable circumstances. Twice the columns of the enemy on the Plank road were repulsed by the concentration of the fire from this line of batteries. The loss of the enemy must have been very heavy from this fire, and I am of the opinion that, with a constant supply of ammunition, and the woods held to the right of the road, this line of batteries could have defied the enemy's attack. As the batteries expended their ammunition they were withdrawn. Clark's borrowed ammunition after expending its own. No battery moved from this line having

anything in its chest except canister, which could not be used on account of the position of our own troops. When our troops abandoned the crest, Lieutenant Lewis, of the Tenth New York Battery, was placed in battery near and to the left of Chancellorsville; four pieces of Seeley's (K, Fourth U.S. Artillery) to the left of the Plank road, about half-way from Chancellorsville to Fairview, and two of Randolph's, under Lieutenant Bucklyn, on the road on the same line. These pieces were exposed to a terrible fire, but were gallantly and very effectively served every round of ammunition was expended. The section of Randolph's had not previously been engaged, a large number of men and horses being killed, and their withdrawal rendered necessary. The loss of horses in the section of Randolph's had been so great as to compel Lieutenant Bucklyn to remove one piece by hand and abandon the other. He had only horses enough, after dismounting his sergeant, to draw one piece. The abandoned piece was disabled before left. Lieutenant Seeley, whose loss was as heavy, succeeded in removing his entire battery, having more horses.

To prevent any injustice to Lieutenant Bucklyn, I call attention to the fact that, while Lieutenant Seeley had four pieces and caissons, with complete teams, Lieutenant Bucklyn had but two pieces and no caissons, and therefore could not, as did Seeley, draw his pieces by reducing his caissons team. His section was on the road, and his loss proportionately greater even than Seeley's. He deserves very great credit, however, in saving his battery entire, after such losses of men and horses as he had suffered. Lewis's battery, the Tenth New York, remained until a later hour, and then withdrew to a position near the white house, where was also von Puttkammer's battery, the Eleventh New York, both under the command of Captain Weed, Fifth U.S. Artillery. Puttkammer was relieved at night, but Lewis remained until our lines were left, on the night of the 4th, doing good service at the several times that parts of our lines were engaged.

On the night of the 5th, Lewis' (Tenth New York) battery recrossed to the north side of the Rappahannock, and, with the other batteries of the corps which had crossed during the day of the 5th, returned to its former camp. Clark's battery was retained in position, covering the ford until the afternoon of the 5th.

Throughout this engagement Captain Osborn, chief of artillery, Second Division, and Captain Clark, chief of artillery, First Division, proved themselves brave, cool, and reliable officers. I have only to point to the service done by the batteries under their command to prove their merit. Lieutenant Seeley, commanding Battery K, Fourth U.S. Artillery, handled his battery as in on drill, and even the heavy loss his battery suffered was amply compensated by the effect of his fire on the enemy. Lieutenant Winslow,

commanding Osborn's battery (D, First New York); Lieutenant Lewis, commanding Tenth New York Battery; Lieutenant Sims, commanding Clark's, handled their commands very creditably, as did Lieutenant Bucklyn, who had the section on the Plank road on the right of Seeley's. It gives me great pleasure to speak in terms of the highest praise of Lieutenant Lewis and his battery, especially as it had been, unfortunately, somewhat under a cloud. Nothing could be more praise-worthy than his conduct from first to last.

I regret to report the death of Lieutenant Dimick, commanding Battery H, First U.S. Artillery. Captain Osborn, who was his immediate commander and an eye-witness, characterizes the conduct of Lieutenant Dimick as heroic.

Even more than the death of an officer, do I regret to report the disgraceful conduct of Captain von Puttkammer. As the matter has come to the eye of the general commanding in another way, I will not enlarge upon it here.

Smith's (Fourth New York) battery was placed in position near the United States Ford, and much of its material used in rendering the other batteries of the Second Division immediately serviceable, preventing its being ordered to the front. I hope this circumstances, the best thing that could be done at the time, will in no way affect the reputation of this battery. It was against the urgent protest of its officers that it was crippled to render other batteries that could be of more service able to return at once into action if called upon.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. E. RANDOLPH,
Captain First Rhode Island Art., Chief of Art., Third Army Corps.

SPECIAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, No. 153.}
Camp near Falmouth, Va. , June 5, 1863.

II. The following is the summer field allowance of clothing for men of mounted batteries of this army. All surplus will be turned in at the commencement of a march. One half shelter tent; one blanket for each cannoneer; one great coat for each driver; one jacket, one blouse, one pair trousers, three pairs of stockings, two pairs of drawers, two flannel shirts, one pair shoes or boots. So much of this clothing as is not worn on the person will be transported by drivers on the valise saddles; by cannoneers, in the knapsacks, or on the foot-boards. If packed in knapsacks, they will be carried by the men. If carried on the foot-boards, the articles will be

closely packed or rolled, and secured in a proper sack or sacks, and batteries so transporting this clothing will turn in their knapsacks. The gunners and chiefs of caissons will be held responsible that the clothing is properly packed and secured on their respective carriages. All attempts to abuse this privilege of transporting their kits will be punished by throwing away the extra articles, excepting the soap, towels, and brushes of the men, and compelling them to carry the regulated allowance themselves.

III. Commanders of batteries will be held responsible for the execution of this order, and for those hereafter published.

Respecting the loading of the carriages, see Paragraphs VIII and IX, General Orders, No. 164, October 18, 1862, headquarters Army of the Potomac, and the commandants of artillery of corps will, by frequent inspection, enforce the responsibility. Paulins will in no case be used as tents, but they may in wet weather be used to cover harness.

VI. At the expiration of the leave of absence granted to Major General George Stoneman for the benefit of his health, by Special Orders, Numbers 137, * current series, from these headquarters, he will report in person to the Adjutant-General of the Army for further instructions.

By command of Major-General Hooker

**HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 25, 1863-7 a.m.**

Brigadier-General TYLER,
Commanding Artillery Reserve:

The Reserve Artillery, on the receipt of this order, will take up its line of march for Edwards Ferry, which point it should make to-day.

**HOOKER,
Major-General.**

**GENERAL ORDERS, WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJT. GENERAL 'S OFFICE,
No. 194. } Washington, June 27, 1863.**

By direction of the President Major General Joseph Hooker is relieved from command of the Army of the Potomac, and Major General George G. Meade is appointed to the command of that army, and of the troops temporarily assigned to duty with it. By order of the Secretary of War:

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

General R. O. TYLER,
Commanding Artillery Reserve, Edwards Ferry:

The Fifth Corps (Aldie) will march at 4 a. m. to-morrow, crossing Goose Creek at Carter's Mill; thence to Leesburg, crossing the Potomac at the upper bridge at Edwards Ferry and the Monocacy at its mouth, and follow the river road in the direction of Frederick City. The Reserve Artillery will cross on the lower bridge at Edwards Ferry, and follow the Fifth Corps. Please acknowledge. By command of Major-General Hooker:

S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

SPECIAL ORDERS, HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Numbers 175.} Frederick, Md. , June 28, 1863.

II. The First Brigade of Horse Artillery is assigned to the Cavalry Corps, and the commanding officer will report forthwith to Major-General Pleasonton, at the City Hotel, for instructions. By command of Major-General Meade:

S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Headquarters Artillery Reserve,
Camp near Frederick, Md. , June 28, 1863-7.20 a. m.
General S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac:

GENERAL: In the absence of General Tyler, who is now at general headquarters, I have the honor respectfully to state, in reply to your communication of this a. m. , that nine batteries were sent to Washington the morning of June 25, viz: Thirtieth New York Independent Battery; Thirty-second New York Independent Battery; Twelfth Ohio Battery; Battery B, First Maryland Artillery; Battery C, First Pennsylvania Artillery; Battery H, First Rhode Island Artillery; Keystone Battery, together with Schuetz's [K, Tenth Michigan] and Borrowe's [H, Pennsylvania Light] batteries of the Pennsylvania Reserves. The first five batteries above mentioned took with them twenty-eight guns (twelve 3-inch, ten light 12-pounders, and six 10-pounder Parrotts). Of the remaining four batteries, I am not able to give you the number of guns, as they merely reported for duty, and moved directly to Arlington Heights, pursuant to Special Orders, No. 173, headquarters Army of the Potomac, June 25, 1863. The batteries belonging to the old organization of the Artillery Reserve, sent to Washington, are the Thirtieth New York Independent Battery and the Thirty-second New York Independent Battery, and their places were filled by the Ninth Massachusetts Battery and the Second Connecticut Battery.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
C. H. WHITTELYSEY,
Captain, and Assistant Adjutant-General.

WASHINGTON,
June 30, 1863.
Brigadier General W. F. BARRY,
Inspector of Artillery, &c. :

GENERAL:
In case of a distribution of field batteries along the northern line, the following strikes me as a convenient arrangement:

To Fort Sumner, on battery, with directions to put two or three pieces in Battery Benson, and hold the rest for maneuver.

To Forts Mansfield and Simmons, one battery; to put two pieces in Battery Bailey; to put two pieces in the battery to the left to Mansfield, and hold two disposable, or to be put in rifle-pits between Simmons and Bayard, where there are places prepared.

To Fort Reno, one battery, for maneuver, or to be placed in rifle-pits.

To Fort Kearny, ne battery, to occupy Batteries Rossell and Terrill.

To Fort De Russy, one-half battery, to occupy Battery Kingsbury.

To Fort Stevens, one and a half batteries; one-half to occupy Battery Sill; one to occupy the battery in the edge of the woods, between Stevens and Slocum.

To Fort Bunker Hill, one battery, one section to occupy the battery in front of the fort, and the rest to take post on the hill on the right of Bunker Hill, where a new battery is to be built.

To Fort Saratoga, one battery; four pieces in the battery immediately to the right, and the other two near the shed, to flank Fort Thayer, where a new battery is being built.

To Fort Thayer, one battery; four pieces on west side of railroad, and two pieces on east side. On this side Benning's Bridge, one battery. Total, ten batteries. Should the other side of the river be threatened, I should recommend-

For Fort Worth, one battery, to be placed in rifle-pits or batteries adjacent to that work, at the discretion of the commanding officer.

Fort Ward, one battery, to be placed as above.

Fort Richardson, one battery, for any part of the line between that and Barnard.

Fort Craig, two batteries, to occupy the battery immediately on its right, and those between it and Richardson.

Fort Whipple, two batteries, to occupy with two or four guns the battery immediately in its front, and the rest to be put in the various rifle-pits between Tillinghast and De Kalb. Chain Bridge position. -Two or three field batteries could be advantageously used in the different batteries.

I am, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. G. BARNARD,
Brigadier-General.

Organization of Artillery of the Army of the Potomac, Major General George G. Meade, U.S. Army, commanding, at the battle of Gettysburg, July 1-3, 1863.

ARTILLERY.

Brigadier General Henry J. Hunt.

ARTILLERY RESERVE.

Brigadier General Robert O. Tyler. Captain James M. Robertson.

Headquarters Guard. 32nd Massachusetts Infantry, Company C, Captain Josiah Fuller.

First Regular Brigade.

Captain Dunbar R. Ransom.

1st United States, Battery H: Lieutenant Chandler P. Eakin. Lieutenant Philip D. Mason.

3rd United States, Batteries F and K, Lieutenant John Turnbull.

4th United States, Battery C, Lieutenant Evan Thomas.

5th United States, Battery C, Lieutenant Gulian V. Weir.

First Volunteer Brigade.

Lieutenant Colonel Freeman McGilvery.

Massachusetts Light, 5th Battery (E), Captain Charles A. Phillips.

Massachusetts Light, 9th Battery: Captain John Bigelow. Lieutenant Richard S. Milton.

New York Light, 15th Battery, Captain Patrick Hart.

Pennsylvania Light, Batteries C and F, Captain James Thompson.

10th New York Battery

Second Volunteer Brigade.

Captain Elijah D. Taft.

1st Connecticut Heavy, Battery B, *Captain Albert F. Brooker.

1st Connecticut Heavy, Battery M, *Captain Franklin A. Pratt.

Connecticut Light, 2nd Battery, Captain John W. Sterling.

New York Light, 5th Battery, Captain Elijah D. Taft.

Third Volunteer Brigade.

Captain James F. Huntington.

New Hampshire Light, 1st Battery, Captain Frederick M. Edgell.

1st Ohio Light, Battery H, Lieutenant George W. Norton.

1st Pennsylvania Light, Batteries F and G. Captain R. Bruce Ricketts.

West Virginia Light, Battery C, Captain Wallace Hill.

Fourth Volunteer Brigade.

Captain Robert H. Fitzhugh.

Maine Light, 6th Battery (F), Lieutenant Edwin B. Dow.

Maryland Light, Battery A, Captain James H. Rigby.

New Jersey Light, 1st Battery, Lieutenant Augustin N. Parsons.

1st New York Light, Battery G, Captain Nelson Ames.

1st New York Light, Battery K Captain Robert H Fitzhugh. Train Guard.

4th New Jersey Infantry (seven companies), Major Charles Ewing.

FIRST ARMY CORPS

Artillery Brigade. Colonel Charles S. Wainwright.

Maine Light, 2nd Battery (B), Captain James A. Hall.

Maine Light, 5th Battery (E): Captain Greenleaf T. Stevens. Lieut Edward N. Whitier.

1st New York Light, Battery L:* Captain Gilbert H Reynolds. Lieut George Breck.

1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery B, Captain James H. Cooper.

4th United States, Battery B, , Lieutenant James Stewart.

SECOND ARMY CORPS

Artillery Brigade. Captain John G. Hazard.

1st New York Lights, Battery B: Lieutenant Albert S. Sheldon.

Captain James McKay Rorty. Lieutenant Robert E. Rogers.

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery A, Captain William A. Arnold.

1st Rhode Island Light Battery B: Lieut T. Fred. Brown. Lieut Walter S. Perrin.

1st United States, Battery I:Lieut George A. Woodruff. Lieut Tulli McCrea.

4th United States, Battery A: Lieut Alonzo H. Cushing. Sergt. Frederick Fuger.

Battery E, 1st New York Light Artillery

THIRD ARMY CORPS.

Artillery Brigade. Captain George E. Randolph. Captain A. Judson Clark.

New Jersey Light, 2nd Battery: Captain A. Judson Clark. Lieut Robert Sims.

1st New York Light, Battery D, Captain George B Winslow.

New York Light, 4th Battery, Captain James E. Smith.

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery E: Lieutenant John K. Bucklyn.

Lieutenant Benjamin Freeborn.

4th United States, Battery K: Lieut Francis Seeley. Lieut Robert James.

FIFT ARMY CORPS.

ARTILLERY BRIGADE. Captain Augustus P. Martin.

Massachusetts Light, 3rd Battery (C), Lieutenant Aaron F. Walcott.

1st New York Light, Battery C, Captain Almont Barnes.

1st Ohio Light, Battery L, Captain Frank C. Gibbs.

5th United States, Battery D: Lieut Charles E. Hazlett. Lieut Benjamin F. Rittenhouse.
5th United States, Battery I: Lieut Malbone F. Watson. Lieut Charles C. McConnell.

SIXTH ARMY CORPS.

ARTILLERY BRIGADE. Colonel Charles H. Tompkins.

Massachusetts Light, 1st Battery (A), Captain William H. McCartney.

New York Light, 1st Battery, Captain Anrew Cowan.

New York Light, 3rd Battery, Captain William A. Harn.

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery C, Captain Richard Waterman.

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery G, Captain George W. Adams.

2nd United States, Battery D, Lieutenant Edward Williston,

2nd United States, Battery G, Lieutenant John H. Butler.

5th United States, Battery F, Lieutenant Leonard Martin.

ELEVENTH ARMY CORPS.

ARTILLERY BRIGADE. Major Thomas W. Osborn.

1st New York Light, Battery I. Captain Michael Wiedrich.

New York Light 13th Battery, Lieutenant William Wheeler.

1st Ohio Light, Battery I. Captain Hubert Dilger.

1st Ohio Light, Battery K, Captain Lewis Heckman.

4th United States, Battery G: Lieut Bayard Wilkeson. Lieut Eugene A. Bancroft.

TWELFTH ARMY CORPS.

ARTILLERY BRIGADE. Lieutenant Edward D. Muchlenberg.

1st New York Light, Battery M Lieut Charles E. Winegar.

Pennsylvania Light, Battery E, Lieutenant Charles A. Atwell.

4th United States, Battery F, Lieutenant Sylvanus T. Rugg.

5th United States, , Battery K Lieutenant David H. Kinzie.

CAVALRY CORPS.

HORSE ARTILLERY.

First Brigade.

Captain James M. Robertson.

9th Michigan Battery, Captain Jabez J. Daniels.

6th New York Battery, Captain Joseph W. Martin.

2nd United States, Batteries B and L, Lieutenant Edvard Heaton.

2nd United States, Battery M, Lieutenant A.C M. Pennington, jr.

4th United States, Battery E, Lieutenant Samuel S. Elder.

Second Brigade.

Captain John C. Tidball.

1st United States, Batteries E and G, Captain Alanson M. Randol.

1st United States, Battery K, Captain William M. Graham.

2nd United States, Battery A, Lieutenant John H. Calef.

3rd United States, Battery C, Lieutenant William D. Fuller.

*Report of Colonel Charles W. Wainwright, First New York Light Artillery,
Commanding Artillery Brigade, First Army Corps.*

**HEADQUARTERS ARTILLERY BRIGADE, FIRST CORPS,
July 17, 1863.**

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by my command in the battle of Gettysburg on the 1st, 2d, and 3rd instant: On the night of June 30, the main body of the command lay about 2 miles from Emmitsburg, while the Second Maine Battery, Captain Hasll, was in position a couple of miles farther on, commanding the bridge on the Gettysburg turnpike over Marsh Creek, having been ordered to report to Brigadier-General Wadsworth, commanding the advance division. About 8 o'clock on the morning of the 1st, we received orders to march to Gettysburg, no intimation, however, being given that we were likely to fall in with the enemy near that place, which had been occupied by our cavalry twenty-four hours before. The corps marched in the following order: First Division, General Wadsworth, Hall's battery: Third Division, General Robinson; Major-General Doubleday temporarily in command of the corps. About 4 miles this side of Gettysburg, the Third Division took a by-road to the left, Captain Cooper's battery of four 3-inch guns following them. The first intimation I received of the proximity of the enemy was the sound of firing when we arrived within some 2 miles of Gettysburg and at about 10:30 a. m. I immediately joined General Doubleday, and by his order moved the three batteries remaining with me across the fields toward the seminary or college. On our arrival at this point, we learned that a portion of the advance division had been engaged with the enemy and had been drawn in; also the death of our commanding officer, Major General J. F. Reynolds. Captain Hall's battery (Second Maine) had been in action at this point. Having seen nothing of it myself, I insert his own report, as follows: My battery was ordered into position by General Reynolds on the right of the Cashtown road, some 400 yards beyond Seminary Hill, on the south and west of the town. The enemy had previously opened a battery of six guns directly in our front, at 1, 300 yards distance, which they concentrated upon me as I went into position, but with very little effect. We opened upon this battery with shot and shell at 10. 45 a. m., our first shots causing the

enemy to change position of two his guns and place them under cover behind a barn. In twenty-five minutes from the time we opened fire, a column of the enemy's infantry charged up a ravine on our right flank, within 60 yards of my right piece, when they commenced shooting down my horses and wounding my men. I ordered the right and center sections to open upon these column with canister, and kept the left firing upon the enemy's artillery. This canister fire was very effective and broke the charge of the enemy, when, just at this moment, to my surprise, I saw my support falling back without any orders having been given me to retire. Feeling that if the position was too advanced for infantry it was equally so for artillery, I ordered the battery to retire by sections, although having no order to do so. The support falling back rapidly, the right section of the battery, which I ordered to take position some 75 yards to the rear, to cover the retiring of the other four pieces, was charged upon by the enemy's skirmishers and 4 of the horses from one of the guns shot. The men of the section dragged this gun off by hand. As the last piece of the battery was coming away, all its horses were shot, and I was about to return for it myself when General Wadsworth gave me a peremptory order to lose no time, but get my battery in position near the town, on the heights, to cover the retiring of the troops. I sent a sergeant with 5 men after the piece. all of whom were wounded or taken prisoners. I had got near to the position I had been ordered to take, when I received another order from General Wadsworth to bring my guns immediately back; the officer bringing the order saying he would show me the road to take, which was the railroad grading leading out from town, which was swept at the time by two of the enemy's guns from the hills beyond, through the excavations at Seminary Hill. Having gotten on to this road, from its construction I could not turn from it on either side, and was obliged to advance 1, 200 yards under this raking fire. Arriving at Seminary Hill, I found no one to show me the position I was to occupy, and placed my battery in park under cover of the hill. and went forward to see where to take position, when I again met an aide of General Wadsworth, who ordered me to go to the right along the woods, pass over the crest and over a ravine. and there take position. Obeying this order, I moved toward the right until met by an orderly, who informed me I was going directly into the enemy's lines, which were advancing from this direction. I halted my command, and rode forward, but before reaching the described position was fired upon by the enemy's skirmishers. I then counter marched my battery, and moved to near the seminary. Gettysburg Seminary is situated on a ridge about a quarter of a mile from the town, the ridge running nearly north and south and parallel with the Emmitsburg pike. It is crossed by the Cashtown turnpike about 100 yards north of the seminary, and cut through by there railroad some 40 yards farther on. The west front of the seminary is shaded by a grove of large

trees, and the whole top of the ridge on both sides is more or less crowned with open woods through its entire length. Beyond this ridge the ground falls gradually to the west, and rises again into a parallel ridge at a distance of about 400 yards. This second ridge is wider and smoother than that on which the seminary stands, but ends about 200 yards north of where the Cashtown pike cross it. On the south side of this point is a house and large barn, with an apple orchard and some 5 acres of wood to the south of it, the rest of the ridge is cleared. It was around this house and wood that the first skirmish, in which General Reynolds fell, took place. Having massed the batteries immediately in rear of the first ridge, I rode forward to examine the ground in front, and was met by a member of General Doubleday's staff, with an order to post a battery on the outer ridge, if possible. Directing Captain Reynolds to move his battery of six 3-inch guns forward, I rode up on to the ridge, but finding that the battery would be exposed and totally without support, I withdrew it before it reached the crest. Soon after-ward the Third Division, with Cooper's battery being posted in an oat-field some 350 yards south of the Cashtown road. One brigade of the First Division had meantime reoccupied the woods where the first engagement took place, and General Wadsworth sent to ask for a battery, but as there was no infantry to protect its right flank, and Captain Hall had previously come so near to losing his battery in the same position, I did not consider it safe place a battery in that position until our Second Division, which was just arriving, had taken position and I had examined the ground on the flank, the enemy being quiet at this time.

Finding General Robinson's division and the Second Brigade of the First Division occupying a wood on the west slope of Seminary Ridge north of the railroad, and the Eleventh Corps coming into position across the flat at right angles to our front, I returned to the Cashtown road, and directed Lieutenant Stewart to report to General Robinson with his battery, which had previously been posted some 200 yards south of the seminary, but not engaged. Meantime General Wadsworth had ordered Captain Tidball's horse battery into position on the right of his First Brigade,

where Captain Hall's battery had been, and it had just commenced a sharp engagement with the enemy's battery directly in front. As soon as possible, I moved Reynolds' battery immediately on our right. By this cross-fire both batteries were obliged to withdraw, Reynolds taking position again at right angles to the ridge, so that his left was covered by the woods. While removing his battery, Captain Reynolds received a severe wound in the right eye, but refused for some time to leave the field. The enemy's battery soon after ceased firing. Receiving another request from General Wadsworth for some guns on his front, I posted Lieutenant Wilber, with a section of Company I, First New York, in the orchard on the south side of the Cashtown road, where he was sheltered

from the fire of the enemy's battery on his right flank by the intervening house and barn, and moved the remaining four pieces around to the south side of the wood on the open crest. Having heard incidentally some directions given to General Doubleday about holding Cemetery Hill, and not knowing that there was such a place, while the seminary was called indiscriminately cemetery and seminary, I supposed the latter was meant. I therefore directed Captain Cooper to take a good position in front of the professor's house on this ridge, and sent an order to Captain Stevens, of the Fifth Maine Battery, to occupy the position first assigned to Lieutenant Stewart. Soon after this, the enemy filed in two strong columns out of the woods, about 500 yards to our front, and marched steadily down to our left until they outflanked us nearly a third of a mile. They then formed in double line of battle, and came directly up the crest. During this movement, Battery L opened on the columns, but the firing of Lieutenant Breck's four guns was much interfered with by our own infantry moving in front of his pieces. As we had no regular line of battle on these crest and the enemy outnumbered us five to one, I withdrew Lieutenant Breck's two sections when their first line was within about 200 yards, and ordered him behind a strong stone wall on the seminary crest. Meantime General Doubleday had removed Captain Stevens' battery to the right of Captain Cooper's, and Lieutenant Wilber's section falling back with its support came into position at the same point, thus concentrating twelve guns in so small a space that they were hardly 5 yards apart. Lieutenant Stewart's battery was also in position on the same line, half the battery between the Cashtown pike and the railroad, the other half across the railroad in the corner of a wood. The enemy's lines continued to advance steadily across the spacer between the two crests, but when the first line was within about 100 yards of the seminary, Lieutenant Davison, commanding the left half of Stewart's battery, swung his guns around on the Cashtown pike. so as to enfilade the whole line. This, with the fire of the other batteries, checked them for a moment at this point, but it was only for a moment as their second line did not halt, but pushed on, strongly re-enforced by a third column deploying from the Cashtown road. An order was now received by Captain Stevens from General Wadsworth to withdraw his battery. Not knowing that he had received such an order, and still under the false impression as to the importance attached to holding Seminary Hill, I directed all the batteries to remain in position. A few minutes, however, showed me our infantry rapidly retreating to the town. All the batteries were at once limbered to the rear, and moved at a walk down the Cashtown pike until the infantry had all left it and passed under cover of the railroad embankment. By this time the enemy's skirmishers had lapped our retreating columns and opened a severe fire from behind a paling fence running parallel to and within 50 yards of the road. The

pike being clear, the batteries now broke into a trot, but it was too late to save everything. Lieutenant Wilber's (Battery L, First New York) last piece had the off wheel-horse shot, and just as he had disengaged it, 3 more of the horses were shot down and his own horse killed, so that it was impossible for him to bring it off. It affords me pleasure to say that not the slightest blame can be attributed to Lieutenant Wilber in the loss of this gun. Three caissons belonging to Battery B, Fourth U. S. Artillery also broke down before we entered the town, and the bodies had to be destroyed. Four officers were struck while in position on Seminary Hill, two of them severely wounded. The loss of the batteries during the day's engagement was heavy, amounting in all to 83 officers and men and about 80 horses. A large proportion of the last were hit while passing over the short open space between Seminary Ridge and the town, at the enemy having at that time a fire upon us from three sides, and our infantry not replying. The batteries passed immediately through the town along with the other troops, and were placed in position again on reaching Cemetery Hill along with several of the Eleventh Corps batteries, so as to command the town and the approach from the northwest in case the enemy should attempt to follow us through the town. At dusk, no attack having been made, the batteries on the hill outside the cemetery gate were posted as follows, and light earthworks thrown up in front of each gun to protect the men from the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters: Four guns of Battery B, Fourth U. S. Artillery, across the road so as to command the approaches from the town (two guns of this battery had been disabled by loss of pointing rings) along the north front of the hill; four guns of Battery I, First New York Artillery (Captain Wiedrich's, Eleventh Corps), on the left; next Cooper's battery and then Reynolds', giving thirteen 3-inch guns on this front, some of which could also be turned to bear upon the town and our old position of the morning. The Fifth Maine battery was posted to the right and some 50 yards in front of this line, on a small knoll, from whence they could obtain an oblique fire upon the hills in front of our line as well as a flanking fire at close quarters upon any attacking columns. Captain Hall's (Second Maine) remaining three guns (the others had been dismounted) were in position on the left of the cemetery-by order of Major-General Howard - where he remained during the next day's engagement, after which he reported to General Tyler for repairs. July 2. - During the morning several moving columns of the enemy were shelled at intervals, but no engagements occurred until about 4 p. m. , when they planted a battery of four 20-pounders and six 10-pounder Parrotts in a wheat-field on our immediate front, at about 1,300 yards and opened the most accurate fire I have ever yet seen from their artillery. We replied with our thirteen 3-inch guns with good effect. It was an hour and a half, however, before we were able to compel them to withdraw, and then they

hauled off their two right pieces by hand. Twenty-eight dead horses were found on the knoll occupied by this battery. A portion of the guns again took position farther to the right, but were soon silenced, as we could bring an additional number of pieces to bear on them there. Soon after, Captain Cooper's battery, which had suffered considerably, was relieved by Captain Rickett's battery of six 3-inch guns. About dusk they again opened from a knoll on our left and front, distant 1, 800 yards, which fire was followed by a strong attack upon our position by General Rodes' Louisiana [?] brigade. As their column filed out of the town they came under the fire of the Fifth Maine Battery at about 800 yards. Wheeling into line, they swung around, their right resting on the town, and pushed up the hill, which is quite steep at this corner. As their line became fully unmasked all the guns which could be brought to bear were opened on them, at first with shrapnel and afterward with canister, making a total of fifteen guns in their front and six on their left flank. Their center and left never mounted the hill at all, but their right worked its way up under cover of the houses, and pushed completely through Wiesrich's battery into Rickett's. The cannoneers of both these batteries stood well to their guns, driving the enemy off with fence-rails and stones and capturing a few prisoners. I believe it may be claimed that this attack was almost entirely repelled by the artillery. My surgeon, who was in the town and dressed many of their wounded that night, tells me that they reported their loss in this attack as very great. July 3. - There was no serious attack upon the position we held during this day's fight. The batteries fired occasional shots at bodies of the enemy's troops in the distance during the morning, and joined in the general artillery engagement in the afternoon. The fire of the enemy's batteries was noticed to be much less accurate than on the previous day, owing, I think, in a measure to their keeping their guns too much under cover of the hills on which they were posted. With regard to the behavior of the batteries during this three days' fight, I have only to say that, all the officers and men performed their duty to my perfect satisfaction. I would mention the case of a shell exploding immediately under one of Captain Cooper's guns in the heat of the second day's engagement, killing or wounding all the detachment around the gun, yet fire from that piece was reopened before all the wounded men were removed. I do not know that I can mention any officer or man in the batteries as particularly prominent above the others, but would respectfully call attention to First Sergt. John Mitchell, of Battery B, Fourth U. S. Artillery, who took command of the left half battery after Lieutenant Davison was wounded, and showed himself as efficient as an officer during an engagement as I have noticed him to be in his drill and the general routine of the battery.

I remain, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
C. S. WAINWRIGHT,
Colonel First N. Y. Art. , Comdg. Art. Brig. , First Army Corps.

*Report of Major Thomas W. Osborn, First New York Light Artillery,
Commanding Artillery Brigade, Eleventh Army Corps.*

**HEADQUARTERS ARTILLERY, ELEVENTH CORPS,
July 29, 1863.**

SIR: I have the honor to report, concerning the part borne by this command in the battle of Gettysburg on the 1st, 2d, and 3rd instant, that on the morning of the 1st instant I moved from Emmitsburg toward Gettysburg with the artillery of the corps, consisting of five batteries, and marched in the following order: Captain Dilger in advance with the Third Division, Lieutenant Wheeler with the First Division and in the center, the three remaining batteries following closely in rear of the center division. I herewith enumerate the batteries of the command: Battery G, Fourth U. S. Artillery, commanded by Lieutenant B. Wilkeson, six light 12-pounders; Battery I, First Ohio Artillery, commanded by Captain H. Dilger, six light 12-pounders; Battery K, First Ohio Artillery, commanded by Captain L. Heckman, four light 12-pounders; Battery I, First New York Artillery, commanded by Captain M. Wiedrich, six 3-inch, and Thirteenth New York Independent Battery, commanded by First Lieutenant W. Wheeler, four 3-inch guns. Total, 26 guns. After moving 5 or 6 miles, I received notice from Major-General Howard that the First Corps was already engaged with the enemy at Gettysburg, and that I should move the artillery to the front as rapidly as possible. A little after 10 a. m. the first battery (Dilger's) reached the town, and was ordered by General Schurz to the front of and 300 yards beyond the town, where he took position, and at once became engaged with a rebel battery about 1,000 yards in its front. This battery was soon supported by another, when Captain Dilger was compelled to stand the fire from both until the arrival of Wheeler's battery half an hour later, when I ordered Lieutenant Wheeler to report to Captain Dilger. The result of this artillery duel was one piece of Wheeler's battery dismounted and five pieces of the enemy's, which they left upon the ground; besides, they lost comparatively heavier than we in horses and materiel. During the short struggle both batteries changed position several times, and did so with excellent results and in the best possible manner, Captain Dilger using much judgment in the selection of his several positions. They did not leave their immediate locality until the corps was ordered by the commanding

general to fall back to Cemetery Hill. About 11 a. m. Lieutenant Wilkeson reached the field, and was ordered to report to General Barlow, commanding the First Division, which was engaged about three-fourths of a mile from the town and on the left of the York pike. The battery was assigned position by General Barlow, and when I reached the ground I found it unfortunately near the enemy's line of infantry, with which they were engaged, as well as two of his batteries, the concentrated fire of which no battery could withstand. Almost at the first fire, Lieutenant Wilkeson was mortally wounded, and carried from the field by 4 of his men. The command of the battery now devolved upon Lieutenant Bancroft. By changing position several times, the battery maintained its relative position until the division fell back to the town, when it retired to Cemetery Hill. During this engagement the battery was separated into sections or half batteries, and its struggle to maintain itself was very severe and persistent. Captain Heckman was not ordered in until the corps had begun to fall back. He was then put into position, with a view of holding the enemy in check until the corps had time to retire through the town to the hill beyond, and though he worked his battery to the best of his ability, the enemy crowded upon it, and was within his battery before he attempted to retire. She was compelled to leave one gun in the hands of the enemy. I think no censure can be attached to this battery for the loss of the gun. The battery was so severely disabled otherwise that I was compelled to send it to the rear, thus losing the benefit of it during the fight of the second and third days. Captain Wiedrich was assigned, on his arrival upon the field, to a position on the hill immediately in front of the cemetery entrance and overlooking the town. She was engaged several times during the day with the enemy's artillery at a long range. He maintained the same position during the three days' fighting, but on this p. m. Colonel Wainwright, chief of artillery First Corps, took command of his battery, with the artillery on that side of the Baltimore pike. The artillery of the corps ceased firing for the day, when the corps fell back to Cemetery Hill. I would remark here that during the p. m. of the 1st and the a. m. of the 2d, I furnished Colonel Wainwright, Chief of artillery First Corps, with ammunition from the Eleventh Corps train, the train of the First Corps not being within reach. This of necessity caused considerable annoyance later in the engagement, on account of the difficulty in procuring a supply of ammunition sufficient to cover the great expenditure we were compelled to make through the engagement. On the morning of the 2d, I applied to General Hunt, chief of artillery Army of the Potomac for a greater amount of artillery than we then had, as our position was finely adapted to its use, and I did not consider that we had sufficient to assist our small infantry force in holding the position if the enemy should attack us in heavy force. The following batteries were ordered to report to

me: Battery H, First U. S. Artillery, Lieutenant Eakin, six light 12-pounders; Fifth New York Independent Battery, Captain Taft, six 20-pounder parrotts; Battery C, First West Virginia Artillery, Captain Hill, four 10-pounder Parrotts; Battery H, First Ohio Artillery, Captain huntington, six 3-inch rifles; Second Maine Battery, Captain Hall, four 3-inch rifles; First New Hampshire Battery, Captain [Edgell] six 3-inch rifles. Total, 32. Heckman's battery having been sent to the rear and one gun of Wheeler's battery dismounted, gave us on the morning of the 2nd a total of fifty-two guns. In the morning, before General Slocum had occupied his position, and while he was doing so, I placed three batteries on the right of the Baltimore road, commanding the ravine between the two prominent hills on our right; yet, as General Slocum withstood every assault on his lines without assistance, later in the day I withdrew these batteries to the hill. As soon as the enemy developed the position he would probably occupy with his batteries, I placed mine in position commanding them. By the assignment on the hill, Dilger had the right, resting next the Baltimore road and parallel with the Emmitsburg road; on his left, and in order, were Bancroft, Eakin, Wheeler, Hill and Hall, commanding the enemy's batteries to the right of the town; and across the Baltimore road I placed Taft in rear of and perpendicular to Bancroft; also Huntington in rear of and perpendicular to Wheeler, but farther in the rear of Wheeler than Taft was of Bancroft, so that Taft's battery would not obstruct his line of fire. By this assignment of artillery, I commanded with a reputable number of guns every point on which the enemy could place artillery commanding Cemetery Hill. I also occupied every point of the hill available for artillery, and during the engagement every gun, at different times, was used with good effect, and the fire of no one gun interfered with the fire of another. A sharp curve in the side of the hill also afforded good and convenient protection for the caissons. Most of the day the firing of the enemy's artillery was irregular, they scarcely opening more than one battery at a time, and when they did so we readily silenced them. On our entire front the enemy held a fine crest for the protection of aratillery, at a distance of 1, 000 to 1, 400 yards from us; but at the time the heavy attack was made on the extreme left of our line, the firing was very severe, and especially upon the hill. They engaged the greater portion of our whole line, and from both the right and left of the town much of the fire was concentrated on our position, but we soon gained a decided advantage over them, and long before the infantry struggle on the left was decidend, we had silenced most of their guns. In this artillery fire, Lieutenant Eakin was wounded in the hip, and carried from the field. Between 7 and 8 o'clock in the evening, a rebel brigade charged from the town upon the hill and upon Captain Wiedrich's battery. The charge was very impetuous, and the infantry at first gave way,

and the battery was held for a moment by the enemy, when the cannoneers rallied with the infantry, and, seizing upon any weapons they could reach, threw themselves upon the enemy, and assisted to drive them back. All was done that could be, both before and after the repulse of the enemy, by the use of canister upon their ranks. Colonel Wainwright speaks in highly complimentary terms of both officers and men for their galant conduct on this occasion. Although the command was much exhausted by the two days' work, most of the night was passed in replenishing the batteries with ammunition and making repairs. On the morning of the 3d, we were in position the same as on the 2d, but little was done during the a. m. by our corps. Occasionally a rebel battery would open upon the cemetery, evidently with a view to obtain the exact elevation and time to make their fire effective in the p. m. 's work on our position. At each attempt we silenced them, with but little loss to ourselves. About 2 p. m. they opened along our whole front with an unbroken line of artillery, and also heavily on our right flank, apparently using every description of missiles and field artillery. The crest which the enemy occupied varied from 1, 000 to 1, 900 yards distance, and afforded an excellent protection. I judge that the guns of not less than one-half mile of this front were concentrated on our position, besides several batteries on our right, which enfiladed our position, excepting Captains Taft's and Huntington's batteries. Our artillery endured this fire with surprising coolness and determination. No battery even showed a disposition to retire, and several times during the cannonading we silenced several of their batteries, but at a moment's cessation on our part they would reopen upon us. The fire was extremely galling, and by comparing the rapidity with which the shells fell among and passed by our guns with the rapidity with which our guns replied, the number of guns playing on the hill was very much greater than the number in position there; probably double. Our guns were worked with great coolness, energy, and judgment, but as no satisfactory results were obtained, I ordered all our guns to cease firing, and the men to lie down to await developments. At the same time the artillery of our entire front ceased firing, and a few moments later the infantry of the enemy broke over the crest from where their artillery had been playing, and made their grand charge across the plain upon our lines. The left of the charging column rested on a line perpendicular to our front, then stretching away to the right beyond our view, thus offering an excellent front for our artillery fire. We used, according to distance, all descriptions of projectiles. The whole force of our artillery was brought to bear upon this column, and the havoc produced upon their ranks was truly surprising. The enemy's advance was most splendid, and for a considerable distance the only hinderance offered it was by the artillery, which broke their lines fearfully, as every moment showed that

their advance under this concentrated artillery fire was most difficult; and though they made desperate efforts to advance in good order, were unable to do so, and I am convinced that the fire from the hill was one of the main auxiliaries in breaking the force of this grand charge. But while the enemy was advancing, and after having been repulsed, I insisted that the artillery fire should be turned intensely upon the infantry, and no notice whatever was to be taken of their artillery. I am not able to speak of any one or more batteries as deserving especial notice over another. Every battery did its whole duty; the officers proved themselves brave and efficient, and the men on the battle-field were most willing, brave, and gallant; in fact, the only fault I could mention was too great willingness to luse ammunition at small squads of men and on unimportant objects, yet this was not carried to excess. The artillery of the reserve proved all that could be expected or even asked of it; without their assistance I do not conceive how I could have maintained the position we held. I feel most thankful for their assistance, and the very willing and cordial manner in which it was rendered. I would also speak of Lieutenant George W. Freeman, acting assistant adjutant-general of the command, for the great assistance he was to me and to the whole command during the engagement. I am unable to give any definite estimate of the amount of ammunition expended during the engagement. After we had exhausted the supply with the batteries, I replenished from our train. Colonel Wainwright, on the p. m. of the 1st, also replenished from our train, and, after this source was exhausted, I drew from the reserve train of the army. The casualties of this command are as follows. * Our loss in pieces and horses is as follows:

.....	Horses killed.
Battery G, Fourth U. S. Artillery	31
Battery I. First Ohio Artillery(one piece disabled)	28
Battery K, First Ohio Artillery(one piece lost)	9
Battery I, First New York Artillery(one piece dismantled).....	18
Thirteenth New York Independent Battery (one piece dismantled).....	12
Total	98

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,
T. W. OSBORN,
Major, Commanding Artillery, Eleventh Corps.

*Reports of Captain Augustus P. Martin, Third Massachusetts Battery,
Commanding Artillery Brigade, Fifth Army Corps.*

HDQRS. ARTILLERY BRIGADE, FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
Camp near Warrenton, Va. , July 31, 1863.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Artillery Brigade, Fifth Corps, at the battle of Gettysburg, Pa. : The artillery entered the field between 4 and 5 p. m. on the 2nd instant, three batteries in rear of the First Division, viz: Battery D, Fifth U. S.

Artillery, First Lieutenant Charles E. Hazlett commanding; Battery C, Massachusetts Artillery, First Lieutenant Aaron F. Walcott commanding, and Battery I, Fifth U. S. Artillery, First Lieutenant M. F. Watson commanding. Two batteries in rear of the Second Division, viz: Battery L, First Ohio Artillery, Captain Frank C. Gibbs commanding, and Battery C, First New York Artillery, Captain Almont Barnes commanding. On the 2nd instant, about 4. 30 p. m. , Battery D, Fifth U. S. Artillery, was moved to the left of the First Division about three-quarters of a mile, and posted on an eminence known as Rock Hill [Round Top], forming a line nearly perpendicular to that of the First Division. Immediately upon taking up the position, the battery opened upon the enemy, who was engaging the First Division, completely enfilading the enemy's lines with marked effect. The battery kept up a continuous fire until dark. On the 3rd instant, the battery opened upon the enemy at intervals during the day, whenever he made his appearance in force.

The battery remained in position until the 5th instant, when it was withdrawn, and took up the line of march with the corps. First Lieutenant B. F. Rittenhouse says: The battery had been engaged only about an hour, when First Lieutenant Charles E. Hazlett [who commanded the battery] was shot in the head. He was carried to the rear, and died at 8 p. m. In his death the Government has lost one of its bravest and most able officers. Second Lieutenants Charles H. Carroll and Samuel Peeples, Fifth U. S. Artillery, serving with Battery D, the latter having reported to this battery on the 3rd instant, after the battery with which he was serving [Battery I, Fifth U. S. Artillery] was disabled, deserve especial mention for their services during the engagement; also First Lieutenant B. F. Rittenhouse, upon whom the

command of the battery devolved after the death of the lamented Hazlett, deserves credit for the manner in which the battery was served. The battery lost in killed, 1 officer and 6 men; in wounded, 6 men. Battery C, Massachusetts Artillery, and I, Fifth U. S. Artillery, were left in rear of the line of battle of the First Division, with instructions to await orders. When positions had been selected and orders sent for the batteries to move to the front, they were not to be found. Subsequently Battery C, Massachusetts Artillery, was found in rear of the Third Corps. The officer commanding reported that he had been ordered there by an officer of General Sickles' staff, who had orders to take any batteries he could find, no matter where they belonged. Battery I, Fifth U. S. Artillery, was taken in the same way, thus depriving the Fifth Corps of its proper amount of artillery. Battery C, Massachusetts Artillery, not having been relieved until about dark, was not put in position with the Fifth Corps. The battery lost 6 men slightly wounded, a list of which is inclosed; also 2 horses killed and 4 wounded. Battery I, Fifth U. S. Artillery, was placed in position by some unknown officer of the Third Corps. Second Lieutenant MacConnell, upon whom the command of the battery devolved when Lieutenant Watson was wounded, says: The battery was without support of any kind. The enemy appeared shortly - say twenty minutes - after taking position, nearly in front, at a distance of about 350 yards, and the battery immediately opened on them with shell. As they approached nearer, the battery poured in canister, some twenty rounds, until men and horses were shot down or disabled to such an extent that the battery was abandoned. It was, however, soon recaptured by the bravery and determination of Second Lieutenant Samuel Peeples, Fifth U. S. Artillery, who, having procured the services of the Garibaldi Guards, took a musket and led the charge himself, driving the enemy from the guns, and retaking everything that was lost, and conveyed it safely to the rear. Second Lieutenant MacConnell says: First Lieutenant M. F. Watson, commanding the battery, was wounded in the opening of the engagement, while in the faithful discharge of his duties. The conduct of officers and men throughout was unexceptionable. He also says: I would particularly notice the gallantry of Second Lieutenant Peeples and First Sergt. Lemuel Smith. The former I would most respectfully recommend for a bravest first lieutenancy, and the latter, in my opinion, is most deserving of promotion.

On the 3rd instant, the battery was reported unserviceable, and General Sykes, commanding corps, directed Lieutenant MacConell, with the approval of Brigadier-General Hunt, chief of artillery, Army of the Potomac, to go to Westminster, Md. It subsequently moved to Frederick City, Md. , where Lieutenant MacConnell received orders from headquarters Army of the Potomac to

report with the battery to Washington for re-equipment. The battery lost in killed, wounded, and missing, 1 officer and 21 men, a list of which is herewith inclosed; also 41 horses. The report of ammunition expended is not included in the report of the battery commandant. Battery L, First Ohio Artillery, Captain F. C. Gibbs, moved up to the field in rear of the Second Division. One section, commanded by First Lieutenant Guthrie, was posted on the slope of the hill known as Rock Hill [Round Top], to the right of Battery D, Fifth U. S. Artillery. Another section, under command of First Lieutenant Walworth, was posted at the base of the hill, commanding the ravine in front of Rock Hill [Round Top]. The remaining section was held in reserve. The two sections posted in front opened upon the enemy, when he advanced upon our lines, with spherical case and canister, doing good service in checking the advance of the enemy. First Lieutenant H. F. Guthrie and his section deserve special mention for the splendid manner in which the section was served. On the 3rd instant, the section in reserve was posted on the slope of the hill between Battery D, Fifth U. S. Artillery, and First Lieutenant Guthrie's section. This battery did not open upon the enemy on the 3rd instant, they being out of range of light 12-pounder guns. The battery lost 2 men severely wounded; also 1 horse killed and 4 wounded. Battery C, First New York Artillery, Captain Almont Barnes, took up position on the right of Battery L, First Ohio Artillery, with instructions not to fire until orders reached him to do so, the First and Second Divisions being in line covering his front. The battery remained in position under fire until the fighting ceased, without firing a shot or losing anything in men, horses, or materiel. At 3 a. m. on the 3rd instant, in compliance with orders, Captain Barnes reported with Battery C, Massachusetts Artillery, and Battery C, First New York Artillery, to Brigadier-General Howe, commanding division in the Sixth Corps, and moved to the extreme left of the line, and there remained in position without being engaged until the close of the engagement.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. P. MARTIN,

Captain, Commanding Artillery Brigade, Fifth Corps.

*Report of Lieutenant Edward D. Muhlenberg, Fourth U. S. Artillery,
Commanding Artillery Brigade, Twelfth Army Corps.*

**HDQRS. ARTILLERY BRIGADE, TWELFTH CORPS,
Near Kelly's Ford, Va., August 1, 1863.**

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following movements and operations of the artillery arm of the Twelfth Corps, from the date of its departure from camp at Aquia to its arrival in its present position: The brigade-F, Fourth U. S. Artillery; K, Fifth U. S. Artillery; Knap's Independent Pennsylvania, and M, First New York-broke camp on June 13. Marched, via Stafford Court-House, Dumfries and Occoquan City, to Fairfax Court-House, Va. Left the latter place, and occupied Leesburg on the 17th, the batteries, to be prepared for any emergency, taking positions near the fortifications situated on the west, northeast, and southeast approaches to said place. On the 26th, the corps was again in motion. Two batteries (F, Fourth U. S. Artillery, and M, First New York), with First Division, and two (K, Fifth U. S. Artillery and Knap's Independent Pennsylvania), with Second Division, crossed the Potomac at Edwards Ferry; marched, via Rockville, Jefferson, Frederick, and Brentsville Md. , to Littlestown, Pa. , entering the latter place on the 30th. On July 1, the brigade, moving along the Baltimore pike to a point 5 miles southeast of Gettysburg, called Two Taverns, took position there to counterattack any movement of the enemy from the Hanover side. About noon of the same day, the two batteries attached to it moved with the First Division away from the pike in a northeasterly direction toward the Hanover road, and, approaching Gettysburg from the east, took position on tolerably favorable ground about 1 1/2 miles from it; the two batteries moving with the Second Division along the Baltimore pike encamped about the same distance from the town. On the morning of the 2d, the batteries operating with First Division moved with it over to the baltimore pike. The infantry, going into the heavy woods on the northeast side of same and forming junction with the Second Division, completed the right wing of the army. The density of the growth of timber, the irregularity and extremely broken character of the ground, studded with immense boulders, prevented the artillery from taking position in the line proper of the corps. It was, therefore, held in reserve and readiness to answer all calls which might be made upon it by the future movements of the opposing forces. The enemy seriously annoying the left of the line of the Twelfth, a vacant space eligible for a battery was found a bout 200 yards on the right of the First Corps. At 3. 30 p. m. one gun (10-pounder Parrott), and at 5 p. m. two more of the same caliber, Knap's Independent Pennsylvania, the three under charge of Lieutenant Gearyl, were placed in position, and were joined by one section of 12-pounder Napoleons (K, Fifth U. S. Artillery), under charge of Second Lieutenant William E. Van Reed. The moment their presence was observed, the enemy opened with eight guns; continued an incessant fire for some thirty minutes; then, having a caisson exploded, ceased. The conduct of both the officers above mentioned, as well as of their commands, is creditable in the highest degree. The

remarkable coolness exhibited under a very galling fire, and the bravery displayed in sustaining all the parts assigned to them, deserve notice. In this engagement, or artillery duel, Lieutenant Geary had 1 killed and 2 wounded; Lieutenant Van Reed, 2 mortally and 3 severely wounded. The rebel artillery having ceased firing, no infantry making its appearance, and the corps having been ordered to the left of the army, to support it, if necessary, these guns were withdrawn from the above position, and Knap's Independent Pennsylvania Battery, Lieutenant Charles A. Atwell commanding, was placed on a knob situated south west of the pike 100 yards from it, and known on that day as Slocum's Hill; Battery M, First New York Artillery, Lieutenant Winegar commanding, on a second elevation, a quarter of a mile distant, and nearly due east from the first mentioned, both overlooking and commanding the ground just vacated by the corps. These two batteries retained these positions during the whole engagement and did excellent service. Battery F, Fourth U. S. Artillery, and Battery K, Fifth U. S. Artillery, remained in park at base of the Slocum's Hill, ready for a move to the left, if called upon. After the return of the corps from the left, it found the greater portion of its intrenchments already in possession of the enemy, supposed to be a portion of its intrenchments already in possession of the enemy, supposed to be a portion of General Ewell's corps, variously estimated from 5, 000 to 8, 000 strong. On the morning of the 3d, at 1 a. m. , Batteries F, Fourth U. S. Artillery, and K, Fifth U. S. Artillery, were placed in position parallel to and on the southwest side of the Baltimore pike, almost directly opposite the center of the line formed by the Twelfth, and controlling the approach of the enemy along the ravine formed by the stream known as Rock Creek. At 4. 30 a. m. the two rifle batteries (ten guns) and the two light 12-pounder batteries (ten guns) opened, and fired for fifteen minutes without intermission at a range of from 600 to 800 yards; ceased firing, and allowed infantry to take part. Commenced at 5. 30 a. m. , and continued firing at intervals until 10 a. m. , at which hour the enemy had retreated and the infantry of the corps had regained their works.

The artillery was of essential service, and did excellent execution at this part of the field, and no doubt contributed greatly in preventing the enemy from establishing himself in so desirable a position, whence he could either have held the pike or have moved his force along the southeast slope and occupied a sufficiency of Cemetery Hill to annoy, if not to entirely control, the position held by the army. The marks on the trees and immense boulders contiguous to the line of intrenchments prove conclusively that the practice of the artillery was excellent and splendidly accurate. Batteries F, Fourth U. S. Artillery, and K, Fifth U. S. Artillery, remaining in the position

just mentioned, were exposed to a most terrific fire during the afternoon of the 3d, the enemy opening with all his artillery upon the left and center of the army. The direction of their lines of fire was such that almost every projectile passing over Cemetery Hill found its bed within the battery line of these two batteries. The commands stood nobly under this unexpected and incessant hail, and displayed by their actions the attributes of true soldiers. I take the greatest pleasure in presenting to your favorable notice Lieutenant D. H. Kinzie, commanding Battery K, Fifth U. S. Artillery, and his second lieutenant, William Egan, as well as Lieutenant S. T. Rugg, of my own command, Battery F, Fourth U. S. Artillery. The batteries, observing the same order of march as before, moved with the corps on the 5th, via Littlestown, Pa. , Frederick, Burkittsville (one section in position at Crampton's Gap on the 8th, under Second Lieutenant S. T. Rugg), Rohrersville, Bakersville, and Fair Play, Md. , and took position on the 12th on the left of the new line of battle, 1 mile from Jones' Cross-Roads, on the west side of the Hagerstown and Sharpsburg pike. Remained here until the 14th. Made a reconnaissance with the First Division batteries toward Falling Waters, and found the enemy had recrossed the Potomac Broke camp on the 15th. Recrossed the Potomac at Harper's Ferry on the 19th. Marched, via Snickersville, Paris, Manassas Gap, Rectortown, White Plains, Thoroughfare Gap, Hay Market, Catlett's Station, and Warrenton Junction, to our present position, on the south side of the Rappahannock River, which we reached on the 30th ultimo. A list of casualties is herewith annexed. *

I have the honor to remain, Your most obedient servant,
EDWARD D. MUHLENBERG,
First Lieutenant 4th U. S. Arty. , Comdg. Arty, Brig. , 12th Corps.

*Report of Captain John G. Hayard, First Rhode Island Light Artillery,
Commanding Artillery Brigade, Second Army Corps.*

HDQRS. ARTILLERY BRIGADE, SECOND ARMY CORPS,
August 1, 1863.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit the following report of the part taken by the batteries of this brigade in the battle of July 2 and 3. On the morning of July 1, the brigade-composed of Light Company I, First U. S. Artillery, First Lieutenant George A. Woodruff commanding; Battery A, Fourth U. S. Artillery, First Lieutenant A. H. Cushing commanding; Battery A, First Rhode Island Light Artillery, Captain W. A. Arnold commanding;

Battery B, First Rhode Island Light Artillery, First Lieutenant T. Frederick Brown commanding; Battery B, First New York Artillery, Captain J. M. Rorty commanding-moved from Uniontown, Md. , to Taneytown, where a halt of three hours was made. At 2 p. m. the brigade moved toward Gettysburg, Pa. , to the support of the First Corps, then engaged with the enemy, and at 11 p. m. went into position 3 miles southeast of Gettysburg, on the Taneytown road and facing Gettysburg. The brigade moved with the corps at daylight on July 2 toward Gettysburg, and, upon the establishment of the battle-line of the corps to the left of the Taneytown road, took position in the following order, as shown in the diagram: On the right, in a grove, Light Company I [six light 12-pounders]; 150 yards to the left, Battery A, First Rhode Island Light Artillery, and Battery A, Fourth U. S. Artillery [both six 3-inch batteries]. Upon their left was placed Battery B, First Rhode Island Light Artillery [six light 12-pounders], while to the extreme left, and operating with the First Division of the corps, was placed Battery B, First New York Artillery [four 10-pounder Parrotts]. At 11 a. m. the enemy was seen in force in the woods to the front and right, and shell and case shot were fired till their disappearance. The enemy opened with artillery several times during the day, but was always silenced by the concentrated fire of our own artillery. About 4 p. m. the Third Corps advanced to the Emmitsburg road, and, upon being repulsed, our lines were opened upon by the enemy with artillery. A vigorous fire was returned. At 6 p. m. the enemy advanced in force, and, after a sharp contest, our lines were pushed back several hundred yards, the two batteries on the left-Battery B, First New York Artillery, m and Battery B, First Rhode Island Light Artillery-conforming their movement to that of the infantry. Upon gaining a more commanding position upon the crest of the hill, a rapid fire was opened upon the enemy, causing

great slaughter, and steadily driving them back. The two batteries on the left, being at the main point of attack on the left and center of the line, suffered most severely. Battery B, First New York Artillery, lost 1 man killed, 8 men wounded, and 13 horses disabled. Battery B, First Rhode Island Light Artillery, lost 1 man killed, 7 men wounded, and 2 missing. This battery was exposed to a most severe infantry fire; 24 horses were killed and 6 disabled, and it became necessary to send two guns to the rear. First Lieutenant T. Fred. Brown was severely wounded in the neck by a musket-shot while gallantly commanding the battery, and the command devolved upon First Lieutenant W. S. Perrin. First Lieutenant Samuel Canby, Battery A, Fourth U. S. Artillery, was severely wounded in the hand. The morning of July 3 was quiet until about 8 o'clock, when the enemy suddenly opened fire upon our

position, exploding three limbers of Battery A, Fourth U. S. Artillery, but otherwise causing little loss. Little reply was made, save by Light Company I, First U. S. Artillery, which battery during the forenoon had eight separate engagements with the enemy. At 1 p. m. the artillery of the enemy opened along the whole line, and for an hour and a quarter we were subjected to a very warm artillery fire.

The batteries did not at first reply, till the fire of the enemy becoming too terrible, they returned it till all their ammunition, excepting canister, had been expended; they then waited for the anticipated infantry attack of the enemy. Battery B, First New York Artillery, was entirely exhausted; its ammunition expended; its horses and men killed and disabled; the commanding officer, Captain J. M. Rorty, killed, and senior First Lieutenant A. S. Sheldon severely wounded. The other batteries were in similar condition; still, they bided the attack. The rebel lines advanced slowly but surely; half the valley had been passed over by them before the guns dared expend a round of the precious ammunition remaining on hand. The enemy steadily approached, and, when within deadly range, canister was thrown with terrible effect into their ranks. Battery A, First Rhode Island Light Artillery, had expended every round, and the lines of the enemy still advanced. Cushing was killed; Milne had fallen, mortally wounded; their battery was exhausted, their ammunition gone, and it was feared the guns would be lost if not withdrawn. At this trying moment the two batteries were taken away; but Woodruff still remained in the grove, and poured death and destruction into the rebel lines. They had gained the crest, and but few shots remained. All seemed lost, and the enemy, exultant, rushed on. But on reaching the crest they found our infantry, fresh and waiting on the opposite side. The tide turned; backward and downward rushed the rebel line, shattered and broken, and the victory was gained. Woodruff, who had gallantly commanded the battery through the action of July 2 and 3, fell, mortally wounded, at the very moment of victory. The command of the battery devolved upon Second Lieutenant Tully McCrea, First U. S. Artillery. Batteries from the Artillery Reserve of the army immediately occupied the positions vacated by the exhausted batteries of the brigade, and immediate efforts were made to recuperate and restore them to serviceable condition. So great was the loss in officers, men, and horses, that it was found necessary to consolidate Light Company I, First U. S. Artillery, Battery A, Fourth U. S. Artillery, and Batteries A and B, First Rhode Island Light Artillery, thus reducing the five batteries that entered the fight to three. The greatest praise is due to the gallantry and courage of the officers and men of the brigade, of whom one-third were either killed or wounded. The fire under which they fought on the afternoon of July 3 was most severe and terrible, as the inclosed list of killed, wounded, and

missing* will sufficiently testify. In the death of Captain J. M. Rorty the brigade has lost a worthy officer, a gallant soldier, and an estimable man. He had enjoyed his new position but one day, having assumed command of Battery B, First New York Artillery, on July 2, as it was about to engage the enemy. First Lieutenant A. H. Cushing, commanding Battery A, Fourth U. S. Artillery, fell on July 3, mortally wounded by a musket-shot. He especially distinguished himself for his extreme gallantry and bravery, his courage and ability, and his love his profession. His untimely death and the loss of such a promise as his youth cherished are sincerely mourned. First Lieutenant George A. Woodruff, commanding Light Company I, First U. S. Artillery, fell, mortally wounded, on July 3, while the rebel lines, after a most successful and daring advance, were being pushed back in destruction and defeat. To the manner in which the guns of his battery were served and his unflinching courage and determination may be due the pertinacity with which this part of the line was so gallantly held under a most severe attack. Lieutenant Woodruff was an able soldier, distinguished for his excellent judgment and firmness in execution, and his loss is one which cannot be easily replaced. He expired on July 4, and, at his own request, was buried on the field on which he had yielded his life to his country. Second Lieutenant Joseph S. Milne, First Rhode Island Light Artillery, was mortally wounded on the afternoon of July 3 by a musket-shot through the lungs. He survived his wound one week, and breathed his last at Gettysburg on July 10. In his regiment he was noted for his bravery and willingness to encounter death in any guise, while his modesty and manliness gained for him the ready esteem of his many comrades. His death is a loss to all, and we cannot but mourn that so bright a life should thus suddenly be veiled in death. At the time of his decease he was attached to Battery A, Fourth U. S. Artillery, with which battery he had served during the campaign. Every officer in this battery was either killed or wounded. First Lieutenant T. Fred. Brown, Battery B, First Rhode Island Light Artillery, was severely wounded in the neck on the afternoon of July 2. This officer deserves great praise for the cool and able manner in which he commanded his battery, although exposed to a most galling infantry fire, in a position to the front of the line of the corps, where his horses were shot down faster than they could be replaced. The guns were served admirably and with precision, driving the rebels with great loss. Honorable mention should be made of First Lieutenant A. S. Sheldon, Battery B, First New York Artillery, wounded on the afternoon of July 3; of Captain W. A. Arnold, commanding Battery A, First Rhode Island Light Artillery, who, after gallantly fighting his own battery and saving it, also withdrew the battery of A, Fourth U. S. Artillery, Cushing and Milne having fallen; of Second Lieuts. Tully McCrea and John Egan, First U. S. Artillery, for their

distinguished coolness and bravery, and of First Lieutenant R. E. Rogers, First New York Artillery, upon whom the command of Battery B, First New York Artillery, finally devolved. Special mention is made of First Sergt. Frederick Fuger, of Battery A, Fourth U. S. Artillery, for his bravery during the battle, especially exhibited when all his officers had fallen, and he, in the heat of the fire, was obliged to assume command of the company. He is most earnestly recommended for promotion, having proved himself a brave soldier and a modest but competent officer. I beg leave to call particular attention to First Lieutenant G. L. Dwight, ordnance officer and acting adjutant of the brigade, for the untiring energy displayed in supplying the brigade with ammunition, and the efficient service rendered in the field. Reposing the utmost confidence in this officer's abilities,

I most respectfully recommend him for promotion.

JNO. G. HAZARD,

Captain First Rhode Island Light Artillery, Comdg, Brigade.

*Report of Captain John C. Tidball, Second U. S. Artillery,
Commanding Second Brigade, Horse Artillery.*

**CAMP NEAR WARRENTON, VA. ,
AUGUST 4, 1863.**

SIR: I HAVE THE HONOR TO SUBMIT HEREWITH THE REPORTS OF
LIEUTENANT CALEF,
COMMANDING HORSE BATTERY A, SECOND U. S. ARTILLERY, AND

LIEUTENANT FULLER, COMMANDING HORSE BATTERY C, THIRD U. S.
ARTILLERY,
DETAILING IN AS CONCISE FORM AS POSSIBLE THE OPERATIONS OF
THEIR RESPECTIVE
BATTERIES IN THE RECENT MOVEMENTS OF THE ARMY OF THE
POTOMAC, WHICH RESULTED
SO SUCCESSFULLY IN THE EXPULSION OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY
FROM PENNSYLVANIA AND
MARYLAND. IN SUBMITTING THESE REPORTS, IT IS UNNECESSARY FOR
ME TO ADD
ANYTHING TO SHOW THE IMPORTANT PART ACTED BY THESE
BATTERIES IN CONJUNCTION
WITH THE CAVALRY WITH WHICH THEY WERE SERVING IN THESE

OPERATIONS. NEVER IN THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC HAS SUCH ARDUOUS SERVICE BEEN REQUIRED OF BATTERIES, AND IN EVERY INSTANCE IN MARCHING AND INFIGHTING THEY PROVED THEMSELVES EQUAL TO ALL REQUIREMENTS, AND RECEIVED THE WELL-EARNED COMMENDATION OF THOSE WITH WHOM THEY SERVED. AS THE OPERATIONS OF THE CAVALRY ARE MOSTLY ON THE EXTERIOR OF THE ARMY AND OUT OF VIEW OF THE GREATER PART OF IT, BUT AN IMPERFECT KNOWLEDGE EXISTS OF THE IMPORTANCE AND ARDUOUSNESS OF ITS SERVICE. SO ALSO OF THE BATTERIES OF HORSE ARTILLERY SERVING WITH THE CAVALRY; BATTERIES AND SECTIONS, CONSTANTLY DETACHED AND FREQUENTLY ENGAGED WITH THE ENEMY, WITH THAT UNCERTAINTY OF POSITION, FORCE, AND OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ALWAYS ATTEND RECONNAISSANCES AND SKIRMISHING, NECESSARILY CALL TO THE FULLEST EXTENT FOR THE INTELLIGENCE AND ALL OTHER RESOURCES OF THE OFFICERS COMMANDING, AND IT IS WITH PRIDE AND SATISFACTION THAT I REQUEST THE SPECIAL ATTENTION OF THE MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING TO THE RECENT SERVICES OF SECOND LIEUTENANTS CALEF AND RODER, OF HORSE BATTERY A, SECOND U. S. ARTILLERY, AND OF FIRST LIEUTENANTS FULLER, MEINELL, AND KELLY, AND SECOND LIEUTENANT LANCASTER, OF HORSE BATTERY C, THIRD U. S. ARTILLERY. HORSE BATTERY K, FIRST U. S. ARTILLERY (GRAHAM'S), AND E, FIRST U. S. ARTILLERY (RANDOL'S), THE OTHER TWO OF THE SECOND BRIGADE, HORSE ARTILLERY, ARE STILL DETACHED WITH THE FIRST AND SECOND CAVALRY DIVISIONS, AND THE REPORTS OF THEIR OPERATIONS WILL DOUBTLESS BE MADE THROUGH THE COMMANDING OFFICERS OF THOSE DIVISIONS.

VERY RESPECTFULLY, YOUR OBEDIENT SERVANT,
J. C. TIDBALL,
Captain 2nd U. S. ARTILLERY, COMDG. 2nd BRIG. , HORSE ARTILLERY.

**SPECIAL ORDERS, } HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS,
Numbers 122.} August 16,1863.**

IV. The batteries of horse artillery belonging to the Second Brigade (Tidball's), serving with corps, will be replaced by batteries from the First (or Robertson's) Brigade, after which Captain Tidball will report with his brigade to Brigadier-General Tyler, commanding Artillery Reserve.

V. To equalize the number of batteries in the brigade, the Ninth Michigan Battery is transferred to the Second Brigade Horse Artillery.

**By command of Major-General Pleasonton:
A. J. ALEXANDER, Assistant Adjutant-General.**

**Reports of Brigadier General Robert O. Tyler,
U.S. Army, commanding Artillery Reserve, Army of the Potomac.**

**HEADQUARTERS ARTILLERY RESERVE,
Camp near Warrenton Junction, Va, August 30, 1863.**

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit herewith a report of the operations of the Artillery Reserve, from June 28 to July 4. I also inclose the reports of brigade, battery, and other commanders. June 28. - The reserve remained in camp near Frederick City.

At night Captain Robertson's brigade of horse artillery, temporarily attached, was ordered to join the command of Major-General Pleasonton. June 29. - Marched from Frederick City to about 1 mile beyond Bruceville. June 30. - Marched to Taneytown, and encamped a short distance beyond the village, on the Emmitsburg turnpike. On the evening of July 1, I was ordered to proceed to Gettysburg with about eight batteries and report to Major-General Hancock. I detailed the brigades of Captains Ransom and Fitzhugh, and, leaving about sundown, reported with them to General Gibbon, in the absence of General Hancock, at ebbed 10. 30 p. m. The same day, Lieutenant Sheldon, with his

battery (B, First New York Artillery), was ordered to report to the chief of artillery of the Second Corps. I encamped that night on the Taneytown road, near the cross-road leading to Two Taverns. July 2. - In the morning I moved from camp with my brigades, and placed them in park behind the line of battle of the Third Corps, about 1 1/2 miles from Gettysburg. The remainder of the reserve batteries, having been ordered to join me, left Taneytown at early dawn, under command of Major McGilvery, and reported to me with the ammunition train about 10. 30 a. m. They were held in reserve on a cross-road between the main road and the Baltimore turnpike. Much to my regret, the two batteries of 4 1/2-inch guns (B and M, First Connecticut Artillery) were ordered to Westminster, to remain with the supply train. I am satisfied that the action of Gettysburg would have demonstrated their extreme mobility and usefulness as field guns, in addition to their already proved excellence as guns of position. Early in the day I stationed Captains Fitzhugh (K, First New York Artillery) and Rigby (A, First Maryland Artillery) and Lieutenant Parsons (A, First New Jersey Artillery) along the Baltimore turnpike at points designated by Generals Meade and Hunt. At 3. 30 p. m. , pursuant to instructions received, I ordered Major McGilvery with two batteries (Fifteenth New York Battery and C and F, Pennsylvania artillery) of his brigade to report to Major-General Sickles. Afterward, as the action went on, I sent forward, as they were called for, the remaining batteries of that brigade, and in addition, those commanded by Captains Sterling (Second Connecticut Battery) and Ames (G, First New York Artillery), making in all six batteries of thirty-four guns. These Batteries were placed in position so as to fire upon the masses of the enemy moving up on our left flank, which made the general artillery line make a large angle to the infantry line of battle, and exposed it to a very galling enfilading fire of the enemy's artillery, in addition to the continual annoyance of their sharpshooters. These batteries, under Major McGilvery, held their places, doing terrible execution upon the successive columns attacking our left until about 6 p. m. , when, our infantry falling back, they were compelled to retire, though contesting the ground gallantly under great disadvantages. Upon the crest of the hill, Major McGilvery formed a new line with the guns which he could collect, being re-enforced by Lieutenant Dow with his battery (Sixth Maine), and the farther advance of the enemy was checked by the fire of artillery almost unaided by infantry.

The reserve batteries lost very heavily on this occasion in horses and men, so that several guns were necessarily left upon the field, but, after dark, parties were sent out and all but one gun, belonging to Captain Thompson's battery (C and F, Pennsylvania), were returned to the command to which they belonged. The gun in question was left behind much nearer the new position

than many others which were regained, and it is not improbable that it was brought in by troops of some of the corps. I would respectfully call attention to Major McGilvery's report of this part of the action. When the action became general, I ordered Captain Ransom's Regular Brigade (C, Fourth U. S. Artillery; C, Fifth U. S. Artillery; F and K, Third U. S. Artillery; H, First U. S. Artillery) to form line of battle on the crest of the hill near General Meade's headquarters. Soon two batteries - Lieutenant Turnbull's (F and K, Third U. S. Artillery) and Captain Ransom's (C, Fifth U. S. Artillery) - were ordered forward to General Humphreys, and occupied a much exposed position near the right center when the enemy's advance was made. Lieutenant Turnbull (F and K, Third U. S. Artillery) was compelled to retire, with the loss of 1 officer and 8 men killed, 14 men wounded, and 45 horses killed. Four guns were left on the field, but were afterward brought off by infantry. No report has yet been received from Captain Ransom's (C, Fifth U. S. Artillery) or Captain Sterling's (Second Connecticut) batteries. Lieutenant Eakin (H, First U. S. Artillery) was ordered to cemetery Hill, where he was wounded soon after his guns went into battery. Lieutenant Thomas, with his battery (C, Fourth U. S. Artillery), held the crest of the hill, and did excellent service in repelling the attack on our center. Captain Huntington's brigade (H, First Ohio Artillery; F and G, First Pennsylvania Artillery; A, First New Hampshire Artillery; C, First West Virginia) and Captain Taft's battery (Fifth New York) of 20-pounders were ordered to report to Major-General Howard, commanding the Eleventh Corps, and by him placed in position in the cemetery, where they engaged the enemy's batteries opposite, firing upon bodies of troops as they appeared in force until daylight was ended by the darkness. During the charge upon our right center, two of the guns belonging to Captain Ricketts' battery (F and G, First Pennsylvania Artillery), of this brigade, were captured, and one of them spiked, but the enemy was held in check by the cannoneers with pistols, handspikes, &c., and afterward driven back by a brigade of the Second Corps, and the guns recaptured. Lieutenant Gillett, First Connecticut Artillery, ordnance officer of this command, was engaged the entire night in issuing ammunition to the batteries of the several corps, as well as those of the artillery Reserve. Seventy wagons were unloaded, which were sent to the rear on the morning of the 3d. At daylight on July 3, Captain Rigby's battery (A, First Maryland Artillery) opened fire, by direction of Major-General Slocum, upon the troops across Rock Creek moving of our right. The ammunition train and some of the reserve batteries, which had been refitted during the night, were moved up near the Taneytown road, together with the Horse Artillery Brigade of Captain Robertson, who had been ordered to report temporarily to me. On riding along the lines, I found all the reserve batteries (twelve in number), which had

been ordered to the different corps on the day previous, in position. The infantry had constructed a slight breastwork of such materials as the ground afforded along the entire crest of the hill, and some shelter had been thrown up for the artillery. The enemy had brought out a large number of guns, and held them in position in sight on the opposite side of the Emmitsburg road. Everything was moderately quiet until about 12 o'clock, when, as I was returning with Captain Robertson from reconnoitering a position for artillery opposite our left, the enemy opened a terrific fire of artillery, which, passing over the crest of the hill, concentrated behind the lines where the reserve was lying. Several officers and men were wounded and animals killed both in the batteries and the ammunition train. My own horse was killed at this time, just as I reached the park. Orders were given to move the whole to the rear, out of range, the cannonading being kept up for more than two hours. There being signs of an intention to attack on the part of the enemy, all the reserve batteries and one battery of horse artillery were ordered into position. Captain Fitzhugh (K, First New York Artillery) and Lieutenant Parsons (A, First New Jersey Artillery) came up very opportunely to the support of the troops of Brigadier-General Webb, of the Second Corps, at a time when artillery was much needed, and with their steady and well-directed fire rendered great assistance. After 3 p. m. the enemy moved up immense bodies of troops, and made a series of attacks upon our center, but, despite the vigor and gallantry with which they were led and handled, they could not withstand the heavy fire of artillery to which they were subjected, combined with the brave and obstinate defense of the infantry, and were hurled back from our position with immense loss. The company of the Thirty-second Massachusetts (Company C, Captain J. C. Fuller commanding) and the battalion of the Fourth New Jersey, guarding my train, were formed in line, and assisted in driving back stragglers during the afternoon's engagement. I wish to explain here that the dispositions of my batteries were generally made upon orders of General Hunt, chief of artillery, though sometimes by orders direct from the commanding general or requisitions of corps commanders. Most of the batteries in position until July 5, when they were withdrawn for the march on that day. Appended and marked A will be found a tabular statement of losses and expenditures during the battle. I believe it almost unnecessary to speak of the value of the services rendered by the Artillery Reserve during the last two days of this action and the great share it had in the glorious result. The one hundred and eight guns which were on the field were all in position, their fire being concentrated and felt wherever the battle was hottest. The skill and gallantry with which they were handled is amply attested by the dead of the enemy, slain by shell and canister, lying in their front, and the fierce fire under which they did their work is proved by the heavy loss of horses and the long record of men and

officers killed and wounded. From the ammunition train, as already stated, seventy wagon-loads were issued on the night of the 2nd to the batteries of the army, and, as shown by the report of my ordnance officer, 10, 090 rounds were issued to batteries outside of the reserve during the battle. The necessity and usefulness of the organization, I believe, is beyond a question. I would respectfully call the attention of the commanding general to the defects of a system which fails to give field officers for the necessary subdivisions of so large a body of artillery. There should be at least a field officer with a proper staff to each four batteries in action, and the supervision of a commander of superior rank is equally necessary in camp or on the march. There was no exception to the gallantry, coolness, and steadiness of the officers and men of my command, and I would call attention to the many special instances of distinguished good conduct mentioned in accompanying reports. I feel it due to bring to the notice of the commanding general the intrepid conduct and excellent judgment displayed by Major F. McGilvery, First Maine Artillery, under whose immediate command fell many of the reserve batteries engaged on our left center, as well as to the tenacity and bravery of Captain P. Hart, Fifteenth New York Battery; Captain N. Irish, Battery F, Pennsylvania Artillery, and Lieutenant Baldwin, Fifth U. S. Artillery, who, though painfully wounded, remained on the field and fought with their batteries during the whole action; also, of Captain Ransom, Third U. S. Artillery, who was severely wounded by a sharpshooter while gallantly reconnoitering a position for his guns. Lieutenant Milton, upon whom the command of his battery devolved after every other officer belonging to it had been either killed or wounded, displayed remarkable coolness and resolution. I wish to make special mention of gallantry coming under my notice on the part of Private William Sheridan, First Connecticut Artillery, who was the only one of several orderlies who remained with me under the terrific cannonading of the 3d. He immediately gave me his horse when mine was killed, and brought off from the field my entire arms and horse equipments, carrying them on foot for nearly a mile under a fire the concentration of which few who experienced it will fail to remember. I desire to especially express my obligations to the officers of my staff. The gallantry and activity of Lieutenant [Gustav von] Blucher, the only aide-de-camp with me, were specially conspicuous. The work of bringing up and the care of the ammunition train devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel [William E.] Morford, quartermaster, and Lieutenant [S. A.] Wood, acting assistant quartermaster, the former of whom, with Lieutenant [Lowell A.] Chamberlin, my commissary of musters, afforded me much valuable assistance on the field. Lieutenant Gillett, my ordnance officer, worked day and night after the action commenced, issuing ammunition to the corps as well as to the reserve, and to his labor and

excellent system much of the efficiency of the artillery on the 3rd is due. I am greatly indebted to my assistant adjutant-general, Captain C. H. Whittelsey, for his gallant and untiring labors during the whole action and the cheerfulness and energy with which he executed every duty that he was called upon to perform. My thanks are also due Captain Robertson, who did excellent service in withdrawing the reserve batteries during the confusion attending the heavy cannonading of the 3d, and upon whom devolved the command of the batteries during a temporary indisposition that succeeded the fall from my horse.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. O. TYLER,
Brigadier-General of Volunteers, Commanding.

Troops in the Department of Washington, Major General Samuel P. Heintzelman, U. S. Army, commanding, August 31, 1863.

**Brigadier General William F. Barry, Chief of Artillery,
Department of Washington.**

**LIGHT ARTILLERY CAMP OF INSTRUCTION.
Lieutenant Colonel J. ALBERT MONROE.**

Michigan Light, 10th Battery, Captain John C. Schuetz.
1st New York Light, Battery F, Captain William R. Wilson.
1st New York Light, Battery H, Captain Charles E. Mink.
New York Light, 19th Battery, Lieutenant Edward W. Rogers.
Ohio Light, 12th Battery, Captain Aaron C. Johnson.
1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery H, Captain Andrew Fagan.
5th United States, Batteries I and L, Lieutenant Edmund D. Spooner.
1st West Virginia Light, Battery A, Lieutenant George Furst.
1st West Virginia Light, Battery F, Lieutenant James C. Means.

**DEFENSES NORTH OF THE POTOMAC.
Lieutenant Colonel JOSEPH A. HASKIN,
Aide-de-Camp, in charge.**

**First Brigade.
Colonel AUGUSTUS A. GIBSON.**

2nd Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery, Colonel Augustus A. Gibson.
1st Vermont Heavy Artillery, Colonel James M. Warner.

Second Brigade.

Colonel LEWIS O. MORRIS.

1st Maine Heavy Artillery, Colonel Daniel Chaplin.
7th New York Heavy Artillery, Colonel Lewis O. Morris.
9th New York Heavy Artillery, Colonel Joseph Welling.
9th New York Battery, Captain Emil Schubert.

Third Brigade.

10th New York Heavy Artillery, Colonel Alexander Piper.

DEFENSES SOUTH OF THE POTOMAC.

Brigadier General GUSTAVUS A. DE RUSSY.

First Brigade.

Colonel JOSEPH N. G. WHISTLER.

1st Massachusetts Heavy Artillery, Lieutenant Colonel Levi P. Wright.
2nd New York Heavy Artillery, Major William A. McKay.
5th New York Heavy Artillery (3rd Battalion), Major Gustavus F. Merriam.

Second Brigade.

Colonel LEVERETTE W. WESSELLS.

2nd Connecticut Heavy Artillery, Lieutenant Colonel Elisha S. Kellogg.
15th New York Heavy Artillery, Captain Leander Schamberger.

Third Brigade.

Colonel HENRY L. ABBOT.

1st Connecticut Heavy Artillery, Colonel Henry L. Abbot.
1st Rhode Island Light Artillery, Battery H, Lieutenant Charles F. Mason.
Wisconsin Heavy Artillery Company, Captain Charles C. Meservey.

Fourth Brigade.

Lieutenant Colonel THOMAS ALLCOCK.

2nd Massachusetts Cavalry, Companies B,C,D, and K, Captain George F. Holman.
4th New York Heavy Artillery (eight companies), Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Allcock.

DISTRICT OF ALEXANDRIA.
Brigadier General JOHN P. SLOUGH.

Pennsylvania Light Artillery, Battery H, Captain William Borrowe.

FORT WASHINGTON, MD.
Captain CHARLES R. DEMING.

16th Indiana Battery, Captain Charles R. Deming.
4th U. S. Artillery, Regimental Headquarters, Colonel Charles S. Merchant.

DEFENSES OF BALTIMORE.
Brigadier General ERASTUS B. TYLER.

Baltimore (Maryland) Light Artillery, Captain Frederick W. Alexander.
Maryland Battery A (Junior Artillery), Captain John M. Bruce.
Maryland Battery B (Eagle Artillery), Captain Joseph A. Audoun.
5th New York Heavy Artillery, Companies B and C, Major Casper Urban.
3rd Pennsylvania Artillery, Light Battery H, Captain William D. Rank.

Second Separate Brigade.
Bvt. Brigadier General WILLIAM W. MORRIS.

5th New York Heavy Artillery (six companies), Lieutenant Colonel Edward Murray.
8th New York Heavy Artillery (ten companies), Colonel Peter A. Porter.
2nd U. S. Artillery, Battery I, Lieutenant James E. Wilson.

FORT DELAWARE, DEL.
Brigadier General ALBIN SCHOEPF.

Delaware Heavy Artillery (one company), Captain George W. Ahl.
Pennsylvania Artillery, Battery A, Captain Stanislaus Mlotkowski.
Pennsylvania Artillery, Battery G, Captain John J. Young.

RELAY HOUSE, MD.
5th U. S. Artillery (detachment),* Lieutenant Edmund D. Spooner.

DELAWARE DEPARTMENT.

Delaware Emergency Artillery (detachment), Lieutenant Thomas Crossley.

Troops in the Department of the Susquehanna, Major General Darius N. Couch, U. S. Army, commanding, August 31,1863.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.

27th New York Battery, Captain John B. Eaton.

Nevin's (Pennsylvania) Battery (militia), Captain Robert J. Nevin.

Independent Pennsylvania Battery (militia), Captain William H. Woodward.

LEHIGH DISTRICT.

1st New York Light Artillery, Battery A, Lieutenant Isaac B. Hall.

Goodwin's (New York) Battery (militia), Captain William F. Goodwin.

READING, PA.

Ringgold (Pennsylvania) Battery (militia), Captain George R. Guss.

5th U. S. Artillery, Battery E,++ Lieutenant James W. Piper.

Troops in the Department of West Virginia, Brigadier General Benjamin F. Kelley, U. S. Army, commanding, August 31,1863.

SCAMMON'S DIVISION.

Brigadier General E. PARKER SCAMMON.

First Brigade.

Kentucky Battery, Captain Seth J. Simmonds.

Second Brigade.

1st Ohio Battery, Captain James R. McMullin.

MARYLAND HEIGHTS DIVISION

Brigadier General HENRY H. LOCKWOOD.

First Brigade

17th Indiana Battery, Captain Milton L. Miner.

1st Pennsylvania Light Artillery, Battery C, Captain Jeremiah McCarthy.

Second Brigade

Maryland Light Artillery, Battery B, Captain Alonzo Snow.

32nd New York Battery, Captain Charles Kusserow.

Unattached.

1st Massachusetts Heavy Artillery (four companies), Major Frank A. Rolfe.

MARTINSBURG.

30th New York Battery, Lieutenant Alfred von Kleiser.

Averell's Brigade

1st West Virginia Light Artillery, Battery B, Captain John V. Keeper.

Campbell's Brigade

1st West Virginia Light Artillery, Battery E, Captain Alexander C. Moore.

Mulligan's Brigade

1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery L, Captain John Rourke.

Pennsylvania Light Battery (militia), Captain Horatio K. Tyler

1st West Virginia Light Artillery, Battery B, Captain John Carlin.

MISCELLANEOUS

Hagerstown, Md

5th U. S. Artillery, Battery B, Lieutenant Henry A. Du Pont.

Troops in the Department of Virginia and North Carolina, Major General John G. Foster, U. S. Army, commanding, August 31, 1863.

FORT MONROE, VA.

3rd Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery (nine companies), Colonel Joseph Roberts.

NORFOLK, VA

7th New York Battery, Captain Peter C. Regan.

GETTY'S DIVISION

1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery A, Captain John G. Simpson.

5th United States, Battery A, Lieutenant James Gilliss.

Unattached Artillery.

Captain FREDERICK M. FOLLETT.

3rd Pennsylvania Heavy, Company F, Captain John A. Blake.

3rd Pennsylvania Heavy, Company G, Captain Joseph W. Sanderson.

3rd Pennsylvania Heavy, Company M, Captain Francis H. Reichard.

4th United States, Battery D, Captain Frederick M. Follett.

4th United States, Battery L, Captain Robert V. W. Howard.

YORKTOWN AND VICINITY

Wistar's Brigade

8th New York Battery, Captain Butler Fitch.
16th New York Battery, Captain Frederick L. Hiller.
1st Pennsylvania (field and staff), Colonel Robert M. West.
1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery E, Captain Thomas G. Orwig.
2nd Wisconsin Battery, Lieutenant Carl Schulz.
4th Wisconsin Battery, Captain George B. Easterly.

DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

DEFENSES OF NEW BERNE

3rd New York Light, Artillery (nine batteries), Colonel Chas. H. Stewart.
1st Rhode Island Light Artillery, Battery F, Lieutenant Thomas Simpson.
5th Rhode Island Heavy Artillery, Colonel Henry T. Sisson.

SUB-DISTRICT OF THE ALBERMALE

24th New York Battery, Captain A. Lester Cady.

SUB-DISTRICT OF BEAUFORT

1st U. S. Artillery, Battery C, Lieutenant Redmound Tully.

SUB-DISTRICT OF THE PAMLICO

23rd New York Battery, Captain Alfred Ransom.

Troops in the Department of the East, Major General John A. Dix, U. S. Army, commanding, August 31, 1863.

CITY AND HARBOR OF NEW YORK

NEW YORK CITY

First Brigade

7th Massachusetts Battery, Captain Phineas A. Davis.

Second Brigade

2nd Connecticut Battery, Captain John W. Sterling

Artillery

Captain DUNBAR R. RANSOM.

1st Delaware Battery, Captain Benjamin Nields.
5th United States, Battery C, Lieutenant Gulian V. Weir.

NEW YORK HARBOR

Davids Island

20th New York Battery (detachment).

28th New York Battery (detachment), Lieutenant Robert F. Joyce.

Fort Hamilton

11th New York Heavy Artillery (detachment), Captain Seward F. Gould.

13th New York Heavy Artillery (detachment), Captain George A. Bulmer.

5th U. S. Artillery (headquarters), Lieutenant Thompson P. McElrath.

Fort at Sandy Hook

11th New York Heavy Artillery, Company C, Captain Henry P. Merrill.

Fort Richmond

11th New York Heavy Artillery, Company A, Captain William Church.

Fort Schuyler

20th New York Battery, Lieutenant Frank A. Davis.

28th New York Battery, Captain Josiah C. Hannum.

Fort Constitution, N. H.

New Hampshire Heavy Artillery, 1st Company, Captain Charles H. Long.

Fort Knox, near Buckport, Me.

1st Maine Heavy Artillery (detachment), Lieutenant Thomas H. Palmer.

Fort Warren, Boston, Mass.

1st Massachusetts Heavy Artillery Battalion, Major Stephen Cabot.

1st U. S. Artillery (headquarters), Colonel Justin Dimick.

Fort at Clark's Point, New Bedford, Mass.

Massachusetts Heavy Artillery, 6th Company, Captain John A. P. Allen.

Fort Independent, Boston, Mass.

Massachusetts Heavy Artillery, 3rd Company, Captain Lyman B. Whiton.

Fort Trumbull, New London, Conn.

3rd U. S. Artillery, Battery G, Lieutenant Lewis Smith.

**Report of Captain John G. Hazard, First Rhode Island Light Artillery,
Commanding Artillery Brigade.
HDQRS. ARTILLERY BRIGADE, SECOND CORPS D'ARMEE,
Near Warrenton, Va., October 23, 1863.**

COLONEL: I have the honor to transmit the following report of the part sustained by the Artillery Brigade on the 14th instant, in the actions of the corps at Auburn and Bristoe Station, Va.:

On that date the brigade was composed of:

Battery A, First Rhode Island Light Artillery (6 3-inch rifled guns),, Captain W.A. Arnold commanding.

Battery F, First Pennsylvania Artillery (6 3-inch rifled guns), Captain R. Bruce Ricketts commanding.

Battery G, First New York Artillery (6 light 12 [pounder] smooth-bore guns), Captain Nelson Ames commanding.

Light Company I, First U.S. Artillery (4 light 12 [pounder] smooth-bore guns), First Lieutenant F.S. French, commanding.

Battery B, First Rhode Island Light Artillery (4 light 12 [pounder] smooth-bore guns), First Lieutenant T. Fred. Brown commanding.

Making in all five batteries, and numbering 12 3-inch rifled guns, and 14 light 12 [pounder] smooth-bore guns.

The advance of the corps the First Division moving on the road passing through Auburn toward Bristoe Station, was fired into on crossing Cedar Run, a little after daybreak, by a battery of the enemy, in position on an eminence to the east of the road. Rickett's battery, immediately in rear of the division, was placed in position and soon silenced the battery engaged. Scarcely was it silenced, when the enemy's skirmishers appeared in the rear, necessitating a change of front to rear. Arnold's battery and Ames' battery remained with the First Division, at this point. The other batteries of the brigade resumed the march toward Bristoe Station, with the Second and Third Divisions of the corps.

Two hours after the departure of the corps from Auburn, a strong line of the enemy's skirmishers appearing in front of First Division fire was opened upon them by order of Major-General Warren. In about an hour the enemy opened fire from a battery distant about 1,500 yards, on the opposite side of Cedar Run. It was immediately replied to and the fire sustained nearly an hour, with an expenditure of 200 rounds of ammunition. Ames' battery remained unengaged. The artillery at this point being relieved by a section of Martin's horse battery,

the batteries resumed the march of the corps with the First Division. In the engagement the loss was extremely slight.

At 3 p.m. the advance of the corps while marching by the flank was met at Bristoe Station by a column of the enemy moving in the same direction. The Second Division immediately secured the southern side of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad as a line of defense, and Brown's battery, temporarily attached to the division, obtaining a most fortunate position, fired with spherical case upon the advancing line of the enemy, checking it, and causing it to seek shelter under the crest in the immediate front. Lieutenant Brown was then ordered into position on the eastern side of Broad Run by General Webb, whose division

(the Second) was about to make a similar move. After crossing the battery it was seen the division had recrossed the run to its former position. The battery was unable to recross as the road it had just passed over was fully commanded by the enemy, so it moved up the railroad a distance of 200 yards to a position that enfiladed the enemy, and opened fire with good effect.

Every exertion was employed to hasten the batteries on their way to the field, and the arrival of Rickett's and Arnold's batteries was most timely. Rickett's was immediately placed in position in rear of that first occupied by Brown, while Arnold's took an advantageous position in rear of the First Division. The fire of these batteries upon the charging lines of the infantry was most effective and deadly, and assisted greatly in securing their demoralization. Upon the withdrawal of the infantry of the enemy, the fire of the two batteries was directed upon a rebel battery of six guns that had opened fire in front of the Third Division, and with such accuracy and ardor as to cause the hasty retreat of the rebel gunner, and the capture of five guns of the battery by the prompt advancement of skirmishers from the Second Division. One gun of Captain Ames' battery was placed about 100 yards to the left and of Captain Arnold's battery, upon the line of the railroad and did excellent execution.

About 4 p.m. an attack being anticipated upon the left and rear, two sections of Captain Ames' battery were placed in position facing Cedar Run. French's and Brown's batteries were placed in position on Arnold's right. The sixth gun of Ames' battery was placed upon the left of the first gun of his battery in position on the line of the railroad.

The enemy opened an artillery fire upon our left and front. The fire of Arnold's, French's, and Brown's batteries, and the two guns of Ames' battery were concentrated upon it, and in twenty minutes caused its withdrawal. During this fire the other four guns of Ames' battery opened fire upon two brigades of

rebel infantry on the west side of Cedar Run, with good effect. Assistance was rendered by Horse Battery A, Fourth U.S. Artillery, and Martin's horse battery, Sixth New York Artillery.

At dark orders were received from the general commanding to move the brigade, and the two horse batteries, A, Fourth U.S. Artillery, Sixth New York Artillery.

At dark orders were received from the general commanding to move the brigade and the two horse batteries, A, Fourth U.S. Artillery, and Martin's Sixth New York battery, supported by Colonel Miles' brigade, First Division, to Centreville.

During the two engagements of the day the batteries of the brigade sustained the following losses, respectively:

Arnold's battery. - Killed, 1 enlisted man; wounded, 1 officer, 7 enlisted men. Horses: Killed, 2; wounded, 4.

Ricketts' battery. - Wounded, 1 officer, 6 enlisted men. Horses; Killed, 3;

wounded, 5. Ames' battery. - None. French's battery. - Wounded, 5 enlisted men.

Brown's battery. - Killed, 1 enlisted man; wounded 4, enlisted men. Horses: Killed, 2.

Praise is due to the battery commanders for the cool and able manner in which their commands were fought and the precision of their fire.

Notice is respectfully called to the following extract from the report of First Lieutenant Brown, commanding Battery B, First Rhode Island Light Artillery: Bugler John F. Leach is especially to be mentioned for collecting 13 stragglers and disposing of them as skirmishers on the right flank of the battery on north side of the railroad at the time when the battery was wholly unsupported across the run, without doubt preventing much annoyance from the enemy's skirmishers (who engaged his men), if not the capture of the battery.

I would especially mention First Lieutenant G.L. Dwight, acting assistant, adjutant-general, and First Lieutenant Thomas Farrell, acting aide, for their efficient aid during the day.

Respectfully submitted.

JOHN G. HAZARD,

Captain First Rhode Island Light Artillery, Commanding Brigade.

**ARTILLERY HDQRS. , ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp near Warrenton, October 26, 1863.**

**General W. F. BARRY,
Inspector of Artillery, U. S. Army:**

GENERAL: There is much complaint of the inefficiency, at close quarters, of the canister for the light 12-pounder gun, owing to the small number of balls it contains. This effect was made apparent at Gettysburg, and is complained of frequently now that the batteries of these guns in the horse artillery often come in close contact with the enemy's cavalry and infantry. The present canister shot is so large as to be effective at long ranges, so long that it would be better to use shrapnel.

I respectfully request that canister with a smaller ball, say of 2 to 3 ounces-or if of smaller diameter than that of a 2-ounce iron ball, then one of lead-may be furnished at as early a day as practicable, in sufficient quantities to furnish at least the horse artillery with one-half their canister of the new pattern. These canisters would carry from 60 to 80 shots, and would probably be much more effective within 200 yards than the present 7-ounce ball of 28 to the canister.

**HENRY J. HUNT,
Brigadier-General, Chief of Artillery.**

**Report of Captain George E. Randolph, First, Rhode Island
Light Artillery, commanding Artillery Brigade, Third Army Corps.
HDQRS. ARTILLERY BRIGADE, THIRD ARMY CORPS,
September 2, 1863.**

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the artillery of the Third Army Corps, from June 28 to July 3: On the morning of June 28, the batteries of the corps, with one exception, were encamped near Middletown Md. Clark's battery was near Crampton's Pass, with one brigade of infantry. Early in the day, in compliance with the order of Major-General Birney, commanding the corps, I marched to Frederick, where I encamped and fed about noon, and where I was joined by Clark's battery an hour or two later. In the afternoon the corps marched to Woodville, and, on June 29, to Taneytown, encamping a mile north of the town. On the afternoon of the 30th, the corps, including batteries, marched to Bridgeport, a place about 2 miles from

Taneytown, on the road to Emmitsburg, and pushed on the next morning to the latter place. In the afternoon of July 1, by command of Major-General Sickles, who had resumed command of the corps at Frederick, three batteries-Randolph's, FE, First Rhode Island; Clark's, B, First New Jersey, accompanying the First Division, and Seeley's, K, Fourth U. S. Artillery, accompanying the Second Division-marched to Gettysburg, and encamped on the left of the town, near the Taneytown road. Early on the morning of July 2, Randolph's and Clark's batteries were placed in position on the line held by General Birney's division, running from near the left of the Second Corps to the base of Signal or Round Top Mountain. The positions of both were low, unprotected, and commanded by the ridge along which runs the road from Emmitsburg to Gettysburg. Seeley's battery remained in the field where it had encamped, and, as there were no desirable positions on our part of the line, Smith's and Winslow's batteries, on their arrival from Emmitsburg, were parked near Seeley's until some better disposition could be made of them. Between 1 and 1 p. m. Major-General Sickles notified me that he was about to change his line, throwing his right forward to the high ground, running his line from Round Top Mountain, on the left, to a peach orchard on the Emmitsburg road, and thence along the road toward Gettysburg to a second orchard. This new disposition seemed to me, notwithstanding the sharp angle in our line made necessary by the formation of the ground, to be a much more desirable one. I placed Smith's battery near the extreme left, between Round Top Mountain and the woods, on a rocky hill commanding a long valley running toward Emmitsburg. On the right of Smith's, after passing a belt of woods, was an opening, in which I placed Winslow's battery of light 12-pounders. This position was surrounded by woods, but, in my opinion, the line was materially strengthened by this battery of short-range guns. In the open field, with his left resting near the woods, I placed Captain Bigelow's (Massachusetts) battery, from the Artillery Reserve; on this right Clark's, and next, and in the peach orchard that stood in the angle formed by our lines, was Ames' battery, G, First New York, also from the Artillery Reserve. All these batteries fronted toward Emmitsburg, or in the direction from which the attack of the enemy was expected and afterward received. Randolph's battery was placed on the Emmitsburg road, fronting nearly perpendicular to those before mentioned; and still farther to the right, and near the extreme left of the line held by the corps, was Seeley's. With the exception of almost continual skirmishing between our sharpshooters and those of the enemy, the first movement of the latter toward attacking was, at about 2 p. m. , to place a battery in position near the intersection of the Fairfield and Emmitsburg roads, near a barn, and easily visible from the peach orchard in the angle of our lines. In obedience to the command of

Major-General Sickles, as well as in accordance with my own conviction of the necessity of holding that point, I was examining the ground with a view of placing a battery in the orchard, when the enemy opened a smart artillery fire upon the troops massed in the open field. I directed Captain Clark to take the position before mentioned as held by his battery, and to silence, or at least reply to, while I placed Ames' battery of light 12-pounders in the orchard to assist him. It soon became evident that the enemy was preparing for an attack at this point. He soon opened more batteries on the right of his first, and commenced a heavy fire from them upon our troops. Ames and Clark were soon so well at work that the advantage was not on the side of the enemy, and at last a well-directed fire from Smith's battery (10-pounder Parrotts) on the extreme left silenced them for a time. The respite, however, was short, as at about 3 p. m. the enemy reopened fire, and, under cover of his artillery, began to push infantry against our position. The part of our line where Smith's battery was placed was assailed in the most furious and determined manner, and, notwithstanding the gallant conduct of our troops, after a long struggle it became evident that the line would break. The hill upon which the guns stood was very rough and rocky, rendering maneuvering with horses almost an impossibility. Four of Captain Smith's guns only had been at first placed in battery. These were served effectively till they could no longer be without danger to our own troops, who had advanced to the front of the battery. The remaining two were placed in position a few yards in rear, and pointed obliquely into the woods on the left, in front of Round Top Mountain, which were occupied by the advancing lines of the enemy. These guns continued their fire till their supports were compelled to retire, when they were withdrawn by Captain Smith, leaving three of the four that were in advance still on the hill and in possession of the enemy. Captain Smith says he supposed the hill would be immediately retaken by our troops, and that, as it was a place most difficult of access, it was wiser to leave them where they could be used against the enemy immediately we regained the hill. I regret the loss, but from my knowledge of the position and of the gallantry displayed by Captain Smith, I am convinced that it was one of those very unpleasant, but yet unavoidable, results that sometimes attend the efforts of the most meritorious officers. The attack on the left of our line involved Winslow's battery. From the position of the battery and of the infantry supporting, it was deemed best for a time to fire solid shot into the woods over our troops, who were fighting in front under protection of a stone wall. This fire was very effective (as such use of solid shot always is when troops are engaged in woods, the moral effect being at least equal to the physical), and was continued till our troops in front fell back of his battery, when Captain Winslow used case shot, 1 and 1 1/2 second fuse, ending with canister. When

the enemy had gained two sides of the woods, and the position was no longer tenable, Captain Winslow, by command of General Birney, retired handsomely by piece, losing heavily during the movement. The position of Captain Winslow's battery did not seem to be very good, owing to the nearness of the woods on all sides, but the result proved that the battery was able to do good service, and Captain Winslow deserves credit, not only for the good working of his battery, but for the handsome manner in which he withdrew under trying circumstances. In the open field between the woods occupied for a time by Barnes' division, of the Fifth Corps, and the Emmitsburg road, were Bigelow's (Massachusetts), Clark's (New Jersey), and Ames' (New York) batteries. Of Bigelow's, I can only say that they took the position I assigned them promptly under a heavy fire, and fought gallantly till compelled to retire. I have tried to obtain reports from the batteries of the reserve that they reported to Major-General Sickles, but with no success, excepting in the case of Captain Ames, G, First New York. Clark's battery, B, First New Jersey, was placed in position about 2 p. m. A column of the enemy had been discovered moving on the Fairfield road, toward the left of our line. Captain Clark opened with shell and shrapnel, making excellent shots, and diverting the column of the enemy to some road in rear of and covered by the ridge running perpendicular to the Emmitsburg road, near its intersection with the Fairfield. An hour later the enemy's batteries opened from this ridge, and Clark replied, while Ames' battery was being placed in the peach orchard on his right. The combined fire of Smith's, Clark's, and Ames' batteries soon silenced those of the enemy. The artillery fire, however, was only preliminary. Shortly after 3 p. m. the attack was made by the enemy's infantry. Beginning, as I have stated, on the left, near Smith's position, it extended to the right, and brought the whole line under a destructive, fire of musketry. The attack on the peach orchard, where Ames' battery was placed, was hardly less furious than that on the left. Ames' battery maintained its position under a fire from front and right flank until it was relieved by Battery I, Fifth U. S. Artillery. Randolph's battery, E, First Rhode Island, was placed in position to counteract a cross-fire from the woods in front of the Emmitsburg road upon Ames' battery, and the troops in the peach orchard were immediately engaged with the enemy, composed of infantry and a battery of 12-pounders, in front and a little to the left of its position. The very effective fire of this battery of six light 12-pounders did great damage to our lines until it was silenced by the fire of Randolph's battery and a section of Ames' that had been turned upon it. Randolph's battery remained in this position, doing good service, but greatly exposed, as the returns attest, until the withdrawal of its support to strengthen the peach orchard and the subsequent repulse of our

troops in that position made its withdrawal a matter not only of prudence but of necessity. Lieutenant John K. Bucklyn, commanding, received a painful wound while endeavoring to take from the field a caisson, some of the horses of which had been killed. All the batteries whose operations I have thus far described were supported gallantly and effectively by the First Division (Birney's), who held this very extended line, notwithstanding the overwhelming force thrown against it, from 3 p. m. until dark, fighting with the dogged determination that has made it famous. Seeley's battery (K, Fourth U. S. Artillery), supported by the Second Division (Humphreys'), was placed near the left of our corps line about 3 p. m. , and became immediately engaged with artillery and infantry in its direct front. After driving the batteries in its immediate front from the field, and having been two hours in position, it directed its fire upon the guns of the enemy farther to the left, that were firing upon the positions held by Ames', Clark's, and Randolph's batteries. About 5. 30 p. m. Lieutenant Seeley was badly wounded, and the command devolved upon Second Lieutenant Robert James. At the same time, the enemy's infantry advanced under cover of the crest to very near the battery, and attacked it almost with impunity, and, as the supports had fallen back, the battery was withdrawn. A second position was taken and held till the next morning, when the battery was ordered to the rear. I have chosen to report the action of each battery rather than the artillery of the corps as a whole, at the risk of being thought diffuse, because I consider that in no other way can I convey a distinct idea of the operations of my command. The batteries were widely separated, and each performed special duties that no other kind of narrative could describe. At about 5 p. m. I rode along the line, and became aware that the batteries were becoming very much exhausted, and upon my representation of the fact to Major-General Sickles, he applied for batteries from the Artillery Reserve to relieve them; they arrived, however, too late for the purpose intended, but in time to be used by Major McGilvery in forming a second line. I was especially fortunate in having the advice and assistance of Brigadier-General Hunt, chief of artillery, Army of the Potomac, who examined the ground with me, and who, at the commencement and during the action, was present to contribute by his valuable advice to the efficiency of our artillery. I regret that I cannot more accurately locate the batteries. Having been absent from the army when our troops reoccupied the battle-field, I lost the opportunity of examining it after the battle, as well as of correcting the impressions received during an action and hearing many incidents that might be of interest, though not mentioned in battery reports. A wound that I received in the shoulder early in the action prevented my being as active on the field as I desired, and although I was able from time to time to ride along the line and to keep informed of the progress of the

battle in the various parts of the field where my batteries were stationed, I could not give the line the same personal attention I would had I been stronger. The conduct of my command was admirable. They were all in exposed positions, as the loss will show. The battery commanders fully sustained the reputation they had gained by distinguished conduct in former battles, and to the old added the laurels of a new and most severely contested engagement. It is proper that I acknowledge here the valuable aid rendered me by Lieutenant P. S. Jastram, acting assistant adjutant-general of my brigade, whose duties were rendered more arduous by my own inability to keep the saddle, and who displayed the same energy, bravery, and good judgment that he had already given evidence of as a battery commander. Although in this battle of July 2 each of my batteries was compelled to retire, I may be permitted to claim, in view of the grand results of the three days' fighting, that they contributed in no small degree to the success of our arms. I append statement of losses in men* and material.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
GEO. E. RANDOLPH,
Captain First R. I. Art. , and Chief of Art. Third A. C.

**Report of Captain George E. Randolph, First Rhode Island Light Artillery,
Commanding Artillery Brigade.
HDQRS. ARTILLERY BRIGADE, THIRD ARMY CORPS,
November 4, 1863**

COLONEL: In compliance with circular of November 2, 1863, I have the honor to report the movements and operations of the artillery of the corps, as follows:

On the 11th, of October, the artillery, excepting one battery attached to the Second, one to the Third, and two to the First Divisions preceding the corps, marched by way of Welford's and Freeman's Fords, to the north side of the Rappahannock, the last battery arriving at 12 a.m. and encamped for the night near Freeman's Ford. On the road from Culpeper to the Hazel River the skirmishers of the rear division (the First) discovered a small party of cavalry; and not knowing the force of the enemy, General Birney deployed a brigade placed a section of Sleeper's rifled battery and the whole of Randolph's in position to cover the road running perpendicular to that on which the corps was marching, where the enemy had been seen. The enemy retired before General Birney's skirmishers, and the division almost immediately resumed the march in accordance with orders from General French.

On the 12th, the reserve batteries were encamped in the low ground in the angle formed by the roads to Rappahannock and to Fant's Mills, one battery being still attached to each division. At night, on the receipt of the information that the enemy was crossing at Sulphur Springs, by direction of Major-General French,

I placed Clark's battery in position covering the reserve batteries, in order to guard against any raid or night attack from the direction of Fox's Ford.

On the 13th, two batteries were assigned to the Second two to the Third, and three to the First, and the corps marched to Three-Mile Station, where line of battle was formed six batteries being placed in very good positions, facing toward Warrenton and the direction of the Warrenton pike. One battery was held in reserve and two rifled batteries placed on the right of road leading to Auburn were intended to be used wherever on the field more artillery should become necessary.

At 3 p.m. the corps, First Division leading, resumed the march toward Greenwich. Near Auburn, the major-general commanding discovered the cavalry vedettes of the enemy on a high hill on the left of the road, and, sending his escort for the purpose, discovered in our immediate front a large force of the enemy's cavalry. Skirmishing having commenced on the part of the escort, General French ordered the leading section of Sleeper's battery into battery on the road, and deployed the infantry of First Division on the left of the road. The section opened fire with shell upon the woods in which the enemy were and soon after the remaining four pieces also opened fire with good effect. After the enemy had been driven, a section of Clark's and one of Sleeper's were placed by General French on the top of the hill on the left to reply should the enemy use artillery, but these guns had no occasion to fire. The march was resumed, and the corps encamped at Greenwich, the batteries attached to the Second Division reaching camp between 3 and 4 a.m. of the 14th.

At 5 o'clock of the 14th, I received your order to move at 6. The march was promptly made, trains doubling at every opportunity and every exertion made to shorten the column and hasten the march. The corps massed at Broad Run and then moved on through Manassas, across Mitchell's Ford, to Centreville. One battery remained at Manassas with two brigades of Third Division, retained by General Meade until night, and then rejoined the corps at Centreville.

On the morning of the 15th, three batteries marched with the First Division to Fairfax Station; the other four marched to Union Mills. A section of 12-pounders was sent to McLean's Ford with General Mott. This section was found to be of too short range, and when General Mott was attacked by the enemy's

cavalry, I was sent by General French with a section of Robinson's rifled guns, with discretion to use a whole battery if I thought best. I moved the section which had preceded from the position assigned it by General Mott, near the ford, to the commanding hill upon which was a redoubt built by the enemy. This position commands the ford and the hills in front of Blackburn's Ford, as well as the road from Centreville to Manassas, via Blackburn's and McLean's Fords. The section engaged the enemy at once, firing upon his cavalry, and receiving the fire from his artillery. I ordered the remainder of the battery up, but before it arrived the enemy had nearly all retired. Captain Robinson did very good service. The section of 12-pounders was placed in reserve behind the hill, and at night returned to Union Mills.

On the 19th, the batteries one attached to each division and five in reserve, marched to Bristoe Station.

On the 20th, marched in the order, prescribed by circular of July 22, to Greenwich, the reserve batteries encamping at the village, and those attached to divisions, about 2 miles down the road toward Auburn.

On the 21st, marched the reserve batteries by direct road to Catlett's Station, the other batteries going with the troops by way of Auburn, and encamped near the station, having one battery covering bridge over Cedar Run and one covering ford at Weaverville.

On the 25th, moved the reserve batteries to farm of Mr. Stone and near the road from Catlett's to Greenwich in compliance with the order of General French. The position of the batteries attached to divisions was not materially changed.

On the 26th, sent Edgell's rifled battery to General Birney at Foulk's house, Randolph's being near the left of the line covering the ford over Cedar Run at Hazen's house.

On the 30th, the batteries marched in the usual order to Licking Run, those with divisions camping on the south, and the reserve on the north side in positions assigned them by the major-general commanding.

Of the many verbal orders that I have received from the major-general commanding, I can only say that on our march from Culpeper they constantly impressed me with the importance of making a compact and rapid march, correcting errors or irregularities calculated to impede or disarrange the march of the troops, and enjoining care, vigilance, and promptness.

I desire to commend Captain Sleeper and his battery for their good conduct and promptitude in their first engagement. In this skirmish they gave promise of what they can be depended on to perform in affairs of more importance.

The behavior of Captain Robinson and his men at McLean's Ford was all very praiseworthy.

I forward herewith report of Captain Clark of operations under General Prince just previous to our march from Culpeper.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. E. RANDOLPH,
Captain First R.I. Art., Chief of Art., Third Army Corps.

HEADQUARTERS ARTILLERY RESERVE,
November 15, 1863.

I have seen and used the telegraph line run by the Signal Corps of this army, and am satisfied with the rapidity with which they are established and the skill displayed in operating them. I regard them as a valuable acquisition to the service, and I believe them important to the proper equipment of the Signal Corps.

R. O. TYLER,
Brigadier-General.

HDQRS. FOURTH VOL. BRIG. , ARTILLERY RESERVE,
---, -- -, 1863.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the batteries under my command at the battle of Gettysburg, July 1 to 5: Arriving on the field from Taneytown about 8 a. m. July 2, I was ordered by Brigadier General R. O. Tyler, commanding Artillery Reserve, to take two batteries (K, First New York Artillery, and A, First New Jersey Artillery, First Lieutenant A. N. Parsons commanding) and go into position on the Baltimore turnpike, near General Slocum's line. From this time until July 5, the other batteries of the Fourth Brigade were detached from my command, G, First New York Artillery, and the Sixth Maine Battery, First

Lieutenant E. B. Dow commanding, being under command of Lieutenant Colonel F. McGilvery, and Battery A, First Maryland Artillery, Captain J. H. Rigby, being sent to the Twelfth Corps. The two batteries left with me - A, First New Jersey Artillery, First Lieutenant A. N. Parsons commanding, and K, First New York Artillery - remained unengaged until 1 p. m. of Friday, July 3, when, by order of General Hunt, I put them in position near the stone fence in front of General Webb's division of the Second Corps, Battery A, First New Jersey Artillery, on the left of K, First New York Artillery. At this time the enemy were making a strong effort to break the Second Corps line, their infantry having charged up to the stone fence near a small wooded ; knoll about 75 yards on my right, while their artillery fire swept the ground occupied by the two batteries. Just then there were no other batteries at that point, and there seemed to be a good deal of confusion. The rebel artillery fire, from near a house and barn about 1, 000 yards on my left and front, was especially severe, but soon materially slackened, and became very wild under a fire of percussion and time shell from Battery K. In the meantime, Lieutenant Parsons poured about 40 rounds of shrapnel into the flank of the rebel infantry charging the Second corps, and in about half or three-quarters of an hour the enemy abandoned the attack on that point altogether. After a pause of about an hour, the rebel infantry began forming on the right of the house and barn before spoken of, while from the same quarter their artillery opened upon us a brisk but poorly directed and inefficient fire, to which, by direction of General Hunt, I made no reply, but awaited the attack of their infantry, who soon yards on my left, as they did so giving the two batteries an opportunity to pour in an enfilading fire, which they did with great effect, for the enemy did not reach the point, but broke and gave way in all direction when about the middle of the field. After this, we remained in position on the same ground until about 10 a. m. July 5, when I was ordered to rejoin the Artillery Reserve. Of the conduct of officers and men, both of Battery A, First New Jersey Artillery, Lieutenant A. N. Parsons commanding, and of K, First New York Artillery, with the Eleventh New York Battery attached, I cannot speak too highly. Coming into position at a critical point of the rebel charge on our center, and under a galling fire, the guns were worked with great deliberation and a most decided effect. Casualties in Battery K, First New York Artillery, and Eleventh New York Independent Battery attached: Wounded, 7. Losses in material, &c. : Horses, 5. Ammunition expended: Percussion shell, 57; shrapnel, 15, and time shell, 17. Total, 89. Casualties in Battery A, First New Jersey Artillery: Killed, 2; wounded, 7. Losses in material, &c. : Horses, 5. Ammunition expended: Shrapnel, 120; shell, 80. Total, 200.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. H. FITZHUGH,
Comdg. Fourth Volunteer Brigade, Artillery Reserve.

**REPORT OF Captain JAMES M. ROBERTSON, SECOND U. S.
ARTILLERY, COMMANDING FIRST BRIGADE, HORSE ARTILLERY.**

**HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, HORSE ARTILLERY,
AUGUST 22, 1863.**

SIR: I HAVE THE HONOR TO SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING REPORT OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE FIRST BRIGADE, HORSE ARTILLERY, SINCE JUNE 28: ON JUNE 28, I REPORTED WITH MY BRIGADE-CONSISTING OF LIEUTENANT PENNINGTON'S BATTERY (M, SECOND U. S. ARTILLERY), ELDER'S BATTERY (E, FOURTH U. S. ARTILLERY), HEATON'S BATTERY (B AND L, SECOND U. S. ARTILLERY), AND CAPTAIN MARTIN'S (SIXTH INDEPENDENT NEW YORK) BATTERY OF HORSE ARTILLERY-TO GENERAL PLEASONTON, COMMANDING CAVALRY CORPS. IN OBEDIENCE TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM GENERAL PLEASONTON, TWO BATTERIES (PENNINGTON'S AND ELDER'S) WERE DETAILED, AND LEFT CAMP AT DAYLIGHT ON THE 29TH, TO REPORT FOR DUTY WITH THE THIRD DIVISION, CAVALRY CORPS. THESE TWO BATTERIES HAVE BEEN ON DUTY WITH THIS DIVISION SINCE THAT TIME, AND MAKE THEIR REPORTS THROUGH ITS COMMANDING OFFICER. AT 8 A. M. I WAS READY TO MOVE WITH THE REMAINING TWO BATTERIES (HEATON'S AND MARTIN'S), BUT OWING TO THE ROAD BEING BLOCKED WITH TROOPS AND WAGON, I WAS UNABLE TO MOVE UNTIL 4 P. M. AFTER MARCHING ABOUT 2 MILES, WAS JOINED BY CAPTAIN DANIELS, COMMANDING NINTH MICHIGAN BATTERY, WHO REPORTED TO ME, AND WAS ASSIGNED TO MY BRIGADE BY ORDER OF THE GENERAL

COMMANDING CAVALRY CORPS. CONTINUING THE MARCH, I ARRIVED AT MIDDLEBURG, MD. , AT 2 A. M. THE 30TH, WHEN I FED, AND RESTED MY COMMAND UNTIL 9 A. M. , AND THEN MARCHED TO TANEYTOWN, ARRIVING AT 4. 30 P. M. , AND REMAINED ENCAMPED AT THE LATTER PLACE UNTIL 11. 30 P. M. JULY 1, WHEN I MARCHED, AND ARRIVED NEAR THE BATTLE-GROUND OF GETTYSBURG AT 5. 30 A. M. ON THE 2D, AND REPORTED TO THE GENERAL COMMANDING THE CAVALRY CORPS, AND BY HIS DIRECTION HELD MY BATTERIES IN RESERVE NEAR THE BATTLE-GROUND UNTIL NEARLY DARK, WHEN, BY HIS DIRECTION, I MOVED BACK ABOUT 2 MILES ON THE BALTIMORE PIKE, AND ENCAMPED FOR THE NIGHT. ON THE MORNING OF THE 3D, I AGAIN MOVED TO THE FRONT, AND OCCUPIED THE SAME GROUND AS THE DAY PREVIOUS, AND, BY DIRECTION OF GENERAL PLEASANTON, I REPORTED TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL TYLER, TO ASSIST HIM WITH THE RESERVE ARTILLERY. WHILE OUT WITH GENERAL TYLER EXAMINING OUR LINES, WITH A VIEW OF SELECTING POINTS FOR ARTILLERY, THE ENEMY OPENED FIRE WITH ALL HIS BATTERIES, AND WE RETURNED TO OUR COMMANDS. FINDING THAT THE RESERVE OCCUPIED A VERY EXPOSED POSITION, IT WAS ORDERED TO FALL BACK TO WHERE IT COULD GET COVER FROM THE FIRE OF THE ENEMY. WHILE EXECUTING THIS MOVE, GENERAL TYLER'S HORSE WAS SHOT AND KILLED UNDER HIM. FROM THE EXTREME HEAT AND OVER-EXERTION, GENERAL TYLER RECEIVED A SUNSTROKE, WHICH PROSTRATED HIM FOR THE TIME, AND HE TURNED OVER THE COMMAND OF THE ENTIRE RESERVE TO ME. SOON AFTER THIS (ABOUT 12M.), THERE BEING AN URGENT DEMAND FOR RIFLED ARTILLERY, AND HAVING NO OTHER AT MY DISPOSAL, I SENT FORWARD THE BATTERY OF HORSE

ARTILLERY (NINTH MICHIGAN) COMMANDED BY Captain J. J. DANIELS, WHO REPORTED TO GENERAL NEWTON, AND WAS PLACED IN POSITION BY HIM, WHERE HE REMAINED, DOING GOOD EXECUTION, UNTIL THE CLOSE OF THE BATTLE. CAPTAIN DANIELS' LOSS IN THIS ENGAGEMENT WAS 1 MAN KILLED, 4 WOUNDED, AND 23 HORSES KILLED. CAPTAIN DANIELS BIVOUACKED FOR THE NIGHT ON THE FIELD WHERE HE HAD FOUGHT. CAPTAIN DANIELS IN HIS REPORT OF THIS ENGAGEMENT (A COPY OF WHICH REPORT I HEREWITH INCLOSE) DOES NOT PARTICULARIZE ANY OFFICERS OR SOLDIERS OF HIS BATTERY, BUT SPEAKS OF ALL IN TERMS OF THE HIGHEST PRAISE FOR THEIR COOLNESS AND STEADINESS UNDER FIRE. CAPTAIN DANIELS AND THE OFFICERS AND MEN UNDER HIS COMMAND DESERVE ALL THE MORE CREDIT, AS THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME HIS BATTERY HAD EVER BEEN ENGAGED GENERAL TYLER HAVING RECOVERED SO AS TO RESUME HIS DUTIES, ABOUT DARK I MOVED BACK ON THE BALTIMORE PIKE WITH MY TWO REMAINING BATTERIES TO THE CAMP OCCUPIED BY ME THE NIGHT PREVIOUS, AND WAS JOINED BY CAPTAIN DANIELS ON THE 4TH. I REMAINED HERE UNTIL 10 O'CLOCK ON THE 5TH, WHEN I MARCHED, AND ARRIVED AT CREAGERSTOWN AT 10 O'CLOCK THE SAME EVENING. MARCHED FROM CREAGERSTOWN AT 9 A. M. THE 7TH, AND ARRIVED AT MIDDLETOWN, VIA FREDERICK CITY, AT 10 P. M. ON THE 9TH, I MOVED FORWARD TO BOONSBOROUGH, WHERE TWO MORE OF MY BATTERY WERE DETACHED-CAPTAIN MARTIN'S (SIXTH INDEPENDENT NEW YORK) BATTERY TO GENERAL GREGG, SECOND DIVISION, CAVALRY CORPS, AND LIEUTENANT HEATON'S BATTERY (B AND L, SECOND U. S. ARTILLERY) TO GENERAL BUFORD, FIRST

DIVISION, CAVALRY
CORPS. THESE TWO BATTERIES HAVE BEEN ON DUTY WITH THESE
DIVISION SINCE THAT
TIME, AND MAKE THEIR REPORTS TO THESE HEADQUARTERS. HAVING
BUT ONE BATTERY
REMAINING WITH ME, BY DIRECTION OF GENERAL PLEASANTON I
REPORTED TO GENERAL
TYLER TO ASSIST HIM WITH THE ARTILLERY RESERVE SHOULD IT BE
CALLED INTO ACTION,
AND REMAINED WITH IT UNTIL OUR ARRIVAL AT BERLIN ON JULY 15,
WITHOUT ANYTHING
HAPPENING WORTHY OF NOTE. ON THE 16TH, LIEUTENANT WILLISTON,
COMMANDING
BATTERY D, SECOND U. S. ARTILLERY, AND LIEUTENANT KING,
COMMANDING BATTERY
A, FOURTH U. S. ARTILLERY, EACH WITH FOUR LIGHT 12-POUNDER
GUNS, WERE
ASSIGNED TO MY BRIGADE, AND ORDERED TO BE EQUIPPED AS HORSE
ARTILLERY. HORSES
WERE PROCURED AT BERLIN ON JULY 19, BUT EQUIPMENTS COULD NOT
BE OBTAINED AT
THAT PLACE. WITH THE THREE BATTERIES, WILLISTON'S KING'S AND
DANIELS', I
MARCHED FROM BERLIN AT 6 P. M. JULY 19, AND ARRIVED AND
ENCAMPED NEAR
WARRENTON, VA. , ON THE 25TH, WITHOUT ANYTHING TRANSPILING
WORTHY OF NOTE.
ON THE 30TH, THE LAST OF THE EQUIPMENTS WERE RECEIVED FOR THE
TWO LIGHT
12-POUNDER BATTERIES, AND ON THE 31ST THEY WERE COMPLETED
AND READY FOR ACTIVE
FIELD SERVICE. GREAT CREDIT IS DUE TO FIRST Lieutenant J. H. BELL, OF
THE
SIXTH NEW YORK CAVALRY (THE ONLY OFFICER ON MY STAFF), FOR
THE EFFICIENT
MANNER IN WHICH HE HAS PERFORMED THE DUTIES OF ACTING
ASSISTANT
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, ASSISTANT COMMISSARY OF SUBSISTENCE, AND
ACTING ASSISTANT
QUARTERMASTER, NOT ONLY IN PROCURING HORSES AND SUPPLIES OF
AL KINDS FOR THE

BATTERIES WHICH WERE HELD IN RESERVE, BUT ALSO FOR PROCURING AND FORWARDING HORSES AND OTHER SUPPLIES TO THOSE ON DUTY WITH THE DIFFERENT CAVALRY DIVISIONS.

VERY RESPECTFULLY, YOUR OBEDIENT SERVANT,
J. M. ROBERTSON,
CAPTAIN SECOND U. S. ARTILLERY, COMMANDING BRIGADE.

CIRCULAR.] HDQRS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 8, 1863.

Attention is called to existing orders from these headquarters forbidding batteries to be withdrawn from the field because of a want of ammunition. This was done in several instances in the recent battle, and in one instance a large quantity of ammunition was found upon the ground so abandoned. As rapidly as ammunition is expended, caissons will be emptied by transfer to other chests; and as soon as two caissons at most are emptied, they will be sent to the trains for supplies. Wagon-loads can no longer be sent to batteries. The privilege of thus sparing the labor of battery horses has been abused to the injury of the service.

The practice of taking a number of rounds of shot, shell, and shrapnel from the chests, and bringing them near the gun when in action, is positively prohibited. Proper pointing gives ample time under all circumstances for procuring ammunition, one round at a time, from the limber chests; the only exception is in the case of canister at close range. Large quantities of ammunition have been left upon the ground as a result of the bad practice referred to. Commanders of batteries will be held responsible for compliance with the foregoing instructions. In all clear cases of violation or neglect of these orders, the battery commanders will be recommended for dismissal.

Immediately after each action, commandants of artillery will send direct to the chief of artillery of the army a brief statement of losses, and requirements to put their batteries in order. The report will be in the form of a field return, and will note the losses of officers and men, horses, and the number of guns, limbers, caissons, &c. , shot or damaged sufficiently to require being replaced. It is impossible to make the necessary arrangements to refit the artillery after an action without prompt information on these subjects. The returns will be brief, and in addition to all returns and

reports required by corps commanders.

A copy of the foregoing will be furnished to every battery commander in this army by corps commanders and Artillery Reserve.

By command of Major-General Meade:

S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 12, 1863-5 p.m.

Commanding Officer Artillery Reserve:

The commanding general directs me to say that, as all the army has now crossed the Antietam, and is posted along the Sharpsburg and Hagerstown pike, a more suitable position for the Reserve Artillery will be found in the vicinity of Jones' Four Corners, the intersection of the Sharpsburg and Hagerstown pike with the Boonsborough and Williamsport road. He directs, therefore, that you examine that vicinity, and, after reaching a suitable point, move your artillery to it after night.

Very respectfully, &c. ,

A. A. HUMPHREYS,
Major-General, and Chief of Staff.

Reports of Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt,
U.S. Army, Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac
ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
September 27, 1863.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS
Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac.

GENERAL:

I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the artillery in this army
in the battle of Gettysburg, July 1, 2, and 3;

On July 1, Reynolds (First) and Howards (Eleventh) Corps and Bufords Division of Calvary,

the whole under the command of Major General John F. Reynolds, engaged the enemy on the west and northwest of the town of Gettysburg. On the west of Gettysburg, about a third of a mile distant, there is a ridge running nearly north and south, parallel to the Emmitsburg Pike. This ridge, on which the Seminary is situated, is crossed by the Cashtown Pike about 100 to 150 yards north of the Seminary, and some 50 yards farther on it is cut by a railroad. On the west of the Seminary is a grove of large trees, and the summit of the ridge and the upper part of both its slopes are more or less covered with open woods through its entire length. The ground slopes gradually to the west, and again rising, and again forms a second ridge, parallel to and about 500 yards distant from the Seminary Ridge. This second ridge is wider and smoother than that upon which the seminary stands, and terminates about 200 yards north of the point at which the Cashtown road crosses it. Near this point, and to the south of it, are a house and barn with some five or six acres of orchard and wooded grounds, the rest of the ridge being cleared. It was in the skirmish near this house that General Reynolds fell, and over the country covered by the ridge that the First Corps fought. To the north and east, beyond where the Seminary Ridge terminates, the country is more flat, and this ground was occupied by the Eleventh Corps, the front of which was in a nearly perpendicular position to that of the First Corps, and faced the north.

About 10:15am Hall's Battery (Second Maine, six 3-inch) was ordered into action by General Reynolds on the right of the Cashtown Road, on the second ridge, and some 500 yards beyond the seminary. The enemy had previously opened fire from a battery of six guns at a distance of about 1,300 yards, and directly in front of his position, on Reynolds troops, and Hall, on coming into action, replied with effect. In the course of half an hour, a body of the enemy's infantry approached the right of Hall's Battery under cover of a ravine, and opened upon him at a distance of 60 to 80 yards, killing and wounding a number of his men and horses. The right and center sections replied with canister, while the left section continued its fire on the enemy's battery. The supports now falling back, Captain Hall found it necessary to retire, which he did by sections.

Soon after, the Third Division (Rowley's), First Corps, occupied the open ground on this ridge with Copper's Battery (B First Pennsylvania, four 3-inch), which took post

in an oat field, about 380 yards south of the Cashotown road.

The Second Division (Robertson's) occupied a road on the west slope of the Seminary Ridge, north of the railroad, and the Eleventh Corps came into position on the flat ground farther north, and in a position nearly perpendicular to that of the First Corps.

Colonel Wainwright, commanding the artillery of the First Corps, sent Stewart's Battery

(B, Fourth United States, six 12 pounders) to report to General Robertson, and ordered Reynolds to move with his battery to support of Calef's Horse Battery (A, Second United States, six 3-inch), which had been placed in position by General Wadsworth on the spot just occupied by Hall's (Second Main, six 3-inch), and was sharply engaged

with the enemies battery in its front. Reynolds had hardly taken position when the enemy

opened a severe fire from a second battery immediately on his right. The cross fire of the

enemies two batteries caused both Calef's and Reynolds' to retire, Reynolds taking up a new position at right angles to the ridge, with his left covered by the woods, near the house and barn reffered to. At the request of General Wadsworth, Colonel

Wainwright

posted Wilber's section of Reynolds Battery in the orchard on the south side of the Cashtown

road, where he was sheltered from the fire of the enemy's battery on his right flank by the intervening house and barn, and moved the other two sections to the south side of the wood, on the open crest.

In the meantime the Eleventh Corps had taken position. and Dilger's Battery (I, First Ohio, six 12 ounders), attached to Schurz's Division, soon became engaged with one of the enemy's batteries at 1,000 yards distance, which was soon re-enforced by another. Dilger maintained his position untill re-enforced by Wheeler (Thirteenth New York Independant, four 3-inch), sent to his assistance by Major Osborn, commanding the artillery of the Corps, when a sharp contest ensued, the result of which was one piece of Wheeler's dismounted and five of the enemy's, which Major Osborn states they left

on the ground. The enemy sufferd the most loss. Durring this action, Captain Dilger several times changed the positions of his batteries with excellent effect, selecting his ground

with judgement.

About 11am Wilkeson's Battery (G, Fourth United States, four 12 pounders) came up, and reported to General Barlow, who posted it close to the enemy's line of infantry, with

which it immediately became engaged, sustaining at the same time the fire of two of his batteries. In the commencement of this unequal contest, Lieut. Bayard Wilkeson (Fourth United States), commanding the Battery, a young officer of great gallantry, fell, mortally wounded, and was carried from the field. Lieutenant Bancroft succeeded to the command, and by changing position and distributing his sections, in order to meet the different movements of the enemy, succeeded in maintaining himself handsomely until the division fell back to the town, when he withdrew to Cemetery Hill.

About 4 pm. the troops were withdrawn to Cemetery Hill, and Schurz's Division, with Heckman's (K, First Ohio, four 12 pounders) and Wiedrich's (I, First New York, six 3-inch) Batteries, were posted as to cover the movement of the Corps, Weidrich's being placed on the hill in front of the cemetery entrance. Heckman worked his guns well, and held his ground until the enemy entered his battery. He then retired with the loss of one gun, the battery being so much crippled that it was sent to the rear, and was not again called into action. Weidrich's Battery was actively engaged, and about 4:30pm the enemy made an attempt to turn our right, but his line was very soon broken by the fire of this battery, and the attempt failed.

The First Corps was withdrawn about the same time as the Eleventh. Colonel Wainwright, commanding the Artillery of this Corps, understanding the order to hold Cemetery Hill to apply to Seminary Hill, posted Cooper's Battery (B, First Pennsylvania) in front of the professor's house. Captain Stevens (Fifth Maine) was soon after posted by General Doubleday on Cooper's right. Soon after, the enemy emerged in two strong columns from the woods in front, about 500 yards distant, outflanked our line nearly a third of a mile, then formed in two lines of battle, and advanced directly up the crest. During this movement, Reynolds Battery (L, First New York) opened on the columns, but the fire of his sections was much interfered with by the movements of our own infantry in their front. Colonel Wainwright therefore moved these two sections, under Lieutenant Breck, to a strong stone wall on the Seminary crest, near Stevens position. The movement was not ordered until the enemy, outnumbering our troops 5 to 1, were within 200 yards of the battery. Lieutenant Wilber's section of the same battery soon after fell back with his supports (L, First New York; Fifth Maine; Cooper's B, First Pennsylvania) to the same position, thus concentrating sixteen guns. Stewart's Battery

(B, Fourth United States) was also on the same line, half of the Battery between the Cashtown Pike and the railroad, the other half across the railroad in the corner of a wood.

The enemy's lines continued to advance across the space between the two crests, but when the first line was within about 100 yards of the seminary, Lieutenant Davison

(Fourth United States) commanding the left half of Stewart's Battery, placed his guns on the Cashtown Pike, so as to enflade the whole line. This movement, well sustained by the other batteries, brought the first line to a halt, but the second, supported by a column deployed from the Cashtown road, pushed on. An order was now received by Captain Stevens from General Wadsworth, directing his Battery to withdraw, but Colonel Wainwright, not knowing this, and still under the mistaken impression to hold Seminary Hill, directed all the Batteries to maintain their positions.

In a few minutes however, all our infantry were seen rapidly retreating toward the town,

and the Batteries were all limbered to the rear, and moved off down the Cashtown Pike,

maintaining a walk until the infantry had left it. By this time our retreating columns were

lapped by the enemy's skirmishers, who opened a severe fire from behind a fence within 50 yards of the road. As soon as the road was clear, the batteries moved at a trot,

but it was too late to save all the material. Lieutenant Wilber's last piece(L, First New York)

had one of its wheel horses shot, and by the time this could be disengaged, 3 others were shot and Lieutenant Wibur's own horse killed. It was impossible to move the piece

off, and it was lost. No blame apparently can be attached to the officers of this or of Heckman's Battery (K, First Ohio) for the loss of the two guns in the retiring of the two

Corps. It was the necessary result of the obstinate resistance made to the enemy, so as to cover the withdrawal of their respective Corps. Three of the caisson bodies of Stewart's battery were broken down, 1 of his caissons exploded, 2 of his guns had been disabled by the breaking of their pointing rings, and 3 of Hall's guns dismantled.

The loss of the Batteries of the First Corps in these operations were heavy; 83 officers and men killed and wounded, including 6 officers wounded, and about 80 horses, a large

proportion of the latter between the Seminary Ridge and the town, the enemy having at

that time a fire upon them from both flanks and the rear, and no infantry replying. The Battery's passed immediately through the town, and were placed with those of the Eleventh

Corps in position of Cemetery Hill, so as to command the town and the approaches from

the north west. The Battery's north of the Baltimore Pike in front of the Cemetery Gate,

under the command of Colonel Wainwright, chief of artillery, First Corps. were posted

as follows:

Stewart's Battery (B, Fourth United States) across the road so as to command the approaches from the town.

Weidrich's (I, First New York), Cooper's (B First Pennsylvania) and Reynolds (L, First

New York), in all thirteen 3-inch guns along the north front, some of them in such a position that they could be turned to bear upon the town and the field of battle of the 1st.

Steven's Battery (Fifth Maine) was posted to the right at some 50 yards in front of this line, on a knoll from whence they could obtain an oblique fire upon the hills in front of

our line, and a flanking fire at close quarters upon any attacking columns.

Each of the guns in these batteries had a small earthwork thrown up in its front, to afford

a partial shelter from the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters. Osborn's Batteries (Bancroft's

G, Fourth U.S; Dilger's, I, First Ohio; Wheeler's, Thirteenth New York) of the Eleventh Corps with the exception of Weidrich's, transferred to Colonel Wainwright, Heckman's, crippled and sent to the rear, and one gun of Wheeler's dismounted, were placed in the cemetery grounds, to the north of the Baltimore Road.

On the night of July 1, the commanding general left Taneytown, and reached Gettysburg

about 2am of the 2d. Soon after his arrival, he directed me to see to the position of the artillery, and make such arrangements respecting it as were necessary. I examined the positions at Cemetery Hill, so far as the darkness would permit, and then accompanied the general and major General Howard in an inspection of the west front of the field, occupied by the Second and Third Corps. Cemetery Hill commanded

the positions which could be occupied by the enemy to the north and north west. Toward the south the line occupied the crest of a gentle elevation, which, concealing everything immediately behind it from the observation of the enemy, commanded the ground to the west, which sloped down gradually for a few hundred yards, and then rising, formed another crest, varying from half to three quarters of a mile distant. The summit of this crest was wooded, and toward the south bent eastwardly and crossed the Emmitsburg Road, forming a very favorable position for the enemy's artillery, and affording concealment to his movements in that direction. About half or three quarters of a mile south of the cemetery our own crest and the ground in front of it were broken by groves of trees, and still farther on by rough and rocky ground. At a distance of about 2 miles from Cemetery Hill, a high, rocky, and broken peak formed a natural termination of our lines. The broken character of the ground in front of the southern half of our line was unfavorable to the use of artillery. From the cemetery, as a center, the right of our line extended toward the east, and lay on the north of the Baltimore Pike. The ground is hilly, heavily wooded, and intersected with ravines and small water course, very unfavorable to the use of artillery. The First and Eleventh Corps were stationed on and near Cemetery Hill. The Second Corps stretched along the crest on the left of the Cemetery Hill, with the Third Corps on its left. To the right of the cemetery lay a portion of the First Corps, and beyond it the Twelfth.

At or near daylight, Major-General Slocum reported to the commanding general that there was a gap between the left of his line and the right of the First Corps, which he feared would be taken advantage of by the enemy, as he apprehended an immediate attack. The general commanding then gave me directions to make the necessary arrangements to meet the emergency. I considered this, in connection with the order previously given me, as a recognition, for the present, at least, of the position I had held at Antietam and Fredericksburg, as commander of the artillery of the army, and proceeded to make the necessary dispositions and to give all directions I considered necessary during the rest of the battle. In order to cover the gap between the First and Second Corps, the batteries of

the Twelfth Corps (Muhlenberg's, F, Fourth United States, six 12-pounders; Kinzie's, K, Fifth United States, four 12-pounders; Winegar's, M, First New York, four 10-pounders, and Knap's, E, Pennsylvania, six 10-pounders) were placed so as to command the outlet from that interval toward the Baltimore pike, and such of the batteries on Cemetery Hill as commanded the ground and its approaches from the side of the enemy were also placed in position. The interval between the lines was too broken and too heavily wooded to permit the artillery to be placed on the immediate line of battle. These positions were held by the batteries until the infantry line was completed and well strengthened, when the artillery was arranged for any attack the enemy could make.

The batteries at the cemetery, under command of Colonel Wainwright, remained as already described, and Major Osborn, chief of artillery of the Eleventh Corps, was directed to take command on the south of the road. I re-enforced him with half of Hall's battery (Second Maine, three 3-inch) from the First Corps, the other half being disabled, and five batteries (Eakin's, H, First United States, six 12-pounders; Taft's, Fifth New York, six 20-pounders; Hill's, C, First West Virginia, four 10-pounders; Huntington's, H, First Ohio, six 3-inch, and Edgell's, First New Hampshire, six 3-inch) from the Artillery Reserve, thus placing at his disposal, including the three batteries (Bancroft's, G, Fourth United States, six 12-pounders; Dilger's, I, First Ohio, six 12-pounders, and Wheeler's, Thirteenth New York, three 3-inch) of his own corps remaining to him, six 20-pounder Parrotts, twenty-two light rifles, and eighteen light 12-pounders. These were stationed as follows: On the right, resting next the Baltimore road and facing the Emmitsburg, Dilger; on his left, Bancroft; then, in the order named, Eakin, Wheeler, Hill, and Hall. These eighteen light 12-pounders and ten light rifles commanded the enemy's positions to the right of the town. In rear of Bancroft and perpendicular to him were Taft's six 20-pounder Parrotts; on Taft's right and rear were

Huntington's 3-inch guns; these batteries facing the north. This arrangement, in connection with that of Wainwright, Brought all the positions within range of the cemetery that the enemy could occupy with artillery under a commanding fire. The batteries were all brought into requisition at different periods of the battle.

July 2, during the morning, several moving columns of the enemy, passing toward our right, were shelled, and compelled to make detours, or seek the cover of ravines to make their movements. At about 3.30 p.m. the enemy established a battery of ten guns (four 20-pounders and six 10-pounder Parrotts) in a wheat-field to the north and a little to the east of the Cemetery Hill, and distant some 1,200 or 1,300 yards, and opened a remarkably accurate fire upon our batteries. We soon gained a decided advantage over them, and at the end of an hour or more compelled them to withdraw, drawing off two of their pieces by hand. Twenty-eight horses were afterward found on the knoll. The enemy suffered severely, and, although we were successful, we had cause to regret that our 4½-inch guns had been left at Westminster, as the position offered great advantages for them. The enemy endeavored to re-establish his Battery farther to his right, but as we could in this position bring a larger number of guns to Bear than before, he was soon driven off. Cooper's battery (B, First Pennsylvania, four 3-inch), which had suffered severely in this affair, was now relieved by Ricketts', from the Artillery Reserve. In this cannonade, Lieut. C. P. Eakin, First U.S. Artillery, was badly wounded and carried off the field, and Lieut. P. D. Mason, First U.S. Artillery, assumed command of the battery.

About the same hour, 3.30 p.m., as the enemy was seriously annoying the left of the Twelfth Corps, three guns of Knap's battery, under command of Lieutenant Geary, and Van Reed's section of K, Fifth U.S. Artillery, were placed in an eligible position, about 200 yards from the right of the First Corps. As soon as their presence (Knap's

Pennsylvania Battery, 10-pounders, and Kinzie's, K, Fifth U.S. Artillery, light 12-pounders) was noticed, the enemy turned his battery (eight guns) upon them, but after a spirited contest of thirty minutes, in which he had a caisson blown up, his guns were silenced. The conduct of both Lieutenants Geary and Van Reed is highly spoken of by their chiefs of artillery.

When the infantry of the Twelfth Corps crossed over to the support of the Third Corps, on the left of our line, these guns were withdrawn and rejoined their batteries. About sunset the enemy again opened from a knoll in front of the cemetery, distant about 1,800 yards, and this was soon followed by a powerful infantry attack on the position by General Rodes' Louisiana [?] brigade. As their columns moved out of the town, they came under the fire of Stevens' battery (Fifth Maine), at 800 yards distance. Wheeling into line, they pushed up the hill. As their line became unmasked, all the guns that could be brought to bear upon them, some twenty, were opened, first with shrapnel and then with canister, with excellent effect. The center and left were beaten back, but their right worked their way up under cover of the houses, and pushed completely through Wiedrich's battery (I, First New York, six 3-inch) into Ricketts' (F and G, First Pennsylvania, six 3-inch). The cannoneers of both batteries stood well to their guns, and when no longer able to hold them, fought with handspikes, rammers, and even stones, joining the infantry in driving them out, and capturing several prisoners. This attack of Rodes was mainly repelled by the artillery alone. The loss of the enemy was reported to be large by their wounded in the affair, who afterward fell under the care of our surgeons in Gettysburg.

About 12 m. a detachment of Berdan's Sharpshooters was sent into the woods near the point where the enemy's crest opposite the left of our army cuts the Emmitsburg road, and reported the enemy as moving in force toward our left flank.

About 2 p.m. General Sickles formed his corps in line to meet an attack from this direction, his right resting on the Emmitsburg road, in a peach orchard, in advance of the center of our left, and his line extending in a general direction toward Sugar Loaf or Round Top, a peak which terminated our line on the left. At this time I reached the ground, and found Captain Randolph, chief of artillery Third Corps, making arrangements

to station his battery on the right, those on the left having already been posted as follows:

Smith's battery (Fourth New York, six 10-pounders) on the extreme left and on a steep and rocky eminence in advance of Sugar Loaf, and on his right Winslow's (D, First New

York, six 12-pounders), in a wheat-field, separated from Smith by a belt of woods. I accompanied Captain Randolph, first sending to General Tyler, commanding the Artillery

Reserve, for two batteries, one of light 12-pounders and one of rifles, and assisted him in

posting the other batteries as follows: Clark's battery (B, First New Jersey, six 10-pounders)

on the line to the left of the peach orchard; Ames' (G, First New York, six 12-pounders),

from the Artillery Reserve, in the orchard, both facing the south, and perpendicular to the

Emmitsburg road: then along the Emmitsburg road and facing the west, Randolph's (E, First

Rhode Island, six 12-pounders), and Seeley's (K, Fourth United States, six 12-pounders)

batteries, Seeley's well to the right of Randolph's. While Ames and Clark were moving up,

the enemy opened a brisk fire upon them from a position near the Emmitsburg road and on

the opposite side of it.

By this time, about 3.30 p.m., Major McGilvery came up from the Artillery Reserve with

three batteries--Bigelow's (Ninth Massachusetts, four 12-pounders); Phillips' (Fifth Massachusetts, six 3-inch), and Hart's (Fifteenth New York, four 12-pounders)--which I ordered into position on the left of Clark's. As I saw that more batteries of the enemy were getting into position on the south of the Emmitsburg road and forming opposite to

this line, I sent to the reserve for more rifled guns, and then, as Smith (Fourth New York,

six 10-pounders) had not opened, I went to his battery to ascertain the cause. When I arrived, he had succeeded in getting his guns into position, and just opened fire. As his position commanded that of the enemy and enfiladed their line, his fire was very effective,

and with that of Ames (G, First New York, six 12-pounders) and Clark (B, First New Jersey, six 10-pounders) in front, soon silenced that battery. In the meantime the

enemy

had established his new batteries to the north of the road, and Smith turned his guns upon them. I now moved along the line and examined the condition of the different batteries.

Winslow (D, First New York, six 12-pounders) had not yet been attacked, his position facing a wood at short range that the enemy had not yet occupied. Bigelow, Phillips, and Hart were hotly engaged, and the battle soon raged along the lines.

In the meantime the additional batteries ordered from the reserve--Thompson's (C and F, Pennsylvania, six 3-inch) and Sterling's (Second Connecticut, four James and two howitzers), and Ransom's brigade, consisting of Thomas' (C, Fourth United States, six 12-pounders), Weir's (C, Fifth United States, six 12-pounders), and Turnbull's (F and K, Third United States, six 12-pounders) batteries --were brought up by General

Tyler in person. Ransom's brigade was formed on the crest, above general headquarters,

and soon after Turnbull's, Weir's, and Thomas' batteries were ordered forward to join Humphreys' division, taking position on the right of Seeley.

Some time after, two batteries of the Fifth Corps--Watson's (I, Fifth United States, four 3-inch) and Walcott's (C, Massachusetts Artillery, six 12-pounders)--were brought

upon the ground by some staff officer of General Sickles; but for this there seemed to be

no necessity, abundant provision having been made to supply all needs from the Artillery

Reserve. The effect was to deprive the Fifth Corps of its batteries, without the knowledge

and to the inconvenience of the commander of the corps. The batteries were exposed to

heavy front and enfilading fires, and suffered terribly, but as rapidly as any were disabled

they were retired and replaced by others. Watson (I, Fifth United States, four 3-inch) relieved Ames' battery (G, First New York, six 12-pounders); Thompson's (Pennsylvania,

six 3-inch) took position near it, relieving Hart (Fifteenth New York, four 12-pounders).

Turnbull's (F and K, Third United States, six 12-pounders) was posted near the Emmitsburg road. The officers and men performed their duties with great gallantry

and success, notwithstanding the unfavorable nature of the ground, which gave the enemy all the advantages of position, driving off several of the enemy's batteries, silencing others, and doing good execution on his infantry, until about 5.30 or 6 p.m., when the line was forced back, and the batteries were compelled to withdraw.

So great had been the loss in men and horses, that many of the carriages had to be withdrawn by hand and others left on the field, which, with the exception of four, were afterward brought off. Three of these belonged to Smith's battery (Fourth New York, six 10-pounders), on our extreme left. The guns were stationed on the brow of a very precipitous and rocky height, beyond a ravine in front of our line. The difficulty of getting these guns up the height had caused the delay in Smith's opening his fire. He fought them to the last moment in hopes of keeping the enemy off, and in the belief that the ground would be in our possession again before the guns could be carried off by the enemy. He got off one of the four guns he had placed on the height, but was compelled to abandon the other three. The fourth of the guns lost belonged to Thompson's battery, the horses being all killed, the men engaged in hauling off the other pieces by hand, and his infantry supports having left him. In withdrawing, many acts of gallantry were performed, the enemy in several instances being driven out from the batteries by the cannoneers and such assistance as they could procure from the infantry near them. The line reformed on the crest, which constituted our original line, and repulsed all further attacks.

The batteries of the Second Corps were posted on the morning of the 2d by its chief of artillery, Captain Hazard, First Rhode Island Artillery, as follows, from left; to right, connecting with the batteries of the Third Corps on the left, and those on- Cemetery Hill on the right: Rorty's (B, First New York, four 10-pounders), Brown's (B, First Rhode Island, six 12-pounders), Cushing's (A, Fourth United States, six 3-inch), Arnold's (A, First Rhode Island, six 3-inch), and Woodruff's (I, First United States, six 12-pounders). The

enemy opened upon them several times during the morning, but were always silenced by their concentrated fire.

When the Third Corps fell back, about 6 p.m., their batteries opened a vigorous fire, and the two left batteries (Rorty's and Brown's) conformed their movements to those of the infantry. When the crest of the hill occupied by our lines was reached, it gave the batteries a commanding position; a rapid fire was opened, and the enemy gradually driven back. Brown's battery suffered so severely in men and horses that it became necessary to send two guns to the rear.

The artillery of the Fifth Corps arrived on the field between 4 and 5 p.m. Hazlett's (D, Fifth United States, six 10-pounders), Walcott's (C, Massachusetts Artillery, six 12-pounders), and Watson's (I, Fifth United States, four 3-inch) batteries, with the First Division of the corps; Gibbs' (L, First Ohio, six 12-pounders), and Barnes' (C, First New York, four 3-inch), with Second Division. I have already stated that Watson's and Walcott's were taken from their positions by order of Major-General Sickles, and noted their services. Walcott's was not engaged, but was under fire; 6 men wounded, and 6 horses killed and wounded.

About 4.30 p.m. Hazlett's battery was moved to the extreme left, placed in position on Round Top, and immediately opened upon that portion of the enemy's force which attacked the First Division, and continued it until night with marked effect, as its fire enfiladed the enemy's line. Guthrie's section of Gibbs' battery was posted on the same hill on the right of Hazlett, and Walworth's section at the base of the hill, commanding the ravine in front of Round Top, the remaining section being held in reserve. These sections did excellent service, especially Guthrie's. On this afternoon, Lieut. Charles E. Hazlett, Fifth U.S. Artillery, a young officer, who had gained an enviable reputation for gallantry, skill, and devotion to his country and the service, received a mortal wound, and died the same evening.

For more detailed reports of the services of the artillery in the action on our left, I respectfully refer to the reports of General Tyler, commanding Artillery Reserve, and to the reports of the chiefs of artillery of the Second, Third, and Fifth Corps, transmitted herewith. It will be perceived that the batteries suffered severely in officers, men, and horses, losing a large proportionate number of officers--3 killed (Lieut. Charles E. Hazlett, Fifth Artillery, commanding Battery B; Lieut. M. Livingston, Third Artillery, commanding Turn-bull's battery; Lieut. C. Erickson, Bigelow's battery); and 12 wounded (Capt. D. R. Ransom, Third Artillery, commanding Regular Brigade,

Artillery Reserve; Capt. J. Thompson, C, Pennsylvania Artillery; Capt. N. Irish, D. Pennsylvania Artillery; Capt. Patrick Hart, Fifteenth New York Battery; Lieut. T. F. Brown, Hazard's battery; Lieut. Samuel Canby, Fourth Artillery, Cushing's battery; Lieut. J. K. Bucklyn, First Rhode Island, Randolph's battery; Lieut. F. W. Seeley, Fourth U. S. Artillery, commanding Battery K; Lieut. M. F. Watson, Fifth U.S. Artillery, commanding Battery I; Lieut. J. L. Miller, Thompson's battery, mortally; Lieut. E. M. Knox, Fifteenth New York Battery; Lieut. E. Spence, Ricketts' battery).

The night of the 2d was devoted in great part to repairing damages, replenishing the ammunition chests, and reducing and reorganizing such batteries as had lost so many men and horses as to be unable efficiently to work the full number of guns.

By daylight next morning this duty had been performed so far as possible, and, when it was found impossible to reorganize in time, the batteries were withdrawn, replaced by others from the Artillery Reserve, and finished their work during the next morning.

On the evening of July 2, a portion of Slocum's corps (the Second) [Twelfth], which formed the right of our line, was sent to re-enforce the left. During its absence, the enemy took possession of a portion of the line in the woods, and it was resolved to drive him out at daylight. Knap's battery (E, Pennsylvania, six 10-pounders) was placed on the hill known as Slocum's headquarters, and near the Baltimore pike, and Winegar's battery (M, First New York, four 10-pounders) at a short distance east of it. These batteries overlooked and commanded the ground vacated by the corps.

At 1 a.m. of the 3d, Muhlenberg's (F, Fourth United States, six 12-pounders) and Kinzie's (K, Fifth United States, four 12-pounders) batteries were posted opposite the center of the line of the Twelfth Corps, so as to command the ravine formed by Rock Creek.

At 4.30 a.m. these batteries opened, and fired without intermission for fifteen minutes into the wood, at a range of from 600 to 800 yards. Soon after daylight, Rigby's battery (A, Maryland, six 3-inch) was also placed on the hill, and at 5.30 a.m. all the batteries opened, and continued firing at intervals until 10 a.m., when the infantry succeeded in driving out the enemy and reoccupied their position of the day before. In this work the artillery tendered good service.

At our center, on and near Cemetery Hill, the batteries were in position very nearly the same as on the previous day. Those outside of the cemetery gate and north of the Baltimore pike, under the command of Colonel Wainwright, First New York Artillery, were, from right to left: Stevens' (Fifth Maine, six 12-pounders), Reynolds' (L, First New York, four 3-inch), Ricketts' (F, First Pennsylvania, six 3-inch)--which had relieved

Cooper's (B, First Pennsylvania, four 3-inch) the night before--Wiedrich's (I, First New

York, four 3-inch), and Stewart's (B, Fourth United States, four 12-pounders). The batteries south of the pike, and under command of Major Osborn, First New York Artillery, were: Dilger's (I, First Ohio six 12-pounders), Bancroft's (G, Fourth United States, six 12-pounders), Eakin's (H, First United States, six 12-pounders), Wheeler's (Thirteenth New York, three 3-inch), Hill's (C, First West Virginia, four 10-pounders), and Taft's (Fifth New York, six 20-pounders).

On the left of the cemetery the batteries of the Second Corps were in line on the crest occupied by their corps in the following order, from right to left: Woodruff's (I, First United States, six 12-pounders), Arnold's (A, First Rhode Island, six 3-inch), Cushing's (A, Fourth United States, six 3-inch), Brown's (B, First Rhode Island, four 12-pounders), and Rorty's (B, First New York, four 10-pounders), all under command of Captain Hazard, chief of artillery.

Next on the left of the artillery of the Second Corps were stationed Thomas' battery (C, Fourth United States, six 12-pounders), and on his left Major McGilvery's command,

consisting of Thompson's (C and F, Pennsylvania, five 3-inch), Phillips' (Fifth Massachusetts, six 3-inch), Harts (Fifteenth New York, four 12-pounders), Sterling's (Second Connecticut,

four James and two howitzers), Rank's section (two 3-inch), Dow's (Sixth Maine, four 12-pounders), and Ames' (G, First New York, six 12-pounders), all of the Artillery

Reserve, to which was added, soon after the cannonade commenced, Cooper's battery (B, First Pennsylvania, four 3-inch), of the First Corps.

On our extreme left, occupying the position of the day before, were Gibbs' (L, First Ohio,

six 12-pounders) and Rittenhouse's (late Hazlett's, D, Fifth United States, six 10-pounders)

batteries. Gibbs' was, however, too distant from the enemy's position for 12-pounders, and was not used during the day, although under fire. Rittenhouse was in an excellent position for the service of his rifled guns, on the top of Round Top. We had thus on

the western crest line seventy-five guns, which could be aided by a few of those on Cemetery Hill. There was but little firing during the morning.

At 10 a.m. I made an inspection of the whole line, ascertaining that all the batteries only those of our right serving with the Twelfth Corps being engaged at the time-- were in good condition and well supplied with ammunition. As the enemy was evidently increasing his artillery force in front of our left, I gave instructions to the batteries and to the chiefs of artillery not to fire at small bodies, nor to allow their fire to be drawn without promise of adequate results; to watch the enemy closely, and when he opened to concentrate the fire of their guns on one battery at a time until it was silenced; under all circumstances to fire deliberately, and to husband their ammunition as much as possible.

I had just finished my inspection, and was with Lieutenant Rittenhouse on the top of Round Top, when the enemy opened, at about 1 p.m., along his whole right, a furious cannonade on the left of our line. I estimated the number of his guns bearing on our west front at from one hundred to one hundred and twenty. I have since seen it stated by the enemy's correspondents that there were sixty guns from Longstreet's, and fifty-five from Hill's corps, making one hundred and fifteen in all. To oppose these we could not, from our restricted position, bring more than eighty to reply effectively. Our fire was well withheld until the first burst was over, excepting from the extreme right and left of our positions. It was then opened deliberately and with excellent effect. As soon as the nature of the enemy's attack was made clear, and I could form an opinion as to the number of his guns, for which my position afforded great facility, I went to the park of the Artillery Reserve, and ordered all the batteries to be ready to move at a moment's notice, and hastened to report to the commanding general, but found he had left his headquarters. I then 'proceeded along the line, to observe the effects of the cannonade and to replace such batteries as should become disabled.

About 2.30 p.m., finding our ammunition running low and that it was very unsafe to bring up loads of it, a number of caissons and limbers having been exploded, I directed that the fire should be gradually stopped, which was done, and the enemy soon slackened his fire also. I then sent orders for such batteries as were necessary to replace exhausted ones, and all that were disposable were sent me.

About 3 p.m., and soon after the enemy's fire had ceased, he formed a column of attack in the edge of the woods in front of the Second Corps. At this time Fitzhugh's

(.K, First New York, six 3-inch), Parsons' (A, First New Jersey, six 10-pounders), Weir's (C, Fifth United States, six 12-pounders), and Cowan's (First New York Independent, six 3-inch) batteries reached this point, and were put in position in front of the advancing enemy. I rode down to McGilvery's batteries, and directed them to take the enemy in flank as they approached. The enemy advanced magnificently, unshaken by the shot and shell which tore through his ranks from his front and from our left. The batteries of the Second Corps on our right, having nearly exhausted their supply of ammunition, except canister, were compelled to withhold their fire until the enemy, who approached in three lines, came within its range. When our canister fire and musketry were opened upon them, it occasioned disorder, but still they advanced gallantly until they reached the stone wall behind which our troops lay. Here ensued a desperate conflict, the enemy succeeding in passing the wall and entering our lines, causing great destruction of life, especially among the batteries. Infantry troops were, however, advanced from our right; the rear line of the enemy broke, and the others, who had fought with a gallantry that excited the admiration of our troops, found themselves cut off and compelled to surrender. As soon as their fate was evident, the enemy opened his batteries upon the masses of our troops at this point without regard to the presence of his own. Toward the close of this struggle, Rorty's (B, First New York, four 10-pounders), Arnold's (A, First Rhode Island, six 3-inch), and Cushing's (A, Fourth United States, six 3-inch) batteries, which had lost heavily in men and horses, were withdrawn, and as soon as the affair was over their places were filled with fresh ones.

Soon the necessary measures had been taken to restore this portion of the line to an efficient condition. It required but a few minutes, as the batteries, as fast as withdrawn from any point, were sent to the Artillery Reserve, replenished with ammunition, reorganized, returned to the rear of the lines, and there awaited assignment. I then went to the left, to see that proper measures had been taken there for the same object. On my way, I saw that the enemy was forming a second column of attack to his right of the point where the first was formed, and in front of the position of the First Corps (Newton's). I gave instructions to the artillery, under command of Major McGilvery, to be ready to meet the first movements of the enemy in front, and, returning to the position of the Second Corps, directed the

batteries

there, mostly belonging to the Artillery Reserve, to take the enemy in flank as he advanced.

When the enemy moved, these orders were well executed, and before he reached our line he was brought to a stand. The appearance of a body of our infantry moving down in

front of our lines from the direction of the Second Corps caused the enemy to move off

by his right flank, under cover of the woods and undergrowth, and, a few minutes after, the

column had broken up, and in the utmost confusion the men of which it was composed fled

across the ground over which they had just before advanced, and took refuge behind their

batteries. The attacks on the part of the enemy were not well managed. Their artillery fire

was too much dispersed, and failed to produce the intended effect. It was, however, so severe and so well sustained that it put to the test, and fully proved, the discipline and excellence of our troops. The two assaults, had they been simultaneous, would have divided

our artillery fire. As it was, each attack was met by a heavy front and flank fire of our artillery,

the batteries which met the enemy directly in front in one assault taking him in flank in the other.

The losses of the artillery on this day, and especially in the assault on the Second Corps,

were very large. The loss in officers was 3 killed, 2 mortally and 9 severely wounded.

Killed: Capt. J. M. Rorty, B, First New York; Lieut. A. H. Cushing, Fourth United States; Lieut. G. A. Woodruff, First United States (mortally wounded); Lieut. J. S. Milne,

First Rhode Island; Lieut. A. H. Whitaker, Ninth Massachusetts (wounded severely);

Capt. J. Bigelow, Ninth Massachusetts; Lieut. A. S. Sheldon, B, First New York; Lieut.

H. H. Baldwin, Fifth United States; Lieut.. J. McGilvray, Fourth United States; Lieut. R. C.

Hazlett, Fourth Pennsylvania Battery; Lieut. J. Stephenson, Fourth Pennsylvania Battery;

Lieut. H. D. Scott, Battery E, Massachusetts; Lieut. W. P. Wright, First New York Battery;

Lieut. W. H. Johnson, First New York Battery. Captain Rorty, who had taken

command

of his battery but three days before, fell, fighting, at his guns. Lieutenants Cushing and Woodruff belonged to a class of young officers who, although of the lowest commissioned

rank, have gained distinguished army reputation. The destruction of materiel was large.

The enemy's cannonade, in which he must have almost exhausted his ammunition, was

well sustained, and cost us a great many horses and the explosion of an unusually large

number of caissons and limbers. The whole slope behind our crest, although concealed

from the enemy, was swept by his shot, and offered no protection to horses or carriages.

The enemy's superiority in the number of guns was fully matched by the superior accuracy

of ours, and a personal inspection of the line he occupied, made on the 5th, enables me to

state with certainty that his losses in materiel in this artillery combat were equal to ours, while

the marks of the shot in the trees on both crests bear conclusive evidence of the superiority

of our practice.

This struggle closed the battle, and the night of the 3d, like the previous one, was devoted to repairs and reorganization. A large number of batteries had been so reduced

in men and horses that many guns and carriages, after completing the outfit of those which remained with the army, were sent to the rear and turned in to the ordnance department.

Our losses in the three days' operations, as reported, were as follows:

Casualties, July 1, 2, and 3.

Organizations....	Number of Guns....	Officers Killed....	Men Killed	Officers Wounded	Men Wounded	Missing Horses
In the corps.....	212.....	5.....	57....
.....	18.....	361.....	565
Artillery Reserve.....	108	2.....	41.....	15
.....	171	316

Total3207..... 98
33..... 532 881

Of these 320 guns, 142 were light 12-pounders, 106 3-inch guns, 6 20-pounders, 60 10-pounder Parrott guns, and a battery of 4 James rifles and 2 12-pounder howitzers, which joined the army on the march to Gettysburg. This table excludes the Horse Artillery, 44 3-inch guns, serving with the cavalry. It will be seen that the Artillery Reserve, every gun of which was brought into requisition, bore, as in all the campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, its full share, and more, of the losses.

The expenditure of ammunition in the three days amounted to 32,781 rounds, averaging over 100 rounds per gun. Many rounds were lost in the caissons and limbers by explosions and otherwise. The supply carried with the army being 270 rounds per gun, left sufficient to fill the ammunition chests and enable the army to fight another battle. There was for a short time during the battle a fear that the ammunition would give out. This fear was caused by the large and unreasonable demands made by corps commanders who had left their own trains or a portion of them behind, contrary to the orders of the commanding general. In this emergency, the train of the Artillery Reserve, as on so many other occasions, supplied all demands, and proved its great usefulness to the army.

For a more particular account of the operations of the artillery and of their relations to those of the other arms of service, I respectfully refer to the report of the commander of the Artillery Reserve, and to those of the chiefs of artillery of the army corps, transmitted herewith, to which reports I also refer for the names of those who distinguished themselves by their conduct and courage.

I have to acknowledge my indebtedness to these officers: Brig. Gen. R. O. Tyler, commanding Artillery Reserve; Col. C. S. Wainwright, First New York Artillery, First Corps; Capt. J. G. Hazard, First Rhode Island Artillery, Second Corps; Capt. G. E. Randolph, First Rhode Island Artillery, Third Corps; Capt. A. P. Martin, Third Massachusetts Battery, Fifth Corps; Col. C. H. Tompkins, First Rhode Island Artillery, Sixth Corps; Maj. T. W. Osborn, First New York Artillery, Eleventh Corps; Lieut. E. D. Muhlenberg, Fourth U.S. Artillery, Twelfth Corps, for their zealous co-operation in all

the administrative labors that devolved upon me, and for the efficiency with which they discharged their duties in the field.

My staff Lieut. Col. E. R. Warner, First New York Artillery, inspector of artillery; Capt. J. N. Craig, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieut. C. E. Bissell, aide-de-camp--performed the duties devolving upon them with intelligence and gallantry.

Upon Lieutenant-Colonel Warner fell much of the labor required in the reorganization of batteries withdrawn from the field and in replacing them. These duties and others which devolved upon him were discharged with his accustomed energy and thoroughness.

Lieutenant Bissell was my only aide, and was, therefore, busily employed. He was much exposed, his duties keeping him more or less under fire at every point at which attacks were made.

In my report of the battle of Chancellorsville, I took occasion to call attention to the great evils arising from the want of field officers for the artillery. The operations of

this campaign, and especially the battle of Gettysburg, afford further proofs, if such were necessary, of the mistaken policy of depriving so important an arm of the officers

necessary for managing it. In this campaign, for the command of 67 batteries (372 guns),

with over 8,000 men and 7,000 horses, and all the materiel, and large ammunition trains,

I had one general officer commanding the reserve, and but four field officers (Brig. Gen. R. O. Tyler, U.S. Volunteers, commanding Artillery Reserve; Lieut. Col. F.

McGilvery, First Maine Artillery, commanding brigade Artillery Reserve; Col. C. H. Tompkins, First Rhode Island Artillery, Sixth Corps; Col. C. S. Wainwright, First New

York Artillery, First Corps; Maj. T. W. Osborn, First New York Artillery, Eleventh Corps;

Capt. J. M. Robertson, Second U. S. Artillery, commanding First Brigade Horse Artillery;

Capt. J. C. Tidball, Second U.S. Artillery, commanding Second Brigade Horse Artillery).

In the seven corps, the artillery of two were commanded by colonels, of one by a major, of three by captains, and of one by a lieutenant, taken from their batteries for the purpose. The two brigades of horse artillery attached to the cavalry were commanded

by captains, and there was one field officer in the reserve. The most of these commands in any other army would have been considered proper ones for a general officer. In no army would the command of the artillery of a corps be considered of less importance, to say the least, than that of a brigade of infantry. In none of our corps ought the artillery commander to have been of less rank than a colonel, and in all there should have been a proper proportion of field officers, with the necessary staffs. The defects of our organization were made palpable at Gettysburg, not only on the field, but in the necessary and important duties of reorganizing the batteries, repairing damages, and getting the artillery in condition to renew the battle, or take the road in efficient condition on the morning after a conflict.

I respectfully and urgently call the attention of the commanding general, and through him of the War Department, to this subject.

Not only does the service suffer, necessarily, from the great deficiency of officers of rank, but a policy which closes the door of promotion to battery officers, and places them and the arm itself under a ban, and degrades them in comparison with other arms of service, induces discontent, and has caused many of our best officers to seek positions, wherever they can find them, which will remove them from this branch of the service. We have lost many such officers, and unless something is done to cure the evil we will lose more.

The reports of the horse artillery were rendered to the cavalry officers under whose orders they served, and I have not yet received all of them. As their operations were detached from those of the main body of the army, and do not naturally connect with them, I reserve them as the subject of a separate report.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
HENRY J. HUNT,
Brigadier-General and Chief of Artillery, Commanding.

ARTILLERY HDQRS. ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
October 4, 1863.
Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

GENERAL: In compliance with your directions, I have the honor to state that the following were the captures from the army in the recent operations: First Corps lost one gun, 3-inch, from Reynolds' battery (L, First New York), July 1; Eleventh Corps, one light 12-pounder, Heck-man's battery (K, First Ohio), July 1; Third Corps, three 10-pounder Parrotts, Smith's Fourth Independent New York Battery, July 2; Artillery Reserve, one 3-inch, Thompson's battery, Third and Fourth Pennsylvania, July 2; six lost.

I received no report of captures from the enemy in an official form, although I heard that the cavalry had picked up several on the road, and that two were taken at Falling Waters.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
HENRY J. HUNT,
Major-General, Chief of Artillery.

Organization of Artillery for the Army of the Potomac,
Major General George G. Meade, U. S. Army,
Commanding, October 10, 1863.

ARTILLERY
Brigadier General HENRY J. HUNT.

ARTILLERY RESERVE.
Brigadier General ROBERT O. TYLER.

First Regular Brigade.
Captain ALANSON M. RANDOL.
1st United States, Battery H, Lieutenant Philip D. Mason.
3rd United States, Batteries F and K, Lieutenant George F. Barstow.
4th United States, Battery C, Lieutenant Charles L. Fitzhugh.

Second Volunteer Brigade.
Captain ELIJAH D. TAFT.
1st Connecticut Heavy, Battery B, Captain Albert F. Brooker.
1st Connecticut Heavy, Battery M, Captain Franklin A. Pratt.
1st New York Light, Battery B, Lieutenant Robert E. Rogers.

New York Light, 5th Battery, Captain Elijah D. Taft.
West Virginia Light, Battery C, Captain Wallace Hill.

First Brigade Horse Artillery.

Captain JAMES M. ROBERTSON.

New York Light, 6th Battery, Captain Joseph W.,. Martin.
2nd United States, Batteries B and L, Lieutenant Albert O. Vincent.
2nd United States, Battery D, Lieutenant Edward B. Williston.
2nd United States, Battery M, Lieutenant Alexander C. M. Pennington, jr.
4th United States, Battery A, Lieutenant Horatio B. Reed.
4th United States, Battery E, Captain Samuel S. Elder.

First Volunteer Brigade.

Lieutenant Colonel FREEMAN McGILVERY.

Maine Light, 6th Battery (F), Lieutenant William H. Rogers.
Massachusetts Light, 9th Battery, Captain John Bigelow.
New York Light, 4th Battery, Lieutenant Thomas Goodman.
Pennsylvania Light, Batteries C and F, Captain James Thompson.

Third Volunteer Brigade.

Major ROBERT H. FITZHUGH.

Maryland Light, Battery A, Lieutenant Thomas Binyon.
New Hampshire Light, 1st Battery, Captain Frederick M. Edgell.
New Jersey Light, battery A, Captain William Hexamer.
1st New York Light, Battery K, Lieutenant Edward L. Bailey (11th N. Y. Batt'y attached).
New York Light, 15th Battery, Captain Patrick Hart.

Second Brigade Horse Artillery.

Captain WILLIAM M. GRAHAM.

Michigan Light, 9th Battery, Captain Jabez J. Daniels.
1st United States, Battery E, Lieutenant Egbert W. Olcott.
1st United States, Battery K, Lieutenant John Egan.
2nd United States, Battery A, Lieutenant Robert Clarke.
2nd United States, battery G, Lieutenant John H. Butler.
3rd United States, Battery C, Captain Dunbar R. Ransom.

Ammunition Guard.

6th New York Heavy Artillery, Colonel J. Howard Kitching.

FIRST ARMY CORPS,

Artillery.

Maine Light, 2nd Battery (B), Lieutenant Albert F. Thomas.
Maine Light, 5th Battery (E), Captain Greenleaf T. Stevens.
1st New York Light, Batteries E and L, Captain Gilbert H. Reynolds.
1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery B, Captain James H. Cooper.
4th United States, Battery B, Lieutenant James Stewart.

SECOND ARMY CORPS

Artillery.

1st New York Light, Battery G, Captain Nelson Ames.
1st Ohio Light, Battery H, Captain James F. Huntington.
1st Pennsylvania Light, Batteries F and G, Captain R. Bruce Ricketts.
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery A, Captain William A. Arnold.
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery B, Lieutenant T. Fred. Brown.
1st United States, battery I, Lieutenant Frank S. French.

THIRD ARMY CORPS

Artillery.

Maine Light, 4th Battery (D), Captain O'Neil W. Robinson, jr.
Massachusetts Light, 10th Battery, Captain J. Henry Sleeper.
New Jersey Light, battery B, Captain A. Judson Clark.
1st New York Light, Battery D, Captain George B. Winslow.
New York Light, 12th Battery, Lieutenant George K. Dauchy.
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery E, Lieutenant John K. Bucklyn.
4th United States, Battery K, Lieutenant Robert James.

FIFTH ARMY CORPS.

Artillery.

Massachusetts Light, 3rd Battery (C), Lieutenant Aaron F. Walcott.
Massachusetts Light, 5th Battery (E), Captain Charles A. Philips.
1st New York Light, Battery C, Captain Almont Barnes.
1st Ohio Light, Battery L, Captain Frank C. Gibbs.
5th United States, Battery D, Lieutenant Benjamin F. Rittenhouse.

SIXTH ARMY CORPS.

Artillery.

Massachusetts Light, 1st Battery (A), Captain William H. McCartney.
New York Light, 1st Battery, Captain Andrew Cowan.
New York Light, 3rd Battery, Captain William A. Harn.
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery C, Captain Richard Waterman.
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery G, Captain George W. Adams.
5th United States, Battery F, Lieutenant Leonard Martin.
5th United States, Battery M, Captain James McKnight.

ORDNANCE OFFICE, October 27, 1863.

Ordnance, and other ordnance stores, procured and supplied to the Army since the beginning of the rebellion, and the quantity remaining on hand in the arsenals June 30, 1863.

Numbers 1.-CANNON AND MORTARS.

.....	Field guns.....	Siege guns. ...	Sea-coast
... Total			

On hand at the beginning of the rebellion

.....231.....544.....1,508.....2,283
---------------	---------------	-----------------	------------

Purchased since2,734 546..... 418
..... 3,698			

Total stock2,965.....1,0901,926
.....5,981			

Issued from the arsenals during the same period2,481.....

841.....1,247.....4,569
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Remaining on hand at the arsenals June 30, 1863.....484.....249

.....679.....1,412
---------------	------------

Numbers 2.-CANNON-BALLS, SHELLS, AND OTHER PROJECTILES.

.....	Field.	Siege	Sea-coast
.....Total			

On hand at the beginning of the rebellion90,199.....131,036142,356
.....363,591			

Purchased up to June 30, 18631,912,894242,155 407,695
....2,562,744			

Total stock2,003,093373,191.....
550,051.....2,926,335	

Issued from arsenals during same period1,528,578138,29878,710
...1,745,586

Remaining on hand at arsenals June 30, 1863474,515..... 234,893
.....471,341...1,180,749

Numbers 3.-ARTILLERY CARRIAGES.

.....FieldSiege Sea- coast
.....Mortar-beds.

On hand at the beginning of the rebellion.....266104
.....1,787.....106

Purchased since, up to June 30, 1863.....1,948
.....154.....45.....97

Fabricated at the arsenals 637
484.....509.....234

Total stock
2,851.....742.....2,341.....437

Issued from the arsenals during the same period.2,492
.....698.....1,719.....207

Remaining on hand June 30, 1863. 35941.....622
.....230

.....Caissons.....Traveling forges....Battery wagons
...Total No.

On hand at the beginning of the rebellion.....213
.....117.....60.....2,653

Purchased since, up to
June30,1863.....2,063.....348.....226.....4,881

Fabricated at the
arsenals.....223.....58.....64.....2,209

Total
stock.....2,499.....523.....350.....9,7
43

GEO. D. RAMSAY,
Brigadier-General and Chief of Ordnance.

SPECIAL ORDERS, No. 497.
WAR DEPT., ADJT. GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, November 9, 1863.

III. A Board of Officers, to consist of Brig. Gen. W. F. Barry, U.S. Volunteers, lieutenant-colonel First U. S. Artillery; Brig. Gen. J. G. Barnard, U.S. Volunteers, lieutenant-colonel U.S. Engineers; Brig. Gen. G. W. Cullum, U.S. Volunteers, lieutenant-colonel U. S. Engineers; Brig. Gen. G. A. De Russy, U.S. Volunteers, captain Fourth U.S. Artillery; and Lieut. Col. B. S. Alexander, additional aide-de-camp, major U.S. Engineers, will meet in this city on the 10th day of November, 1863, or as soon thereafter as practicable, to examine and report upon the armaments of the works constituting the defenses of Washington.

The Board will report upon the points to be presented to them in a letter of instructions, and will make any other recommendations which in their judgment may seem proper.

The Chiefs of Engineers and of Artillery will furnish all information required by the Board, and the report of the Board will be submitted to them for comment or approval.

The junior member will record the proceedings.

By order of the Secretary of War:
E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

**Report of Captain George E. Randolph, commanding Artillery
Brigade, of action at Kelly's Ford and skirmish at Brandy Station.**

**HDQRS. ARTILLERY BRIGADE, THIRD ARMY CORPS,
November 11, 1863.**

CAPTAIN: I have the honor respectfully to submit the following report of the operations of the artillery of this corps during the recent movement:

The batteries marched in the usual order on the morning of the 7th instant from their camps near Licking Run to Kelly's Ford, reaching the latter place shortly after noon. Almost immediately [after] the head of column reached Mount Holly Church, I placed Sleeper's (Tenth Massachusetts) battery (3-inch guns) in position on the heights close to the Rappahannock and half a mile south of the ford. I placed Captain Pratt's battery of 4 1\2-inch Rodman guns in battery on the road from Mount Holly Church to the ford, about a quarter of a mile from the church on the south side of Marsh Run, covering the ford, and, from the long range of the pieces, commanding the heights behind Kellysville on the south side of the Rappahannock.

Battery E, First Rhode Island (light 12-pounders), commanded by Lieutenant Bucklyn, followed De Trobriand's brigade to the bluff on the north side of Marsh Run overlooking Kellysville, taking position in the angle formed by the river and a deep cutting, which, according to Captain Paine's map of December, 1862, runs from Wheatley's Mill to mouth of Marsh Run.

I placed Winslow's battery (D, First New York) in reserve, near Captain Pratt's position, with orders to engage any battery the enemy might open from the wooded hill to the left of Sleeper's position, on the south side of the Rappahannock.

I placed McKnight's battery (Twelfth New York), Lieutenant Dauchy commanding, and Robinson's Fourth Maine, in rear and on the right of the position of Battery E, First Rhode Island, to protect the latter, should the enemy place batteries on the heights on the road from Wheatley's Mill toward Brandy Station, and attempt to dislodge it.

The other batteries of the corps, viz, Clark's light 12-pounders, Roders' (K, Fourth United States) light 12-pounders, and Edgell's (First New Hampshire) 3-inch, were held in reserve in rear of the hill on which were Robinson's and McKnight's.

Captain Sleeper first opened on the brick mill at the ford, where the enemy's picket was stationed. He had, however, fired but a few shots at it when he was attacked by a battery of the enemy in an earth-work on the hill, in rear of

Kellysville. He replied to the fire, shooting excellency, and taking the rebel battery in front while Lieutenant Bucklyn, with solid shot from his nearer position, struck its flank, and their combined fire compelled the rebel battery to change position twice, and finally to retire.

Lieutenant Bucklyn, having by a well-directed fire prevented the strengthening of the enemy's force at the mill, fired into the town, from the houses of which the enemy kept up a brisk fire. When our skirmishers attempted to cross, he threw a few rounds of canister into the enemy's rifle-pits with such excellent effect that our sharpshooters were enabled to cross with comparatively little resistance, as well as to capture a number of the enemy, who chose to remain rather than retreat across a hill and plain completely commanded and covered by Bucklyn's battery.

After the enemy's battery had retired, Captain Sleeper kept up a brisk fire upon the enemy's line in the edge of the woods that skirt the hill on the south side, checking its advance and co-operating with General Ward, who, having crossed the ford, was advancing and taking position on the heights back of the town. Captain Pratt's battery fired at the enemy's battery, making splendid shots at nearly 2 miles distance, and then at the mill and houses in Kellysville, doing good service by the great accuracy of its shooting.

It will be seen that these three batteries, Sleeper's 3-inch, on the left and near the river; Pratt's 4 1\2-inch, in front and three-quarters of a mile from the ford, and Bucklyn's light 12-pounders, on the right immediately over Kellysville, were so posted as to be able to concentrate over Kellysville, were so posted as to be able to concentrate their fire upon the important positions of the enemy. It was on these three positions that I relied. Winslow was to prevent Sleeper being dislodged, and Robinson and McKnight to protect Bucklyn.

The crossing of Ward's division having been effected, I sent Clark's and McKnight's by the ford to report to General Ward, and the remaining batteries followed the corps on the bridge.

The corps marched at daylight of the 8th toward Brandy Station, halting, to wait for the Second Corps, near the intersection of the Kellysville road and the railroad.

On resuming the march we met the enemy's cavalry and a battery on the hill near the house now occupied by General French, Third Corps headquarters. I placed a section of Edgell's (New Hampshire) battery (3-inch) near the railroad and about 1,800 yards from and commanded by the enemy's position. The fire of this section failed to accomplish the result desired, viz, to develop the enemy's

force or to cover the advance of the Third Division, which was to take the hill.

Our infantry having driven the enemy beyond Brandy Station, I put both sections of Edgell's battery in front of the station on right and left of the road and opened fire on the retreating cavalry. They were so distant, however, that the fire was not very effective. The batteries camped at Brandy Station on night of 8th, and, with unimportant changes of camp, remain there still.

Captains Sleeper and Pratt and Lieutenant Bucklyn deserve praise for the skillful and effective manner in which they performed the duty allotted to them.

The only casualties were 1 man, Albert N. Colwell, killed, and 2, Martin Harvey and Corpl. Edward A. Chandler, wounded by the premature discharge of a piece of Battery E, First Rhode Island Artillery. They were the gunner and Nos. 1 and 3. Numbers 3 lost his thumb.

Below I give the expenditure of ammunition: Rounds.

Captain Sleeper's battery, Tenth Massachusetts:

Schenkle percussion, 3-inch.....	300
Hotchkiss percussion shell, 3-inch.....	40
Hotchkiss fuse shell, 3-inch.....	50
Schenkle percussion shell, 3-inch.....	10
Total.....	400

Lieutenant Bucklyn, E, First Rhode Island Artillery:

Solid shot, light 12.....	80
Spherical case, light 12.....	72
Shell, light 12.....	24
Canister, light 12.....	5
Total.....	181

Captain Edgell's battery, First New Hampshire:

Schenkle case-shot.....	20
Schenkle percussion shell.....	10
Hotchkiss fuse shell.....	30
Total.....	60
Grand total.....	641

Lieutenant Bucklyn complains about his Boormann fuses not working well, and the Schenkle percussion used by Captain Edgell did not burst. I was surprised at this, for I have seldom known them to fail. Captain Sleeper's worked well, and this, in connection them to fail. Captain Sleeper's worked well, and this, in connection with the accuracy of this shooting, made his fire very effective.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. E. RANDOLPH,
Captain, First Rhode Island Artillery, Chief of Artillery.

Report of Captain Augustus P. Martin, Battery C, Massachusetts Station, on the afternoon of the 7th instant:

HDQRS. ARTILLERY BRIGADE, FIFTH ARMY CORPS,

About 4.30 p. m. two batteries, viz, Battery E, Massachusetts Artillery, Captain C. A. Phillips commanding, were placed in position on the left of the railroad and near the left of the line of the First Division, and about 1,500 yards from the enemy's works. The batteries opened fire upon the enemy as soon as they came into position, and continued to engaged him with good effect-many of the shells bursting directly in and over the enemy's works--until dark, when the works were carried by our forces. The enemy replied, but without doing the slightest injury.

Battery E, Massachusetts Artillery, expended during the engagement 110 rounds of case-shot, and Battery D, Fifth U. S. Artillery, expended 100 rounds of ammunition. The batteries lost nothing in men, horses, or materiel.

Captain Phillips and First Lieutenant Rittenhouse, and the officers and men under their command, behaved with great coolness, and are deserving of much credit for the handsome manner in which their batteries were served.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. P. MARTIN,

Captain, Commanding Artillery Brigade, Fifth Corps.

Report of Colonel Charles H. Tompkins, First Rhode Island Light Artillery, commanding Artillery Brigade, of engagement at Rappahannock Station.

**CAMP NEAR WELFORD'S FOR, HAZEL RIVER,
November 14, 1863.**

COLONEL: I have the honor to submit herewith a report of the operations of my command in the action of the 7th instant, at Rappahannock Station, Va.:

The brigade left Warrenton at 7 a. m. the 7th instant. Battery A, First Massachusetts Artillery, Captain McCartney commanding, and the Third New York Battery, Captain Harn commanding, marched with the First Division. Battery M, Fifth U. S. Artillery, Captain McKnight commanding, marched with the Third Division. The remainder of the brigade marched in rear of the First Division, and reached the railroad near Rappahannock Station at 1 p. m.

At 3 p. m., by order of General Wright, commanding Sixth Corps, I sent Battery C, First Rhode Island Artillery, Captain Waterman commanding, and Battery F, Fifth U. S. Artillery, Lieutenant Martin commanding, to report to General Howe. The remainder of my command was parked in the rear of the First Division in readiness to move to the front if required. At 3.45, our skirmishers having cleared the first crest, I placed Martin's battery in position on the left, and Waterman's battery on the right of the road leading to the station, to engage the enemy's artillery in the works on the north bank of the river, about 1,500 yards distant. As soon as the batteries moved into position, the enemy opened upon them from the works on the north bank, and also from a battery of 20-pounders in the redoubt on the south bank of the river. Taft's battery of 20-pounder guns was ordered up by Brigadier-General Tyler, commanding Artillery Reserve, to reply to the guns in the redoubt, and the fire of Martin's and Waterman's batteries concentrated upon the enemy's works and troops on the north bank.

At 4.30 p. m. three guns of Waterman's battery moved to the extreme right of our line, by order of General Howe. The firing was continued with regularity and precision until the works were carried by the storming party.

About 9 p. m. I sent a detachment, with horses, from Martin's battery, and withdrew two 1-pounder Parrotts, two 3-inch rifled guns, and one limber captured in the works. The remaining three limbers and four caissons were left by the enemy close to the river bank, and, being within short musket range of the enemy's pickets upon the opposite side of the river, it was not deemed best to remove them that night. The following morning the guns and caissons captured, together with a quantity of artillery harness found strewn about the works, and one wounded horse were, by order of Major-General Sedgwick, turned over to Brigadier-General Tyler, commanding Artillery Reserve.

The practice made by the batteries engaged was very good, with the exception of a few shots of Martin's battery, caused by defective ammunition. All the ammunition expended by Captain Waterman worked well.

The conduct of the officer and men of both batteries was all that could be desired. I inclose a list of casualties,* and a list of material expended.

I have the honor to remain, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CHAS. H. TOMPKINS,
Colonel, Commanding Artillery Brigade, Sixth Corps.

**Report of Captain Elijah D. Taft, Fifth New York Battery,
commanding Second Volunteer Brigade, Artillery Reserve, of engagement at
Rappahannock Station and action at Kelly's Ford.**

**HDQRS. SECOND VOL. BRIGADE ARTILLERY RESERVE,
November 17, 1863.**

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by the several batteries composing the Second Volunteer Brigade, Artillery Reserve, in the late action:

In compliance with order received from headquarters Artillery Reserve, November 6, 1863, Battery M, First Connecticut Artillery, Captain F. A. Pratt, marched from the camp of the Artillery Reserve, near Catlett's Station, at 4 a. m. of the 7th instant, and reported at General French's headquarters near Germantown,

and proceed thence to Kelly's Ford, where it took position, and soon afterward opened fire on the enemy, with good effect, as will be seen by the report of Captain Pratt, a copy of which is hereunto attached

The Fifth New York Independent Battery, commanded by me, and Battery B, First Connecticut Artillery, Captain Brooker, marched from the above-named camp, at 6.30 a. m. on the 7th instant, to near Bealeton Station, where I halted about 10 a. m., awaiting orders. At 1 p. m. I again resumed the march toward Rappahannock Station, arriving at the battle-ground near the station about 3.30 p. m., and took position with the Fifth New York Independent Battery (in compliance with orders of Brigadier General R. O Tyler) about 1 mile from the Rappahannock River, and immediately opened fire of the enemy's works near the river, firing 134 rounds with good effect, and, as would appear from fragments of 20-pounder shells found in and about the enemy's works the next morning, many of the shells had taken effect in the forts.

Battery B, First Connecticut Artillery, Captain Brooker, although on the ground, was not required to take part in the action. This battery was therefore kept in reserve.

Captain Pratt reported back to these headquarters with his battery on the 13th instant.

Battery B, First New York Artillery, Captain Sheldon, and Battery C, First [West] Virginia Artillery, Captain Hill, were ordered to report to the commanding officer at Warrenton Junction, where they will remain.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

E. D. TAFT,

Captain 5th N. Y. Indpt. Batty., Commanding 2nd Vol. Brigadier

Captain JOHN N. CRAIG,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Artillery Reserve.

Report of Captain George E. Randolph, First Rhode Island Light Artillery, commanding Artillery Brigade.

**HDQRS. ARTILLERY BRIGADE, THIRD ARMY CORPS,
December 4, 1863.**

COLONEL: I have the honor respectfully to submit the following report of the operations of my brigade during the recent movement:

On the morning of the 26th ultimo, the batteries (Clark's, B, First New Jersey, and McKnight's, Twelfth New York, reporting to General Prince, and marching with leading division; Roder's, K, Fourth U. S. Artillery, with the Third Division, General Carr; and Randolph's, E, First Rhode Island, with First Division, General Birney, and the remaining four in reserve following ambulances of Birney's division) marched from Brandy Station, crossing Mountain Run at Milton's Mills, to Jacobs' Ford, the head of the column reaching that place just after noon.

The Twelfth New York, under Lieutenant Dauchy, and Clark's battery, the former 3- inch guns, and the latter light 12- pounders, were at once placed in battery near the white house on the left of road, distant about 500 yards from opposite bank of the Rapidan, to cover the laying of the bridge. K, Fourth United States, was halted near the woods in the open field as you approach the ford, and the remaining batteries were halted as they came up farther back on the road. There was no resistance to our passage of the river sufficiently determined to require the use of artillery.

The hill on the south side of the Rapidan was so steep as to be considered impracticable for the passage of artillery, and about 5.30 p. m. I received the order to march all the artillery by way of Germanna Ford around to the position opposite Jacobs' Mills, where the corps was to encamp for the night. I stated my column at once and marched toward the point indicated and reached it with three batteries (E, First Rhode Island; B, First New Jersey, and K, Fourth United States), shortly after daylight of the 27th. Near Jacobs' Mills, on the road from that place to Germanna Ford, is a very long, steep hill to ascend, on which very many of my teams, exhausted as they were by dragging through the very bad roads from Brandy [Station] to Mountain Run, were necessarily doubled, and this, with other very bad points before reaching the ford, delayed the rear of my column, and my pushing on with the leading batteries, that I might reach my destination with a part of my command, left some gaps in it. After three of my batteries had reached the plank road and crossed the ford, the head of the column of the Sixth Corps artillery coming down the plank road cut the remainder of my column from the road and compelled it to wait till the whole of theirs had crossed, or from about 10 p. m. till 7 a. m. of the 27th.

After crossing these five batteries and watering the animals, which had been in harness on the road all night, I marched them, by command of Major- General French, to a point on the turnpike about a mile in rear of Robertson's Tavern,

and reported there to Brigadier- General Hunt, chief of artillery, Army of the Potomac.

Of the batteries that had reached the corps, I ordered Lieutenant Bucklyn, commanding Battery E, First Rhode Island, to report to General Prince; Lieutenant Roder, K, Fourth United States, to report to General Carr, and Clark's to General Birney. The corps marched, Second Division leading, toward Robertson's Tavern and encountered the enemy in large force near Locust Grove.

When the skirmishers and leading regiment of General Prince's division had cleared the way, Lieutenant Bucklyn put a section in position supporting the line, firing slowly where the enemy appeared in greatest force, and rendering great assistance to the infantry engaged. About 5 p. m. he relieved that section by a fresh one, and at the same time Lieutenant Roder, K, Fourth United States, in compliance with an order from General French in person, placed his battery, six light 12- pounders, on the left of Bucklyn. About ten minutes after the enemy charged our line, driving our infantry and advancing within a hundred yards of the guns. Roder and Bucklyn loaded with canister, and immediately their front was clear of our men, opened upon the enemy, driving him back in confusion. He reformed, however, and charged a second time, but only to be again repulsed with great loss.

The fire was continued with solid shot and shell till the enemy had retired 600 yards, when it was stopped to allow our skirmishers to advance. The four remaining pieces of Bucklyn's battery were brought up, but they were not used. By this time it was dark, and the batteries remained there in harness during the night. The next morning these batteries marched with the corps to Robertson's Tavern. Here the five reserve batteries rejoined the corps, and moved with it to the heights on the left of Beaver Dam, parallel to Mine Run. I placed three rifled batteries, Edgell's, First New Hampshire, McKnight's, Twelfth New York, and Sleeper's, Tenth Massachusetts, and one 12- pounder battery, Bucklyn's, E, First Rhode Island, in a very commanding position on the hill overlooking Mine Run, and distant from 1,400 to 2,200 yards from the enemy's line. I held four batteries, Clark's, Winslow's, Roder's, and Robinson's, in reserve a quarter of a mile in rear of this position.

They remained in these positions during the 29th. On the morning of the 30th, I put Robinson's, Fourth Maine, in position on the left of Edgell's, and at 8 o'clock, in accordance with General French's order, opened fire on the enemy's works on the hill beyond Mine Run. Bucklyn's 12 pounders were not of sufficient range, and I withdrew them, moving Sleeper to Bucklyn's position, between

General Birney's headquarters and a pine woods on the right. My fire was directed partly at the enemy's line in front of our right, and partly at the batteries that he opened on Ward's brigade, away to our left about 2,000 yards from my guns. The fire of Captain Robinson and Lieutenant Dauchy, Fourth Maine and Twelfth New York, at this battery was very good. That of Captain Edgell at the rifle-pits on mature bursting of his Schenkl case-shot. After firing about an hour without drawing any reply from the enemy, I ceased by command of General French.

Before daylight of the 1st of December, I sent four batteries, E, First Rhode Island; K, Fourth United States; Twelfth New York, and Fourth Maine, in command of Captain Robinson, to report to the Artillery Reserve, in accordance with orders from headquarters Army of the Potomac. I placed the batteries I retained in the positions then held, and retained them till 6 p. m. At this time I marched three batteries, following ammunition train, and one with rear division to Culpeper Ford, and halted near Richardsville, between 4 and 5 a. m. of the 2nd of December. At about 10 o'clock, following the ambulance train, I marched to Mountain Run, halting at 9 p. m. for the night, and resuming the march at daylight of the 3rd, reached present camp about 9 a. m.

For the particulars of the engagement of the 27th near Locust Grove, I must refer to the reports of Lieutenants Bucklyn and Roder. All reports agree in saying that the management of these batteries by both of these officers was highly creditable and their fire very effective. The small loss they suffered and the heavy loss they inflicted prove how skillfully their pieces were posted and used. I think proper to show here some of the causes of the delay on the part of the artillery of the corps. The road from Brandy Station was very bad, so that the ambulances and medicine wagons that preceded the batteries were continually sticking fast, and the batteries themselves, overloaded as they were with grain, could with ford, that road was for a time blocked by the train of headquarters Army of the Potomac, causing the batteries and troops to take to the bushes.

Upon arriving at Jacobs' Ford I carefully examined the hill on the opposite side, and reported to General French that I could cross at that place, though with difficulty, but more easily than I could march around by way of Germanna.

Captain Turnbull, of the Engineers, and others reported it impossible to move artillery up the hill. General French, however, gave me permission to attempt it after the infantry had crossed, but meanwhile an order was received from General Meade to move around via Germanna.

I still think it would have been easier to have crossed at Jacobs' Ford. Between Jacobs' Ford and Germanna Ford, on this side, is one high hill, and between the plank road and Jacobs' Ford, on the other, are three others, requiring double teams to ascend. The hill at Germanna Ford also required this. This doubling, of course, delayed the column and made gaps in it. The passage of the Sixth Corps batteries in advance of mine delayed me for eight hours.

After reaching Robertson's Tavern, and moving toward our position on the left of the First Corps, the fact that the staff officers of General Meade, who conducted the column, knew nothing of its position caused a very considerable delay, and threw the movement of the reserve batteries late into the night. There was no delay that energy, skill, or foresight on my part could have prevented. Every battery commander worked unceasingly. The march, so far as the artillery was concerned, was the hardest within the range of my experience.

It is not out of place here to enter my protest against overloading batteries with grain, as was necessary, if, with our limited transportation, we were to carry the amount of forage ordered. So far as the mobility of the artillery is concerned, it would be increased and not diminished by increase of transportation. Nothing should be carried on the batteries but the blankets of the men, and if eight or ten days' forage are required to be carried, sufficient transportation should be allowed, without putting the carriages of the batteries to this improper use.

Lieutenants Roder and Bucklyn deserve special mention for the manner in which they fought their batteries. The latter reports that he was ordered by General Prince to advance a section in a line with the skirmishers. His own good judgment prevented his obeying and losing his guns.

Captain Robinson, Fourth Maine Battery, also deserves great praise for the enemy he showed in marching his battery. Having two axles broken while on the march, he patched up a conveyance for his piece, and took the caisson, whose axle was also broken, entirely apart and loaded it in a wagon, not leaving even a bucket. The success of artillery depends so much on good marching that I think an officer who shows especial excellence in this respect deserves credit no less than for good conduct in battle.

I desire to commend the officers of the Fourth Maine Infantry for the cheerfulness with which they helped my batteries through the very heavy road in the woods near our position on Mine Run. It is not common for either men or officers to volunteer so cheerfully to assist or aid the march of another arm

than their own. I owe it to this regiment that my column was able to follow in its place on our retreat as promptly as it did.

I would be glad if the major-general commanding would in some manner recognize and reward this voluntary and very opportune assistance.

The casualties were 4 men wounded in Battery K, Fourth U. S. Artillery.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. E. RANDOLPH,

Captain 1st R. I. Arty., and Chief of Arty., 3rd A. C.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 2. ARTY. HDQRS., ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

January 15, 1864.

The following instructions and regulations for the artillery of this army, having been sanctioned by the general commanding, are published for the government of all concerned:

1. The responsibility of choosing the position for action devolves upon the commander of the artillery. If assigned to his position by the general officer under whose orders he is placed he will, to relieve himself from the responsibility, report to the latter its objectionable features, provided a better one can be found, and suggest the means necessary to improve or secure it.

2. In taking up a position, four points require especial attention:

I. The efficacy of fire of the battery.

II. Cover for the pieces from the enemy's fire.

III. The position of the rest of the troops.

IV. Facility of movement.

I. That the fire should be effective is in all cases the most important consideration, to which, as far as may be necessary, the second consideration must be sacrificed. For this purpose a clear view of the enemy is necessary, and judgment must be used in the selection of the different projectiles, according to the nature of the ground and the object to be attained. Concentration of fire, rather than its distribution, is of importance; hence the guns should be as much as possible so placed that their fire

may converge on important points, and should not be too much scattered over the field.

In a hilly or undulating country a moderate elevation, which gives a good view of the ground,

is the best position for artillery. Too much elevation should be avoided, since the fire is more

effective in proportion as the projectiles pass more closely to the ground. Ground covered

by bushes, trees, or other obstructions is not favorable to the use of artillery. It is advantageous

under all circumstances to fire at lines obliquely, and at columns in the direction of their

greatest depth. Against walls, the most effective projectile is solid shot. Shot and, in rare

cases, shell should be used against log stockades, barricades, &c., and for sweeping a wood--

to which latter purpose shrapnel and canister are not well adapted--and also against deep

columns of cavalry, taken in the prolongation of the column. There has been too much neglect

of solid-shot fire from the smooth-bore guns, and altogether too much dependence placed

upon shell. In the above cases percussion shell fired direct so as to act first as solid shot or,

at need, shrapnel without the fuse are the best for rifled field guns. Canister is to be employed

at close quarters. It is effective both from the wide spread of its balls and from the rapidity with

which it may be fired, accurate aiming not being necessary. Canister may be fired with great

advantage into the edge or skirts of a wood which is about to be charged by our infantry,

and against the flank of an enemy's battery at close quarters, under which circumstances the

canister-shot are very destructive to both men and horses. The prevailing tendency to the

use of canister is too great. Shrapnel may be considered as a long-range canister, the iron

case or shell carrying the bullets safely over the ground before distributing them. It should be

chiefly used against troops which are stationary or not moving rapidly, or directed

against fixed points over which an enemy is passing. Distances must be accurately judged, the projectiles carefully prepared, the fire slow and deliberate, and its effect well noted, with a view to the correction of errors. Shrapnel is too often wasted. Artillery officers should recollect that, although it is the most effective and powerful of projectiles if well used, it is also the most harmless and contemptible if used badly; that the elements of uncertainty in its effect are numerous, and therefore in its use nothing should be left to chance which can be made certain by care and attention. Shrapnel should never be fired rapidly, except against large and dense masses, and then solid shot would generally be better. An intelligent officer, or non-commissioned officer, should be detailed to watch the effect of each shot, and to report what correction appears necessary. When time presses and observation of the shrapnel fire is difficult, canister is preferable, if the range is such as to admit of its use. Shrapnel fire is very effective against lines of troops, columns, or batteries which are stationary upon open ground. It is not to be used against troops which are covered from view by the conformation of the ground, or by obstacles of any kind, except only when it is known that the enemy is stationed within a certain distance in the rear of a given obstacle, as in the case of field works, against the defenders of which shrapnel is effective. The allowance of shrapnel for the light 12-pounder gun is largely in excess of the ordinary requirements of bat-tie. By reference to the table for packing ammunition chests it will be seen that for the 12-pounder gun only eight shrapnel are allowed. In determining the proportion for the light 12-pounder gun the number was increased to twelve, because circumstances might arise which would make them useful, but it was expected that habitually one-third of them, at least, would be used as solid shot. Batteries should be as much as possible protected from sudden attack, either by their position or by troops posted near them. A position within rifle-range of a wood, or

other

cover which is not held by our own troops, is a bad one, and should not be taken if possible

to avoid it, since the enemy can occupy the cover, if only with sharpshooters, and pick off our

men and horses. Woods and other places of cover within the range of small-arms must therefore

be occupied by our own troops. Even on perfectly open ground the flanks of a battery must be

protected from assaults. Its front can take care of itself; and hence it follows that the supports

of batteries should never be placed behind them, nor amongst the carriages, but always on the

flanks, either on the prolongation of the line of the battery, or, if cover can be secured, in advance

or rear of that prolongation; but always within easy supporting distance and no closer, so that the

fire directed on the battery may not injure its supporting troops. Although artillery, as a rule,

must protect itself against attacks from the front, yet if such attacks are made by a heavy force,

either in successive lines or in column, and with determination and persistence, the supporting

troops should, if practicable, wheel forward their outward flanks, so that their cross-fire may

sweep the ground in front of the battery, and may then charge vigorously with the bayonet, the

commander of the supports having previously arranged with the commander of the battery for

a suspension of the artillery fire. The enemy having been driven off, the supports will at once

fall back toward the flanks so as to unmask the fire of the battery.

II. Artillery should, whenever practicable without undue detriment to its offensive powers, seek

positions in which it may be protected from the enemy's fire, or concealed from his observation.

The best natural cover is that afforded by the crest of hills which slope gently toward the enemy.

The guns should be placed behind them with their muzzles looking over the top. The limbers

and caissons will thus be entirely concealed. Cover which makes splinters when struck by shot, such as masonry, wood stacks, &c., is objectionable. Artificial cover may be obtained by sinking the piece. This is done by making an excavation for it to stand in. The excavation should be one foot and a half deep in front, and should slope gently upward toward the rear. The earth is to be thrown up in front to the height of about one foot and a half. Ditches may be dug at the sides for the men. This system of sinking the piece is used with advantage behind the edge of a hill, as it permits the piece to be brought closer to the crest and enables it the better to sweep the ground. Good drainage should always be secured. Next to the protection of the guns, that of the caissons and limbers is of importance. Where the batteries are frequently moving the limbers cannot be put under cover, but must remain close in rear of the pieces. Where so situated that they are not likely to require movements greater than can be effected by hand, as on a defensive line, or in position, a caisson body for each piece, or even one for each section, may be partially protected near the guns by digging trenches of one spade width, for the wheels only, so as to sink them to the axles, all the limbers with their horses being placed under cover if it can be found within reasonable distance of the position of the battery. Each section should load from one caisson-body until the latter is empty, when it should be replaced and sent to the ammunition train to be replenished. Neither caissons nor limbers must, under any circumstances, be so far separated from their guns as to be beyond the prompt control of the battery commander.

III. The third consideration in posting artillery is the position of the rest of the troops. In general, the movements and positions of the infantry and cavalry determine the position for

action of the artillery, which usually places itself on the flanks of the other troops, or between their intervals where it is secure itself and can fire for the longest period of time.

A position in advance of other troops is very objectionable, especially in advance of cavalry.

Cases occur, however, in which it cannot be avoided, those cases being, in general, when the action of the artillery is of primary importance, and there is no suitable position

for it elsewhere. When a line of battle is established, on which infantry is to receive an attack, it is often strengthened by artificial means. A rifle-pit is dug, or barricades of wood

constructed, or advantage is taken of stone walls, &c. In such cases the artillery should be

placed immediately on the line, preferably on advanced points, or in flanking positions,

if such offer, so that it can be used freely, and fire canister at need. This it cannot do if posted, as is too often the case, behind the line so as to fire over the troops. For the reasons

already given, the guns when so posted should not be placed behind wood or stone barricades.

Such cover should be removed and the pieces sunk as already directed, or earth parapets

placed in front of them. It may be laid down as a rule that artillery should not fire over our own

troops. For this there are three good reasons: Accidents are liable to happen to the troops from

projectiles; it embarrasses their advance by battering the ground in front of them, and obliging

them to hold back until the fire can be stopped or its range extended; it makes the men over

whom the projectiles are passing uneasy, and may demoralize them. When it becomes necessary

to fire over troops, solid shot and, in rare cases, shell should be used, and not canister nor

shrapnel; the latter projectile being liable to burst too soon, and to carry destruction among

those over whose heads it was intended to pass.

IV. It is of importance that every position assumed by artillery should afford facilities for free movement in every direction, in order that such new positions may be taken up as circumstances may require. When this is not the case, care must at

least be taken that the safety of the guns is not compromised. When the position is to be held to the last extremity, strong supports should be furnished and the guns fought to the last, so that if lost it shall be with honor. If the position is not to be so held, and the nature of the ground will permit, prolonges must be fixed that the battery may be fought retiring with the other troops. When it is likely that a position will be carried and its defense will not justify the loss of guns, they must, if the nature of the ground will not admit of the use of the prolonge, be limbered up and retired in due season under the protection of their supports. A battery may often be retired by sections, and half batteries under the protection of its own fire alone. Whenever a battery takes post, the means of moving it to the front, the flanks, or the rear must be studied by its commander, and, if necessary, walls and fences torn down and ditches filled up, so that no unexpected obstacles may hinder its freedom of movement in any direction. It is a disgrace to an artillery officer if a gun, or even an opportunity of rendering service, should be lost through a neglect or want of forethought on his part. Guns may be honorably lost, especially if their sacrifice is necessary to the safety of other troops. But in all such cases the enemy should be made to pay dearly for them.

3. Objects of fire: It is too much the tendency of artillery to fire at artillery. In the beginning of a battle the artillery should direct its fire wherever the enemy seems most exposed to danger. When the battle is further advanced, if our own troops are about to repel an attack, that portion of the enemy's force is to be fired on whose attack is the most dangerous for the time being. If we are acting on the offensive, the guns must fire on that portion of the enemy whose resistance is the most formidable. When acting on the defensive the enemy's infantry and cavalry are the most proper objects of fire. Artillery fire is to be concentrated on single points rather than divided between numerous objects, notwithstanding that such a division or distribution of the fire may cause a greater absolute loss to the enemy. It is not the number of killed and wounded that decides a battle, but the panic and demoralization of those who remain; and this panic and demoralization are much sooner created and spread by concentrating the artillery fire on successive points than by distributing it over a wide space. The general rule is that artillery should concentrate its fire upon that part of the enemy's force which,

from its position, or from its character, it is the most desirable to overthrow. Against an enemy's battery the fire should be concentrated on a single piece until that is disabled, and should then be turned upon another, and an analogous plan should generally be followed in firing upon infantry and cavalry. When firing upon a hostile column the guns are to be directed at its center. If the column is in the act of deploying the flank toward which the deployment is being made is to be fired on with canister or shrapnel. As a general rule artillery should not fire upon skirmishers or small groups of men. It is too much the habit to open fire on wagons or single horsemen, or small parties, and sometimes, as in almost all cases of shelling woods, on a mere suspicion that an enemy may be in a certain locality. This is a perversion of artillery from its proper duties, which are to destroy material obstacles and disorganize masses of men, so as to make them an easy prey to the other arms. A successful fire upon individuals, or even on small bodies, produces no adequate result, and may be compared to picket shooting, which scarcely rises above the level of murder.

4. Expenditure of ammunition: One of the evil effects of firing at small bodies is the waste of ammunition. Rapid firing at large bodies and opening at long ranges are additional causes of waste. In small skirmishes between 300 and 400 rounds per battery are expended; the fire, according to the reports, frequently averaging, and sometimes exceeding, one round per minute for each gun. In general engagements batteries have been known to expend all the ammunition in their chests in a little over an hour and a half. An officer who expends ammunition in this manner proves his ignorance of the proper use of his arm, and a want of capacity for the command of a battery. He also incurs a heavy responsibility by throwing a whole battery out of use, and should be held to answer for the consequences. There has been an improvement in this respect, but there is still too great a consumption of ammunition. It is not so much the loss of the ammunition that should be considered--limited as is the amount which an army can transport--as the loss of effect from too distant and too rapid firing. In no case, except when firing canister at short ranges, should the rate exceed one round from each gun in two minutes; and that rate should only be reached at critical moments, when the distance, numbers, and formation of the enemy are such that the fire is sure to be effective. At all other times one round in four to six minutes is as rapid firing as should

be permitted. The value of the rifled cannon consists principally in its accuracy.

Accuracy

requires careful pointing, with close observation of the effect, and these require time.

Twelve shots in an hour at an object over 1,000 yards distant, the time being spent in careful loading and pointing, will produce better results than fifty shots will

ordinarily

produce from the same gun in the same time. If a heavy artillery fire is required it should be

obtained not by rapid firing, but by bringing a large number of guns into action, and firing

each with the greatest accuracy attainable. The campaign allowance is calculated to suffice

for a general action and the combats which usually precede it; and, under ordinary circumstances, an officer who expends all his ammunition in a few hours renders himself

liable to the suspicion that his reckless expenditure was prompted by a desire to quit the

field. In future, batteries will not be permitted to leave their positions under this plea.

The

guns and cannoneers will remain on the ground until ammunition is furnished them.

As

soon as one caisson from each section has been emptied the empty caissons will be sent to the rear, under charge of a non-commissioned officer, to replenish at the ammunition train. At a time when all the resources of the country are taxed to the utmost

to provide the army and navy with munitions of war, the non-effective expenditure of ammunition, in addition to other evils, diminishes greatly the efficiency of fire to which

the artillery might attain; for the consequent excessive demand gives us, in many instances,

imperfectly made and hastily inspected projectiles, instead of carefully manufactured and

approved ones.

5. The custom which obtains in some batteries of bringing from the ammunition-chests

a number of rounds and placing them near the gun on the ground is a bad one, and is positively prohibited. It not only leads to too rapid firing, but in case of a sudden movement of the battery this ammunition is apt to be left on the ground, as it requires time properly to repack it.

6. Opening fire: That the enemy is within range is not a sufficient reason for firing upon him. The fire is not to be commenced until the enemy is within effective range--that is, so near that at least one-quarter of the shots are hits. Firing at too great a distance wastes ammunition which will be wanted at the critical moments of the battle, and emboldens the enemy's troops by giving them a contemptuous idea of the effects of our fire. Frederick the Great, in his instructions on this subject, says: It sometimes happens that the general in command, or some other general, is himself forgetful, and orders the fire to be opened too soon, without considering what injurious consequences may result from it. In such a case the artillery officer must certainly obey, but he should fire as slowly as possible and point the pieces with the utmost accuracy, in order that his shots may not be thrown away. Such a fire is only pardonable when the general wishes to attract the enemy's attention to one point so as to make movements in another. But in such a case as this the object of the fire should be explained to the artillery officer. Accuracy of fire is of more importance than quickness. The fire should be slow while the enemy is at a distance, is to be quicker as the distance diminishes, and is to become rapid when canister shot is being fired at effective ranges. There are moments in which we should not fire, or only very slowly, and others of a critical nature in which there should be no question of saving of ammunition but the latter are only of short duration and do not lead to a lavish expenditure, while the inefficient constant fire at long ranges always has that effect. A careful record will be kept of the amount and kinds of ammunition used.

7. After an engagement the commander of each battery must use all diligence in putting it into a condition to march and to fight. He will replace disabled horses, fill up his ammunition-chests, make whatever repairs his means will permit, and, if necessary, reassign officers and men, so as to be ready for service at the earliest possible moment. This will be done before he sleeps. He will also present to the commander of the artillery

brigade to which he belongs a field return, showing the number of effective officers and men, of guns, caissons, and horses, the amount of ammunition expended, and what he has on hand after replenishing his chests. The field return will give the names of officers killed and disabled, and those for duty, and will be made each night of a battle lasting more than one day. The field returns of batteries will be at once consolidated by the commander of the brigade, who will use all the means at his disposal to complete the batteries for service. He will note his action on the consolidated returns and transmit them to the chief of artillery of the army for his information, and to enable him to provide at once for all deficiencies. When a general action is fought the batteries should be refitted and ready to take the field at dawn of the ensuing day, even with a reduced number of guns.

8. As soon after the action as possible a general return of the losses Of men and material, and a separate report of the fight, will be presented to the commanders of artillery brigades for transmittal to the chief of artillery. The return should contain a specification of the men and horses killed and disabled, giving the names of the killed and wounded officers and men and dates of death of whatever has been made unserviceable or has been injured; of whatever has been expended, lost, or damaged, distinguishing what has fallen into the hands of the enemy; and, under the head of remarks, should call attention to all defects of material and of ammunition noticed, and should suggest proper remedies. The report, which is in addition to that required by the commander of the troops with which it serves, should briefly describe the participation of the battery in the engagement, as far as may be necessary for understanding the part taken by it; the special instructions communicated; its position, with a statement of the neighboring troops; the nature of the enemy's troops against which its fire was directed; the distances of fire; the kind of projectiles used; the effect remarked; the reasons why positions were changed; the behavior of the men, and, without regard to rank, who distinguished himself; and, lastly, all important circumstances observed in its neighborhood. If sections or half batteries were detached, it is to be specified by whose order and for what purpose they were so detached. Separate reports should be prepared by the commanders of pieces so detached. They are to be annexed, in original, to the narrative of the commander of the battery.

9. When more than one battery is engaged, the brigade commander should also forward a general account of the operations of the artillery, mentioning specially those who distinguished themselves. He will also consolidate and tabulate the returns of losses of men and material of his corps.

10. Commanders of each brigade of artillery will see that the inspections prescribed by the General Regulations, paragraph 104, are regularly made. He will himself inspect each battery once in each month, and make a report of the inspection in the prescribed printed form to the chief of artillery of the army. The inspection will be made as early in the month as practicable, and will extend to all the points embraced in the forms, in which all blanks will be properly filled. This inspection report will accompany the monthly return.

11. A monthly return of each battery, according to the form furnished from this office, will be made on the first of each month to the brigade commander. The returns of each corps will be consolidated, and the consolidated return sent to the office of the chief of artillery. Should any battery be detached, so that its returns are not received within three days by the brigade commander, he will enter its name with the reasons for its absence in the column of remarks, and forward the consolidated returns by the third of the month at latest. As soon as the return is received from the absent battery, it will be forwarded to the office of the chief of artillery, entered on the consolidated return, and returned to the commandant. Requisitions for horses and ordnance stores will also be transmitted with the monthly return. Except in cases of exigency, such requisitions will be sent in at no other time.

12. Commandants of artillery will watch over and check the extravagant expenditure of ordnance stores, and take the necessary measures to cause instructions to be given regularly to officers and non-commissioned officers in all their duties. A regular course of instruction for officers and non-commissioned officers will be established whilst in winter quarters. These recitations will embrace the tactics, orders, &c., in force, and also the subject of ammunition, its description, and mode of preparation. Special attention should be called to the study of Articles IV and V of the Instructions for Field Artillery.

13. On marches no supplies or baggage whatever, except the knapsacks of cannoneers, articles authorized by regulations, and, when circumstances absolutely require it, two days' forage of grain and hay (twisted) will be allowed on artillery carriages, nor will

any
article be placed on the spare wheels. Brigade commanders will be responsible for the enforcement of this order, and will in their respective commands cause all articles placed
on artillery carriages, contrary to this order, to be thrown off.

14. On level, good roads, when it will not add sensibly to the labor of the horses, a portion of the cannoneers, not to exceed two to the piece and four to the caisson, may be allowed to ride, but no man shall be allowed to ride longer than half an hour at a time. If the roads are bad or pass over rolling ground no one shall, under any circumstances, be allowed to mount the chests, except the artificers who work in camp for whom the limber-chests of the forge and battery wagon are reserved. Cannoneers may from time to time change places with the drivers. The sick, unable to march, must be carried in ambulances, or as may be otherwise provided. The chests will be mounted only by order of the commander of the battery, or by his authority delegated to chiefs of sections. On approaching a hill the men so mounted will, without waiting for orders, dismount. On the march batteries will never stop to water. It delays the column behind them. The cannoneers will remain near their pieces, and when an obstacle presents itself will be called to the front at once to remove it, fill up mud holes, repair bridges, &c. An officer, or intelligent non-commissioned officer, should always precede the column so far as to enable him to return and notify the commandant of any obstructions. When it is probable that there will be a delay of ten minutes or more the drivers should be dismounted and the pole props let down. When, from any cause, a carriage on the march is unable to proceed it will immediately be drawn out of the column, and the carriages behind it will pass and close up, so as not to delay the movement of the troops.

15. When not on the march, and battery drills are not practicable, the battery horses will, when the weather permits, be exercised daily.

By command of Brigadier-General Hunt:

**JNO. N. CRAIG,
Assistant Adjutant-General.**

**ARTILLERY HDQRS., ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
March 14, 1864.**

I. You will at once take the necessary steps to put your brigade in condition to take the field, and for this purpose direct requisition for the necessary number of horses and other materials to be made out.

II. Should you consider it advisable, the number of horses in a six-gun battery may be carried up to 116, and for a four-gun battery 88, but the number of spare horses should not be carried beyond the possible wants, as the supplies for the number we have are limited.

III. The ammunition should, so far as practicable, be made to conform to the proportions directed in General Orders, No. 5, of 1863, from these headquarters, viz, 12 to 16 solid shot, 12 to 8 shrapnel, 4 shell, 4 canister to each chest for 12-pounders; 25 to 30 shell, 20 to 15 shrapnel, 5 canister to each chest for rifle guns.

IV. Care should be also taken that both Hotchkiss and Schenkl shell, or Hotchkiss and Schenkl shrapnel, should not be used in the same battery. Where such mixtures have taken place the batteries should exchange with each other and with the train, and reduce so far as possible the kind of ammunition which they do not habitually use.

There is scarcely any occasion on which the percussion-fuse is not superior to the time-fuse shell. It would be a good rule to use only the percussion. Every effort is now being made to provide a concussion shell for the light 12-pounder to supersede the time-fuse.

V. When requisitions are hereafter made for one kind of ammunition another kind will not be received until it is ascertained that the Artillery Reserve train cannot furnish it, nor even then, except in very urgent cases, will a different kind of ammunition be received than that asked for.

VI. By a circular from these headquarters, dated December 17, 1863, paragraph I, you were notified that a supply of new canister for light 12-pounders had been ordered (72 3-ounce balls to the canister), and you were requested to make requisition for it at a rate not to exceed 10 rounds per gun. Will you please state in

your report of your train if such canister has been received, and call special attention to it with a view of obtaining a report as to its efficiency in our next battles?

VII. When proper ground can be found in the vicinity of a corps, a course of target practice should be entered upon, of which careful records should be kept and a copy sent to these headquarters. (See Article XI, page 16, Revised Regulations.) In this practice batteries should use only the kind of ammunition they use in battle.

Application

must be made to the chief of artillery for permission to practice, stating the day and hour at which it is to commence, in order that notice may be given to the other corps and to prevent alarm.

VIII. The trains will be immediately inspected, and a report of their condition and that of the ammunition made to the chief of artillery, in order, if there are deficiencies, that steps be taken to supply them.

The allowance of wagons is as follows: Brigade headquarters, two wagons; brigade medical department, one wagon; brigade transportation of subsistence for sales to officers, one wagon; each four-gun battery, four wagons; each six-gun battery, five wagons; to every twenty-five ammunition wagons, five additional ones for transportation of forage for the teams.

By command of Brigadier-General Hunt:

JNO. N. CRAIG,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

(To chiefs of corps artillery, artillery reserve, and horse brigades.)

Report of Lieutenant Colonel Richard H. Jackson, Assistant Inspector-General, U. S. Army, Commanding Artillery, July 10.

MORRIS ISLAND, S. C., July 11, 1863.

GENERAL: In accordance with verbal instructions, I have the honor to report the part taken by the batteries under my command in the action of the 10th instant.

Agreeably to Special Orders, Numbers 174, dated Headquarters U. S. Forces, Folly Island, S. C., July 8, 1863, I assumed chief command of all the batteries

on the north end of Folly Island on the 9th instant, and immediately inspected and prepared them for action. They were constituted as follows:

First line.- Four 3-inch rifled guns, served by Captain Brayton's light company, Third Rhode Island Artillery; four 20-pounder Parrotts, served by Captain Strahan's company, Third Rhode Island Artillery; four 30-pounder Parrotts, served by Company C, First U. S. Artillery; eighth 30-pounder Parrotts, served by Captain Shaw's company, Third Rhode Island Artillery; six 10-pounder Parrotts, served by Light Company E, Third U. S. Artillery; six 10-inch siege mortars, served by Captain Greene's company, Third Rhode Island Artillery; four 10-inch siege mortars, served by Captain Comstock's company, Third Rhode Island Artillery. Total first line, twenty-six rifled guns and ten mortars.

Second line.- Six Wiard guns, served by Light Battery F, Third New York Volunteer Artillery; five 8-inch siege mortars, served by Lieutenant Holbrook's company, Third Rhode Island Artillery. Total second line, six Wiard guns and five mortars.

Grand total, thirty-two rifled guns and five mortars.

The duty in the magazines was performed by skillful men detailed for that purpose from Company C, First U. S. Artillery. The firing commenced at 5 a. m. and lasted until about 8 a. m., when the heights and batteries of the enemy were so gallantly carried by the infantry under your command. The crushing effect of a concentrated and well-directed fire of artillery, so much in favor with artillery officers, has never been better illustrated than in this action.

The enemy at the commencement was so bewildered as to be unable to serve his guns with effect, and the rain of shot and shell from my batteries was so incessant and effective as to drive his gunners from their pieces, killing and wounding many. His infantry were also prevented from taking up their position in the strong rifle-pits about 800 yards in advance of our batteries, and never attempted to occupy them until our troops were disembarked on Morris Island, which occurred about 8 a. m.

As our infantry moved up the slopes of the sand ridges to carry the enemy's position, I directed the officers in command of the 10-inch mortar batteries and 20 and 30 pounder Parrotts to fire over the head of the leading column and over the hills in front, in order to prevent the assembling of the enemy's infantry for the purpose of opposing our troops when they would have crowned the heights. I am happy to say that the fire over the heads of our own men. As soon as I perceived the enemy's infantry preparing to oppose General Strong's

advance, the fire of eleven pieces on the left of the first line was directed upon them, with good effect, and did much to facilitate the advance.

During the action, I had to cut away and enlarge many of the embrasures in order to obtain a large field of fire. Lieutenant Michie, of the engineer corps, performed this duty admirably, under the enemy's fire.

In walking through the enemy's batteries and over his position, after the action, I was much gratified to observe with how much skill and accuracy both officers and gunners must have directed the fire of their pieces, from the manner in which the earthworks were torn to pieces and from the number of killed and wounded by shot and shell.

As near as could be ascertained, the number of projectiles expended during the action was 2,500.

I have had only two casualties, severely wounded. They occurred in Captain Shaw's company, Third Rhode Island Artillery, from the premature discharge of a piece.

Captain L. L. Langdon, First Artillery, and Lieutenant J. P. Farley, ordnance corps, had the immediate direction of the first line, and Major J. E. Bailey, Third Rhode Island Artillery, of the second, and performed their duty entirely to my satisfaction; but as all the officers and men behaved with so much zeal and coolness, I am unable to select any for special commendation. I desire to say, though, that should my services be deemed necessary in any future operations on Morris Island it will give me great pleasure to command the same batteries again.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. H. JACKSON,

Captain 1st Art., Lieutenant Colonel, and A. I. G., 10th Army Corps.

**Reports of Brigadier General John W. Turner, U. S. Army,
Chief of Artillery, including bombardment of Fort Sumter.**

**HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH, OFFICE CHIEF OF
ARTILLERY,
Morris Island, S. C., September 8, 1863.**

GENERAL: I have the honor to transmit the following general report of the artillery operations on Morris Island from the 26th day of July 1863, when, in

obedience to your orders, I assumed the direction of them, to the 7th day of September, when our flag was successfully planted on the enemy's works at Fort Wagner and Battery Gregg:

After the failure of the assault upon Fort Wagner on the 18th of July, it was determined by the commanding general to proceed to the erection of breaching batteries against Fort Sumter upon ground then within our possession, and as the work required upon them would nearly, if not quite, consume the entire labor of the command, the approaches to Wagner were not to be pushed till the completion of the batteries should render the labor of the troops available for this purpose.

The selection of the ground for the location of the batteries being determined upon, work was commenced upon them on the night of the 24th of July, and from this date steadily progressed day and night, with the labor of mounting guns, supplying magazines with implements and ammunition, till all were completed.

The batteries, commencing on the right, ran around to the left, as follows:

BATTERY BROWN.

On right of second parallel, near the beach; distance from Fort Sumter, 3,560 yards; from Battery Gregg, 2,170 yards; from fort Wagner, 830 yards.

Armament.-Two 8-inch Parrott rifles.

Garrison.-Company I, Third Rhode Island Heavy Artillery, commanded by Captain Charles G. Strahan, Third Rhode Island Heavy Artillery.

BATTERY ROSECRANS.

Near left of second parallel; distance from Fort Sumer, 3,500 yards; from Battery Gregg, 2,110 yards; from Fort Wagner, 830 yards.

Armament.-Three 100-pounder Parrott rifles.

Garrison.-Company M, Third Rhode Island Heavy Artillery, and a detachment of the One hundred and seventy-eighth New York Volunteer Infantry, commanded by Captain J. J. Comstock, jr., Third Rhode Island Heavy Artillery.

BATTERY MEADE.

Near left of second parallel, in front of Battery Rosecrans; distance from Fort Sumter, 3,457 yards; from Battery Gregg, 2,085 yards; from Fort Wagner, 820 yards.

Armament.-Two 100-pounder Parrott rifles.

Garrison.-Detachments from Third Rhode Island Heavy Artillery, One hundredth New York Volunteers, and One hundred and seventy-eighth New York Volunteer Infantry, commanded by First Lieutenant Henry Holbrook, Third Rhode Island

Heavy Artillery, and after his death by First Lieutenant A. E. Greene Third Rhode Island Heavy Artillery.

NAVAL BATTERY.

Center of first parallel, 200 yards north of Beacon House; distance from Fort Sumter, 3,980 yards; from Battery Gregg, 2,590 yards; from Fort Wagner, 1,335 yards.

Armament.-Two 8-inch Parrott rifles and two 80-pounder Whitworths.

Garrison.-Detachment of sailors from the U. S. frigate Wabash, commanded by Commander Foxhall A. Parker, U. S. Navy.

BATTERY HAYS.

On creek, 312 yards west of Beacon House; distance from Fort Sumter, 4,225 yards; from Battery Gregg, 2,850 yards; from Fort Wagner, 1,710 yards.

Armament.-One 8-inch Parrot rifle.

Garrison.-Detachment of Company D. Third Rhode Island Heavy Artillery, commanded by Captain R. G. Shaw, Third Rhode Island Heavy Artillery.

BATTERY RENO.

On creek, 135 yards west of Battery Hays, in sand ridge; distance from Fort Sumter, 4,320 yards; from Battery Gregg, 2,950 yards; from Fort Wagner, 1,860 yards.

Armament.-One 8-inch Parrott rifle and two 100-pounder Parrott rifles.

Garrison.-Company H, Third Rhode Island Heavy Artillery, and a detachment of the One hundred and seventy-eighth New York Volunteer Infantry, commanded by Captain A. W. Colwell, Third Rhode Island Heavy Artillery.

BATTERY STEVENS.

Immediately to the left of Battery Reno; distance from Fort Sumter, 4,320 yards; from Battery Gregg, 2,950 yards; from Fort Wagner, 1,860 yards.

Armament.-Two 100-pounder Parrott rifles.

Garrison.-Detachments Company C, First U. S. Artillery, and Seventh Connecticut Volunteer Infantry, commanded by First Lieutenant James E. Wilson, Fifth U. S. Artillery.

BATTERY STRONG.

Immediately to left of Battery Stevens; distance from Fort Sumter, 4,345 yards; from Battery Gregg, 2,950 yards; from Fort Wagner, 1,900 yards.

Armament.-One 10-inch Parrott rifle.

Garrison.-Detachment Seventh Connecticut Volunteer Infantry, commanded by Captain S. H. Gray, Seventh Connecticut Volunteer Infantry.

BATTERY KIRBY.

One hundred yards to the left of Battery Strong; distance from Fort Sumter, 4,400 yards, from Battery Gregg, 3,000 yards; from Fort Wagner, 1,960 yards.

Armament.-Two 10-inch seacoast mortars.

Garrison.-Detachment Eleventh Maine Infantry, commanded by First Lieutenant Charles Sellmer, Eleventh Maine Volunteer Infantry.

Most of this heavy artillery had been brought from Hilton Head, and all of it landed on this island since the 24th of July. The place of landing for our artillery, and, indeed, of all our supplies, was at the south end of Morris Island, in Light-House Inlet, a narrow, confined stream, approached from the sea only through a crooked, narrow channel, and over a bar admitting at high water vessels of only 8 and 10 feet draught. Nearly one-half the time there was no ingress or egress to the inlet, and much valuable time was lost in waiting for high water, on which to float our transports over the bar.

Where we landed our artillery on Morris Island to our batteries was a distance varying from 1 1/2 to 2 miles. This entire distance was heavy sand, through which all the guns were dragged into position by troops at night. Seventh heavy guns were thus dragged to the immediate front of Fort Wagner, put in position, equipped, magazines filled, and the batteries served for seven days, through within half range of seven heavy pieces of artillery with which that place was garnished and within 400 yards of their sharpshooters, with their whole front covered with marksmen armed with telescopic rifles of extraordinary power.

On the evening of the 16th of August, a sufficient number of batteries being completed and in readiness to warrant the opening of the bombardment, final orders were issued to open fire upon Fort Sumter at daybreak on the morning of the 17th from all the batteries which were completed, opening the other batteries as fast as they were finished.

Accordingly, on the morning of the 17th Battery Brown opened with one 8-inch, throwing shell. A gunner's gimlet having been accidentally broken off in the vent of the other piece of this battery, its service was lost for three days while drilling it out.

Battery Rosecrans, one gun throwing shell and the other two shot.

Battery Meade, both pieces throwing shell.

Naval Battery, the Parrotts throwing shell and the Whitworths shot.

Fire was opened in the first instance from the Whitworths with shell, but the frequent instances of premature explosion which occurred made it necessary to abandon the use of shell entirely.

Battery Hays, one 8-inch, throwing shot.
Battery Kirby, throwing mortar shell.

On the morning of the 18th, there was added to this fire from
Battery Reno, one 8-inch, throwing shell; one 100-pounder throwing shell and
100-pounder throwing shot.

On the 19th---
Battery Stevens, one 100-pounder, throwing shell.

On the 20th, all our guns were in operation, adding to the fire of the 19th.
Battery Brown, one 8-inch, throwing shot.
Battery Stevens, one 100-pounder, throwing shot.
Battery Strong, one 10-inch, throwing both shot and shell.

The following batteries had also been erected with the view of keeping down the
enemy's fire which was to be expected from Fort Wagner and Battery Gregg when
we should open our breaching batteries upon Fort Sumter.

BATTERY HAYS.

On creek, 312 yards west of Breacon House; distance from Battery Gregg, 2,950
yards; from Fort Wagner, 1,830 yards.

Armament.-Seventh 30-pounder Parrot rifles.

Garrison.-Detachment Company D, Third Rhode Island Heavy Artillery, commanded
by Captain R. G. Shaw, Third Rhode Island Heavy Artillery.

BATTERY WEED.

In rear of first parallel, 125 yards; distance from Fort Wagner, 1,460 yards.

Armament.-Five 10-inch siege mortars.

Garrison.-Detachments Companies H and D, Seventh Connecticut Volunteer
Infantry, commanded by Captain B. F. Skinner, Seventh Connecticut Volunteer
Infantry.

BATTERY REYNOLDS.

In first parallel, distance from Fort Wagner, 1,335 yards.

Armament.-Five 10-inch siege mortars.

Garrison.-Company b, Third Rhode Island Heavy Artillery, and detachment One
hundred and seventy-eighth New York Volunteer Infantry, commanded by Captain
A. E. Greene, Third Rhode Island Heavy Artillery.

BATTERY KEARNY.

On extreme left of second parallel, next to creek; distance from Fort Wagner,

720 yards; from Battery Gregg, 1,955 yards.

Armament.-Three 30-pounder Parrott rifles.

Garrison.-Detachments Companies C and K, Seventh Connecticut Volunteer Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant S. S. Atwell, Seventh Connecticut Volunteer Infantry.

Besides the above-mentioned guns, there were in position in the second parallel, at a distance of 885 yards from Wagner, eight field guns for defensive purposes, to repel sorties, viz:

Four 12-pounder howitzers of Light Company B, First U. S. Artillery, Lieutenant Guy V. Henry, First U. S. Artillery, commanding, and manned by detachments from Company B, First U. S. Artillery, and Light Company E, Third U. S. Artillery; two 12-pounder Napoleon guns of Light Company F, Third New York Artillery, Captain James E. Ashcroft commanding, and two 12-pounder Wiards, of Light Company B, Third New York Artillery, Lieutenant Paul Berchmire commanding.

The fire from the breaching batteries upon Sumter was incessant, and kept up continuously from daylight till dark, until the evening of the 23rd. For five days all the guns were directed upon the gorge wall, and had resulted in bringing it down to such an extent that on the evening of the 21st a practicable breach had been accomplished. On the morning of the 22nd, the fire from Batteries Meade, Rosecrans, and Brown was directed upon the parapet of the southeasterly face, or right flank, of the work, with the view of dismounting the guns on the barbette of this face, which commanded the entrance to harbor, as well as to destroy the guns on the orth easterly face, which this fire would take in reverse. The fire upon the gorge had, by the morning of the 23rd, succeeded in destroying every gun upon the parapet of it, and, as far as could be observed, had disabled or dismounted all the guns upon the parapet of the two faces looking toward the city, which it had taken in reverse. The parapet and ramparts of the gorge were completely demolished for nearly the entire length of the face, and in places everything was swept off down to the arches, the debris forming an accessible ramp to the top of the ruins. Nothing further being gained this day upon the southeasterly flank, and continued an incessant fire throughout the day. The demolition of the fort at the close of this day's firing was complete, so far as its offensive powers were considered. Every gun upon the parapets was either dismounted or seriously damaged; the terre-plein for the entire circuit of the place must have been shattered and plowed up by our projectiles, hundred of which had been sent to strike upon it. The parapet could be seen in many places, both on the sea and channel faces, completely torn away down to the terre-plein; the place, in fine, was a ruin, and

effectually disabled for any immediate defense of the harbor of Charleston. Having accomplished the end proposed, orders were accordingly issued on the evening of the 23rd for the firing to cease, having been continuously sustained for seven days. There had been thrown 5,009 projectiles, of which about one-half had struck the fort.

The labor required for the service of these heavy guns for such a long period of continuous firing was very great, and at its termination both officers and men were nearly exhausted. The zeal they displayed and the manner in which they performed their duties throughout entitle them to much credit. The battery commanders are deserving of especial mention for the interest and attention which they gave to their duties and for their efforts to attain that accuracy of fire so essential to success, and which, with the service of rifled guns in the field, is attained only by unremitted attention.

Lieutenant Henry Hobrook, Third Rhode Island Artillery, commanding Battery Meade, was mortally wounded in his battery, on the 19th by a fragment of a shell. He had been the first selected from the subordinates of his regiment to command a battery, and had proved himself an energetic, zealous, and brave soldier.

The loss in the batteries during the seven days was 1 commissioned officer and 12 enlisted men wounded, and 3 men killed.

The immense labor of landing all this heavy artillery, putting it in position, equipping the batteries, and supplying them with ammunition and projectiles, was under the supervision of Captain Alfred Mordecai, ordnance department, to whose untiring industry, energy, and ability you are indebted for so speedy a completion of your batteries.

Lieutenant James E. Wilson, Fifth U. S. Artillery, had the immediate charge of mounting guns, and rendered most efficient service in this particular. He was engaged every night for over a month on this laborious duty.

A detachment of Company C, First U. S. Artillery, have been invaluable in the experience which they possessed in handling ordnance and ordnance stores, and magazine work; their attention to duty and their industry do them great credit.

From the 23rd of August till the 30th, a desultory fire was kept up on Sumter, to prevent repairs and hinder the enemy from mounting guns.

On the 30th, a severe cannonade was opened, and continued during the day and the 31st, at the request of the commanding officer of the naval forces, who had in view to enter the harbor on the night of the 31st. This fire destroyed every vestige of a gun or carriage left on the parapet of the work.

During this period, our approaches toward Fort Wagner had progressed rapidly, and were, on the evening of the 4th of September, within 150 yards of the ditch. A battery of four 8-inch siege mortars and three Coehorns had been established in the fifth parallel, at a distance of 250 yards from the enemy's works, and one of two 10-inch siege mortars at a distance of 500 yards. Captain B. F. Skinner, Seventh Connecticut, commanded the 8-inch mortars, and Captain J. Ben. Dennis, Seventh Connecticut, the 10-inch.

At this period of our operations, the great disadvantage under which we labored from the want of development in our attack was most severely felt, in limiting, as it did, our artillery fire, and enabling the enemy in corresponding degree to keep up his, as well as to keep his front line with sharpshooters. Unable to establish batteries on the flanks of our approachers, we were left to the only resource of using our guns over the heads of our own troops and working parties at the front. This led to repeated and unfortunate accidents, as, when a rifled shot would prematurely explode or capsize, or the brass ring at the base would strip off, it would almost always injure some one among the thickly crowded troops in the trenches, and obliged us to suspend this fire almost entirely. We replaced it, as far as our means would allow, by a vertical fire, but the enemy, despite it, brought his artillery, with a formidable fire of sharpshooters, to bear with fury upon the head of our sap, which, together with the want of earth for cover, about stopped further progress.

A consultation was here held with the commanding general and the assistant engineer in charge of operations at the front, in which it was determined to bombard the place again in conjunction with the naval force, if this plan should be agreed upon by the commanding officer of the squadron, and if, after thirty hours' bombardment it should appear to be justifiable, to follow it by an assault.

In conference with the commanding officer of the naval forces, it was agreed upon to put the Ironsides into the attack upon Wagner, which would bring a battery of eight heavy guns into action; the monitors to prevent the success of the place during the night after the first day's bombardment, to interrupt communication between Forts Wagner and Gregg, and to engage Wagner just previous to the assault.

Accordingly, at daylight on the morning of the 5th of September, all the troops but a picket guard being withdrawn to the rear of the batteries, our artillery opened fire.

The following pieces of artillery were brought into action: One 10-inch rifle; four 8-inch rifles, nine 100-pounder rifles; ten 30-pounder rifles; ten 10-inch siege mortars; four 8-inch siege mortars, and three Coehorn mortars.

The 30-pounder Parrotts were used principally to intercept communication between Wagner and Gregg. The heavy guns, with the exception of two 8-inch in Battery Brown, were directed upon the bomb-proof. Battery Brown was used upon the left flank of the enemy's works extending down to the sea; the vertical fire searched the fort from right to left, and the Ironsides took it in flank, enfilading the entire front.

This fire continued with no abatement during the day and night, and opened with renewed vigor on the morning of the 6th.

The enemy's fire was completely silenced by it, and he was driven for cover to his bomb-proof. Our engineers, availing themselves of this, renewed their labors, and on the morning of the 6th had crowned the glacis of the work.

The enemy was unable to withstand for an instant the fury of our fire, but kept close in his bomb-proof, and our parties pushing the sap worked undisturbed. On the morning of the 6th, it became apparent that under our fire we could run our approaches so far forward as to mask all the enemy's artillery, and so enable an assaulting column to debouch from them and gain the enemy's parapets without being exposed to a single gun. This it was deemed desirable to do, and accordingly the fire was ordered to be continued till the following morning, the 7th, when an assault was arranged to take place at low tide, which would give us the greatest breadth of beach. The fire of the heavy rifle guns, through, was slackened, it being evident they were doing no great damage to the bomb-proof, and five of them were turned upon other parts of the work.

During the night of the 6th, information was received that the enemy was evacuating the place, which was confirmed by a reconnoissance, when our fire ceased, and our troops immediately took possession.

This bombardment lasted about forty-hours, in which time there were thrown by the land batteries 1,663 rifle projectiles and 1,553 mortar shells.

Notwithstanding the heavy fire of this bombardment, together with all the fire Fort Wagner had been subjected to since the commencement of our attack, from land and naval batteries, its defenses were not materially injured; that is to say, the parapets, bomb-proofs, and traverses of sand still remained and would have afforded shelter to infantry behind them, though greatly tossed about and

torn up by our projectiles, but, under our fire, it was impossible to serve their artillery, nor could they expose themselves outside of their bombproof for an instant.

Our fire of rifle shells on the 5th and 6th instant at the bombproof did it little or not damage; still, it was very effective in other respects, seriously interrupting the communications which ran under the traverses of the sea face by filling them with sand. It was also found that a magazine located in one of those transverses was seriously in danger of being penetrated by our rifle projectiles.

The great range which had been attained by the Parrott guns gave the means, with the control which we had of the swamp on the left of our position, in which to establish a gun for throwing projectiles into Charleston. The difficulty was in preparing a battery in the center of this swamp, a mile distant from firm ground, as it was required to be to attain an effective range of Charleston. It was finally overcome by the commanding general, and a battery for an 8-inch Parrott established, under the direction of Colonel E. W. Serrell, Volunteer Engineers, at 7,900 yards from Saint Michael's Church, in the city of Charleston.

The piece was mounted under the supervision of Lieutenant Wadlie, Third New Hampshire, who deserves great credit for the accomplishment of this work, done under so many difficulties. The battery was garrisoned by a detachment of the Eleventh Maine Volunteer Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Charles Sellmer, Eleventh Maine.

This battery was opened, on the night of the 22nd of August, on Charleston, and fired some 15 rounds. Unfortunately, on the second occasion of firing, the gun burst, the breach breaking just in rear of the vent, and was blown clear of the re-enforce. Some 35 shells were fired in all from it. Both incendiary shell and shells filled with Greek fire were used. The latter worked very poorly, nearly every one prematurely exploding, and it is not determined whether any shells containing Greek fire ever reached Charleston.

The total number of projectiles thrown against Sumter up to the 7th of September was 6,451, and against Wagner, since the 26th of July, 9,875, making a total of artillery projectiles of 16,326.

In closing this report, I would call the attention of the commanding general to zeal and efficient services rendered by Captain C. R. Brayton, Third Rhode Island Heavy Artillery, who has acted during this period of operations as my assistant.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOHN W. TURNER, Colonel, and Chief of Artillery.

**OFFICE CHIEF OF ARTILLERY,
Folly Island, S. C., November 30, 1863.**

GENERAL: In compliance with your verbal request that I give some of the details of firing, with what observations I may have made in the artillery practice, particularly in the use of the Parrott rifle, during the artillery operations upon Morris Island, I would submit the following:

The armament of the breaching batteries first erected against Fort Sumter, as I have before enumerated in my first report, consisted of one 10-inch, six 8-inch, nine 100-pounder Parrott rifles, and two 80-pounder Whitworths.

In the second bombardment, commencing the 26th of October, there were in position one 10-inch, two 8-inch, and nine 100-pounder rifles, one 10-inch columbiad, and four 10-inch seacoast mortars; and subsequently, at the date of this report, there were added eight 10-inch seacoast mortars, two 10-inch siege mortars, and two 13-inch seacoast mortars.

The garrisons of these batteries were made sufficiently strong, so that each gun had three reliefs. A relief consisted of a full detachment of cannoneers, with 2 and 3 men for service in magazine with each relief.

A tour of duty for a relief with the breaching batteries was four hours on and eight off. The relief, however, which came on at 8 o'clock in the evening generally remained till 4 next morning when no night firing took place.

The firing from the batteries against Wagner not being so rapid or so constant as from the other batteries, men served in them twelve hours on and twenty-four off.

It was quite a task for the men simply to go to and from the batteries, when added to the labor they performed at their guns. The numerous guns of the enemy which encircled us swept the ground for a specie of nearly a mile in rear of our batteries. Throwing our camps necessarily beyond it, this distance had to be passed over at every tour of duty.

It very soon became manifest, after our fire upon Sumter had opened, that unremitting attention to the service of these rifled guns in every particular of detail would be imperative to insure that accuracy necessary for success.

The precision of fire of the Parrott rifles was remarkable, probably excelling any artillery ever before brought on to the field in siege operations; but it was quickly found that, in the field, where preparations are not always very complete and necessary appliances are scanty, many elements entered to disturb this accuracy, more particularly when the power of the gun came to be taxed, as in the range we wished to attain in our fire upon Sumter; that errors at this distance multiplied in these guns very rapidly, and therefore greater attention than that ordinarily given to a smooth-bore gun would be required to eliminate them. To this end, battery commanders were required to be present at all firing, and were constantly instructed and strictly enjoined in the observance of everything connected with the service of the piece which it was thought might in any way affect its accuracy.

It was expected that the 100-pounders and the 8-inch would fire with a rapidity of about one discharge in eight minutes, but the result of the first day's firing showed that this time was greatly exceeded. Afterward, however, when officers and men had more experience, and the machinery of the carriages had worked smooth, the firing was more rapid, and, when necessary, the 100-pounders could be fired once in five minutes, and the 8-inch once in seven and eight minutes. The 10-inch was never fired faster than once in ten minutes, but could be served with facility for a day at a rate of once in eight minutes.

There is an immense labor incurred in the handling of the projectiles of these guns, carrying them to and from the magazine while serving the piece, when continuous firing is required. To lighten this task, I have had in our later firing fatigue parties regally detailed for this work.

It was the practice, in obedience to instructions, to wash the guns out thoroughly after about the 20th round. I do not know as this was absolutely necessary, but it insures a better service of the gun, when dirt and sand are so liable, as in field works, to get into the bore of the piece, and it was found a useful measure of precaution, as time was thus taken to allow the gun to cool, as it became quite hot after about this number of rounds.

The projectiles were also carefully greased, and latterly an oiled sponge has been used, in addition, after every third or fourth shot. The very great liability, though, of having dirt and sand adhere to the projectiles and sponge when thus greased, notwithstanding every care may be taken, make these expedients very doubtful. If permitted to be used, close attention must be given it at all times.

As with the smaller Parrott rifles, when the projectile failed to take the groove, it received a wobbling motion and frequently capsized. The remedy of slightly separating the band of brass from the base of the projectile, to allow

the gas to penetrate, was quite effectual in stopping it. This required one or two men more in each battery, to attend to this duty alone. Great care must be taken to avoid the danger of separating the brass to such extent as to wedge the shell in the gun, which is liable to occur.

But few instances occurred of the brass stripping from the projectile. The frequent premature explosion of shells while in the piece or just after leaving it, attracted attention, and led to the belief at first that the powder was ignited but the flame passing around the thread of the fuse. every precaution was immediately taken by the use of white lead applied to the thread when inserting the fuse-plug, but without correcting the evil. A close examination through a long of firing, with many examples, has finally led to the opinion that it is due to defects in the iron at the base of the shell when it comes from the foundry.

Flaws and cracks, which are frequently detected by the eye, permit the flame of the burning powder in the gun to penetrate and ignite the charge in the shell. This was a series evil, producing a rapid destruction of the gun, and caused a suspension of fire entirely whenever it became necessary to throw troops in advance of the batteries. I understand it is now being corrected by a change in the mode of casting the shell.

Two kinds of percussion fuses were used, both of Parrotts, invention. In the one, to the plunger is attached two metallic prongs for retaining it in a fixed position for transportation and which are designed to be wrenched off by the rifle motion of the projectile in the first moments of flight, before the inertia of the plunger is overcome; in the other, the plunger is kept in position by a wooden washer over the nipple, and which is broken by the concussion when the projectile strikes. The metallic prongs in the former were found to be too stiff to be always wrenched off, as it is expected they will be, or, when broken off, they caught the plunger and retarded its motion sufficiently to prevent its striking with a force necessary to explode the cap. It therefore became necessary to take off these prongs before inserting the fuse in the shell. In this shape, this kind of fuse used exclusively. But few the others were used, and they did not give satisfaction. The explosion of a shell was generally insured when striking against a vertical wall, but it was by no means so certain when entering rubbish or broken masonry, which the walls of Sumter soon became, or mounds of earth or sand, as the defends of Wagner, unless the projectile struck very fair, point foremost. The slightest cause, it was found, would deflect a rifle projectile when striking upon earth or sand, and, when deflected, it almost invariably failed to explode.

In our firing upon the sand parapets and traverses of Wagner, a rifle projectile would bound off when a spherical one would be arrested in its flight, the rifle shot almost always making on e high bound after striking, and turning and ever end.

The great number o shells which failed to explode in our firing from this cause plainly indicated the advantages that would be derived from a fuse so constructed as to insure an explosion however the projectile might strike.

A violent gale which prevailed for three days exhibited most satisfactorily the constancy of range of these guns. The 10-inch was just perceptibly affected by it; the 8-inch felt it more, but was not seriously disturbed; the 100-pounders varied more than the rest, but the deviation was not so great but that good work was obtained from them during the whole of it.

There seemed to be causes slightly affecting the range of a gun for the same elevation during different parts of the day which could not be trace deicer to the powder, or the projectile, or the manner of serving the guns; also two guns of the same caliber in the same battery would with the same elevation vary in range. This difference was more constant.

The 10-inch required a little greater elevation to attain the same range than the 8-inch, but was more accurate. It was mounted on an iron carriage, with a center pintle chassis, and worked with great ease and facility. Steps were cut in the parapet upon which Nos. 1 and 2 were mounted to load; the projectiles were carried on hand barrows.

Unfortunately, it was disabled, soon after opening fire, by a premature explosion of a shell near its muzzle, which blew off abut 18 inches of its length. It was repaired at the suggestion and under the supervision of Captain Gray, Seventh Connecticut, the battery commander, who was a skillful mechanic, by chipping off the bands for a distance beyond the fractures, and enlarging the diameter of the bore this distance from an eighth to a quarter of an inch. This left a band of iron, as it were, around the muzzle. The gun was fired three hundred and seventy times, after this, without any appreciable difference in the range or accuracy being noticed. Subsequently it was completely disabled by continued premature explosions of shells.

The iron used in the manufacture of this gun is of a superior quality, and I see no reason, if it had not been for this accident, which can be guarded against in future, why it would not have endured for 1,000 or 1,500 rounds, in which case it appears to be the perfection of a heavy rifled gun. No one could witness its performance during the bombardment of Sumter, and notice the terrible crushing effect of its huge projectiles upon the masonry of that place, the ease with which it was worked, and its remarkable accuracy at a distance of 2 1/2 miles, without being filled with admiration and wonder.

Iron carriages of the Ordnance and Parrott pattern were used and worked well. Friction clamps were used on the Parrott carriages to lessen the recoil, which was sufficient without them to take the carriage of the chassis.

The working of the 8-inch gun is much facilitated by the use of roller handspikes to raise the rear part of the carriage from the rail when running the piece in battery. The want of them imposed much additional labor upon our men in working the guns.

The two 80-pounder Whitworth guns in the naval battery, though not under my supervision, came under my observation.

These guns opened fire with shell, but it was found necessary to abandon their use entirely, in consequence of their repeated and constant premature explosions, which greatly endangered our troops in the advance trenches, and of the probable injury it would do the guns. Solid shot was then used exclusively. There appeared to be much difficulty experienced at times in loading these guns by the projectile wedging when part way down. It could then be rammed home only by heavy blows of a handspike or by attaching a powerful purchase. They were very unsatisfactory in point of accuracy, shooting very wild, seldom hitting Fort Sumter at a distance of 3,980 yards. In comparison with the 8-inch Parrotts in the same battery, they fell far short in accuracy, and subsequently one of them became disabled by the gun apparently sliding through the re-enforce to the rear. A displacement of nearly an inch took place, closing the vent completely. The other being considered unsafe after this, further use of it was discontinued.

I append to this report a statement of the number of Parrott guns which have burst, with a brief description of the peculiarities of fracture exhibited in each case.

This number, being so great, naturally excites attention, and has raised grave doubts as to the durability of the gun, and, therefore, a question as to its practical usefulness, notwithstanding its great power.

Without entering into this question, for which I am in no manner prepared, I may note those points which have come to my observation in the service of the piece, and which I believe have had no inconsiderable influence in the bursting of these guns.

The proper service of these heavy rifled guns is everything, and to secure it in the field, where firing takes place over parapets and through embrasures, with sand and dirt constantly flying about, will always be a matter of difficulty.

The simple matter of springing to prevent the admission of sand and dirt in the

bore rises to much importance.

The serious evil that may arise from the presence of sand in the grooves when the projectile has taken the rifle in passing out is well understood.

The material of our field works upon Morris Island was dry, hard, flinty sand, which, in a windy day, was constantly blowing about, and at time to such an extent did it fill the air that it was a most severe annoyance to officers and men. On such occasions, it was almost impossible to keep the pieces free from it; and at all times the sponge and reamer staves, moist from the hands of the men, striking the sides and soles of the embrasures, would carry in no inconsiderable quantity. No doubt this difficulty was an extreme one with us in the position of our batteries, and I am of the opinion that it entered to some considerable extent, as an element causing the destruction of the guns which have burst lately, though by no means sufficient in itself.

A more serious matter was the premature explosion of shells, of which so many have occurred in our late firing.

The shock produced by an explosion of a shell within a gun cannot but tend rapidly to destroy it; indeed, in instances which have come under my personal observation, I am confident it was the direct and immediate cause.

In one instance of the bursting of a 100-pounder where the breech had been blown from the re-enforce, I found the base of shell in the gun. The shell had prematurely exploded, leaving the base in the gun. It had taken the grooves, and was left perpendicular to the axis of the piece and some inches to the rear of its first position, showing that the last force acting upon it was from the explosion of the powder in the shell.

These two cases, the presence of considerable quantities of sand, and the premature explosions of shell, may account for the failure of the 100-pounder in our late firing. The sudden giving way of so many before reaching 300 rounds, when they had attained 1,000 to 1,200 in our first firing, would appear to indicate that some cause existed in the latter that did not in the former, and these two difficulties undoubtedly have existed to a much greater degree in our firing since the 26th of October than they did before.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN. W. TURNER,

OFFICE CHIEF OF ARTILLERY,

Folly Island, S. C., November 30, 1863.

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It very soon became manifest, after our fire upon Sumter had opened, that unremitting attention to the service of these rifled guns in every particular of detail would be imperative to insure that accuracy necessary for success.

The precision of fire of the Parrott rifles was remarkable, probably excelling any artillery ever before brought on to the field in siege operations; but it was quickly found that, in the field, where preparations are not always very complete and necessary appliances are scanty, many elements entered to disturb this accuracy, more particularly when the power of the gun came to be taxed, as in the range we wished to attain in our fire upon Sumter; that errors at this distance multiplied in these guns very rapidly, and therefore greater attention than that ordinarily given to a smooth-bore gun would be required to eliminate them. To this end, battery commanders were required to be present at all firing, and were constantly instructed and strictly enjoined in the observance

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As with the smaller Parrott rifles, when the projectile failed to take the groove, it received a wobbling motion and frequently capsized. The remedy of slightly separating the band of brass from the base of the projectile, to allow the gas to penetrate, was quite effectual in stopping it. This required one or two men more in each battery, to attend to this duty alone. Great care must be taken to avoid the danger of separating the brass to such extent as to wedge the shell in the gun, which is liable to occur.

But few instances occurred of the brass stripping from the projectile. The frequent premature explosion of shells while in the piece or just after leaving it, attracted attention, and led to the belief at first that the powder was ignited but the flame passing around the thread of the fuse. Every precaution was immediately taken by the use of white lead applied to the thread

when inserting the fuse-plug, but without correcting the evil.

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Flaws and cracks, which are frequently detected by the eye, permit the flame of the burning powder in the gun to penetrate and ignite the charge in the shell. This was a series evil, producing a rapid destruction of the gun, and caused a suspension of fire entirely whenever it became necessary to throw troops in advance of the batteries. I understand it is now being corrected by a change in the mode of casting the shell.

Two kinds of percussion fuses were used, both of Parrotts, invention. In the one, to the plunger is attached two metallic prongs for retaining it in a fixed position for transportation and which are designed to be wrenched off by the rifle motion of the projectile in the first moments of flight, before the inertia of the plunger is overcome; in the other, the plunger is kept in position by a wooden washer over the nipple, and which is broken by the concussion when the projectile strikes. The metallic prongs in the former were found to be too stiff to be always wrenched off, as it is expected they will be, or, when broken off, they caught the plunger and retarded its motion sufficiently to prevent its striking with a force necessary to explode the cap. It therefore became necessary to take off these prongs before inserting the fuse in the shell. In this shape, this kind of fuse used exclusively. But few the others were used, and they did not give satisfaction. The explosion of a shell was generally insured when striking against a vertical wall, but it was by no means so certain when entering rubbish or broken masonry, which the walls of Sumter soon became, or mounds of earth or sand, as the defenses of Wagner, unless the projectile struck very fair, point foremost. The slightest cause, it was found, would deflect a rifle projectile when striking upon earth or sand, and, when deflected, it almost invariably failed to explode.

In our firing upon the sand parapets and traverses of Wagner, a rifle projectile would bound off when a spherical one would be arrested in its flight, the rifle shot almost always making on a high bound after striking, and turning and ever end.

The great number of shells which failed to explode in our firing from this cause plainly indicated the advantages that would be derived from a fuse so constructed as to insure an explosion however the projectile might strike. A violent gale which prevailed for three days exhibited most satisfactorily the constancy of range of these guns. The 10-inch was just perceptibly affected by it; the 8-inch felt it more, but was not seriously disturbed; the 100-pounders

varied more than the rest, but the deviation was not so great but that good work was obtained from them during the whole of it.

There seemed to be causes slightly affecting the range of a gun for the same elevation during different parts of the day which could not be traced to the powder, or the projectile, or the manner of serving the guns; also two guns of the same caliber in the same battery would with the same elevation vary in range. This difference was more constant.

The 10-inch required a little greater elevation to attain the same range than the 8-inch, but was more accurate. It was mounted on an iron carriage, with a center pintle chassis, and worked with great ease and facility. Steps were cut in the parapet upon which Nos. 1 and 2 were mounted to load; the projectiles were carried on hand barrows.

Unfortunately, it was disabled, soon after opening fire, by a premature explosion of a shell near its muzzle, which blew off about 18 inches of its length. It was repaired at the suggestion and under the supervision of Captain Gray, Seventh Connecticut, the battery commander, who was a skillful mechanic, by chipping off the bands for a distance beyond the fractures, and enlarging the diameter of the bore this distance from an eighth to a quarter of an inch. This left a band of iron, as it were, around the muzzle. The gun was fired three hundred and seventy times, after this, without any appreciable difference in the range or accuracy being noticed. Subsequently it was completely disabled by continued premature explosions of shells.

The iron used in the manufacture of this gun is of a superior quality, and I see no reason, if it had not been for this accident, which can be guarded against in future, why it would not have endured for 1,000 or 1,500 rounds, in which case it appears to be the perfection of a heavy rifled gun. No one could witness its performance during the bombardment of Sumter, and notice the terrible crushing effect of its huge projectiles upon the masonry of that place, the ease with which it was worked, and its remarkable accuracy at a distance of 2 1/2 miles, without being filled with admiration and wonder.

Iron carriages of the Ordnance and Parrott pattern were used and worked well. Friction clamps were used on the Parrott carriages to lessen the recoil, which was sufficient without them to take the carriage of the chassis.

The working of the 8-inch gun is much facilitated by the use of roller handspikes to raise the rear part of the carriage from the rail when running the piece in battery. The want of them imposed much additional labor upon our men in working the guns.

The two 80-pounder Whitworth guns in the naval battery, though not under my supervision, came under my observation.

These guns opened fire with shell, but it was found necessary to abandon their use entirely, in consequence of their repeated and constant premature explosions, which greatly endangered our troops in the advance trenches, and of the probable injury it would do the guns. Solid shot was then used exclusively. There appeared to be much difficulty experienced at times in loading these guns by the projectile wedging when part way down. It could then be rammed home only by heavy blows of a handspike or by attaching a powerful purchase. They were very unsatisfactory in point of accuracy, shooting very wild, seldom hitting Fort Sumter at a distance of 3,980 yards. In comparison with the 8-inch Parrotts in the same battery, they fell far short in accuracy, and subsequently one of them became disabled by the gun apparently sliding through the re-enforce to the rear. A displacement of nearly an inch took place, closing the vent completely. The other being considered unsafe after this, further use of it was discontinued.

I append to this report a statement of the number of Parrott guns which have burst, with a brief description of the peculiarities of fracture exhibited in each case.

This number, being so great, naturally excites attention, and has raised grave doubts as to the durability of the gun, and, therefore, a question as to its practical usefulness, notwithstanding its great power.

Without entering into this question, for which I am in no manner prepared, I may note those points which have come to my observation in the service of the piece, and which I believe have had no inconsiderable influence in the bursting of these guns.

The proper service of these heavy rifled guns is everything, and to secure it in the field, where firing takes place over parapets and through embrasures, with sand and dirt constantly flying about, will always be a matter of difficulty.

The simple matter of springing to prevent the admission of sand and dirt in the bore rises to much importance.

The serious evil that may arise from the presence of sand in the grooves when the projectile has taken the rifle in passing out is well understood.

The material of our field works upon Morris Island was dry, hard, flinty sand, which, in a windy day, was constantly blowing about, and at time to such an extent did it fill the air that it was a most severe annoyance to officers and men. On such occasions, it was almost impossible to keep the pieces free from it; and at all times the sponge and reamer staves, moist from the hands of the

men, striking the sides and soles of the embrasures, would carry in no inconsiderable quantity. No doubt this difficulty was an extreme one with us in the position of our batteries, and I am of the opinion that it entered to some considerable extent, as an element causing the destruction of the guns which have burst lately, though by no means sufficient in itself.

A more serious matter was the premature explosion of shells, of which so many have occurred in our late firing.

The shock produced by an explosion of a shell within a gun cannot but tend rapidly to destroy it; indeed, in instances which have come under my personal observation, I am confident it was the direct and immediate cause.

In one instance of the bursting of a 100-pounder where the breech had been blown from the re-enforce, I found the base of shell in the gun. The shell had prematurely exploded, leaving the base in the gun. It had taken the grooves, and was left perpendicular to the axis of the piece and some inches to the rear of its first position, showing that the last force acting upon it was from the explosion of the powder in the shell.

These two cases, the presence of considerable quantities of sand, and the premature explosions of shell, may account for the failure of the 100-pounder in our late firing. The sudden giving way of so many before reaching 300 rounds, when they had attained 1,000 to 1,200 in our first firing, would appear to indicate that some cause existed in the latter that did not in the former, and these two difficulties undoubtedly have existed to a much greater degree in our firing since the 26th of October than they did before.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN. W. TURNER,

Brigadier-General, Chief of Artillery.

**Organization of the Union Army At Vicksburg
MAY 19-JULY 4, 1863.--The Siege of Vicksburg, Miss.**

**ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE
Maj. Gen. ULYSSES S. GRANT**

**NINTH ARMY CORPS
FIRST DIVISION**

Pennsylvania Light, Battery D, Capt. George W. Durell

SECOND DIVISION

2d New York Light, Battery L, Capt. Jacob Roemer.

ARTILLERY RESERVED

2d United-States, Battery E, Lieut. Samuel N. Benjamin.

THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS

NINTH DIVISION

Capt. JACOB T. FOSTER.

Michigan Light, 7th Battery, Capt. Charles H. Lanphere.

Wisconsin Light, 1st Battery, Lieut. Oscar F. Nutting.

TENTH DIVISION

Illinois Light, Chicago Mercantile Battery, Capt. Patrick H. White.

Ohio Light, 17th Battery: Capt. Ambrose A. Blount. Capt. Charles S. Rice.

TWELFTH DIVISION

1st Missouri Light, Battery A, Capt. George W. Schofield.

Ohio Light, 2d Battery, Lieut. Augustus Beach.

Ohio Light, 16th Battery, Lieut. Russell P. Twist.

FOURTEENTH DIVISION

2d Illinois Light, Battery A: Lieut. Frank B. Fenton. Capt. Peter Davidson.

Indiana Light, 1st Battery, Capt. Martin Klauss.

FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS

FIRST DIVISION

Iowa Light, 1st Battery, Capt. Henry H. Griffiths.

2d Missouri Light, Battery F, Capt. Clemens Landgraeber.

Ohio Light, 4th Battery, Capt. Louis Hoffmann.

SECOND DIVISION

1st Illinois Light, Battery A, Capt. Peter P. Wood.

1st Illinois Light, Battery : Capt. Samuel E. Barrett. Lieut. Israel P. Rumsey.

1st Illinois Light, Battery H, Capt. Levi W. Hart. Ohio Light, 8th Battery, Capt. James F. Putnam.

THIRD DIVISION

Capt. NELSON T. SPOOR.

1st Illinois Light, Battery E, Capt. Allen C. Waterhouse.

Iowa Light, 2d Battery, Lieut. Joseph R. Reed.

SIXTEENTH ARMY CORPS

FIRST DIVISION

Capt. WILLIAM COGSWELL.

1st Illinois Light, Battery F, Capt. John T. Cheney.

1st Illinois Light, Battery I, Lieut. William N. Lansing.

Illinois Light, Cogswell's Battery, Lieut. Henry G. Eddy.

Indiana Light, 6th Battery, Capt. Michael Mueller.

FOURTH DIVISION

Capt. GEORGE C. GUMBART.

2d Illinois Light, Battery E, Lieut. George L. Nispel.

2d Illinois Light, Battery K, Capt. Benjamin F. Rodgers.

Ohio Light, 5th Battery, Lieut. Anthony B. Burton.

Ohio Light, 7th Battery, Capt. Silas A. Burnap.

Ohio Light, 15th Battery, Capt. Edward Spear, jr.

SEVENTEENTH ARMY CORPS

THIRD DIVISION

Maj. CHARLES J. STOLBRAND.

1st Illinois Light, Battery D: Capt. Henry A. Rogers. Lieut. George J. Wood.

Capt. Frederick Sparrestrom.

2d Illinois Light, Battery G: Capt. Frederick Sparrestrom. Lieut. John W. Lowell.

2d Illinois Light, Battery L, Capt. William H. Bolton.

Michigan Light, 8th Battery: Capt. Samuel De Golyer. Lieut. Theodore W.

Lockwood.

Ohio Light, 3d Battery, Capt. William S. Williams.

SIXTH DIVISION

Maj. THOMAS D. MAURICE.

2d Illinois Light, Battery F, Capt. John W. Powell.

Minnesota Light, 1st Battery: Lieut. Henry Hurter. Capt. William Z. Clayton.

1st Missouri Light, Battery C, Capt. Charles Mann.

Ohio Light, 10th Battery.: Capt. Hamilton B. White. Lieut. William L. Newcomb.

SEVENTH DIVISION

Capt. FRANK C. SANDS.

Capt. HENRY DILLON.

1st Missouri Light, Battery M, Lieut. Julius W. MacMurray.

Ohio Light, 11th Battery, Lieut. Fletcher E. Armstrong.

Wisconsin Light, 6th Battery: Capt. Henry Dillon. Lieut. Samuel F. Clark.

Wisconsin Light, 12th Battery, Capt. William Zickerick.

**ON BOARD U. S. STEAMER LINDEN, Providence, La., February 3, 1863.
Lieutenant Colonel John A. REALIGNS, Assistant Adjutant-GENERAL:**

COLONEL: In consequence of an impenetrable fog and other causes of detention beyond my control, the expedition for the connection of Lake Providence with the Mississippi River did not reach this place

till about 2 p. m. Sunday, 1st instant. At the time of landing I was prostrated from a severe bilious attack, which had set in almost immediately on our leaving the fleet, and from which I have not yet recovered.

Immediately on landing, Colonel Deitzler disembarked and occupied the remainder of the day in making a partial reconnaissance of the relative positions of the lake and river, returning without coming to any definite conclusion as to the place best suited to make the connection, but fully convinced that a connection was entirely practicable.

Yesterday morning a party of 80 mounted men, under the command of Colonel Deitzler, and accompanied by Lieutenant [Herman A.] Ulffers, Captain [Thomas E.] Smith, of the gunboat, and myself (though still very sick), made the entire circuit of the lake, taking the course along the bayou, on the upper side of the lake, as per accompanying chart,* and returning to Providence across Bayou Tensas.

The bayou on the upper side of the lake, although very easily connected with the river, and, as far as depth of water is concerned, better than the canal finally decided upon, is too crooked and much obstructed by timber to be made available for navigation for several weeks, while the course of the proposed canal upon which we are now working is short, and the work can be done within a week, nature having already done the best part of it, and when completed it will would admit of passing through Bayou Tensas or Baxter. Either plan involves the destruction of the town (now nearly deserted), but neither Colonel Deitzler nor myself thought this a matter of sufficient importance to interfere with the accomplishment of the object in view. On our reconnaissance yesterday we passed down Tensas Bayou about a mile, and found it navigable. To make sure, however, whether Tensas or Baxter is best suited for our purpose, a strong reconnoitering party has gone out to-day, which has not yet returned. One of these outlets being decided upon as the best, the other, we propose, if possible, to close before admitting the water from the river. In any event, I do not doubt the entire practicability, during high water, of passing with such vessels as the mosquito fleet from the Mississippi and the Red River. We have heard, however, of a battery on the Washita, near Monroe, planted there with a view to the defense of extensive salt-works in that part of rebeldom and the

army in Mississippi and Arkansas are supplied with that indispensable article. On this subject I hope to be better informed in a few days, when I will immediately advise you. I have sanguine hopes, shared in by Colonel Deitzler, that the general commanding may authorize an expedition to destroy these salt-works, should the information we have from negroes be confirmed.

I should mention that yesterday we met with no obstacles from guerrillas. A few fleeing horsemen were chased, when they dismounted and took to the swamps, leaving their horses and arms, which were captured. We have also driven in some beef-cattle.

Trusting that so much as has been done will meet the approval of the major-general commanding,

I remain, colonel, yours, very respectfully,

W. L. DUFF,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Chief of Artillery, Dept. of the Tennessee.

Report of Lieutenant C. Cushing Eyre, First New York Marine Artillery.

ROANOKE ISLAND, February 8, 1862.

I have the honor to report the working of the battery of the Ranger during the action at Pork Point Battery on February 7 and 8:

commenced firing at 12.30 at the distance of 3 miles. As the vessel worked ahead we were several times obliged to wear ship, each time running nearer to the battery. During the afternoon the firing was more effective, owing to the vessel having been brought closer to the enemy's position. During the latter part of the engagement the shell were thrown into the Point battery with accuracy.

Expended during the action, 3 Parrott shell, elevation $17\frac{1}{2}^{\wedge}$, distance about 3 miles; 6 Parrott shell, elevation 15^{\wedge} , distance about $2\frac{3}{4}$ miles; 3 Parrott shell, elevation 16^{\wedge} , distance about $2\frac{3}{4}$ to 3 miles; 12 Parrott shell, elevation 12^{\wedge} , distance about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles; 2 Parrott shell, elevation $13\frac{1}{2}^{\wedge}$, distance, about $2\frac{3}{5}^{\wedge}$ miles.

From Wiard's 12-pounder, expended 20 shell and shot at an elevation of 15^{\wedge} to 17^{\wedge} , distance $2\frac{3}{4}$ miles; 38 shell and shot at an elevation of 8^{\wedge} to 12^{\wedge} , distance $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles.

About 3.30 p. m. being within range for the 12-pounder boat howitzer, commenced firing with int, and expended 45 shot and shell, very few of them falling short. This gun

was in charge of Lieutenant Dennison, Twenty-seventh Massachusetts Volunteers.

**Respectfully,
C. CUSHING EYRE,
First Lieutenant Marine Artillery.**

Report of Lieutenant A. Hedden, First New York Marine Artillery.

**GUNBOAT HUSSAR,
Roanoke Island, February 10, 1862.**

SIR: In answer to your request this morning I herewith inclose you a statement of the working of guns on board the gunboat Hussar at the bombardment of Pork Point, Friday, February 7, 1862; 102 cap shell from two 30-pounder Parrotts; 82 percussion shell from two 30-pounder Parrotts; 52 shot from one 6-pounder Wiard; 6 percussion shell from one 6-pounder Wiard (fell short). The former had an elevation of from 8[^] to 10[^] at a distance of from 2 1/4 to 1 1/2 miles. A portion of the firing was directed to a rebel steamer which came under cover of battery but retired soon, evidently having a few shot through her. The Wiard gun (6-pounder) shot with great accuracy at a distance of 2 miles with as much elevation as we could give her, suppose about 11[^]. The first shot was fired from the Hussar at 11.45 a. m., and continued firing until a signal from the commodore, "Cease firing," at 6.30 p. m., when we came to anchor out of range of their batteries.

JAMES A. HEDDEN, Lieutenant.

**HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Big Black River Bridge, MISS, May 17, 1863.**

COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following invoice of ordnance and ordnance stores captured by the Thirteenth Army Corps in the engaged this morning. Guns. -Six 12-pounder bronze howitzer; three 12-pounder bronze guns (Napoleons), one disabled; three 6-pounder bronze guns; six 10-pounder Parrott

rifled guns (iron); aggregate, eighteen guns, with limbers and caissons complete, except two, the caissons of which had been previously captured. The following ordnance stores were found on the carriages of the above-mentioned pieces: There hundred and twenty-four rounds of 12-pounder howitzer canister; 578 rounds of 12-pounder howitzer shells (fuse); 11 rounds of 6-pounder howitzer canister; 175 rounds of 6-pounder howitzer shells; 8 rounds of 12-pounder solid shot; 112 rounds of 10 pounder Parrott fuse-shells; 120 rounds of 10-pounder (the Famous) canister; 97 rounds of 10-pounder (Reed projectile) solid shot; 35 port-fires, and 10 6-pounder cartridges, three fourths-pound charge. In addition to the above, the following ammunition was captured in some cars at Edwards Station: Eighty-eight thousand rounds of riffle musket ammunition, calibers. 54,. 58, and . 69; 30 rounds of 6-pounder shell and canister; 10-rounds of 6-pounder spherical case; 110 rounds of 12-pounder howitzer canister (fired); 100 rounds of 3 inch Reed shot; 116 stand of small-arms of various patterns, and 2 boxes of blank cartridges for 3-inch guns. The small-arms captured in the battle of to day will amount to several thousand, but as they have not yet been collected, no definite report can as yet be made.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. MATHER,

Colonel and Chief of Ordnance, THIRTEENTH Army Corps.

**Report of Colonel Thomas S. Mather, Second Illinois Light Artillery,
Chief of Ordnance Thirteenth Army Corps, of ordnance captured.**

HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS, MAY 26,1863.

Lieutenant Colonel John A. RAWLINS,

Assistant Adjutant-GENERAL:

COLONEL: I have the honor to inclose a copy of the partial report of Colonel T. S. Mather, chief of artillery and ordnance, Thirteenth Army Corps, in relation to ordnance and ordnance stores captured by the Thirteenth Army Corps at the battle of Big Black Bridge, May 17, 1863.

Orders have already been issued to collect stragglers, negroes, and mules, and it is being done in this army corps.

Your obedient servant,
WALTER B. SCATES,
Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Big Black River Bridge, MISS, May 17, 1863.

COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following invoice of ordnance and ordnance stores captured by the Thirteenth Army Corps in the engaged this morning. Guns. -Six 12-pounder bronze howitzer; three 12-pounder bronze guns (Napoleons), one disabled; three 6-pounder bronze guns; six 10-pounder Parrott rifled guns (iron); aggregate, eighteen guns, with limbers and caissons complete, except two, the caissons of which had been previously captured. The following ordnance stores were found on the carriages of the above-mentioned pieces: There hundred and twenty-four rounds of 12-pounder howitzer canister; 578 rounds of 12-pounder howitzer shells (fuse); 11 rounds of 6-pounder howitzer canister; 175 rounds of 6-pounder howitzer shells; 8 rounds of 12-pounder solid shot; 112 rounds of 10 pounder Parrott fuse-shells; 120 rounds of 10-pounder (the Famous) canister; 97 rounds of 10-pounder (Reed projectile) solid shot; 35 port-fires, and 10 6-pounder cartridges, three fourths-pound charge. In addition to the above, the following ammunition was captured in some cars at Edwards Station: Eighty-eight thousand rounds of riffle musket ammunition, calibers. 54,. 58, and . 69; 30 rounds of 6-pounder shell and canister; 10-rounds of 6-pounder spherical case; 110 rounds of 12-pounder howitzer canister (fired); 100 rounds of 3 inch Reed shot; 116 stand of small-arms of various patterns, and 2 boxes of blank cartridges for 3-inch guns. The small-arms captured in the battle of to day will amount to several thousand, but as they have not yet been collected, no definite report can as yet be made.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
THOMAS S. MATHER,
Colonel and Chief of Ordnance, Thirteenth Army Corps.
WALTER B. SCATES,
Assistant Adjutant -General.

YAZOO RIVER, MISS. , June 20, 1863.

Brigadier General J. W. RIPLEY, Chief of Ordnance:

General Grant wishes twenty mortars for siege operations, with 400 rounds of ammunition, as soon as possible. I think of this number perhaps half should be Coehorn and stone mortars, and the other 8-inch and 10-inch siege. Please have them come through by special messenger as quickly as possible.

S. C. LYFORD, Chief of Ordnance.

**Report of Major Charles J. Stolband, Second Illinois Light Artillery
Chief of Artillery THIRD DIVISION, SEVENTEENTH Army Corps.
Vicksburg, MISS, July 16, 1863.**

MAJOR: IN obedience to orders, I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by my command in the siege of Vicksburg from the 19th day of May, when it commenced, until the 4th of July, when it terminated in the capitulation of the garrison and the city:

To follow and state the different movements and stations occupied by my command and parts thereof during the forty-seventh days mentioned would be a very laborious task, which I presume is, neither necessary nor expected. I shall, therefore, confine myself to a few of the most important facts. At about 3 'clock of May, 19, I had placed in position the Third Ohio Battery, captain W. S. Williams commanding, the Eight Michigan Battery, captain Samuel De Goyer commanding, and Battery L, Second Regiment Illinois Light Artillery, captain William H. Bolton commanding, at about 2,500 yards distant from the rebel works. The batteries opened fire, and soon thereafter the rebel artillery in their works modified and materially slackened fire. About two hours afterward, having previously reconnoitered the ground, and received Major-General Logan's assent, I directed Captain De Golyers's two howitzer to advance about 1,8000 yards to the line subsequently occupied by all the light batteries. Fire was immediately opened with good effect, vigorously though not very effectively replied to by the rebel artillery for a short space of time. At dark, however these pieces were withdrawn about 500 yards to the rear, owing to the fact that no infantry support came up with the pieces. In the morning of the 20th, the batteries above mentioned were all drawn forward to the ground occupied the evening before by the howitzer, and gradually intrenched by earth thrown up in front. Battery D. First Illinois Light Artillery, was, on the 20th, placed in battery within intrenchments near the white house, and performed during the

siege valuable and important services at different places and station in that vicinity.

The siege having been successfully terminated, I cannot but refer with pleasure and gratification to the willingness, endurance, and zeal with which all my subordinates submitted to all the hardships incident thereunto. Throughout from the captains down to the bugler, the same hearty-co-operation met me, and were in not for a few lamented dead, I should remember with pleasure for the balance of my natural life the devotion to the national cause so unmistakably exhibited by my men. The untimely death of the truly brave Captain Henry A. Rogers mars the pleasantries of my recollections of the siege, and his late command will long mourn his loss. The expenditure of ammunition at the siege has been as follows:

	Rounds.
Battery D, first Illinois Light Artillery.....	5,200
Battery L, Second Illinois Light Artillery.....	2,368
Battery, Third Ohio	3,521
Battery, eighth Michigan	2,409
Total expended	13,498

Respectfully submitted.

C. J. STOLBRAND,
Major, and Chief of Artillery.

OFFICE CHIEF OF ARTILLERY,
New Orleans, August 17, 1863.

Captain Shunk, Chief of Ordnance:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to forward you a list of the light batteries of the Thirteenth Army Corps that have already arrived at Carrollton, with the number of rounds of ammunition on hand with each piece.

In regard to the English rifle, caliber 3.50, there are, I believe, but eight in the country, and all the ammunition that there is for them is at Saint Louis Arsenal. There who have used the James rifle campaign very much of the James projectile, but have found no trouble with the Hotchkiss, and very much prefer the latter.

As soon as the remaining batteries of the corps arrive, I will furnish you with a list of guns and the amount of ammunition.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
RICHARD ARNOLD,
Brigadier-General, Chief of Artillery.

[Inclosure.]

Light batteries in the Thirteenth Army Corps, now at Carrollton, with the number of rounds of ammunition on hand with each.

HERRON'S DIVISION.

Battery F, First Missouri Artillery; Fourth English rifles (iron), caliber 3.50; two James rifles (bronze), caliber 3.80; 320 rounds to each of the English rifles; 120 rounds to each of the James rifles.

Battery E, First Missouri Artillery: Four 10-pounder Parrotts; two English rifles (iron), caliber 3.50 ; 303 rounds to each Parrott; 200 rounds to each english rifle. Battery B, First Missouri Artillery: Four 12-pounder howitzers; two 12-pounder guns; 70 rounds to each howitzer; 128 rounds to each 12-pounder gun.

WASHBURN'S DIVISION.

Seventh Michigan Battery: Six 3-inch ordnance guns; 144 rounds to each gun.

LEE'S DIVISION.

Battery A, First Missouri Artillery: Three 12-pounder howitzers; one 12-pounder Napoleon; two 6-pounder guns; 67 rounds for each howitzer; 103 rounds for the Napoleon gun; 191 rounds for each 6-pounder gun.

Second Illinois Battery: Three 6-pounder guns; one 12-pounder howitzer; 200 rounds to each 6-pounder gun; 128 rounds to the 12-pounder howitzer.

Second Ohio Battery: Four James rifles, caliber 3.50; two 12-pounder howitzers (bronze); 187 rounds to each rifle; 132 rounds to each howitzer.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,
New Orleans, August 19, 1863.

Brigadier General RICHARD ARNOLD,
Chief of Artillery:

SIR: I have the honor to communicate, by direction of the major-general commanding, the following orders for your guidance:

Brigadier General Richard Arnold, chief of artillery, Colonel S. B. Holabird, chief quartermaster, and Major D. C. Houston, chief engineer, are hereby appointed a board to consider and arrange transportation for an immediate movement of the troops. The board will upon its duties at once, and will meet at such time and place as the senior member may indicate.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
RICH'D B. IRWIN, Assistant Adjutant-General.

**OFFICE CHIEF OF ARTILLERY, DEPT. OF THE GULF,
New Orleans, September 2, 1863.**

Captain SHUNK, Chief of Ordnance:

The following-named batteries of the Thirteenth Army Corps are designated to take the field:

Captain Welfley's battery.-Six 12-pounders-four guns, old pattern, and two howitzers.

First Indiana Battery.-Six 12-pounders-four Napoleon and two howitzers.

First Missouri Battery.-One Napoleon 12-pounder, two howitzers, 12-pounders, and three 6-pounder smooth-bores.

Mercantile Battery.-Four rebel imitation Parrotts, caliber 2.90, and two Rodman rifles, caliber 3.

Captain Foust, Company F, First Missouri.-Four English rifles, caliber 3.50, two 10-pounder Parrotts, caliber 2.90.

Foster's First Wisconsin Battery.-Four 30-pounder Parrotts.

If possible, I wish Company F, First Missouri, to turn in the two Parrotts, and take in their place two 12-pounder howitzers.

I have requested that the ordnance officer of the corps be directed to report to you, and state how much ammunition he will require from you to make up 200 rounds per gun, with the almost packed in the ammunition chests.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
RICHARD ARNOLD,
Brigadier-General, Chief of Artillery.

OFFICE CHIEF OF ARTILLERY,
New Orleans, September 8, 1863.

[The following is a] list of batteries of artillery of the Nineteenth Army Corps, to accompany the expedition now organizing in this city:

Reserve Brigade.-Company A, First Artillery, two Napoleon and two 3-inch rifles.

First Division.-Company L, First Artillery, four Napoleons and two 10-pounder Parrotts; Sixth Massachusetts, four Napoleons; First Maine, four Napoleons.

Third Division.-Company F, First Artillery, four Napoleons; Fourth Massachusetts, four Napoleons and two 3-inch rifles; First Vermont, six 3-inch rifles.

Reserve Artillery.-First Indiana Artillery, four 30-pounder and four 20-pounder Parrotts; Eighteenth New York Battery, four 20-pounder Parrotts; Second Massachusetts (Horse Artillery), six 6-pounder rifles.

Recapitulation.-Twenty two Napoleon guns, four 3-inch rifles, six 6-pounder rifles, two 10-pounder Parrotts, eight 20-pounder Parrotts, four 30-pounder Parrotts.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
RICHARD ARNOLD,
Brigadier-General, Chief of Artillery.

**Report o Lieutenant William Marland, Second Massachusetts
Battery, of engagement at Bayou Bourbeau.**

CARRION CROW BAYOU, LA., November 4, 1863.

GENERAL: In pursuance to your orders, I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken in the action at this place on the 3rd of November by the section under my command:

In obedience to orders received on the evening of the 2nd of November, I harnessed up at 4 a. m. on the 3d; remained so until 11 a. m., when I was ordered to unharness; the pickets firing all the while. At about 12.45 p. m. the firing became general. Hearing the cavalry buglers blow "Boots and saddles," I began to harness up on my own responsibility, and was attacked in camp before I could get harnessed. The enemy being within 400 yards of me, I opened on them with canister and percussion shell, which checked their advance and drove them to the right. I limbered to the front, and advanced to the fork of the road, which is about 100 yards; went into battery, and fired a few shot until all my support had left me. Finding it too warm, I limbered to the rear, and moved about 300 yards. Finding the enemy in my rear and on the right, I fired to the right about fifty shots, and was charged upon on three sides. A regiment came up on my left as support, fired one volley, and left.

The enemy then opened two pieces of artillery on me at about 300 yards, killing 1 horse and disabling one caisson wheel . The cavalry still advancing, and no infantry to be seen, when they got within 30 yards I limbered up and started for the woods; here I ordered my cannoneers to draw their revolvers, and had quite a brisk fight; had another horse killed, 2 men missing (1 sergeant and 1 private); went through the woods, the enemy coming out in front and rear of men. As the bridges constructed across the bayou for the passage of our troops were held by the enemy, it was necessary to charge through, which was accomplished, notwithstanding a cavalryman had mired and was taken prisoner near where the section crossed. I got through the enemy's lines without loss, and came up to the Fort- sixth Indiana Regiment, and formed on their right. Colonel Bringham told me he would support me, and I went back through the woods with General Cameron's command, driving the enemy in disorder, who left their dead and wounded on the field. I then returned to camp with General Cameron's brigade.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

WM. MARLAND,

First Lieutenant, Commanding Section.

Brigadier General RICHARD ARNOLD,

Chief of Artillery, Department of the Gulf.

Reports of Captain Frederick E. Prime and Cyrus B. Comstock, . S.

Corps of Engineers, Chief Engineers Army of the Tennessee. * NEW YORK CITY,

November 29,1863.

SIEGE MATERIAL AND WORKS.

The larger part of fascines, gabions, and sap-rollers was prepared by the pioneer companies of the different DIVISION. Material for the wadding of gabions was abundant, grape-vines being chiefly used, though these made gabions that were inconveniently heavy, from the fact that vines of too large size were taken. Captain Freeman, aide-de-camp, experiment with cane as material for wadding, and found by crushing the joints with a mallet the rest of the cane was split sufficiently to allow it to be woven between the stakes of the gabion and yet be strong, making sap-rollers which should be impervious to Minie balls and not too heavy for use on the rough ground over which the saps ran. The difficulty was obviated by Lieutenant Hains, engineers, who caused two barrels to be placed head to head and secured, and the sap-roller to be built up of cane fascines around this hollow core. The aggregate length of our trenches was 12 miles; eighty-nine batteries were constructed during the siege, the guns from those in rear being moved forward as the siege advanced, there being two hundred and twenty guns in position on June 30, according to the reports to the chief of artillery. These guns were mainly siege or field guns, a few heavy ones, however, being obtained from the Navy, one battery of these guns, on the right, in front of Wood's brigade, being manned and officered by the Navy. These batteries were sometimes constructed under the supervision of the pioneers of the DIVISION to which the battery belonged, and sometimes by the officer who was to command the finished work. The style of work was very varied, both reveting and platforms depending on the materials which could be obtained at the time. In some cases they were well and neatly reveted with gabions and fascines, and furnished with substantial plank platforms, while in others reveting of rough boards, rails, or cotton bales was used, and the platforms were made of boards, rails, or cotton bales was used, and the platforms were made of boards and timber from the nearest barn or cotton-gin house. From the feebleness of the enemy's artillery fire, our parapets often were not more than 6 or 8 feet thick. In all close batteries the gunners soon found the necessity of keeping the embrasures closed against rifle balls by plank shutters, sometimes swung from a timber across the top of the embrasure; sometimes nearly placed in the embrasure closed against rifle-balls by plank shutters, sometimes swung from a timber across the top of the embrasure; sometimes merely placed in the embrasure, and moved when firing. Whenever an approach gave opportunity for fire, loop-holes were either formed in the parapet, made by using sand-bags, or in a timber laid along the parapet. These timbers were rarely displaced by the enemy's fire; they would have been dangerous if that artillery fire had been heavy. In close approaches the sap was reveted with gabions, empty barrels, or with cotton bales, or sometimes

left unrevetted, it being difficult to prevent the working parties from sinking the sap to the depth of 5 or even 6 feet when the enemy's fire was heavy, and revetting then was unnecessary. Indeed, when the enemy's grenades were most annoying, it was impossible to keep detailed working parties at their posts, and it was necessary to depend on the pioneers already referred to for this dangerous work. The compactness of the alluvial soil making lining for mining galleris unnecessary, these galleris were formed with ease; as mines could not make an easier way into the enemy's line than existed already, their only use was to demoralize the enemy by their explosion at the moment of an assault. There were completed and several others begun during the siege. More importance was attached to them by officers and men that they deserved. The labor in the trenches was done by men of the pioneer companies of DIVISION, by details from the line, or by negroes. Several of the pioneer companies had negroes attached to them, who had come into our camps. These negroes were paid \$ 10 per month, in accordance with law, and proved to be very efficient labors when under good supervision. The labor performed by details from the line, as is usual in such cases, was very light in comparison with that done by the same number of pioneers or negroes. Without the stimulus of danger or pecuniary reward, troops of the line will not work efficiently, especially at night, after the novelty of the labor has worn off. The amount of night work done by a given detail depends very much on the discipline of the command from which it is taken and on the energy of its officers. Under average circumstances, such details do not in a given time accomplish half the work of which they are capable. The want of officers of engineers already been referred to, there being at no time more than there on engineer duty. Over a line so extended and ground so rough as that which surrounds Vicksburg, only peculiar characteristics, namely that many times, at different places, the work that should be done, and the way it should be done, depended on officers, or even on men, without either theoretical or practical knowledge of siege operations, and who had to rely upon their native good sense and ingenuity. In a battery was to be constructed by men who had never built one before, a sap-roller made by those who had never heard the name, or a ship's gun-carriage to be built, it was done, and, after a few trials, was well done. But, while stating the power of adaptation to circumstances and fertility of resources which our men possess in so high a degree, it must be recollected that these powers were shown at the expense of time, and while a relieving force was gathering in our rear. Officers and men had to learn to be engineers while the siege was going on. The assault, which was to have been made July 6 would probably have been successful, and in this case the siege would, have lasted from May 22, to July 6. That time was too long; we might have been as ready for an assault two or three weeks earlier, if there had been a sufficient supply of engineers

officers to watch that no time was lost or useless work done; to see that every shovelful of earth thrown brought us nearer to the end, and pensionably to push and constantly supervise the special works to which they were assigned. Fortunately, Johnston' relieving force was strengthened so slowly that the delay cost us only time, not the raising of the siege.

FREDERICK E. PRIME, Captain of Engineers.

APPENDIX F.

Reference has already been made to the feebleness of the enemy's artillery fire. The numbers below, from the report of Lieutenant J. H. Parker, ordnance Corps, will show that, while not having a large supply ammunition, they yet might have seriously annoyed our approaches, and still retained enough to meet an assault. The following artillery and material was captured at Vicksburg:

Field guns (smooth-bore).	50
Field guns (rifled).	31
Field howitzers.	22
Siege guns (smooth-bore).	46
Siege guns (rifled).	21
Siege howitzer.	1
Siege mortar.	1
Total.	172
Artillery projectiles.	38,000
Artillery powder (pounds).	58,000
Artillery cartridges.	4,800

Much of the field ammunition was fixed. Among the siege guns were FIFTEEN 10-inch columbiads, the 9 inch, twenty 32-pounders, six 24-pounders; while of rifled guns there were one 8-inch, two 7. ½ inch, two 32-pounder, and four 5-inch guns.

**SPECIAL ORDERS,} HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,
Numbers 123. } December 31,1863.**

6. Brigadier General Davis Tillson, chief of artillery, is hereby assigned to the command of the defenses of Knoxville, Loudon, Kingston, Tenn., and will supervise the erection of the fortifications at those places. His headquarters will be at Knoxville.

**By command of Major-General Foster:
HENRY CURTIS, Jr.,
Assistant Adjutant-General.**

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